The peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL, has roughly 7,500 personnel from nearly 50 countries, and has been in place since 1978.

Its presence has not prevented repeated outbreaks of conflict. Southern Lebanon has seen successive wars between Israel and Hezbollah.

In August last year, however, the UN Security Council, under US pressure, decided to end UNIFIL's mandate on December 31, 2026.

"Pulling the plug on UNIFIL without a robust international force in place would effectively abandon millions of Lebanese civilians to an uncertain and potentially disastrous fate," said Louis Charbonneau, HRW's UN director.

"The peacekeepers are a crucial deterrent against attacks on civilians and human rights abuses," he added.

HRW urged the UN to extend the peacekeeping force's mandate "until the security situation has improved sufficiently to consider further reducing the force".

UN chief Antonio Guterres has said that peacekeepers will be needed in Lebanon after the current mandate expires, a suggestion likely to face opposition from the United States and Israel.

In June, he proposed three options ranging from nearly 2,000 to more than 5,500 UN personnel to monitor the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, and support Lebanon's armed forces.

That same month, France and Italy said they wanted to launch a coalition for after UNIFIL to strengthen Lebanon's sovereignty and prevent its territory from being "a foothold for regional escalation".

The country became embroiled in the Middle East war after Hezbollah fired rockets at Israel on 2 March in response to joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran, prompting a widespread Israeli bombing campaign and ground invasion.

More than 4,300 people have been killed in Lebanon, though violence has decreased since a US-Iran deal and a Washington-sponsored framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel went into force.

In July, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called for UNIFIL to stay. And Lebanon's UN mission sent a letter, signed by 86 member states, to the UN Security Council calling for UNIFIL troops to remain with an expanded mandate.

Aoun said that if UNIFIL could not stay there should be "an alternative force" to "assist the Lebanese army in clearing the southern regions, removing unexploded ordnance, and keeping pace with the implementation" of the framework agreement.

HRW's Charbonneau said that "the Security Council should not leave Lebanese civilians unprotected".

"The council will share much of the blame if UNIFIL's departure creates a security vacuum that opens the door to further abuses".

The U.S. military is on track to pull all of its forces out of Iraq by the end of September, officials said Wednesday, marking the end of a presence that started with the 2003 invasion against Saddam Hussein.

Washington and Baghdad agreed in 2024 to wind down the much smaller U.S.-led operations against the Islamic State group.

U.S. troops pulled out of bases in most areas of Iraq last year but maintained a presence in the semi-autonomous northern Kurdish region. Bases there have regularly come under attack since the U.S. and Israel launched the war on Iran on 28 February.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi met with Adm. Brad Cooper, who leads the U.S. Central Command, on Wednesday. Al-Zaidi said in a statement afterward that he had affirmed 30 September as the “fixed and final date for ending the military mission of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in Iraq and completing the departure of its forces.”

A U.S. official confirmed that the U.S. expects to complete its pullout by 30 September, but declined to say how many troops remain in Iraq or where they would be redeployed.

“The United States, Iraq and coalition partners have achieved tremendous success in defeating ISIS and now the Iraqi security forces, including the Peshmerga and other Iraqi Kurdistan Region security forces, will lead the fight against terrorists in Iraq,” the official said.

Two Iraqi Kurdish officials said a drawdown of U.S. troops and military equipment from Erbil began about three weeks ago.

The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to comment publicly.

The U.S. presence in Iraq grew to more than 170,000 troops at the peak of counterinsurgency operations in 2007. In December 2011, the final combat troops departed. But in 2014, the rise of the Islamic State group and its capture of a wide swath across Iraq and Syria brought U.S. forces back at the Iraqi government's invitation.

After IS lost its hold on territory it once claimed, coalition military operations ended in 2021. The U.S. maintained about 2,500 troops in Iraq for training and to conduct counter-IS operations with Iraq’s military.

Iraq also wants to disarm non-state groups

Iraq's prime minister has also set a  30 September deadline for non-state armed groups in Iraq to give up their weapons, saying they will have no justification to carry arms once the foreign troops withdraw.

Some Iraqi militias have justified their existence by pointing to the U.S. military presence, which they describe as an occupation, although the current U.S. mission came at the invitation of the Iraqi government after IS militants rampaged across the country in 2014, seizing large swaths of territory.

It seems unlikely that the Iraqi government will meet its deadline for disarming non-state groups. Some of the country’s most powerful Iran-backed militias and have said they have no intention of giving up their weapons.

The Riyadh visit was the first announced by an Iraqi security official to Saudi Arabia since Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's trip to the Kingdom was cancelled after the strikes on 29 July.

Officials from the Hashed al-Shaabi, an armed Iraqi alliance also known as the Popular Mobilisation Forces and that includes pro-Iran groups, said the US-Saudi strikes killed 20 militants, including five Iranians.

Riyadh said its forces had intercepted drones targeting oil facilities, blaming Iran-backed groups in Iraq for the attacks.

"Iraq will remain a cherished neighbour; we share bonds of brotherhood, solidarity, and mutual support with its government and its brotherly people. The Kingdom will always stand by Iraq to support its security, stability, development, and prosperity, for the benefit of Iraq and its brotherly people," Khalid bin Salman wrote, in a post on X.

He added that he had met with the director of Iraq's Office of the Commander in Chief Abdul Amir Al-Shammari, saying the pair "reviewed Saudi-Iraqi relations in the military and defence sectors" and discussed developments in the Middle East.

"We also emphasised the importance of continued coordination and cooperation between our two countries to serve our mutual interests and ensure the region's security and stability," he wrote.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an alliance of Tehran-backed groups, had vowed to retaliate to the strikes, but last week announced they would postpone their response.

The first high-level meeting between Saudi Arabia and Iraq since the strikes took place last week was between their foreign ministers on the sidelines of a meeting in the Jordanian capital Amman.

The strikes came as Baghdad faces growing pressure from Washington to disarm pro-Iran armed groups, which have targeted US facilities hundreds of times during the Middle East war.

Zaidi, who came to power this year with Washington's blessing, vowed to ensure those groups would hand over their weapons, but has faced pushback from some powerful factions.

Washington and Tehran are Iraq's main allies, but their enmity has long turned the country into a proxy battleground and left successive governments struggling to maintain a delicate balance between the foes.

Support for dispossession depends on the ruling class's cultivation of segregation between in-and-out groups, fearmongering and propaganda, alongside rewards for aggression, including material gains such as land and other resources, elevated social status and impunity for aggression against the constructed out-group. This manipulation of fear and reward conditions societies to accept genocide as normal, even righteous, because they have been neurologically wired to steal.

The latest example of this dynamic came when Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir proposed surrounding Ketziot prison with a moat of Nile crocodiles (Crocodylus niloticus) to guard Palestinian prisoners.

Who knows, maybe the crocs will be enticed by a benefits package similar to that of newly arrived settlers. After all, both are being recruited to help secure the Zionist frontier.

An appeal to the reptilian brain

Nile crocodiles possess extremely powerful jaws, are opportunistic carnivores, can grow up to 6.1 meters (20 feet) in length, and weigh over 450 kilograms (1,000 pounds). They typically ambush prey near waterholes before executing a "death roll" to subdue large animals (including people). Due to the crocodiles’ inability to chew their food, the roll serves as the primary mechanical tool to break bones, tear flesh and rip the hapless victim into manageable, bite-sized pieces for swallowing.

Ben Gvir’s proposal, which mimics Donald Trump’s failed Alligator Alcatraz, is tragically far from satire. In fact, the National Security Ministry has budgeted around $7 million for the construction of the moats, which are underway. This includes long-term plans for the reptiles’ maintenance and care.

For now, however, the plan has been placed on hold; not out of concern for Palestinians who may be subjected to these barbarically punitive measures, including a death roll, but because of concerns for the animals’ welfare.

The crocodile proposal offers a revealing window into how systems of domination and dehumanisation condition societies, particularly those lower on the in-group hierarchy, to derive rewards from cruelty in service of ruling-class theft.

Similar to many Israeli policies since 7 October, it functions as political theatre designed to reward the most primitive impulses associated with the brain’s emotional/ limbic system and related pathways (what is colloquially called "the reptilian brain") of domination, fear, humiliation, revenge and schadenfreude (pleasure derived from another’s misery).

While Zionist ruling classes indulge in land and resource theft in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, Ben Gvir appeals to those for whom humiliating and abusing people perceived as inferior provides a psychological boost, reinforcing a sense of superiority.

Conscription of crocodiles also provides a political spectacle aimed at harvesting votes, a dopamine delivery system for an Israeli public conditioned to celebrate cruelty as virtue. Within this genocidal milieu, Ben Gvir reigns supreme, ascending the Israeli political hierarchy with the prime minister's office firmly in his sights.

As Richard H. Smith details in The Joy of Pain: Schadenfreude and the Dark Side of Human Nature, a recurring theme among perpetrators is that many were themselves mistreated in the past and sought opportunities for payback. In Israeli society, however, this extends across society, with people encouraged to embody a victim mentality reinforced by the conflation of Zionism and Judaism, drawing on the historical experiences of world Jewry, from the Holocaust to the decontextualisation of Palestinian resistance to Zionist oppression and colonisation.

Indeed, schadenfreude serves as a cheap reward for aggression in service of ruling-class theft of land and other resources, as reflected by the shameless and gleeful sadism demonstrated by Israeli soldiers, particularly since 7 October, for which imperial and domestic impunity promise a lack of accountability and therefore permission and even encouragement to engage in it.

Photos of bound and blinded Palestinian civilians alongside grinning Israeli soldiers have even been used as social currency, including on dating apps.

Dehumanisation and recovery

Frantz Fanon, the Martinican psychiatrist, author and revolutionary thinker, analysed how colonialism dehumanises both the oppressed and the oppressor, with the dehumanisation of the latter expressed through the humiliation and abuse inflicted upon the former.

Engagement in the destruction of Indigenous society epitomises the dehumanisation of the oppressor, which destroys the physical humanity of the oppressed while eroding its own humanity through the forsaking of what makes it human: the capacity for empathy across racial, gender and other constructed divides.

The crocodile episode reflects the extent to which Israeli Zionist society has forsaken its humanity in service of theft, and how its ruling class suppresses empathy while appealing to primitive “reptilian” neural processes of fear and reward to service its greed.

For nearly three years, the Zionist rampage has relentlessly destroyed any semblance of empathy toward the Palestinian people, replacing it with escalated dehumanisation, disgust at their culture, history and existence, and glee at their suffering. What remains is an endless descent into moral depravity and cruelty, where racism, colonial theft and capitalist individualism are celebrated as the very foundation of an identity, and escape from this construct is actively discouraged through threats of severe social and physical punishment.

This is precisely what systems of domination depend upon: convincing people that what has been conditioned is “natural” and therefore cannot be undone, or else. Yet what has been conditioned can be unlearned, and what has been wired for domination can be rewired toward empathy, solidarity and co-resistance by restructuring the social hierarchies that sustain domination.

This is the central argument of my forthcoming book with historian Ilan Pappé, Wired to Steal: Zionism and the Shaping of the Western Mind: an examination of the behavioural and neurological mechanisms through which systems of domination, including Zionism, condition people to participate in, and even derive reward from, the dispossession of others, while showing how that conditioning can be undone.

Yoav Litvin is a writer, photographer and doctor of psychology/neuroscience. Litvin’s new book - Wired to Steal: Zionism and the Shaping of the Western Mind (Interlink Books)- co-authored with renowned historian Ilan Pappé, will be released in November 2026.

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Mohammed Bakir Torki, also known as Soufiane, was remanded in custody after the Sidi M'hamed Court in the capital, Algiers, brought several criminal charges against him.

The accusations brought against the activist, which also include disseminating false information via social media, are related to his participation in a TikTok live broadcast in June this year. Authorities accused Bakir Torki of glorifying and praising terrorism, and undermining public security and public order.

Bakir Torki was arrested on Sunday at his workplace at the Directorate of State Property in Algiers, where he works as a security officer. He was then placed in police custody until Wednesday, before being brought before the Public Prosecutor in Sidi M’Hammed.

The judge thus ordered his placement in pretrial detention and the opening of a judicial investigation.

Bakir Torki is known for coming up with the phrase "Ytenehaw ga3," which translates to "May they all leave" in Algerian Arabic. It quickly became the slogan of the Algerian Hirak protest movement between 2019 and 2021.

The sentence was first heard after he interrupted a local correspondent of the television channel Sky News Arabia on 11 March 2019, after ex-president Abdelaziz Bouteflika announced he was giving up a fifth term. The clip went viral and marked a significant moment for the Algerian Hirak protest movement.

The slogan was used to call for the departure of Algeria's ruling political elite who benefited from Bouteflika’s rule from their posts, and to make way for change.

Bouteflika had been president for 20 years, and announced a fifth term in 2019, triggering mass protests and anger across the North African nation.

Following this, the military insisted on Bouteflika's immediate resignation, which took place on 2 April 2019. Bouteflika passed away from illness in September 2021 at the age of 84.

The protests became the most significant political movement in the country since the 1962 fight for independence, and saw the arrest of several political leaders closely associated with Bouteflika, and the ushering in of elections, which current President Abdelmadjid Tebboune won by 58%, following a 40% turnout.

The Hirak movement saw over 1,200 people arrested, including activists, journalists, and other prominent members of civil society.

Among them are Karim Tabbou, an opposition politician who was arrested in September 2019 and later sentenced to a year in prison on charges including "incitement to violence" and "harming national security".

Others include journalists Fodil Boumala, Khaled Drareni, and Ihsane El Kadi.

The latest activist to be punished for taking part in the Hirak protest is Mohamed Saïd Riahi, who was arrested in June, and was sentenced to 18 months in prison and a 200,000-dinar fine for a post on Facebook.

The Iraqi delegation is headed by Lt Gen Abdul Amir al-Shammari and includes Lt Gen Falah Shaghati, assistant director of the Intelligence Agency; Hamid al-Shatri, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service; Lt Gen Muhannad al-Asadi, commander of Air Defence; and Lt Gen Zaid Houshi, head of the Counter-Terrorism Service.

It is the first publicly announced visit by senior Iraqi security officials to Saudi Arabia since Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi received a renewed invitation to visit Riyadh.

