Going Lakewalker

A girl sits with a bone knife around her neck, surrounded by glowing points of light which move from her head to the hand of a man crouching down and looking at her

I’ve not read everything that sci-fi/fantasy author Lois McMaster Bujold has written, but from what I have read, she sure loves to set a fantasy world in a key site of the emergence of the modern racial structures whilst trying to imagine what it might have been like if they’d been good, actually. Her Chalion/World of the Five Gods novels are set in a fantasy version of Reconquista Spain, where the conflict between Catholics and Muslims has become a conflict between those who worship a fivefold God (Father, Son, Mother, Daughter, Bastard) and the Ragnari, an invading and enslaving people who insist on divine fourness, refusing to recognise the divinity of the fifth person of the Quintarian divinity. While the Ragnari exist as a vague threat in the background of some of the Chalion stories, the real threat is the conflict within and between the Quintarians, who must learn to trust in providence, find the good in demons, and accept their mortality.

Bujold’s Sharing Knife novels have, as far as I can tell, come in for a fair amount of online criticism due to the problematic age gap between the novels’ protagonists, 18 year old farmer-girl Fawn and 55 year old Lakewalker Dag. The world of the Sharing Knife books is more or less the American frontier of the 19th century North America, with the farmers  — gradually spreading out into the new-to-them-world  — standing in for European settlers and the Lakewalkers — ancient nomadic inhabitants of the land in possession of magical powers — for Native Americans. Here the age gap, as well as being a romance genre trope, stands in for the different relationships of the two peoples to the land. Despite their great differences in age, Fawn and Dag are meant for one another: she, while lacking his magical powers, and threatening to dilute the purity of his bloodline, brings a youthful energy and a home-making capacity which Dag, old and tired, and a little weary of his life of tents and travelling, very badly needs. The two must overcome not only others’ qualms about their gap, but also the longstanding hostility between farmers and Lakewalkers. Their union becomes, both symbolically and in real terms, the beginning of a reconciliation between the two peoples, as they unite to face their common enemy: the malices or blight bogles which are found scattered around the land.

The malices are a pure evil of unknown origin, lacking any ‘ground’ of their own and so parasitic of the ‘ground’ of others, Ground here is something like life force, form, or being. The malices begin as shapeless entities which, as they suck the life from the world around them, gradually begin to take form and intelligence from the beings whose life they consume, beginning with small animals and usually working their way up to roughly humanoid forms. Eventually they begin to capture real human beings, here always farmers rather than Lakewalkers, ‘enslaving’ them so that they lumber around, lacking much in the way of intelligence but able nonetheless to do a lot of damage. If the malice is destroyed in time, it’s possible to free these hapless and subjugated souls, but the malice ‘can’t make life at all, really. Only death.’ The malices, that is to say, are a figure for blackness: located, like maroon communities, in the swamps and at the frontiers of North America during colonisation; threatening always to undermine the coherence of the social order, to suck the life from both indigenous people and settlers, who must therefore band together to defeat them; neither human nor non-human animal but something even more uncanny; figures of as Jared Sexton has it, ‘the affectable, the derelict, the monstrous … the unimaginable loss of that all too imaginable loss itself (nothing for no one)’; not the magical and intuitive Lakewalker connection to the land but ‘the slave’s inhabitation of the earth’ which ‘precedes and exceeds any prior relation to land … no ground for identity, no ground to stand on … the landless inhabitation of selfless existence.’

There is only one way to kill a malice, and that is to strike into it a knife which has been infused with the power of a Lakewalker’s death. As a Lakewalker is dying, either they or someone else must take a bone knife (cut from the thigh bone of a dead Lakewalker) and plunge it into their chest before they breathe their last. They must share their death with the knife, that is, in order to share their death with the malice. A malice, for all that it lacks being and substance, is nonetheless unable to die because it does not know how to do so, and must be taught. Only the Lakewalkers can do this, because of their mystical connection to being. Where the farmers’ existence is justified simply by the fact of their existence, by their wholesome and comfortable way of life, which seeks nothing more than to carry on making babies and planting crops, the Lakewalkers’ existence, dangerous and lacking in creature comforts, must adapt itself to the ever-changing threat of the malice’s. Here the Sharing Knife novels repeat what Shari M Huhndorf describes as the ‘primary cultural work’ of narratives of ‘going Native: ‘the regeneration of racial whiteness’; ensuring that ‘European Americans’, as figured by Fawn, ‘are the proper heirs of “Indianness” as well as of the land and resources of the conquered natives’: here conquered not (as in reality) by the brutality of mass slaughter, broken promises, and the violent separation of children from their parents, but by that most deadly of Christian fantasies: by love.

