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Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

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Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی
BERJAYA
Emblem of the IRGC
ActiveMay 5, 1979 – present
CountryBERJAYA Iran
AllegianceSupreme Leader of Iran
BranchGround Forces, Aerospace Force, Navy, Quds Force, Basij
TypeMultidisciplinary military force
RoleProtecting the Islamic Republic system; Internal security; Ballistic missile program
Size~190,000 active personnel
~350,000–600,000 Basij volunteers
Garrison/HQTehran, Iran
Nickname(s)Sepah or Pasdaran
Motto(s)(Arabic: وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ)
"And prepare against them whatever force you can"
EngagementsIran–Iraq War
Syrian Civil War
2026 Iran war
BERJAYA
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps logo

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), commonly called the Pasdaran, (Guards), is an Iranian military force founded after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.[1] It was originally founded to preserve the principles of the revolution and protect the supreme leader. [2] However, the IRGC also acts as an external security force and promotes Iran's interests abroad. [3] It is split into five main branches.

The IRGC was founded on May 5, 1979, by the first Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini. [1] In the period following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, different political and ethnic groups competed with Khomeini for power. Because of this competition, Khomeini created the IRGC as a domestic security force to protect the principles of the Islamic Revolution and suppress non-Islamist opposition.[2]

The role of the IRGC transformed during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Although the regular military (the Artesh) created by the previous regime still existed, Khomeini was suspicious of its loyalty to the newly founded Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). [2] As a result, many members of the Artesh either abandoned their roles or were removed by the IRI.[4] This weakened the Artesh and led to its poor performance at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War. Therefore, the IRGC was expanded to include an army, air force, navy, engineering branch, foreign operations branch (Quds Force), and a volunteer corps (the Basij).[4]

After the end of the war, the IRGC’s role continued to expand economically, politically, and militarily. Economically, the IRGC's engineering branch helped rebuild the country’s infrastructure, housing, and oil sector.[1] Politically, the IRGC began to align itself with the principalist faction of Iranian politics, with former IRGC members appointed to key political positions.[5] They have also grown militarily through their missile program and their partnership with regional militias such as Hezbollah and Hamas.[6]

2026 Iran War

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The IRGC played a role in applying Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz during the 2026 Iran War.[7][8]

During the war, many Iranian high-ranking civil servant and political leaders were killed by American and Israeli air strikes, such as Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. This led to a power vacuum, meaning the IRGC was able to take over important positions by selecting new officeholders with ties to the IRGC. For example, the replacement for Ali Khamenei, his son Mojtaba Khamenei, was very involved with the IRGC. Iranian leadership in other words became more militarized.[9] Some analysts have even claimed that political power in Iran is now fully in the hands of the IRGC, and have started describing the country's leadership as a military dictatorship or a junta.[10]

Ideology

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The IRGC is aligned with the Shia Islamist ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It promises to protect the system of velayat-e faqih, which believes that a Shia cleric should govern until the hidden Imam returns. [2] It also promises to protect and uphold Islamic principles. In foreign policy, the IRGC promotes the spreading of the Islamic Revolution, anti-Westernism, and anti-imperialism. [5]

Organization

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The IRGC consists of five divisions. Just like the regular Iranian military, it has a land army, an air force, and a navy. These divisions exist side-by-side and in parallel. Generally, the IRGC receives the most modern equipment, compared with the regular military.[1]

The IRGC also houses a Cyber Electronic Command, which can be linked to different hacking groups that have attacked Western organizations [16]

Influence and activities

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Politics

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Khomeini opposed the IRGC's involvement in Iranian politics and called for the military to stay out of the affairs of political parties.[17] During this time, there was political unity amongst the supporters of Khomeini. However, under the rule of Ayatollah Khamenei, his Islamist supporters began to divide between principalists and reformists.[5] The principalists wanted to continue strict Islamic rule, social conservatism, and an aggressive foreign policy, whilst reformists called for greater social and political freedoms.[4] The IRGC chose to align itself with the principalist group and encouraged its grassroots organisations, such as the Basij, to vote for principalist candidates in the presidential elections.[5] Under principalist President Ahmadinejad (2004-2014), former senior IRGC members also held important political positions, including minister of defence, intelligence, interior, and oil.[5] This has ended the IRGC's non-involvement in Iranian politics.