An earlier visit was cancelled after US-Saudi strikes on Iraq on 29 July killed 20 people at facilities belonging to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), an umbrella organisation that includes Iran-aligned armed factions.

An Iraqi security official told The New Arab that the delegation was holding talks with Saudi officials over the drone attacks that Riyadh says originated from Iraqi territory and targeted sites and facilities inside the kingdom, as well as the fallout from the subsequent airstrikes inside Iraq, which killed and wounded PMF members.

The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Saudi officials had presented information and evidence they say showed that the attacks originated from Iraqi territory.

The evidence, the official added, appeared to indicate that the incidents "were not the first of their kind".

The Iraqi delegation, meanwhile, briefed Saudi officials on security and military measures taken by Baghdad to prevent further attacks from Iraqi territory and to pursue groups that might use Iraqi territory or airspace to launch attacks against neighbouring countries.

The talks will also address closer security and intelligence coordination between Baghdad and Riyadh, border controls and airspace monitoring, as well as the exchange of information on groups that possess or operate drones, the official said.

The two sides are also expected to discuss rapidly evolving regional security developments and their implications for Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the wider region.

Tensions after drone attacks and airstrikes

The delegation's visit follows an unprecedented security escalation between Baghdad and Riyadh.

The crisis began on 27 July, when the Saudi defence ministry announced that it had intercepted and destroyed several drones that it said had been launched from Iraqi territory and targeted oil facilities in the kingdom's Eastern Province and Riyadh region.

Tensions escalated further on 29 July when airstrikes targeted PMF positions inside Iraq, according to statements from Saudi and Iraqi authorities.

The Iraqi security official said the visit carried additional political significance because it could pave the way for a recalibration of security relations between Baghdad and Riyadh.

The talks will also cover preparations for Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi's expected visit to Saudi Arabia, including its security and military agenda, after an earlier trip was postponed following the latest escalation.

According to the official, the Iraqi delegation will seek to establish two parallel principles during the Riyadh talks.

The first is Baghdad's commitment to preventing Iraqi territory from being used to launch attacks against Saudi Arabia or other countries in the region. The second is Iraq's rejection of military strikes on its territory.

The meetings therefore represent "a test of the two countries' ability to contain the repercussions of the escalation and move from an exchange of accusations and strikes towards a higher level of direct security and intelligence coordination", the official said.

'Iraq does not want to be an arena for conflict'

Yasser Watout, a member of the Iraqi parliament's Security and Defence Committee, told The New Arab that the delegation's visit had come at an important and sensitive moment.

"We view it positively, as it opens the door to direct security dialogue to address the repercussions of the attacks that were said to have originated from Iraqi territory, as well as the strikes that targeted sites inside Iraq," Watout said.

He stressed that Iraq was committed to maintaining balanced relations with all neighbouring countries and would not allow its territory or airspace to be used as a launching point for attacks against another state.

"At the same time, protecting Iraqi sovereignty and preventing any recurrence of attacks on Iraqi territory are fundamental responsibilities of the state," he added.

Watout said the presence of senior officials from Iraq's intelligence services, air defence and counter-terrorism forces reflected the significance of the issues being discussed in Riyadh.

Those include intelligence sharing, airspace surveillance, border security, tracing the origins of drones and preventing armed groups from exploiting Iraqi territory to conduct cross-border attacks.

"The current phase requires moving beyond exchanging messages and accusations towards practical security coordination," Watout said.

Clear mechanisms should be established to deal with intelligence concerning potential threats or launches from Iraqi territory, he added, in a way that both protects Saudi security and preserves Iraqi sovereignty.

"Iraq does not want to become an arena for conflict or a platform for attacks against countries in the region, nor does it accept its territory becoming an arena for military retaliation by any party," Watout said.

"Direct security dialogue and coordination between the relevant institutions is therefore the best way to prevent these developments from recurring."

A date for Prime Minister Zaidi's visit to Riyadh has yet to be set, Iraqi government spokesman Haider al-Aboudi said on Monday.

Zaidi had been scheduled to travel to the Saudi capital on 30 July, but the visit was postponed amid the security developments and the latest regional escalation.

In a new statement issued on Wednesday, Artists4Ceasefire said there was "no ceasefire in Gaza", arguing that the announcement of a truce had not ended the devastating conditions faced by Palestinians in the enclave.

"Every day, Palestinians are continuing to experience horrific suffering," the group wrote. It said that more than 1,200 Palestinians in Gaza had been killed since the so-called ceasefire was announced in October last year, including 300 children in 300 days, while more than 4,000 people had been wounded.

 

 

 

 

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A post shared by @artists4ceasefire

The post also highlighted the fact that nearly 70% of Gaza’s territory remains under Israeli military control, despite the so-called peace plan put forward by US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, envisioning a full withdrawal of the Israeli army.

Artists4Ceasefire, which has repeatedly called for an end to Israel’s war on Gaza, linked the situation in the besieged Palestinian territory to intensifying violence in the occupied West Bank. It said Palestinians there were being "terrorised and murdered by settlers and Israeli soldiers every day", while being forcibly displaced from their homes and land.

The statement was signed by actors and musicians including Javier Bardem, Melissa Barrera, Hannah Einbinder, Ilana Glazer, Annie Lennox, Poppy Liu, Cynthia Nixon, Mark Ruffalo, Susan Sarandon and Morgan Spector.

"As artists, we have the privilege of reaching people through our work and our platforms," the signatories said. "With that privilege comes a responsibility to keep demanding an end to this horrific suffering."

They called for a permanent ceasefire, unrestricted delivery of critical humanitarian aid and an end to what they described as the decades-long denial of Palestinian human rights.

"The only path to a lasting peace is when both Palestinians and Israelis live in freedom, justice, and equity," the statement said.

The group also urged followers to share the message, donate, contact elected representatives and continue speaking out over Israel’s conduct in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

"We need everyone working together to assert our shared humanity towards an end to this decades-long oppression, and to demand our collective liberation,” it added. “None of us are free until all of us are free."

Several of the statement’s signatories have previously used public platforms to call for a ceasefire and highlight Palestinian suffering.

Mark Ruffalo, Ilana Glazer and Susan Sarandon were among hundreds of artists who signed a letter as early as October 2023 urging then-US President Joe Biden to press for an immediate de-escalation and ceasefire, the release of captives and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.

Ruffalo later wore an Artists4Ceasefire pin at the 2024 Oscars, alongside other prominent attendees, and shared the group’s call for an immediate and permanent ceasefire.

More recently, he used the Oscars stage to say "No to war, and free Palestine", while other awards-season interventions have seen him call for sanctions and a boycott of Israeli film institutions he said were implicated in abuses against Palestinians.

District Judge Richard Stearns in Boston ruled that the government had not sufficiently proven that Harvard breached a Civil Rights Act provision that bars discrimination along race, nationality and other lines.

President Donald Trump has launched a campaign against major American universities, accusing them of giving free rein on their campuses to pro-Palestinian movements in the face of the Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip.

In its complaint filed in March, the Department of Justice said Harvard "faculty and leadership turned a blind eye to antisemitism and discrimination against Jews and Israelis."

"Harvard let anti-Israeli demonstrators occupy its libraries. Harvard allowed an anti-Israeli encampment to persist for twenty days in violation of university policy," it said.

But Judge Stearns, who granted a Harvard request to dismiss the lawsuit, said the incidents raised by the Trump administration were "too isolated and episodic" to prove noncompliance with the Civil Rights Act.

The decision marks a blow to Trump's attacks against the oldest university in the United States.

His administration has separately moved to freeze billions of dollars of funding for Harvard for allegedly tolerating antisemitism and harboring liberal bias.

Last September, a federal judge ruled that move largely unlawful and ordered the funds be restored.

Hamad Mohammad Hamad Khalifa announced his resignation from the RSF in a statement televised by Saudi-owned Al Arabiya on Wednesday, citing "ongoing suffering" in areas controlled by the group.

"I, Hamad Mohammad Hamed Khalifa, announce my resignation as governor of the Kordofan region within the structures of the so-called Tasis government, which, regrettably, has become merely a political façade for the practices of the Rapid Support Forces," he said.

"Sudanese people today have no choice but to unite against all attempts to legitimise parallel forces or rogue militias that have squandered an entire generation's lifetime in the service of individual interests," he added.

Alongside being the governor of RSF-held Kordofan, which is split into North, South and West Kordofan, Khalifa was also a member of the presidential council for the RSF's rival government.

The RSF formed a rival government in April 2025, two years after fighting broke out in the capital, Khartoum, launching the country into a vicious civil war that is now in its fourth year.

Khalifa also called for the return of the Sudanese government to the remainder of RSF-held Kordofan and Darfur, which mostly came under the control of the RSF following the capture of El-Fasher.

The capture saw large-scale atrocities and human rights violations perpetrated by the RSF.

On the humanitarian conditions in RSF-held territory, Khalifa stated that there was a "complete inability to provide even the most basic humanitarian needs for the people of Kordofan and Darfur", by the rival government.

He added that the RSF was continuing "a policy of destroying cities and killing civilians without conscience or moral restraint".

Defections come amid continued military pressure on RSF

Khalifa's defection comes as the army says it is pressing ahead with offensives on all fronts.

Other RSF defectors include Al-Nour Ahmed Adam, also known as al-Gubba, an RSF commander who led five units in north Darfur that defected to the army in April.

In late July, the army took control of a major highway linking El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, which had been under a partial siege, with Omdurman, opposite the capital Khartoum.

The army has continued pressing gains, in what conflict monitor ACLED has said marks the start of the war's third phase.

ACLED's Sudan researcher Ali Mahmoud Ali, and risk methodology lead Nohad Eltayeb said the army is  "seeking to build on its gains in Kordofan, and advance in the RSF strongholds, while the RSF attempts to relieve pressure on its western fronts through offensives in Blue Nile and drone strikes on Khartoum, and River Nile".

On Wednesday, the RSF launched drones targeting the capital Khartoum, as well as Omdurman, Atbara, and El Obeid, attacks which continued into Thursday.

Major RSF attacks were also reported in North Kordofan and the town of Kurmuk bordering Ethiopia, which had been recaptured by the army in July.

The army accused Ethiopia of aiding the RSF in the attack on Kurmuk. It denied the claims.

Ali and Eltayeb said that with the escalating fighting, both sides were likely to continue air and drone strikes, particularly in north Kordofan.

"Coupled with a steady trend of RSF fighters defecting to the SAF [Sudanese army], these trends point to a significant disruption of the RSF's supply lines and strike capacity," they said.

"It is therefore unlikely that the RSF can withstand offensives on three parallel fronts. The SAF advances, fragmentation of the RSF, and the shift to aerial warfare by both sides will continue to impact civilians nationwide," the two added.

The Shehab Centre for Human Rights said in a statement that despite the passage of over a decade, the massacre remains one of the bloodiest events in modern Egyptian history.

The organisation noted that the massacre has “opened a long chapter of pain, violations and impunity”, with victims’ families still waiting for the truth and for justice, adding that many families are still facing the consequences of what happened.

The Rabaa massacre took place in Cairo on the morning of 14 August 2014, when security forces violently dispersed a peaceful sit-in at the Rab’a al’Adawiya square, where many had gathered to demand Egypt’s first democratically elected President, Mohammed Morsi, be reinstated.

The large-scale protest had taken place after then-defence minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi led a military coup weeks earlier to remove Morsi from power.

The military operation saw security forces use firearms and tear gas while mounted on horses, and deploy military equipment and bulldozers to get rid of tents that protesters had brought to camp out in.

Hundreds of people were imprisoned and convicted in mass trials; others have fled into exile, while hundreds were killed after being shot at by snipers, trampled on, and beaten.

Rights groups say that protesters were not given enough time and effective warning to leave before the violence, adding that the operation lasted around 12 hours.

No proper investigation

Egyptian authorities have failed to properly probe the events surrounding the protests and the killings, with findings yet to be published.

A decade after the massacre, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights published a report titled ‘Obscuring the Truth’, with one a document from the fact-finding committee stating it “does not doubt that it was possible to end the Rabaa sit-in without all this bloodshed".

The full report from the fact-finding committee has still not been fully published, while the head of the group, Fouad Riad, died in 2020.

The Shehab Centre for Human Rights said on Thursday that it demands a serious and independent investigation into the killing of the protesters, with those responsible for the ordering the crackdown to be held responsible. It also demanded that those who were involved in covering up the violations be held accountable in accordance with international law.

In recent years, several rights groups have attempted to shed light on the repercussions and events of the Rabaa massacre, and are working to gather testimonies from survivors.

The claims prompted Trump to evacuate Ankara, Turkey, last month in an extraordinary escape operation that involved him hiding inside a catering truck before boarding a military plane, according to The Washington Post.

A new report from the same outlet on Thursday said CIA officials did not find the Israeli intelligence "compelling", a view that was conveyed to Trump's team when the information was relayed.

Despite US intelligence officials' scepticism, the president was evacuated first to the United Kingdom, where he later boarded an Air Force C-32A plane back to the US.

"The Secret Service has had three near misses with this president, so they’re not taking any chances. They did what they had to do," an unnamed intelligence official cited by The Post said, explaining the decision to act on the Israeli intelligence.

Another source, a former official, said the Israeli warning matched "a broader pattern of Israeli intelligence reporting that some officials see as designed as much to shape presidential decision-making as to inform it".

Israel's attempts to influence US decision-making have come under increased scrutiny after Trump joined Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in attacking Iran in late February.

The joint attacks, which came in the middle of negotiations over a new nuclear deal with Tehran, were launched in part on the basis of Israeli claims that Iran's government was close to collapse.

The attacks followed decades of lobbying by Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders for tougher US action against Iran.

A New York Times report earlier this year said senior figures in the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, CIA Director John Ratcliffe and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine, had warned the president that Netanyahu had "oversold" the threat posed by Iran.

Democratic lawmakers on Wednesday called for greater transparency over the intelligence and the evacuation operation.

"I am very curious about the extent to which the Israeli-provided intelligence was not only credible but independently verifiable," Senator Chris Van Hollen told The Post. "I have no doubt that Iran would like to see the president gone, but this all seems a little fantastical."

Gaza's civil defence agency said an airstrike west of Khan Yunis killed one person, with the city's Nasser Hospital confirming the arrival of a body following the attack.