Ruled by Wolves

Botticell, 'The Story of Lucretia'

Su Fang Ng makes (I think) a pretty compelling case that that Hobbes ‘rejects the story of Lucretia’s rape as the foundational myth of Rome in favour of the wolf suckling Remus and Romulus, which represents a more monarchical aetiological myth of state formation.’ According to the story, Lucretia, a Roman noblewoman, is raped by a king’s son named Tarquin (a name I had come across before as the kind of thing a stereotypically posh British person might name their child, which it turns out is extremely fucked up thing to do) and kills herself. This suicide prompts a rebellion amongst the Roman aristocracy, following which Rome ceases to be a kingdom and becomes instead a republic. It makes sense that Hobbes, obsessed with making sure that there’s ultimately one person with the power to decide, and much more worried about the threat of political dissolution than he is about abuse of sovereign power, would be less interested in this kind of origin story than he is in the one where two brothers, more or less identical, fight to the death to decide which one gets to be the decided. But reading Ng made me wonder whether a similar argument could be made about Augustine.

According to The City of God, the story of Romulus and Remus encapsulates the truth of the earthly city: a society in which everyone loves themselves above everything else, and which conflict emerges out of pride, selfishness, and the desire for mastery. Augustine contrasts the story of the warring Roman twins with the biblical story of Cain and Abel, which for Augustine exemplifies not the war of all against all which characterises the earthly city but the conflict between the heavenly city — Abel, a pilgrim — and the earthly city — Cain, who exemplifies ‘the devilish envy that the wicked entertain towards the good for no other reason than that they are good, whereas they themselves are evil.'(15.6).

Lucretia does appear in The City of God, not as an avatar of republican revolution but as a thought experiment on the ethics of sexual violence and of self-murder (Augustine rejects the suggestion that women should be held morally responsible for their violation by others, but also, because he can’t just be kind for once in his life, does insist that to kill oneself in the wake of violation is to add ‘to the crime of others a crime of [one’s] own’ (1.19)); and then briefly in a later discussion of how the Roman kings met their ends which seems to me (on an admittedly superficial reading) intended to demonstrate that the fortunes of Roman leaders should not be straightforwardly understood as indicative of divine judgment: in service, that is, of Augustine’s broader insistence that the declining fortunes of the Western Empire can not be laid at the feet of Christianity’s rising influence.

All of which is to wonder whether, on the one hand, Augustine’s favouring of Romulus and Remus can, as for Hobbes be seen as a rejection of a republican model of imperial (and perhaps also divine) power; and also (in light of Anthony Kaldellis’ argument that Byzantium, the Eastern Roman Empire, can best be understood as continuing the Roman Republican tradition) whether we might see the division between Western and Eastern Roman empires as in part a division between these two different models of imperial power.

The God Question and the Problem of Evil syllabus

BERJAYA

This year I designed and taught a number of new modules in my new job and I’ll be posting my syllabi for them over the summer while I finally get time to catch my breath and think about how to rework the modules from this year that I’ll be teaching next year, alongside planning a new undergraduate ecclesiology module and a new MA level module on mystical theology in the Abrahamic traditions that I’m really excited about, and which will be the first of the modules I’ll teach at DCU I’ve actually designed myself. This module was designed for our part time, evening BA in Theology and Religious Studies, and was taught over five weeks in 3-4 hour session. It was surprisingly fun for a module about such unrelentingly grim things. Thanks are due to various people who helped me pull this together all at quite short notice, but especially to Jake Erickson and to Anthony Paul Smith.

Week 1: What is the Problem of Evil?
This week we’ll spend some time introducing the module, beginning to think about the God question and the problem of evil. Then we’ll take a look at some of the classical Christian texts about the nature of God and evil, focusing on the excerpts from Irenaeus, Augustine and Dionysius which are this week’s required reading.