Foreign Policy

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Since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the foreign policy of the IRGC has been carried out by the Quds Force unit.[1] This foreign policy is framed as a political Shi’ism and ‘exporting the Islamic revolution’. However, some authors argue that this Islamic ideology hides plain power politics.[18] Under the leadership of Qasem Soleimani, the Quds Force has supported groups in the Middle East such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen's Houthis, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.[3] They support these groups by providing training, money, weapons, and logistical support. [2] This helps Iran grow its military power and influence in the Middle East. The Quds Force has also carried out operations across Iraq and Syria.[2]

Economic

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The IRGC operates a large network of businesses inside Iran in many different sectors, especially construction. Academics also believe the IRGC may be highly involved in the Iranian black market.[19]

Influence on Media

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For propaganda purposes, the IRGC operates a large number of websites with news meant for an Iranian audience. It also actively encourages other news outlets to cover and write about the IRGC. One of its most important other official media outlets is its magazine, Sobh-e Sadegh. The IRGC's Basij volunteer organization plays a major role within its propaganda, media and influence activities.[20]

Controversies

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A number of countries and organizations have officially named the IRGC a terrorist organization. This includes the European Union[21], the United States of America[22], and Canada [23]. These decisions were based on the violence it perpetrated against its own citizens[21], as well as its suspected involvement in and support of terrorist attacks[22][23].

References

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  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Luce, M. (2020). Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In Zartman, J. (Ed.). Conflict in the Modern Middle East: An Encyclopaedia of Civil War, Revolutions, and Regime Change. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, pp. 141-143.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Keshavarz, A. (2023, ch.3). The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps: Defining Iran's Military Doctrine. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
  3. 1 2 "The Axis of Resistance". Middle East Institute. Retrieved 2026-05-28.
  4. 1 2 3 Safshekan, R. and Sabet, F. (2010). The Ayatollah's Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis. Middle East Journal, 64(4), pp. 543-558. Available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40926499
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 Sabet, F. and Safshekan, R. (2019). The revolutionary guard in Iranian domestic and foreign power politics. In Akbarzadeh, S. (Ed.). Routledge Handbook of International Relations in the Middle East. London: Routledge, pp.96-109.
  6. "The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) | Council on Foreign Relations". www.cfr.org. 2026-01-30. Retrieved 2026-05-26.
  7. "Security Update Brief Persian Golf (Timeframe 231200ZAPR – 301200ZAPR)" (PDF). German Navy Shipping Centre.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  8. Loft, P (2026-04-24). "Israel/US-Iran conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz" (PDF). House of Commons Library. p. 7.
  9. Izadi, R (2026-04-01). "The War with Iran Made the IRGC Stronger". Journal of Democracy.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  10. Csicsmann, L; et al. (2026-03-24). Aronson, L. Z. (ed.). "The Global and Regional Impacts of the Iranian Conflict" (PDF). Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  11. "The IRGC Aerospace Force". Iranwire. 2019-04-09. Archived from the original on 2025-11-16.
  12. "Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force". Iranwatch. 2020-08-24. Archived from the original on 2025-03-24.
  13. Boussel, Pierre (2025-05-04). "The IRGC Navy's long-term strategy of asymmetrical warfare". Fondation pour la recherche stratégique. Archived from the original on 2026-02-28.
  14. "What we know about the volunteer militia cracking down on Iranian protests". ABC News. 2022-10-13 [2026-05-17]. Archived from the original on 2026-04-15.
  15. Demirel, H (2016-08-26). "Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC): More Than A Branch Of Armed Forces". Center for Open Science. doi:10.31235/osf.io/nk9e3.
  16. "Iranian-Affiliated Cyber Actors Exploit Programmable Logic Controllers Across US Critical Infrastructure". April 7, 2026.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  17. Najdi, Y. and Karim, M. A. B. A. (2012). The Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Future of Democracy in Iran: Will Oil Income Influence the Process? Democracy and Security, 8(1), pp. 72-89.
  18. Monshipouri, M. (2021). Iran’s Foreign Policy and Islamic Ideology. In Juneau, T., and Razavi, S. (Eds). Iranian Foreign Policy Since 2001: Alone in the World. London: Routledge, pp. 56-70.
  19. Wehrey, F; et al. (2009). "Economic Expansion: The IRGCʹs Business Conglomerate and Public Works". The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. RAND Corporation. pp. 55–76. JSTOR 10.7249/mg821osd.12.
  20. Wehrey, F; et al. (2009). "Militarizing Civil Society: The IRGCʹs Indoctrination, Training, and Media Activities". The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. RAND Corporation. pp. 35–54. JSTOR 10.7249/mg821osd.11.
  21. 1 2 Tabrizi, A. B. (2026-02-05). "The EU's IRGC terrorist designation marks a major shift on Iran". Chatham House.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  22. 1 2 "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Named a Terrorist Organization" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. 2019-04-09.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)
  23. 1 2 "Government of Canada lists the IRGC as a terrorist entity". Public Safety Canada. 2024-04-19.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: url-status (link)