In a separate incident in Gaza City, the civil defence said one person was killed and several others injured in an Israeli strike on a vehicle in the Sheikh Ajlin neighbourhood.

Al-Shifa Hospital said it had received the body of Gaza City's police governor Jamal Abu Kamil.

Gaza's interior ministry confirmed Abu Kamil "was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike targeting his vehicle on Al-Rashid Street, southwest of Gaza City".

When contacted by AFP, the Israeli military said it was checking the reports.

Israel on Wednesday carried out its first major airstrike in Gaza since 3 August.

The hiatus in airstrikes came after US President Donald Trump's claim of a "major milestone" in his plan to end the war on Gaza.

Hamas had announced that it would disarm by giving its weapons to a nascent Palestinian governing committee.

Trump's "Board of Peace", in charge of implementing the ceasefire deal, had initially announced that Israel in turn would start a phased withdrawal from much of the Gaza Strip.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday publicly rejected the deal and vowed no Israeli pullout, even after the Board of Peace reassured him that Israel would not have to withdraw until complete Hamas disarmament.

Israeli operations in Gaza have killed 1,260 Palestinians since the ceasefire, according to the territory's health ministry.

The Israeli army has reported five deaths in its ranks during the same period.

Andrey X, an activist and journalist who was detained on Monday while attempting to bring food to one of the besieged Palestinian families, told The New Arab that the military entered Qusra in force on Wednesday night, taking over Palestinian homes even as it prepared to remove settlers.

“Over the course of the night, the army invaded the village of Qusra itself with many armoured cars and a bulldozer,” he said. “They took over a Palestinian house, and then they ordered one of the families to vacate one of the houses at the top of the hill.

“The excuse for that is that they are going to use that house as a staging ground to expel the settlers.”

A Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO) spokesperson told The New Arab that the UK "strongly condemns the escalating violence and the establishment of illegal settlements across the West Bank".

The spokesperson added that UK ministers have raised concerns at the highest levels with their Israeli counterparts.

"“The recent attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian villages and communities are appalling, as are violent incidents in response. Civilians should always be protected, international law upheld, and the perpetrators held to account, the spokesperson said. 

"“Settlements are illegal under international law, undermine the viability of a two-state solution, and fuel insecurity for both Palestinians and Israelis," they continued.

Around 15 Palestinian families have now been forced from their homes as part of the Israeli military operation, residents and activists said, with the army declaring parts of Qusra, Jalud and Talfit a closed military zone while it dismantles an illegal settler outpost.

The operation followed days of mounting international pressure over the siege of Palestinian homes by settlers, whose actions US Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee described on Thursday as a “horrific act of terror”.

But for Palestinians in Qusra, the army’s belated move against the settlers has done little to erase what came before it, including soldiers blocking access to families under siege, activists being detained as they attempted to bring in food, and Israeli troops seen praying alongside settler terrorists at the illegal outpost earlier in the week.

“If international pressure dies down, it’s likely that the army will take over the houses and then kick out the Palestinians and pass these houses over to the settlers,” Andrey X told The New Arab.

“If there is enough pressure, then they will dismantle the outpost, and we may be able to save these houses.”

His warning reflects a deep fear among residents that a military operation presented as an effort to remove settlers could itself become another instrument of Palestinian displacement.

Qusra Mayor Abdul Azim Wadi said seven Palestinian homes had been seized by the Israeli military and incorporated into the military zone, while settlers remained close to the houses they had spent days surrounding.

“The Israeli forces have now also taken over seven houses located in the centre of the village and designated them as a military zone,” Wadi told Medical Aid for Palestinians.

“The army did not enter only to remove the settlers; instead, it also entered seven homes in the middle of the village.”

The families have been moved elsewhere in Qusra after being told the operation could last three days.

One of the affected homes belongs to Yousef Hassan, whose family of four had been besieged by settlers since Sunday amid a wave of attacks that residents say has intensified since the beginning of the year.

Hassan said Israeli forces forced him from his home on Thursday morning and turned the property into part of the military zone. He and his family are now staying with his brother.

“We were not given any official or legal written order,” he told MAP. “Instead, we were verbally informed that we had to evacuate the house and were forced to do so.”

His wife and daughter had already left on Tuesday after one of the daughters developed a fever and began vomiting, symptoms a doctor said were linked to the stress of the siege.

The Israeli military said on Thursday that it had dismantled two illegal outposts in Qusra and nearby Jalud, confiscated equipment and detained an Israeli.

It later said Palestinian families would not need to leave their homes during the operation, despite residents and activists reporting that around 15 families had already been forced out.

According to Haaretz, reinforcements from the Israeli military’s 51st Battalion were expected to arrive to assist with the operation.

The military action also came a day after Israeli forces attempted to remove a settler tent erected between three Palestinian homes in the same area but failed to complete the operation after settlers gathered and obstructed the soldiers.

By Thursday, hundreds of Israeli soldiers had been deployed around Qusra, Jalud and Talfit as the military began dismantling structures at the settler outpost in the Ras al-Ain, or Ein Aina, area.

Fuad Hassan, an activist from Qusra, told The New Arab that settlers had established the outpost around six months earlier after taking over five unfinished Palestinian homes, bringing tents, water tanks and livestock onto the land.

He said the settlers withdrew into the surrounding hills with their sheep as the Israeli army entered on Thursday, while soldiers imposed sweeping restrictions on Palestinian movement and effectively confined residents to their homes.

The confrontation has exposed what Palestinians say is a familiar pattern in the occupied West Bank: settlers seize or attack Palestinian land and homes while Israeli forces either stand by, protect them or restrict Palestinians, with action against the settlers coming only after sustained outside pressure.

Ameer Dawood, director of publishing and documentation at the Colonisation & Wall Resistance Commission, told The New Arab that the Israeli response came four days into the siege.

“The victims are being made to bear the consequences of the perpetrators’ actions,” he said.

“Any temporary evacuation of Palestinian families must not become a pathway to permanent displacement or settler takeover.”

“All settlers must be removed from the land surrounding the homes; access roads, water and electricity must be restored; the families must be guaranteed a safe and unconditional return.”

From settler siege to international uproar

The attacks in Qusra have drawn unusual international attention after footage and testimony from the village circulated widely.

On Thursday, Huckabee issued one of his strongest condemnations yet of Israeli settler violence.

“The actions of those doing this to this family’s home is criminal,” he wrote on X, describing the violence as a “horrific act of terror” intended to “intimidate and harass this family”.

Huckabee also said the US embassy in Jerusalem had been “VERY involved” and that the Israeli army and police had gone to Qusra at Washington’s request “to remove the Israeli terrorists doing this”.

His remarks were striking given the long-standing reluctance of US officials to use the language of terrorism to describe settler attacks against Palestinians.

They also appeared to underline the role international pressure played in prompting an Israeli response after days in which Palestinians said the army had failed to protect them.

The European Union also addressed the situation on Thursday, with a spokesperson reiterating that settler violence, intimidation and the destruction of Palestinian homes and property “must come to an end”.

But Palestinians in Qusra say statements have repeatedly come only after attacks have already escalated.

MAP’s West Bank director, Aisha Mansour, said the events in Qusra showed “what happens when state-backed violence becomes part of everyday life”.

Rights groups have increasingly warned that settler violence, land seizures and forced displacement in the occupied West Bank cannot be separated from Israeli state policy, amounting to state-sanctioned ethnic cleansin.

Since the beginning of August, Qusra has faced repeated organised terror attacks by settlers, according to residents and Palestinian officials.

What began as incursions and assaults on the outskirts of the village developed into a siege around Palestinian homes in Ras al-Ain, with settlers blocking roads, water and electricity and erecting tents between houses.

Elsewhere in the occupied West Bank on Thursday, Israeli forces tightened military restrictions east of Jenin ahead of the inauguration of the Ganim settlement, while settlers attacked Palestinians near Qalqilya and Bethlehem and Israeli forces detained around 35 Palestinians in overnight raids.

Settlers also entered the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound under Israeli police protection, where groups performed Jewish religious rituals in several areas of the site, according to the Jerusalem governorate.

The widening settler violence comes as the West Bank faces what UN Deputy Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Ramiz Alakbarov described to the Security Council on Wednesday as a “breaking point”.

For Dawood, the concern in Qusra is that the sudden Israeli intervention will be treated internationally as the end of the crisis rather than another stage of it.

“International engagement must therefore focus on protecting the residents’ continued presence on their land, rather than merely welcoming announcements of military intervention,” he told The New Arab.

Wadi, Qusra’s mayor, said the village had lived with settler violence for more than a decade, with more than 11 residents killed since 2011.

“My message to the UK government is that I hope they will work to strengthen and support people’s resilience and their right to live their lives,” he said.

“We should not always have to pay the price because of our identity. There must be freedom for the Palestinian people.”

Foreign ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei said the slick had "degraded the waters" of the Gulf and Sea of Oman, claiming "preliminary evidence indicates a foreign bulk carrier as the source".

TankerTrackers, a US-hosted website that monitors shipping movements worldwide, said however that the spill seemed to derive from an Iranian attack on bulk carrier Minoan Pioneer in Omani waters on 3 August.

"The spillage then drifted across the strait over to Iran," it said.

Baqaei wrote on X that such spills have in "recent decades imposed trillions of dollars in damage on Iran's coastal areas", calling for compensation.

"Every party that benefits from commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz carries both a legal and a moral obligation to remediate the environmental harm inflicted," he added.

The spill had reached Qeshm island but had been "almost completely cleaned up by Wednesday evening", said Habib Masihi, head of the environmental protection department in Iran's southern province of Hormozgan.

He said about 32,000 square metres of coastal area had been affected along with waters covering 90,000 square metres.

"The oil pollution on the southern coast of Qeshm is just one example of the widespread pollution that has destroyed the region's marine ecosystem over the past few decades," added Sheena Ansari, the head of Iran's Environmental Protection Organisation.

"Who is responsible for compensating for the damage? The countries consuming energy exports from our region or the aggressors who have made this region a staging ground for military operations?" Ansari posted to X on Thursday.

Iran has maintained control over the Strait of Hormuz since the outbreak of the Middle East war on 28 February, blocking the passage of ships carrying energy exports from US-allied countries in the Gulf.

It has said it plans to charge navigational fees from passing vessels to fund services including environmental protection.

The United States and some regional countries have expressed opposition to any fees.

The spill comes after another slick in recent days near neighbouring Oman from a tanker that ran aground.

An AFP investigation previously found the ship had been stranded for weeks near Oman's Al-Qibliyyah island after it was damaged by explosions.

The 7.4-magnitude earthquake that struck western Colombia on Monday has killed at least 265 people, injured 3,494 and left 496 missing, President Abelardo de la Espriella said on Wednesday. Authorities say 25,872 families – more than 53,800 people – have been affected as emergency crews search damaged cities and towns, with thousands of homes destroyed.

The disaster, described as the strongest earthquake to strike Colombia this century, has reduced buildings to rubble across western parts of the country, including in and around Cali and Pereira. Search teams have been using sniffer dogs and acoustic sensors to locate people believed to be trapped, as the chances of finding survivors diminish with each passing day.

Colombia’s disaster management agency initially said it would accept urban search-and-rescue teams from Israel, the United States, Ecuador and El Salvador, while appeals for specialist help from elsewhere were either declined or delayed. The government insisted this was a technical, rather than political, decision, saying that only teams able to meet international protocols and operate self-sufficiently would be admitted, it said.

But the explanation has been challenged after Mexico’s Topos Tlatelolco, a civilian rescue organisation internationally known for deploying after earthquakes and other disasters, said it could not enter Colombia to assist the response. The group had formally offered technical and humanitarian help, but said it was awaiting authorisation from Colombian authorities.

The government later softened its approach, saying it would accept further foreign teams that complied with its stated certification requirements. Colombian media reported that Topos personnel subsequently arrived in Cali, meaning the question is not whether the Mexican rescuers were permanently excluded, but why assistance was restricted during the most critical early stage of the rescue operation.

For critics, Israel’s inclusion in the small initial group of approved countries cannot be separated from De la Espriella’s rapid reorientation of Colombian foreign policy.

The right-wing president took office only days before the quake and has moved with striking speed to repair and deepen relations with Israel, rupturing policies made under the openly pro-Palestine government of his predecessor, Gustavo Petro. Petro severed diplomatic ties with Israel in 2024 over its genocidal war on Gaza, backed South Africa’s genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and stopped Colombian coal exports to Israel.

De la Espriella, who has portrayed Israel as a model for his domestic security agenda, has instead promised renewed diplomatic, security and economic cooperation with Tel Aviv. Before taking office, he proposed a closer alliance with the US and Israel to fight organised crime, emphasising Israeli expertise in military training, drone surveillance, artificial intelligence and cybersecurity.

"Israel will find in Colombia a friend and a determined ally in the fight against terrorism and organised crime," De la Espriella said shortly after entering office.

The political shift was underscored this week when Colombia recognised Israeli sovereignty over the occupied Syrian Golan Heights – becoming only the second UN member state after the US to do so. Israel seized the territory from Syria in 1967 and unilaterally annexed it in 1981, a move declared "null and void" by UN Security Council Resolution 497.

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt condemned Bogotá’s move, arguing that individual recognition cannot alter the Golan’s status as occupied Syrian territory under international law.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar met De la Espriella shortly before the president’s inauguration, hailing what he called the beginning of a "golden age" in bilateral relations. Israel subsequently announced that it would send an aid delegation at Colombia’s request.

Marked annually on 13 August and now celebrating 70 years since the code's introduction, National Women’s Day in Tunisia is one of the most significant women’s awareness days in the region.

Across the country, women’s rights groups marked the occasion by celebrating Tunisian women’s achievements, but also highlighted the struggles and challenges they still face.

What is the 1956 Code of Personal Status, and what does it entail?

Introduced by then-Prime Minister and later president, Habib Bourguiba, in the same year Tunisia gained its independence from France, the Code of Personal Status sets out several laws aimed at creating equality between men and women in Tunisian society. It was formally adopted on 1 January, 1957.

Drafted by a group of about fifteen legal experts — the majority of whom were Arabic speakers — it was adopted in the immediate wake of independence, even before the constitution was written.

The code introduced the banning of polygamy, set out laws which require the consent of both spouses for marriage, and established a minimum age of marriage.