Required Reading:
 ‘Irenaeus’, ‘Augustine’ and ‘Dionysius’ extracts from Mark J. Larrimore (ed), The Problem of Evil: A Reader. Blackwell, 2001.

Recommended Reading:
 ‘Job’s Question’ in Navid Kermani, The Terror of God: Attar, Job and the Metaphysical Revolt. Polity, 2011.

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“I couldn’t encounter my loss face to face”

SST 2026 conference poster: an image of a mountain peak with a stained glass sunburst behind it

Last week I gave a keynote address at the Society for the Study of Theology annual conference, which was on the theme “Theology: A Discipline of Failure?” Below is the text of my paper.

“I couldn’t encounter my loss face to face”[1][2]

As I write this piece, US and Israeli bombs continue to fall on Iran. US secretary of defence Pete Hegseth, author of American Crusade, tattooed with Christian insignia including both a Jerusalem Cross and a Chi Rho, recently quoted the Bible at a Pentagon briefing.[3] A few weeks ago, Christian pastors gathered in the Oval Office to pray for Trump as he led the US into war.[4] Theologian James Orr was recently appointed head of policy for Reform UK.[5] Billionaire Peter Thiel — friend of Jeffrey Epstein, fan of Tolkien, and founder of Palantir — continues to tour his Girardian theology of the end times, according to which we are invited to view Greta Thunberg as the avatar of the antichrist.[6] Perhaps the problem contemporary theology faces as a discipline is not so much its failure as its success.

But we are here to talk about failure. I have argued elsewhere that if there is one thing that Christians can agree on, it is that theology has failed. I am conscious that not all SST members are Christians, and I so hope it is not too much of a colonizing move to suggest that we might broaden this still further: if there is one thing we can all agree on, it is that theology has failed. Things become tricky only when we try to pin down precisely what has gone wrong, and why. In this paper I will take as my starting point a 2024 paper by Esther McIntosh and Anupama Ranawana, which argues that SST specifically has failed in the face of the ongoing genocide in Palestine. I will suggest that failure is best understood neither as a falling away from an original goodness or as a disordering of theology’s inherent orientation towards a particular telos but as inherent and constitutive. The question we should be asking is not how to stop failing but, rather, how to relate to failure. Whether or not we are willing to acknowledge it, theology has always renewed itself through its liaisons with its others, and I will argue that the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan offers us resources for considering this question – how to relate to failure? If Palestine is now, as Steven Salaita argues, an “avatar of campus suppression”, it is because it also condenses so many of the urgent crises we face today.[7]

Continue reading ““I couldn’t encounter my loss face to face””

Was Hobbes gay?

An image of the frontispiece of Hobbes' Leviathan, but with a back view of a naked man instead of the figure of the sovereign

Thomas Hobbes’ biographer Arnold Rogow writes that, “Hobbes … may never have loved a woman, but no one has ever hinted that he was homosexual” (Radical in the Service of Reaction, 66). Even if that was true at the time Rogow was writing (1986), I’m sure it can’t possibly be true any more; but I spent some time digging around Hobbes scholarship over the summer (with the generous support of Edinburgh’s Institute for Advanced Studies) and came up empty-handed. Let me then be, perhaps, the first person to suggest it: I think it’s possible that Hobbes was gay. Here are some of my reasons:

Continue reading “Was Hobbes gay?”

New blogging venture

I have decided to start a new solo blog entitled That Blog You Like Is Going to Come Back in Style. My first post is an attempt to set an appropriate tone.

My reason for doing this is a sense that I need a change. It may be permanent or it may fizzle out. In either case, this site and its archives will remain available, and it will be open for new posts from any of my co-bloggers (i.e., Marika).

Existing email subscribers to this blog have been subscribed to the new one. I apologize for any inconvenience and annoyance. Feel free to unsubscribe without judgment or offense. But by the same token, I’d love to continue the conversation with any past blog fans.