It also introduced judicial divorce rather than allowing a husband to unilaterally end the marriage, the women’s right to compensation following divorce, as well as the principle of equality between men and women regarding citizenship, and the abolishment of the wife's obligation of obedience to her husband.

The Personal Status Code has undergone significant amendments, notably the amendment of 12 July 1993, which repealed and replaced certain provisions regarding the dowry, divorce, alimony, child custody, the wife's contribution to family expenses, and the granting of guardianship rights over minor children to the mother in the event of the father's death.

The amendment also gave the right for wives the right to transfer their nationality to their children to the same extent as husbands, even if they were married to a foreigner.

At the time, the Code of Personal Status was considered more progressive for women’s rights compared to its coloniser, France.

Today, Tunisian women make up 70% of all university graduates in the country, and 62% of those are awarded doctoral degrees.

In the workplace, Tunisian women account for between 26 and 30%, while around 16% of women occupy seats in the legislature. This number has been in decline in recent years, but Tunisia has boasted several high-profile female politicians in the region, notably Najla Bouden, who became the first female Prime Minister in the Arab world during her 2021-2023 tenure.

Used for political agendas

​Despite such progress, several rights groups have over the decades accused the country's governments of using women's rights as a means for political gain, or for pushing certain agendas.

Under Bourguiba's rule, the first-ever Tunisian president imposed restrictions on 'Islamic' clothing, as part of a push to modernise the country. The hijab was outlawed in 1981 in official state spaces, public administration and educational institutions. The sefsari, a traditional white veil worn by some Tunisian women, was also discouraged.

He even went on to ridicule the hijab and niqab, calling them "miserable rags" that Tunisian women shouldn't wear.

Former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was deposed in 2011,  had pushed for the furthering of women's rights in the country but violently repressed critics and cracked down on human rights at the same time.

Challenges persist

Despite progress, Tunisian women today are faced with numerous challenges in the ever-changing landscape of the country, currently under Kais Saied’s increasingly authoritarian leadership, as well as economic hardship exacerbated by inflation, debt, and climate change.

These issued have been highlighted by civil society group Mousawat, which pointed to the continued deterioration in women's living conditions, driven by high rates of unemployment and poverty, the rising cost of living, and the decline of public services, including power and water outages, medicine shortages and price hikes, and environmental issues.

It also pointed to the escalation of violence against women, evidenced by rising homicide rates and the increasing number of female agricultural workers falling victim to transport-related accidents.

The NGO stressed that women in Tunisia are increasingly being used as scapegoats under Saied, which they said "attempts to offload the responsibility for its own incompetence and failure".

Representation for women in politics has declined since Saied assumed the presidency. Mousawat said since coming to power, Saied "has made no secret of his hostility toward the principle of equality".

As they marked National Women's Day, other Tunisian rights groups have issued statements rejecting attempts by politicians to amend the Code of Personal Status, which they say seek to "undermine the gains achieved by women" in Tunisian society.

Roger Lu Phillips, legal director at the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, told The New Arab that the formation of the committee was a "meaningful first step in seeking to obtain custody of perpetrators of atrocities in Syria."

Deputy Justice Minister Mustafa al-Qassem announced the committee on Wednesday, telling Al-Ikhbariyah TV that it would coordinate international efforts to extradite suspects, pursue crimes linked to transitional justice and recover Syrian funds allegedly taken abroad.

He said greater cooperation with foreign governments could help Syria bring back suspects who fled the country and face prosecution at home.

The announcement came a day after a Damascus criminal court sentenced several former officials to death in absentia, including Assad and his brother Maher. The former president fled to Russia after his government was overthrown in December 2024.

But Damascus’s ability to bring former officials back to Syria will depend far less on Interpol itself than on the governments now hosting them.

Phillips said that Syrian authorities will need to compile thorough documentation on the accused, and that there will likely be follow-up questions from states responding to such requests, noting that responses to such requests will be essential.

Syrian human rights lawyer Anwar al-Bunni told The New Arab that extradition could not take place simply because Damascus requested it.

“Extradition does not simply happen because a country asks for a suspect to be handed over. There must be a proper legal process, and in some cases agreements between the countries concerned,” al-Bunni said.

“You need a complete case file containing the charges, evidence and other relevant material so that the authorities can establish that this is a genuine criminal case and not a politically motivated prosecution or a case related to someone’s opinions.”

"From a legal perspective, extradition is only available for cases of sufficient gravity and not for political or military crimes," Phillips explained. 

"The request must also establish “dual criminality” i.e. that the alleged acts of the accused were a crime both in Syria and the state from which extradition is sought. There must be some evidence to show that the alleged crimes were committed by the accused, but the court examining the request will not assess the guilt or innocence of the accused which would require a higher evidentiary threshold," he continued.

He also said that some states may refuse extradition based on a number of reasons, including if they believe the accused could face torture or will not receive a fair trial. 

What Interpol can do

Interpol can help locate suspects and circulate requests for their detention, but it cannot order an arrest or force a country to extradite someone.

As an Interpol member, Syria can seek a Red Notice, an international request asking police forces to locate and provisionally arrest a wanted person while extradition proceedings are considered.

Such requests generally require a domestic arrest warrant or judicial decision, along with information identifying the suspect and detailing the alleged crimes.

But a Red Notice is not an international arrest warrant. Governments remain free to decide whether to act on one according to their own laws and international obligations.

Al-Bunni said Syrian authorities would first have to assemble the relevant case material before seeking international action.

“The file has to go through the relevant authorities and then to Interpol,” he told The New Arab. “Interpol will examine the case and, if it meets its requirements, it can issue a Red Notice requesting that the person be located and provisionally arrested.”

“It is not a case of saying, ‘I want this person returned because he is a criminal,’ and Interpol simply acting on that request,” he added. “It is a much more complicated process, with a number of conditions that have to be met.”

Even an arrest would be only the beginning.

Extradition proceedings can involve courts, government ministries and lengthy appeals. Authorities in the country receiving Syria’s request could scrutinise the evidence against the suspect, the fairness of the Syrian proceedings and whether extradition would expose the person to treatment prohibited under domestic or international law.

That could make the pursuit of some of the most prominent former officials particularly difficult.

Assad, for example, has been granted asylum in Russia, which is unlikely to surrender him to Damascus regardless of whether Syria seeks Interpol assistance.

In practice, the committee may initially prove more useful in assembling case files, locating suspects and testing the willingness of individual governments to cooperate than in securing the immediate extradition of senior figures from the former regime.

Death sentences complicate extradition efforts

Syria’s pursuit also faces another obstacle of its own making: the death sentences handed down against Assad and other former officials.

Many countries will refuse extradition when a suspect could face execution, torture or other ill-treatment, or when there are concerns that a trial would not meet international standards. Governments that permit extradition in death-penalty cases can demand binding assurances that the punishment will not be imposed or carried out.

Al-Bunni said both the prospect of capital punishment and questions over due process could prove decisive when foreign governments consider Syrian extradition requests.

“The country where the suspect is located will also need to be satisfied that the person will receive a fair trial,” he told The New Arab. “The death penalty is another major issue, particularly for countries that do not recognise or apply capital punishment.”

“A complete file, evidence, witnesses and guarantees of a fair trial will all be important,” he added. “The possibility of a death sentence could also create serious difficulties for an Interpol request and for any eventual extradition.”

According to Phillips, any extradition request from a state party to the European Convention cannot agree to extradite for capital crimes, but in such cases Syria could make assurances that it would not apply the death penalty in order to facilitate extradition requests. 

The fact that the latest sentences were issued in absentia could bring additional scrutiny from foreign courts.

Damascus may have to demonstrate that suspects extradited to Syria would receive a full opportunity for a new trial, with access to lawyers, sufficient time to prepare a defence and proceedings before an independent court.

Al-Qassem said the ministry was seeking the “highest degree of compatibility” between Syria’s judiciary and international standards while maintaining Syrian sovereignty over the transitional-justice process.

That balance is likely to become increasingly important as Damascus seeks cooperation abroad.

Human-rights organisations and legal experts have already raised concerns over the use of the death penalty and the safeguards surrounding trials of former regime figures. Foreign governments asked to extradite suspects will have to make their own assessment of those proceedings before agreeing to send anyone back.

The provision is among the most politically sensitive elements of Lebanon’s first general amnesty since 1991, a law passed by parliament on Wednesday after years of negotiations over which prisoners, fugitives and former combatants should benefit.

It revives a long-stalled effort to reopen the contentious status of thousands of Lebanese who feld to Israel as Israeli forces withdrew from the south in May 2000, ending a 22-year occupation.

Among those who left were members of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army, as well as their families and other civilians who feared reprisals after the collapse of Israel's occupation.

Under the new law, Lebanese who went to Israel but were not involved militarily or in security work with the South Lebanon Army may return, according to Lebanese media reports and lawmakers involved in the legislation.

MP Ziad Hawat told Al Jadeed TV  that any Lebanese citizen living in Israel who had not served in the South Lebanon Army and was not the subject of a judicial ruling could return once the amnesty law was published in the official gazette, provided they relinquished Israeli citizenship.

The legislation builds on a 2011 law that sought to regulate the return of Lebanese citizens who had fled to Israel but whose implementation remained stalled for years because it required further government measures.

The new amnesty removes a longstanding legal obstacle to their return covered by the earlier law, while maintaining exclusions for offences including treason, espionage and unlawful dealings with Israel.

The law stops short of granting a blanket pardon for former South Lebanon Army members or others accused of collaborating militarily or in intelligence work with Israel.

No amnesty for collaborators 

Nizar Saghieh, executive director of the Legal Agenda, told The New Arab that the law “did not grant an amnesty to collaborators for the violations they committed”, but rather benefited their families.

“What they did in this law was remove the need for the decree issued under the 2011 law,” Saghieh said. “But the problem is that these families have grown since they fled in 2000. Some have acquired Israeli citizenship, and perhaps some have entered the Israeli army. This will create a problem.”

The provision raises further questions over a generation born and raised in Israel over the past 26 years, some of whom have never lived in Lebanon and may hold Israeli citizenship from birth.

Even those who acquired Israeli citizenship could be eligible to return, provided they relinquish it, raising practical questions over how that process would be verified and how authorities would handle cases involving people born in Israel, those married to Israelis or children whose legal status differs from that of their Lebanese parents.

There are no official figures for how many people could ultimately qualify. Lebanese media have cited estimates of around 4,000 people still living in Israel, though the figure has not been formally confirmed and not all would automatically be eligible to return.

The Israel provision is only one part of a much broader amnesty package that could affect thousands of prisoners and wanted people across Lebanon.

The law covers offences committed before 1 March 2026, while excluding a series of crimes including intentional killing, terrorism offences against civilians and security forces, military crimes, treason and espionage.

It also provides sentence reductions for some prisoners whose offences are not covered by the full amnesty.

The legislation emerged from years of sectarian and political bargaining. Christian parties, including the Lebanese Forces, had long pushed for a resolution to the case of Lebanese families who fled to Israel, while Sunni politicians championed the cause of Islamist detainees and Shia parties, namely the Amal Movement, had pressed for relief in cases involving drug offences.

Saghieh criticised that approach, telling TNA that the law had turned accountability from “the principle” into “the exception”.

“The major observation we have about the law is the breadth of the amnesty,” he said. “Accountability should remain the principle and amnesty the exception, but what happened was the opposite.”

He described the negotiations as a form of political and sectarian bargaining in which each faction sought concessions for its own constituency.

The law was nevertheless welcomed by some in Lebanon as a long-delayed attempt to address prison overcrowding and unresolved cases dating back decades.

The national army, known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), captured the road to secure a vital supply line to its fighters in El-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.

The city sits at a crossroads between SAF-controlled northern and eastern Sudan and RSF-held territory to the south and west, making it a logistics hub for military operations.

For weeks, the RSF targeted El-Obeid with drones, striking vital provisions such as generators, fuel, and water tankers. Despite the attacks, the RSF has struggled to hold ground in the sprawling region.

Shortly after losing control over the 350km highway, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo vowed to fight on until his forces reached Khartoum, which is currently under SAF control.

Analysts say that Hemedti’s statement reflects his desperation to halt the SAF's advances.

“Since losing control of villages around the highway, the RSF has called on all tribes in Darfur to mobilise and enlist,” Mohamed al-Fatih Yousif, a journalist from Darfur who recently visited the region, told The New Arab.

“Many of the new recruits are being trained in South Darfur and in Libya,” he added.

Since the SAF and the RSF plunged Sudan into a civil war in April 2023, they have fought each other to a near stalemate.

In recent weeks, SAF-aligned forces have attacked the RSF on three fronts - in southeastern, central, and western Sudan.

The attacks have inflicted a series of strategic blows against the RSF, pushing the group to launch a major recruitment drive and reactivate vital supply lines, say analysts.

On Wednesday, the RSF reportedly targeted El-Obeid and other Sudanese cities with drone attacks in response to the losses.

“The local tribal authorities have answered the RSF’s call. They are sending many young men to fight, including children,” Yousif told The New Arab.

Tribal allies

Most RSF fighters come from nomadic or pastoralist Arab tribes in the sprawling regions of Darfur and Kordofan.

Like tribes across Sudan, they are governed by native administrations – a hierarchical, British-imposed system from the 1920s. The British created these to bestow individual chiefs with significant power, making them easier to co-opt.

More than a century later, many tribal chiefs are backing the RSF in exchange for money and power. Others fear that their communities could be ethnically targeted if SAF recaptures the region.

Throughout the war, the SAF has labelled young men and women originally from Darfur as RSF “cooperators” or “spies” to justify detaining, torturing, and sometimes executing them.

“Many tribes believe that they don’t have a choice. They believe that they have to enlist their young men into the RSF in exchange for security,” Yousif explained to The New Arab.

At the same time, the RSF poses an existential threat to Arab and sedentary farming “non-Arab” communities that oppose them, say analysts. Back in February, the RSF raided the town of Misterai, the primary base of the Mahamid clan of the Rizeigat Arab tribe - the same ethnic group that the RSF’s own leaders hail from.

The RSF was trying to assassinate Musa Hilal, a rival tribal sheikh who eventually escaped to SAF-controlled areas. Weeks later, the intra-tribal rivalry prompted several RSF commanders from the Mahamid tribe to switch sides. They were lured with promises of amnesty, money, and power.

The UN and human rights groups also accuse the RSF of committing genocidal violence against non-Arab communities in West Darfur and in North Darfur’s capital of El-Fasher.

During the offensive to capture both areas, the RSF gunned down young men in their homes and as they were fleeing into Chad and through RSF checkpoints. The RSF also systematically abducted women and girls and subjected them to sexual violence.

Still, some non-Arab tribes such as the Fur have agreed to back the RSF out of fear that they could suffer a similar fate, according to Noon al-Baramaki, a journalist who survived the atrocities in el-Fasher.

The Fur have reportedly mobilised four battalions of young fighters to enlist with the RSF.

“It’s practically a forced recruitment campaign,” Al-Baramki, a journalist who survived the atrocities in North Darfur, told The New Arab. “[Non-Arab] tribes know that the communities who resisted joining the RSF were subjected to genocide and ethnic cleansing.”

UAE support

The RSF relies entirely on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to fuel its war against SAF, according to numerous reports published by the UN, human rights groups, and media outlets.

Some of the support includes shipments of Chinese-made drones and artillery.

The UAE has also used shell companies to hire former Colombian mercenaries to train RSF fighters in Sudan.

“There is a sort of stubbornness on the side of the UAE that is very, very clear. They are not going to stop [backing the RSF],” Jalel Harchaoui, a political scientist closely observing the UAE’s role in Libya and across North and East Africa, told The New Arab.

Weapons, fuel, and mercenaries often cross into RSF-held territory from neighbouring Chad, South Sudan, and Libya. In exchange, the UAE receives billions of dollars’ worth of illicit gold and preserves its massive strategic influence across the Sahel.

Over the last several weeks, Harchaoui said that the UAE has gradually reactivated a direct supply line from the Libyan town of Kufra into North Darfur.

Libya’s eastern authorities closed that route when Egypt and Turkey began bombing convoys heading directly into Sudan from Kufra in November 2025. The bombing started shortly after the RSF committed mass atrocities during its capture of El-Fasher.

Harchaoui now says that there has been a noticeable increase in the number of cargo planes and hangars stationed in the town since July. He also suspects that the UAE is planning to build air defences to protect convoys traversing this critical route.

“Turkey and Egypt conduct airstrikes very easily, which means that route is really dangerous,” Harchaoui told The New Arab.

“But the UAE is preparing to absorb a percentage of loss - in terms of fighters and munitions - to keep the route open. For the UAE, this is just the cost of doing business.”

Mat Nashed is an award-nominated journalist who has covered the MENA region since the Arab Spring

Follow him on X: @matnashed

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Economic pressures and changing social norms are driving couples in Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria to have fewer babies, with a recent study saying Maghreb fertility was at a historic low.

Experts and couples interviewed by AFP spoke of a combination of factors, including longer educations and growing professional ambitions among women, along with rising divorce rates and financial strain on young professionals.

The trend mirrors changes seen in many parts of the world. But in the Maghreb, it challenges stereotypes of families tending to be large.

A recent study by France's Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) said the decline has been exceptionally rapid and appeared to be "lasting", while Tunisian demographer Mohamed Ali Ben Zina described it as "profound".

In Tunis, Nadia Jaouadi, 42, said she does not regret the decision she and her husband made a decade ago not to have children.

"Nothing encourages having even a single child," said Jaouadi, a civil servant, blaming Tunisia's current economic woes and social climate.

Across all three Maghreb countries, fertility rates fell by more than half since the 1970s, according to official figures.

Social changes

Tunisia now has the lowest fertility rate in the Maghreb, with 1.58 children per woman in 2023 and an estimated 1.53 in 2024, compared with 1.97 in Morocco and 2.61 in Algeria.

Tunisian demographer Hassen Kassar said Tunisia's fertility drop was primarily the result of deep social changes, including the "modernisation of families" and urbanisation, which have reduced family size.

In Algiers, Said, a 66-year-old retired former finance executive who did not provide his full name, said he came from a family of 10 children.

"My father struggled to provide for the whole family," he recalled. "So I decided not to have more than two children. What's important is that they eat their fill, dress properly and live in good conditions."

Chaimae Drioui, a researcher and professor at Morocco's National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics (INSEA), said the decline in fertility was "a rational decision by families in response to a new economic and social context".

Having children was at times seen in popular culture as an investment in the future, particularly among poorer families who relied on their children for prospective support.

But that view "has now been reversed," Drioui said. "The child today costs more than he brings in immediate economic terms."

Economic hardship, however, is not the only factor as the mental and physical demands of parenthood also weigh on many.

"After giving birth, I realised how much motherhood was a challenge for my mental and physical health," said Zina, a 42-year-old Algerian who gave birth to a daughter at 38 and no longer plans to have another child.

In Rabat, Kaouthar, a 38-year-old public-sector manager who did not provide her full name said she will remain child-free: "I chose to live a peaceful life away from the worry and stress inherent in raising a child."

Drioui said women's education and empowerment were key to changing traditional family patterns.

Foreign workers 

Yet a decline in birth rates also translates to an ageing population across the Maghreb.

In Tunisia, people aged 60 and over now account for 17 percent of the population, or nearly 2 million people.

The trend is less advanced in Algeria, where people aged 60 and over represented a 10th of the population in 2023 -- and in Morocco, where the same category accounted for 13.8 percent of the population in 2024.

The demographic shift could put pressure on pension systems and weaken the balance between working-age people and retirees.

INED said that if deaths eventually outnumbered births, only immigration could sustain population growth.

And foreign workers could help fill labour shortages as the working-age population shrinks.

But that prospect could prove difficult in the countries where migration is already a highly sensitive topic.

For Kassar, one possibility is already emerging: "We will need sub-Saharan migrants."

The party's founder and leader, Paul Hopkinson, told The New Arab on Thursday, 13 August, "The party secretary sent me a message informing me that we had been officially registered after receiving an email from the Electoral Commission."

"I knew that there was enormous external pressure being exerted on them not to register the party. The commission received 207 objections from Zionists and Zionist organisations against recognising us as an official party," he added.

The New Zealand Electoral Commission announced its approval of the registration of the "Free Palestine" party as a political party after examining its registration application in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Act 1993.

The decision followed a public consultation during which the commission received 207 submissions opposing the application.

The commission concluded that the party had met the legal requirements, including providing evidence that it had at least 500 current financial members who were eligible to enroll as voters.

It also found no legal grounds requiring it to reject the registration.

The commission said it had carefully considered objections concerning the name "Free Palestine" party and whether it was offensive or likely to cause anger or disgust in a reasonable person.

"The phrase, while highly sensitive and the subject of widespread political disagreement", it noted, was not in itself "offensive" under the legal standard set out in the legislation.

It said supporters viewed it as a call for human rights, freedom and an end to occupation, while opponents considered it offensive or antisemitic or an implicit call for hostility towards Israel and Jewish communities.

The commission stressed that it was required to assess the party's name itself, rather than its positions, slogans or campaign material.

The commission, however, rejected registration of the party's logo, which includes the Palestinian flag and the words "Free Palestine" party, because it could confuse or mislead voters.

This was particularly because they might believe the party officially represented a Palestinian political entity or international movement, or that it had the support or control of Palestinian institutions.

It said the decision was also based on similar electoral precedents.

As a result, the "Free Palestine" party will be able to contest the upcoming general election, compete for party-list votes and nominate candidates in electoral districts.

However, its logo will not appear beside the name of the party or its candidates on the ballot paper, as the legal deadline for submitting an alternative logo has expired.

The party leader said to TNA that the party's official registration had multiple benefits for the Palestine solidarity movement in New Zealand.

"It gives us government funding of $82,000 to help raise awareness of the Palestinian cause, allowing us to increase pressure on any incoming government to listen to more than 60% of the New Zealand public who, according to opinion polls, are calling for action to impose sanctions on Israel," he added. "Most importantly, this registration makes it extremely difficult for any New Zealand government to restrict freedom of expression or the activities of Palestine supporters."

In the first official reaction opposing the party's registration, the Coalition of Ministers Supporting Israel (COMS), which comprises 136 Protestant Christian clergy in New Zealand from Pentecostal, Baptist, Brethren, Presbyterian, Anglican and Methodist churches and others, who support the right of the State of Israel to protect itself, issued a statement.

"The Coalition of Ministers Supporting Israel is concerned about the Electoral Commission's decision to register the "Free Palestine" party as a political party in the general election scheduled for November," it said.

"New Zealand's electoral system has been hijacked by foreign interests and influence seeking to use the electoral process in our country to promote the twisted ideology of those who call for the elimination of Israel," the statement continued.

Next steps for "Free Palestine"

Commenting on this, Hopkinson described the statement, in remarks to TNA, as "shameful" for its support of an apartheid state and the ongoing genocide of the Palestinian people.

He stressed that "calling for the downfall of the Israeli apartheid state is something we are proud to stand in solidarity with, just as many veteran Palestine supporters and activists in New Zealand were proud to support the struggle that ended the apartheid state in South Africa".

Asked about the next steps the party intends to take after its official registration, he said the party "will hold a launch event in the city of Christchurch, and we hope it will be before mid-September, followed by the launch of the campaign at a national level".

"Planning to contest this election is still under way; however, we are of course considering putting forward candidates on the party list, as well as candidates in electoral districts for key single-member seats," he added.

"We hope to be able to bring this issue to the heart of New Zealand politics, where it should be. It is time for New Zealand and its people to be leaders in the struggle against Zionism and Israel, just as we were leaders in the anti-nuclear weapons and anti-apartheid movements," he continued.

For his part, Maher Nazzal, head of the Palestine Forum in New Zealand, told The New Arab that "registering a party to participate in the upcoming general election is a very important step, not only for Palestinians in New Zealand but also for everyone who believes in justice, human rights and accountability".

He stressed that "this registration means that the voice calling for justice for Palestine now has a clear democratic political framework capable of addressing voters directly and raising issues that traditional parties have ignored".

He added that "this step represents the beginning of the road, not its end; the challenge now is to build a strong and organised campaign, reach as many voters as possible, explain the party's programme to people, and not only talk about Palestine but also about issues that matter to all New Zealanders".

Regarding the forum's mechanisms for helping the newly formed party, Nazzal said that "there are several ways, including joining, volunteering and donating within electoral laws, helping the campaign communicate with different communities, spreading the party's messages, and organising meetings and events across the country".

"The most important thing is to show that supporting Palestine does not conflict with being New Zealanders; rather, defending human rights, justice and equality is a fundamental part of the democratic society in which we live," he added.

The New Zealand-Palestinian activist considered that "we are facing a historic opportunity. It will not be easy, but if we work together in an organised and professional manner, we will succeed in turning this registration from a mere announcement into an influential political voice inside the New Zealand Parliament".

He noted that "small parties, under New Zealand's mixed-member proportional representation system, have a real opportunity to exert influence if they manage to reach the required electoral threshold or win an electorate seat".

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

But who is Count Binface, Leader of the Recyclons, and where does he stand on Palestine and other issues in the Middle East?

Binface's foreign policy

Binface, the alter ego of comedian and comedy writer Jon Harvey, has set out a raft of policies, including a cap on croissant prices, improved Wi-Fi on trains and conscripting people who use speakerphones on public transport.

He has also occasionally ventured into foreign policy, including by calling for an end to British arms sales to Saudi Arabia

"The UK must immediately follow the example of President Biden and stop selling arms to Saudi Arabia. (They should also start buying space lasers from Count Binface, but that bit can wait.)," Binface wrote on Twitter in January 2021, responding to a Sky News post about the killing of nine civilians in Yemen by Saudi airstrikes.

The comedy candidate has otherwise said little about the Middle East, with some of his strongest political jabs instead directed at Britain's departure from the European Union.

"First I analysed the cons of Brexit. That took me quite a long time. I'm still doing that," Binface said in an interview with British journalist Mehdi Hasan earlier this week.

"Then I decided to look at the pros," he continued, before adding: "None that I can see."

Despite sitting down with Hasan, who is known for his coverage of the Middle East, the interview steered clear of the region.

'Where's Sangita?'

While Binface has not directly spoken about Palestine, the run-up to the by-election has seen videos resurface of the comedian repeatedly asking journalists from LBC Radio why one of the station's former presenters, Sangita Myska, was suddenly dropped without explanation.

Myska's last appearance on LBC was on 14 April 2024, when she grilled Israeli spokesman Avi Hyman over Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus. She did not return to her regular show, with LBC announcing weeks later that she was leaving the station.

Her departure prompted widespread speculation that it was connected to the interview with Hyman, although LBC has not publicly said this was the reason. Critics have cited the episode in wider concerns about the treatment of voices critical of Israel in Britain's mainstream media.

In one video circulated on social media, an LBC journalist introduces himself to Binface at an election count.

"LBC, lovely!" Binface responds. "What happened to Sangita Myska? What happened to Sangita Myska, everyone?"

The exchange is one of many quips delivered by Count Binface, whose unlikely presence in the political spotlight has also provided an avenue for more serious criticism of British politics and the media.

In the race for Clacton-on-Sea, Binface has taken indirect jabs at scandal-hit Farage by pledging not to accept £5 million gifts from crypto billionaires and to spend more time in Clacton than Washington, references to controversy surrounding the Reform leader and his frequent trips to the United States.

A 26 June deal brokered by the US supposedly linked the progressive withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon to the "verified disarmament" of all non-state armed groups by the Lebanese government. Hezbollah, which is not a party to the agreement, has rejected disarming.

Reuters reported last week that Lebanon and Israel had agreed to a shortlist and reported on Wednesday, citing three sources, that the list included Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia as potential contributors to the verification mechanism.

A Lebanese official on Thursday said there was no such agreement and that Beirut was still in discussions with the United States on the matter.

A State Department official said on Tuesday that a round of US-brokered meetings between Lebanon and Israel in Rome last week discussed the "third-party verification" of the Lebanese army's "clearance operations" but did not mention the shortlist or the countries involved.

Israel and Lebanon are to hold an eighth round of US-sponsored negotiations next month, in Rome.

Israel has killed more than 4,300 people in Lebanon since March.

These changes come amid ongoing attempts to revive the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and bring both sides back to the negotiating table.