I’m not sick, but I’m not well

BERJAYA

Yesterday, a friend I’d not seen in person in a while asked me how my back pain was doing. He asked because he follows me on Facebook, which I use as a personal diary, and I had mentioned back problems there frequently for the last several week. The odd thing about that is that I had one discrete episode of back pain, with a clear etiology related to an injury that I aggravated by exercising too soon, and I fully recovered from it weeks ago. He thought my back was still a problem because I was writing frequently about my fear that it might happen again and my extreme caution about exercising when I feel even the slightest crick in my neck.

I assured my friend that I was fine, but I was a little embarrassed to realize that I had been projecting these fears so frequently. Continue reading “I’m not sick, but I’m not well”

Alone and the Neoliberal Sublime

BERJAYA

No matter how well-matched a couple is, every relationship brings with it some kind of compromise. In our household, one such compromise has resulted in me being a near scholar of the survival reality show Alone. I’ve hated camping for as long as I can remember and, in general, share Socrates’s preference for the city over the countryside. My Esteemed Partner is not the opposite by any means, but she would probably like to do more outdoor activities than we actually wind up doing. When we discovered Alone during the pandemic, that created an important release valve. She gets to indulge her fantasies of roughing it in the wilderness, while I get to apply my “always-on” analytical mind to a show that is in fact almost a parody of neoliberal individualism.

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ChatGPT is going to kill God

BERJAYA

I hate generative AI. I hate how it’s destroying writing pedagogy and giving students even more excuses not to read (because they can just read a “summary”). I hate how whiny and defensive AI users are about the pathetic little ways they’ve integrated it into their lives. If I could push a button and permanently delete it from existence, I would. If I could go back in time and prevent it from being invented, I would.

The reason I hate it is not just that its output is mediocre bullshit. It’s that it is an active attack on everything I value — literacy, analysis, thought. Continue reading “ChatGPT is going to kill God”

Agamben Between Pauline Messianism and Institutional Christianity

BERJAYA

[This paper was presented at the European Academy of Religion conference in Vienna on July 11, 2025, in a session entitled “Agamben’s Theological-Political Horizons: Reimaging Judaism, Christianity, and Messianic Potentiality,” organized by Libera Pisano, Federico Dal Bo, and Carlo Salzani. The topic of my paper drifted a bit from my original proposal, which was going to be an overview of Agamben’s approach to Christianity guided by the question of whether he embraced a “fall narrative.” (Spoiler alert: no.) Hence the title doesn’t quite fit what I presented, but here we are.]

Surely one of the strangest moments in Agamben’s career is that captured in the short book The Church and the Kingdom. Here, in contrast to the academic audience presupposed by virtually all of his other works, Agamben is addressing the bishop of Paris and other clerics, in person, in Notre Dame Cathedral in 2009. In this august and presumably somewhat intimidating setting, he lays out a thorough-going critique of the Church’s betrayal of its Pauline legacy. The Church, he claims, has lost sight of the unique experience of time implied by Paul’s concept of messianism and has thereby ceased to be a community of sojourners in this world and instead become but one worldly institution among others.

For most readers of Agamben’s work up to this point, especially The Time That Remains, this diagnosis is predictable. Those who had moved on to The Kingdom and the Glory would find some of the claims he makes about the result of the Church’s loss of its messianic calling similarly familiar—though with the twist that here he proclaims a “theological genealogy” for the structure of law and exception rather than that of economy:

The crises—the states of permanent exception and emergency—that the governments of the world continually proclaim are in reality a secularized parody of the Church’s incessant deferral of the Last Judgment. With the eclipse of the messianic experience of the culmination of the law and of time comes an unprecedented hypertrophy of law—one that, under the guise of legislating everything, betrays its legitimacy through legalistic excess. I say the following with words carefully weighed: nowhere on earth is a legitimate power to be found; even the powerful are convinced of their own illegitimacy. (CK 40)

Perhaps surprisingly, though, this bleak yet strangely envigorating declaration is paired with an invocation of the possibility that the Church could nonetheless come to play a redemptive role in the world. Though the expected answer to his closing rhetorical question—“Will the Church finally grasp the historical occasion and recover its messianic vocation?” (CK 41)—is surely no, the very fact that he asks implies that the Church might regain the Pauline experience of time and thus presumably serve as a positive model for other institutions.

Continue reading “Agamben Between Pauline Messianism and Institutional Christianity”