Against this backdrop, the appointments offer an early indication of how Iran’s factional politics are evolving under its new leader - and how those shifts could shape the country’s approach to the war and beyond.

Shifting balance of power

Iranian officials have announced several new political appointments in recent days, seemingly formalising shifts in Iran’s factional politics. On 9 August, Mohsen Rezaei - who previously served as commander in chief of the IRGC for 16 years - was appointed secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC).

A decree from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei on the same day appointed Rezaei as one of his official representatives on the SNSC.

These appointments mark Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s first major intervention in Iran’s political landscape since the outbreak of the war and appear designed in part to balance power between competing factions.

Such balancing acts - aimed at preventing any single faction from dominating Iran’s political and security institutions - have long been a feature of elite management in the Islamic Republic.

In this instance, Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment as head of the SNSC ends a just four-month tenure of Mohammed Bagher-Zolghadr, who is reportedly close to Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, Iran’s parliament speaker and a key figure in the Iran-US negotiations.

Zolghadr was nevertheless retained as a political adviser to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, suggesting his removal from the SNSC represents a redistribution of influence, not his wholesale marginalisation.

Renewed US-Iran confrontation

Beyond balancing power, Mohsen Rezaei’s appointment suggests Iran’s new Supreme Leader may favour giving more weight to figures advocating a confrontational stance towards the US.

The former IRGC Commander in Chief has expressed opposition to the Iran-US Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and last week stated that Iran “will never permit the opening of a second corridor in the Strait of Hormuz”.

Such a stance, if adhered to in Tehran, would likely further complicate ongoing Omani, Qatari, and Pakistani attempts to bring Iran and the US back to the negotiating table.

Rezaei’s stance appears to mirror that of Saeed Jalili, the other representative of the Supreme Leader on the SNSC. Jalili, a prominent figure in the hardline Paydari Front, has historically opposed any negotiation with the US, and appears to see any sort of concession to the West as a red line.

Of note, Iranian state media has reported that Jalili was the only member of the 13-person SNSC to vote against the signing of the MoU in June.

Following Rezaei’s appointment, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei also appointed six senior commanders across Iran’s security forces.

This included the confirmation of Ahmad Vahidi as commander in chief of the IRGC, officially succeeding Mohammad Pakpour, who was killed in February at the outset of the Iran-Israel-US war.

In a further sign that Tehran views the war as ongoing, Khamenei in his appointment decree also called on Vahidi to prepare to carry out “powerful offensive operations against the enemy”.

Still, a renewed full-scale war with the US is not a foregone conclusion. Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, have called for de-escalation and the resumption of negotiations with the US.

Both individuals seem to view this as necessary to resolve Iran’s dire economic situation and maintain domestic stability.

Additionally, the continued US blockade of Iranian ports and declining oil revenues could have an economic impact significant enough to bring even more hardline figures to the negotiating table.

The impact of the blockade so far has already been so severe that Majidreza Hariri, head of the Iran-China Joint Chamber of Commerce, has said that the effect of a continued blockade could surpass that of the multi-year sanctions regime imposed on the country.

In the short term, this may push Tehran to seek an understanding with Washington that would secure an end to the naval blockade and ease some economic pressures on Iran, without resolving the wider points of contention between the two sides.

Tactical survival or a new regime?

It remains to be seen whether the appointment of these figures is in preparation for a short-term conflict with the US or represents Mojtaba Khamenei’s long-term vision for the Islamic Republic.

However, the distinction may become increasingly difficult to make. Even if these appointments are primarily a response to the prospect of renewed full-scale confrontation, the strengthening of hardline voices within Iran’s political and security apparatus could have consequences that outlast the immediate conflict.

The consequences could be particularly significant for Iran’s foreign relations. A scenario including renewed, sustained attacks on Gulf states, and the further mobilisation of Iran-linked groups in Yemen, Lebanon and even Iraq, for example, would make a diplomatic and economic rapprochement with Gulf states after the war all the more difficult.

Similarly, further rounds of sustained confrontation with the US, particularly if key issues remain unresolved, would likely undermine Iran’s ability to obtain US sanctions relief in the medium term.

Continued international isolation will only exacerbate Iran’s economic crisis, potentially fuelling further public discontent.

Zahra Ladha is a geopolitical analyst focused on Iran, Iraq, and transnational Shiaism. She holds an MSc in Middle Eastern Studies from the University of Oxford 

Follow her on X: @zahrariy_

Javad Heiran-Nia is an Iranian analyst based in Iran. He is the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran

Follow him on X: @J_Heirannia

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

The unusually direct rebuke from Washington came after Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Lebanese territory and had been ordered to prepare for a long-term presence in areas Israel has designated a "security zone".

A senior US State Department official said in a statement sent to Israel's Channel 12 seeking a response to Katz's remarks that Washington expected Israel to abide by the commitments it made under the US-brokered framework signed in late June.

"A permanent military presence in southern Lebanon is inconsistent with the commitments set forth in the framework, or with the long-term peace and security of both countries," the official said.

The official also reaffirmed Washington's "full support for Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty", drawing a clear line between the agreement negotiated by the United States and Katz's declaration that Israeli troops intend to remain on Lebanese soil.

The State Department official stressed that the framework provides a conditions-based pathway towards a gradual Israeli withdrawal, tied to the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and dismantling of its military infrastructure.

"The Lebanese Armed Forces are currently implementing the first pilot areas, and the United States will continue to support the full implementation of this process," the official said.

Israel has publicly framed its occupation of Lebanon as necessary to secure its northern border, but senior Israeli officials have repeatedly advocated the seizure and colonisation of Lebanese territory and the expansion of Israel's northern borders.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has called for Israel's northern frontier to be moved to the Litani River, while Katz has threatened Lebanon with the "loss of territory". His latest declaration that Israeli forces will remain indefinitely has further fuelled Lebanese fears that the occupation is intended to become permanent.

During a tour of occupied Lebanese territory on Wednesday, Katz said Israeli troops would remain in the so-called "security zones" in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza.

"We will not move from here and we will not withdraw," Katz said.

He said he had instructed the Israeli military to make the administrative and operational preparations required for a prolonged deployment.

The language echoed Israel's earlier occupation of southern Lebanon, when it maintained a self-declared "security zone" for nearly two decades before withdrawing in May 2000.

Katz also spoke openly about the destruction being carried out in the occupied area, saying Israeli forces were demolishing homes and alleged "Hezbollah infrastructure".

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Wednesday condemned Israel's "systematic destruction" of homes and infrastructure in the south, saying it violated international law and was intended to prevent displaced Lebanese residents from returning to their land.

The Israeli statements come as negotiations over implementing the June framework remain deadlocked, particularly over the sequence of Israeli withdrawals and the Lebanese army's deployment in the south.

Lebanon has sought further Israeli withdrawals to allow its army to move into additional "pilot zones", while Israel has made further redeployments conditional on the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and dismantling of its infrastructure, while introducing a widening list of unrealistic and unserious demands.

These include the transfer to Israel of remains from Jewish cemeteries in Beirut and Sidon, information on 11 Jews who disappeared or were killed during Lebanon's civil war, and answers over the fate of Israeli airman Ron Arad, who disappeared in Lebanon in 1986.

The impasse has persisted despite the Lebanese army beginning implementation of the framework in the first pilot area. Lebanon has pushed for the same model to be expanded, with Israeli forces withdrawing and the Lebanese army moving in, but Israel has resisted opening additional zones.

Lebanese army commander General Rudolph Haykal raised the obstacles facing the military during meetings this week with US Major General Joseph Clearfield, who heads the military coordination group involved in implementing the agreement.

According to Lebanese accounts of the meetings, Haykal pointed to continuing Israeli attacks, bulldozing and destruction as among the principal difficulties facing the army as it attempts to deploy and carry out its responsibilities in the south.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun has sought greater American pressure on Israel to withdraw, raising the issue during his July visit to Washington and talks with US President Donald Trump.

The latest comes ahead of another expected round of US-mediated negotiations in Rome in early September.

The confrontation unfolded on Wednesday morning in Qusra, south of Nablus, where settlers had erected a tent just metres from the home of the Abu Rida family. The family says settlers have besieged the property for four days in an attempt to seize it.

The scene was unusual in a territory where the Israeli military has for years been accused of protecting settlers during attacks on Palestinians, including assaults in which homes and property have been torched and Palestinians have been killed.

But shortly after 7am on Wednesday, Israeli soldiers arrived and attempted to dismantle the settlers' tent.

"The occupation army arrived at around 7am today, attempting to dismantle the tent that several settlers had set up in front of our home to seize it," Qusay Abdulmunim Abu Rida told The New Arab. "But what happened was strange, as the settlers attacked the soldiers, who responded by firing tear gas and stun grenades."

Soldiers dismantled the tent and confiscated a car and an off-road vehicle belonging to the settlers, Abu Rida said. The settlers then confronted the soldiers, recovered the car and fled along bypass roads used by settlers.

The confrontation lasted about an hour and a half. But any reprieve for the Abu Rida family proved short-lived.

"It is true that the army left after an hour and a half of clashes, but the number of settlers continued to increase until it reached more than 100 settlers at the site of the same tent that the soldiers had confiscated," Abu Rida said.

A family under siege

For four days, settlers have maintained a tent about four metres from the Abu Rida home, according to the family, as part of what they describe as an escalating effort to force them from the property.

The settlers began digging around water networks before removing electricity poles and destroying cables supplying the house. They also smashed surveillance cameras and blocked the road leading to the property, preventing residents of Qusra from bringing the family food, water and medicine.

For Abu Rida, the tactics bear an unsettling resemblance to what happened about two weeks earlier to the Tubasi family in nearby Jaloud, where settlers seized a Palestinian home after Israeli soldiers intervened and helped remove the family.

"They want to repeat what they did to the Tubasi family's homes in Jaloud," Abu Rida said.

He said the pressure began months earlier, after settlers erected additional tents at an outpost established at the beginning of the year.

Abu Rida, his brothers, their wives and children subsequently moved into the threatened house, which belongs to his brother Murad, who lives and works in the United States and returns to the village for annual visits.

The Israeli army's sudden confrontation with the settlers therefore left the family puzzled.

Just two days earlier, Abu Rida said, soldiers had prevented foreign activists from reaching the family with food and water, telling them that the surrounding area had been declared a closed military zone for six months.

The family says the designation is particularly difficult to understand because the house is in Area B, which under the Oslo Accords is under Palestinian civil administration and joint Palestinian-Israeli security control.

"We do not understand how Mount (Ain Ainya), where our home is located, can be turned into a completely closed military zone," Abu Rida said. "The settlers want to seize the entire mountain, so they have made our lives unbearable through their attacks and siege on us day and night."

The group immediately surrounding the house was initially small, he said, numbering no more than 10 settlers, most of them between 17 and 18 years old.

But larger groups have repeatedly joined them.

"Two days ago, they held a fire party at night, attended by dozens of settlers wearing white and black clothes, and they were armed," Abu Rida said.

Pressure on Israel

The confrontation came as Israel faces growing international scrutiny over escalating settler attacks against Palestinians across the occupied West Bank.

A day earlier, the UN Security Council had discussed the violence at a meeting requested by France, Britain, Greece, Denmark and Latvia, which cited a "significant escalation" in settler attacks in recent months.

Muawiya Musa, a researcher specialising in Israeli affairs, said the timing was significant.

Israel's government and state institutions have openly overseen and supported the expansion of settlements, he said, while the military has provided settlers with security cover during attacks on Palestinians.

The growing international criticism, he argued, had created pressure for Israel to demonstrate that it was capable of restraining the settlers.

"These international protests have finally begun to bother the Israeli government and army, requiring them to take a step that appears more serious, especially after the latter was accused of colluding in these attacks," Musa told The New Arab. "Therefore, today's campaign in Qusra was aimed at giving the impression that the army is enforcing order and the law."

The soldiers' relatively forceful response, including the use of tear gas and stun grenades against settlers, could reflect the need for a more visible display of enforcement, Musa said.

"Its use of a relatively higher degree of violence this morning may indicate an urgent need for a demonstrative display by the army in which it presents itself as more serious than at previous times," he said.

But Musa cautioned against interpreting the confrontation as evidence of a fundamental rupture between the Israeli state and the settlement movement.

Settlers and the religious Zionist movement have become deeply embedded in Israeli political and military institutions, he said, while support for settlement expansion has spread more broadly through Israeli society.

How powerful are the settlers?

Asked whether settlers had grown beyond the Israeli military's control, Musa said it was still "too early" to reach such a conclusion.

What was clearer, he said, was the extent of their influence.

Settlers, particularly members of the religious nationalist movement driving the current expansion campaign, wield considerable power across Israeli state institutions, including the military and security services, Musa said.

That influence makes any sustained confrontation between the state and the settlement movement difficult, he argued, because attempts to restrain settlers could produce far-reaching political consequences inside Israel.

There are nevertheless divisions within the Israeli military and political establishment over how far settlement expansion should go.

According to Musa, some of that concern centres on the expansion of settlements and outposts into Areas A and B of the occupied West Bank, which under the Oslo framework were intended to remain distinct from the territory under full Israeli control.

Expanding deeper into those areas would dramatically increase contact and friction between settlers and Palestinians, Musa said, further eroding any remaining physical separation between the two populations.

That trajectory, he argued, could ultimately force Israel towards either a binational political reality or an increasingly explicit system of apartheid.

Israel's right wing, however, has shown little concern about that prospect, Musa said, seeing the current moment instead as an opportunity to accelerate demographic changes across the occupied West Bank through sustained pressure on Palestinians.

For the Abu Rida family, those larger political questions are playing out immediately outside their home.

The soldiers who dismantled the settlers' tent on Wednesday eventually left. The settlers did not.

Within hours, their numbers had swelled to more than 100.

For Musa, the episode therefore offered little evidence that Israel's broader approach to the settlement movement had changed.

Instead, he said, the struggle over the West Bank was increasingly becoming "a race against time" before the United States determines what final political reality it wants to see there.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

The biggest election night news by far was the defeat of progressive candidate for Wisconsin governor Francesca Hong, who had been ahead in the polls days before the election. She was beat by a razor-thin margin by moderate David Crowley, after her opponents focused on a past comment she made suggesting canceling Thanksgiving.

As with many primaries, the result appeared to come down to electability in a swing state where Democrats will have to appeal to moderates and independents in November. Like the tight Senate race in Michigan the previous week, Hong was quick to endorse Crowley, and the Wisconsin Democrats immediately started a statewide unity tour.

“I think winning became the most important criteria,” David Frank, professor of rhetoric and political communication at the University of Oregon, told The New Arab. “They’ll embrace a significant number of the DSA [Democratic Socialists of America] policies. The key is for the two wings of the Democratic Party to find common ground.”

In Minnesota, the epicentre of months-long anti-ICE demonstrations, progressive Peggy Flanagan beat establishment-backed Angie Craig by nearly 20 percentage points in the Democratic Senate primary. In her victory speech, she vowed to “rip ICE apart.” If elected in November, she would be the first Native American US senator.

On the Republican side, Trump-endorsed pillow executive Mike Lindell lost his bid for nomination for governor by more than 10 percentage points. He has yet to concede the race, and has suggested that errors took place in the vote counting.

Also in Minnesota, notable for its lack of fanfare, was the primary win of Ilhan Omar, who advanced in her Democratic House primary with 80 percent of the vote without a serious challenge from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) or other big donors.

In Connecticut, John Larson, an AIPAC-backed House candidate, who has been in office since 1999, was defeated by Hartford Mayor Luke Bronin, who has been campaigned on affordability and has said he is against sending US tax dollars for offensive weapons to Israel.

AIPAC, which has long been a staple in US elections and policymaking, has become increasingly toxic in Democratic elections, and a growing number of politicians are rejecting the Israel lobbyist’s support, seeing it as a liability.

Some progressives have successfully campaigned on their opposition to AIPAC.

"Every day I lived with the pain, knowing the foetus was dead," she says. "I had two choices. Wait for the pills, or wait to start bleeding."

The 31-year-old mother of four from the Sabra district of Gaza City has been displaced six times since the war began. She discovered she was pregnant in March, between one displacement and the next. 

Nuhail went to the hospital, had the tests, had an ultrasound, and was told the pregnancy was progressing normally.

She went back a fortnight later and was reassured again.

"When the doctor examined me the next time, he said the foetus was dead and incomplete, and that I needed an abortion," she says. "I was shocked, especially because I had been going back to him regularly, and every time he told me things were fine."

She had felt nothing. "I never expected it. I had no sense that the foetus had died, and the shock was enormous."

The doctor told her that the conditions the war had created were likely among the causes: cooking over firewood, physical exhaustion, walking long distances without transport, hunger, and poor nutrition.

The six weeks that followed were the hardest of it. "Every day that passed hurt, in my body and in my mind."

Her health has not returned. "My body became frail. I tire quickly, and my joints hurt. I reached a point where all I wanted was for someone to look after me."

'I had no feeling that this could happen'

Yusra (prefers to use her first name for privacy) is 29, has two children, has been displaced more than five times, and now lives in a tent west of Gaza City.

She learned she was pregnant in April 2026 and followed the pregnancy carefully from the first weeks, visiting a doctor three times and completing every test. Each time, she was told the foetus was developing normally.

"Every time I went, she reassured me the pregnancy was normal. I had no feeling that this could happen to me."

At twelve weeks, sitting inside her tent, she began to bleed heavily.

"I was very frightened. They took me to the hospital quickly, straight into the operating theatre, under full anaesthesia."

She woke to the news that the pregnancy was gone. Her haemoglobin had fallen to seven.

"Since then, I have had dizziness, exhaustion, and pain throughout my whole body. My health has not gone back to what it was."

No specific medical cause was given, only that the conditions of the war, the displacement, the strain and the unrelenting pressure may have been behind it.

Zaher al-Wahaidi, who directs the health information unit at Gaza's Ministry of Health, says the first half of 2026 shows an unprecedented rise in recorded miscarriages: 3,958 cases between January and June.

June recorded the highest number, at 790. April recorded the highest rate, 377.25 miscarriages per thousand live births.

Over the six months, the rate was 208.5 per thousand live births, compared with 64 per thousand in the second half of 2025. It has risen roughly 3.3 times in under a year.

Zaher says 73.6 percent of cases occurred in the first trimester, before thirteen weeks, and 26.4 percent in the second, between 13 and 24 weeks. Among pregnant women on the ministry's register, 57.1 percent were anaemic.

The curve rose from 93.28 per thousand in January to its April peak, fell back in May and June, and remains far above anything recorded before.

What the delivery room sees

Maysoun Suleiman Abu Braik heads the delivery room department at Al-Awda Hospital in Nuseirat. Her staff has recorded more women arriving with pregnancy loss, with early bleeding, and with pregnancies at risk of miscarriage.

Many arrive after their condition has already deteriorated, she says, because repeated displacement, the difficulty of moving around and the interruption of routine antenatal care delayed them getting there at all. She is careful to note that establishing the precise scale of the increase requires official statistics.

What she describes is an accumulation. Severe psychological pressure from bombardment, bereavement and displacement, alongside malnutrition, anaemia, dehydration and a shortage of drinking water.

Limited availability of basic medicines and supplements, iron and folic acid among them, and of the drugs needed for chronic conditions, including hypertension, diabetes and thyroid disease.

Conditions inside shelters and tents compound it: overcrowding, poor sanitation, and a higher risk of infectious disease. So does the physical labour of displacement itself, carrying belongings, walking long distances for water or food, and rarely sleeping properly.

With infrastructure destroyed by Israel and fuel and gas scarce, many women cook over firewood and inhale smoke for hours, alongside the dust and pollutants of the ruins.

Malnutrition, she says, is among the most dangerous factors of all. A woman who cannot get enough protein, energy, iron, folic acid and calcium risks anaemia, restricted foetal growth, low birth weight and premature delivery, and the risk of losing the pregnancy rises when that combines with infection, exhaustion and absent medical care.

Al-Awda's own records show the pattern:

'Permanently alert'

What pregnant women in Gaza face is not one threat but a set of interlocking ones: continuous fear, bombardment, displacement, malnutrition, dehydration, physical exhaustion and the difficulty of reaching healthcare at all, explains Said al-Kahlout, a mental health specialist. 

A pregnant woman in war lives in a state of permanent alert. Her body stays braced because the danger keeps recurring, and stress hormones including cortisol and adrenaline stay elevated.

That response is normal in the face of threat.

Sustained for months, it affects sleep, appetite, blood pressure, immunity and mental health, particularly when there are no intervals of safety in which the body can recover.

He describes insomnia and nightmares, palpitations, muscular tension, loss of appetite, persistent exhaustion, difficulty concentrating, panic attacks, depression and symptoms of post-traumatic stress.

War imposes what he calls continuous trauma, in which the painful experience never ends but renews itself with each bombardment, each displacement, each fear for a family member.

Studies link exposure to armed conflict with higher risks of certain pregnancy complications, including premature birth and low birth weight, though never to a single factor.

Losing a pregnancy in these conditions is harder and more complicated, he says, because a woman does not lose only the pregnancy.

She may have lost her home, or a member of her family, or her sense of safety, while the danger continues around her and there is no safe space in which to grieve or recover.

The response, he argues, cannot be medical alone. It has to include psychological support, social protection, and recognition that losing a pregnancy is a real loss deserving care rather than blame.

"In war, a woman may not only lose her pregnancy," he says. "She may lose her sense of safety with it, and her trust in her own body, and her picture of the future."

A legal question

Abdullah Sharshara, a lawyer and chairman of the Ajyal Association for Creativity and Development, argues that international humanitarian law and international human rights law impose clear obligations toward pregnant women in armed conflict, as among those most exposed to health and humanitarian risk.

Those obligations include guaranteeing access to antenatal, delivery and postnatal care, protecting medical facilities and personnel, securing medicines and medical supplies, and not exposing pregnant women to risks arising from siege, starvation or attacks on health infrastructure.

A rise in miscarriages during war, he says, should not be treated only as a set of individual medical events.

It can constitute a legal and human rights indicator of a possible violation of the right to health, if the cases are shown to be connected to factors produced by the conflict: the targeting or disabling of health facilities, absent medical care, malnutrition, severe psychological pressure, or restrictions on reaching services.

"The right to health, under international instruments, is not limited to providing treatment," he says.

"It also includes guaranteeing the conditions that allow pregnant women to receive safe and continuous care, protecting their lives and the lives of the foetuses they carry."

Where medical and statistical evidence supports it, he argues, such cases can be relied on as evidence of the conflict's direct effect on reproductive health, and of the scale of civilian harm.

But for Nuhail Muharram, she is not thinking about evidence.

She is thinking about the six weeks she spent carrying a pregnancy she already knew was over, waiting for medication that a hospital in Gaza could not give her.

Ansam Al-Kitaa is a freelance journalist based in Gaza. For years, she has covered the successive wars in Gaza and their humanitarian and social impacts for international and local outlets

This piece is published in collaboration with Egab

Infantino, who is seeking reelection next year, has faced open revolt after three confederations—UEFA, AFC and CONCACAF—called for him to quit over his aborted bid to bring private investment into FIFA competitions, including the World Cup.

The Swiss administrator had proposed carving off the commercial rights to the World Cup and selling 20% to private investors to raise about $4.2 billion.

"Recognising the important role of Arab football in bringing people together and strengthening cooperation among football associations across the Arab world, we ... express our full support for Mr Gianni Infantino, president of FIFA, and reaffirm our confidence in his leadership and continued commitment to the development of football worldwide," the heads of the six federations said in a joint statement.

The statement was signed by the heads of the national federations of Qatar, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt and Mauritania. Four of the six signatories are also FIFA Council members.

"We deeply appreciate Mr Infantino’s sustained efforts to advance football globally, expand opportunities across all regions and strengthen the game’s role in bringing people and communities together," they said.

"We look forward to continuing our close cooperation with him towards a stronger and more prosperous future for world football, expanding opportunities and further enhancing Arab football’s contribution to the global game."

Infantino’s withdrawn proposal came with a $20 million grant for member associations for the next funding cycle, an amount that could have been doubled if they signed the deal.

Despite the opposition of the three confederations, which represent 136 of the 211 member associations who will vote in the FIFA presidential election in March, Infantino still has plenty of allies in the game.

Eurovision Song Contest organisers announced Wednesday that they were excluding any country in an armed conflict from hosting the competition and increased the mininum age of competitors.

While they did not mention any country by name, Israel, which has been at war in Gaza since 2023, came close to winning the competition in both 2025 and 2026, ultimately finishing second on each occasion.

Under the old rules, the winning country normally hosts the following year's competition.

Under the new rules, "the winning broadcaster will automatically be ineligible to host the contest if an armed conflict, a sensitive geopolitical situation, or any other situation materially affects the security, safety or stability of their state or immediate region", they said in a statement.

In a first, five countries—Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Iceland—boycotted the 2026 competition in Vienna over Israel's participation.

They said they could not take part alongside Israel because of its genocidal war on Gaza, ongoing since October 2023.

Martin Green, director of the Eurovision Song Contest, said in a statement that the changes had been guided by feedback from member countries.

"These changes are about giving everyone involved greater clarity, protecting artists and ensuring the contest continues to provide a safe and welcoming environment, while preserving the spirit and integrity that make the Eurovision Song Contest so special," he added.

Minimum age requirement

The organisers also announced that competitors must be at at least 18, up from 16, on the day of their first rehearsal.

"This change continues the work already undertaken by the contest to strengthen safeguarding and protect younger artists from the pressures associated with competing at the Eurovision Song Contest," they added in the statement.

The youngest person to win the contest was 13-year-old Sandra Kim from Belgium in 1986, according to Eurovision records.

Eurovision is a co-production of public broadcasters belonging to the European Broadcasting Union. Since the EBU includes members from outside Europe, the contest is not limited to European countries.

The EBU said it could commission an independent security assessment before deciding whether a winning country is capable of hosting the event safely.

If a winning country is found unable to host the contest, the EBU will appoint another host nation.

Under the new rules, that country will organise the concert "in its own right" and "will not be required to stage the event on behalf of another member".

Ukraine hosted Eurovision in 2017 despite the conflict in the country's east between Ukrainian forces and Moscow-backed separatists.

But after Ukraine won the contest in 2022, it was unable to host the following year's edition because of Russia's full-scale invasion.

Eurovision 2023 was instead held in Liverpool in Britain on Ukraine's behalf.

After nearly three years of the Israeli genocidal war, Hamas and Fatah remain divided and face political and organisational limits. Smaller factions like Islamic Jihad have even less capacity to influence Gaza's future.

The issue isn't just how Palestinians should respond to Israel, but also each faction's role post-war. Can Hamas hold a political role if its weapons dominate negotiations? Can Fatah return to Gaza without Hamas's consent? And can factions unify before outside powers decide Gaza's future?

Akram Attallah, a Gaza-based political analyst, believes that the Palestinian factions are entering a phase in which none can impose its vision alone, making unity essential to shaping Gaza's future.

"The Palestinian factions face a new reality after the war. Hamas cannot return to governing Gaza as it did before, while Fatah cannot return without Palestinian agreement," Attallah told The New Arab. "Their weakness could either deepen the division or push them toward a new political understanding."

He said Netanyahu was seeking to alter the second phase by making Hamas' disarmament and the dismantling of its military infrastructure a condition for Israeli withdrawal.

"Israel does not reject the second phase, but wants a second phase that is radically different from the one that was negotiated," he added.

Attallah warned that continued division could leave outside powers determining Gaza's political future.

The weapons question

Hamas is at the centre of the next phase because its weapons is a very contentious issue in negotiations.

Accepting disarmament under Israeli terms risks stripping Hamas of its main military capabilities and protections without Israeli withdrawal guarantees. Rejecting disarmament might enable Israel to retain forces in Gaza or renew hostilities.

According to Palestinian analysts, a middle ground could involve gradual disarmament, phased Israeli withdrawal, international guarantees, reconstruction, and Hamas' inclusion in the Palestinian political system.

Ramallah-based analyst Tamara Haddad believes that the debate isn't just about disarmament but also about "who implements it, how, when, and what defines weapons as disarmed."

"Making disarmament a condition for Israeli withdrawal could reintroduce deadlock, with Israel demanding disarmament before pulling out and Hamas insisting it won't surrender weapons until Israel fulfils commitments," she told TNA.

"Any new deal needs clear timelines and verification to prevent indefinite Israeli presence in Gaza. Beyond weapons, Gaza's governance faces challenges after war damage and regional pressure, making a return to previous rule difficult," she said.

Haddad suggests Hamas could shift from sole governance to participation in broader Palestinian politics, ensuring its presence and avoiding disarmament exclusion.

Fatah faces a different challenge. Officially, the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority might be ready to handle Gaza's administration, but its return needs Palestinian consensus. A return based on Israeli or U.S. plans excluding Hamas could just recreate division.

"Neither Hamas nor Fatah had the ability to impose its vision unilaterally," Esmat Mansour, a Ramallah-based analyst, told TNA.

Hamas, he said, was under pressure over its weapons and its future rule in Gaza, while Fatah could not govern the Strip without Palestinian consensus and political and regional support.

Mansour described the weakness of both sides as a possible opening for a new understanding.

The continued division, he said, "is no longer just an internal Palestinian problem, but has become a strategic weakness," allowing external actors to deal separately with Gaza and the occupied West Bank.

Palestinian or outside control?

The inability of the factions to impose their positions could either deepen their rivalry or encourage them to develop a common political framework.

So, Mansour called for a "comprehensive Palestinian formula" to unify factions, addressing Gaza's administration, weapons, and representation.

He proposed a transitional government of independent figures linked to unified institutions, involving political forces within a broader national framework.

Reconstruction and security efforts could support this, offering Hamas an exit from the control versus disarmament dilemma and Fatah a route back to Gaza based on Palestinian consensus, avoiding external deals.

Islamic Jihad and other factions may need to redefine their roles, shifting from mainly military actions to political participation within a broader Palestinian framework.

Mansour emphasised the immediate need to consolidate the ceasefire and prevent the second phase dispute from collapsing the agreement.

He also highlighted the importance of maintaining simultaneous disarmament and withdrawal.

He argued that this setup would need real US pressure on Israel, as Netanyahu probably wouldn't change just due to mediators.

"Time could be working against the Palestinian factions as Israeli elections approach," Taysir Abdullah, a Gaza-based analyst, told TNA.

He said US pressure on Netanyahu had declined as the Trump administration focused on other issues, while Netanyahu had effectively entered an "election campaign" and could use the rejection of the 15-point proposal to regain room for military operations and targeted killings.

Abdullah warned that continued Palestinian division could allow outside actors to shape Gaza's future. "If Hamas negotiates alone over weapons and Fatah over Gaza's administration, the Palestinians could find themselves implementing arrangements rather than shaping them," he said.

He stressed that consolidating the ceasefire and reaching a Palestinian understanding was essential to preventing US, Israeli and regional actors from determining Gaza's political and security future.

Paradoxically, the factions' shared weakness may offer their best chance for agreement. Hamas cannot restore its previous rule alone, Fatah cannot return without Palestinian consensus, and smaller factions lack a viable alternative.

Attallah, Mansour, al-Hadad and Abullah believe that the most realistic path is to consolidate the ceasefire, establish phased disarmament alongside Israeli withdrawal, form a transitional Gaza administration and rebuild unified Palestinian institutions.

Otherwise, continued division could leave Israel, the United States and regional actors shaping Gaza's future, rather than the Palestinians themselves.

Paramilitary drones on Thursday attacked the Sudanese capital Khartoum for the second day in a row.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been ravaged by war between the Sudanese military, led by its chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), commanded by Burhan's former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Daglo.

The latest attack comes a day after the RSF launched far-reaching coordinated drone strikes targeting five army-controlled cities hundreds of kilometres apart.

On Thursday, an AFP correspondent in the capital reported the firing of anti-aircraft missiles from Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city, followed by the sound of an explosion.

"Military air defences engaged with the militia's drones and downed them," an army source told AFP.

Witnesses in central Khartoum and Khartoum North across the Nile river also reported seeing drones in the sky and hearing explosions.

Across the country, aid workers estimate more than 200,000 people have been killed in what the UN calls a "war of atrocities". The conflict has also caused the world's largest hunger and displacement crises.

Burhan and Daglo, allies until they fell out in a bitter power struggle, have spent most of the war in a relative stalemate, unwilling to hold negotiations while vying for a decisive battlefield advantage.

The RSF last year consolidated its hold on the vast western region of Darfur, and has since pushed to seize territory in the southern Kordofan region and along the southeastern Ethiopian border.

The army holds Sudan's centre, north and east, and last month clinched a victory in Kordofan by pushing the RSF off a key highway leading to the capital.

Daglo in the aftermath said he would "unleash" his fighters—already accused of war crimes including genocide—and his forces have since repeatedly threatened a large-scale retaliatory attack.

An Israeli military base in this part of Gaza and that close to the Palestinian territory's border with Sinai, the north-eastern Egyptian territory that shares borders with both Gaza and Israel, is a clear violation of political and security understandings between Cairo and Tel Aviv, Egyptian observers argue.

"This is particularly a violation of the Philadelphi Accord of 2005," Egyptian political researcher Islam Mansi said.

Speaking to The New Arab, he hoped that Egypt would submit an official complaint at the Multinational Force and Observers, which was established via a 1981 protocol to oversee the implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, to prove the Israeli violation and end it.

Southern Gaza has been home to wide ranging activities by the Israeli military, including earthworks, berms, trenches, roads, and outpost fortifications, according to multiple media reports.

Some of these reports refer to Israeli engineering work continuing even as civilian rubble clearance and reconstruction in parts of the southern Gaza city of Rafah have stalled.

These activities are most probably related to the expansion of Israeli military outposts in the area, not to the construction of new bases, some observers note.

They add, however, that the same expansion works attest to the presence of a plan in Tel Aviv for permanent military presence in Gaza on the Egyptian border.

Constraints

Egypt has yet to officially comment on reports about the construction of new Israeli military bases or the expansion of outposts already present in Rafah.

Concern among observers in the populous Arab country is mainly focused on agreements and political and security understandings regulating military activity and deployments in areas along the Egyptian-Gaza border.

Signed on 1 September 2005 upon Israel's self-proclaimed "unilateral disengagement" from Gaza, the Philadelphi Accord delegated policing Gaza's border with Sinai as a mission to the Palestinian Authority.

It stipulated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Philadelphi Corridor, a narrow strip of roughly 100 metres wide and about 14 kilometres long along the entire Gaza-Egypt border.

The accord came to add to constraints to military activity and presence along the Egypt-Israel border, ones enshrined in the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty, the first between an Arab country and the self-proclaimed Jewish state.

Signed almost six years after Egypt's war for the liberation of Sinai from Israeli occupation, the treaty established demilitarized zones along the Egyptian-Israeli border and set force limits on both sides of the border.

Some Egyptian analysts argue that Israeli military presence in the Philadelphi Corridor also violates the spirit or the terms of those security arrangements and the peace treaty's emphasis on inviolable borders.

Mutual accusations

Israel took control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing on Gaza's border with Egypt in May 2024, almost eight months after it unleashed its brutal genocidal war on Gaza.

At the time, the Israeli government claimed that the move aimed to block Hamas rearmament through tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border.

Egypt condemned, however, the same move as a "dangerous escalation" and warned through diplomatic channels that the operation put its peace treaty with Israel at risk.

Such an exchange came as some Israeli officials and experts criticised what they described as Egypt's military build-up in Sinai, especially in the demilitarized border area, accusing Egypt of violating the peace treaty.

The most notable such criticism reportedly came during a meeting in Jerusalem between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in September 2025.

During the meeting, the Israeli premier called on the US secretary of state to put pressure on Egypt to remove military infrastructure and installations implemented in Sinai in recent years.

Israel's Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter also raised the same issue last year, by warning that Egyptian military bases in Sinai could be used for offensive operations.

Egyptian security analysts say, however, that their country has to beef up security in Sinai to prevent fallout from the chaos in Gaza and protect a territory that straddles one of the world's most crucial maritime chokepoints, namely the Suez Canal.

"Such measures are vital for Sinai's security which is inseparable from Egypt's national security," retired Egyptian army general Mohamed al-Ghabari told TNA.

Egypt, he added, acts under fears from the infiltration of terrorists from Gaza and also Israel's plan to displace Gaza's population into Sinai.

Ceasefire strains

Egyptian anger at the construction or the expansion of Israeli military sites in Gaza near the Sinai border comes at a time of major tension between Cairo and Tel Aviv, observers said.

Together with the other mediators, the US, Qatar and Turkey, Egypt helped broker the current Gaza ceasefire deal in October last year.

The deal, which ended major Israeli military operations in Gaza, stipulates a phased Israeli withdrawal from the war-ravaged territory to pave the way for its reconstruction and recovery.

Nevertheless, throughout all the past months, Israel refused to downsize its military deployments in the Palestinian territory, having already occupied over 70% of its pace, before Hamas decommissions its weapons.

Last month, truce mediators and the Board of Peace, the body formed by US President Donald Trump to oversee the implementation of the Gaza ceasefire plan, convinced Hamas and other factions to disarm.

This did not, however, reason the Israeli government out of its plan to maintain presence in Gaza, which further strains relations with Cairo, analysts said.

Mansi said Israel wants Hamas to be fully disarmed before it makes any troop withdrawal.

Israel, he added, uses its tightening military grip on Gaza as a political pressure card to ensure that its own conditions are met.

"This is why it keeps widening the scope of its military presence in the strip, including through the construction of new bases and the expansion of ones already present," he added.

Here are the updates of the day:

• President Donald Trump claims US has "total control" over the Strait of Hormuz, while Iranian officials claim it remains closed until Washington meets Tehran’s conditions
   
• Pakistan says it is trying to bring Washington and Tehran "to the negotiating table", as Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi visited Iran
   
• Oil prices reached $87.69 a barrel, once again 
   
• Israeli attacks on Gaza, West Bank, and south Lebanon despite any agreement. Meanwhile, Israel's defence minister Israel Katz says Israel will not withdraw from territory it occupies in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza

And so we continue our live coverage...

In May 2026, activists reclaimed the slur by launching the satirical Cockroach Janata Party (CJP). Founded by Abhijeet Dipke, who serves as its president, the movement emerged amid widespread anger over the cancellation of India's national medical entrance examination, known as the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). Medical student aspirants studied for long periods, took the notoriously tough exam, only to be forced to resit it following news that the questions had been leaked.

Multiple students committed suicide following all the distress that they had endured.

Relying extensively on generative AI to produce its public-facing campaign material, the movement rapidly gained traction online. By the time of writing, CJP's Instagram page amassed over 26 million followers, surpassing even the BJP's official Instagram account, which has over 9 million followers.

Following the mass mobilisations that provided the movement with leverage, the CJP leadership put forward a list of principal demands: the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, and the equivalent of around $105,000 (One crore Indian Rupees) in compensation for the families of NEET aspirants who died by suicide.

But the anger that brought people to the streets was wider than these demands. It reflected growing unemployment, an increasingly commercialised education system serving the interests of the ruling class, and a broader frustration with the shrinking space for dissent under Modi's government. For many, the CJP became a vehicle through which these anxieties could converge.

Indeed, in many ways the CJP became a telling story less about the protests themselves than about the political homelessness of sections of India's liberal middle class. After 12 years of BJP rule, institutional collapse and a weakened opposition, many were desperately looking for something that felt like politics again.

The movement became a container for that hope. But hope can also become a political blind spot, making us less willing to ask whether a movement's demands can transform the structures it seeks to challenge.

However, the question was never simply whether the CJP succeeded. It was what success should look like under the Modi regime’s authoritarianism. And the CJP made its biggest mistake the moment it believed a fascist state could be trusted.

On 20 July, while students in the heart of India's capital were being met with tear gas, electric batons, pellet guns, lathi charges and mass detentions, the CJP leadership was negotiating on their behalf inside the residence of J.P. Nadda, the Union Minister for Health and Family Welfare, alongside Jitendra Singh, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office.

Five days later, the same leaders appeared beside those ministers at a joint press conference to announce that the protests would be called off with immediate effect.

Almost overnight, the protest site at Delhi's Jantar Mantar, which had drawn thousands of students and supporters for over a month, was dismantled.

Meanwhile, Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan resigned, only to be replaced by Pralhad Joshi, a five-time Member of Parliament and one of Modi's longest-serving cabinet ministers. Joshi had previously defended the release of the men convicted of the gang rape of Bilkis Bano during the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat. The change therefore offered a symbolic concession without altering the political architecture surrounding the crisis.

Additionally, the very institution that was responsible for the NEET exam issues remained structurally intact, as did the broader architecture that produced it.

For whom was democracy restored?

The most revealing aspect of the CJP movement was also the language that surrounded it. On the day of the 20 July negotiations, arguably the movement's defining moment, the CJP leadership declared that "democracy had died" after the brutal police crackdown on students. Then just five days later, following negotiations with the government, Chief Spokesperson Saurav Das declared that "democracy has been restored."

But what do such declarations mean when the institutions that keep producing the crisis remain intact?

Even the resignation was quickly reframed by the BJP, with Dharmendra Pradhan presenting himself as a martyr who had stepped down to prevent the exploitation of "anti-national elements". This allowed the government to absorb the least possible accountability while conceding the greatest symbolic victory.

Ultimately, the problem that developed within the protest movement was not simply the result of poor negotiation; it was also the result of a single-issue-based political strategy.

The CJP's greatest missed opportunity came from the scale of the moment itself. For perhaps the first time in years, a large and politically diverse group of young people had mobilised against the government's handling of education and were confronting the coercive power of the state.

That created an opportunity to connect their demands to struggles that had long existed outside their immediate political world: farmers fighting for their livelihoods, workers confronting precarity, communities resisting displacement, people fighting against the suppression of dissent, and movements confronting rising unemployment, poverty and the climate crisis.

The question was not whether the CJP could take up every struggle at once, but whether it could recognise that these struggles were connected and use its unprecedented visibility to build something larger.

In contrast to some within the protest movement, politics has never been optional for large sections of Indian society. Adivasi communities resisting land acquisition, Muslim communities confronting the violence of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), Kashmiris living under militarisation, workers fighting precarity, and political prisoners incarcerated for dissent have long experienced the violence of the state as a daily reality.

The CJP resonated most deeply with an urban liberal constituency for whom that inevitability arrived much later. As India's education system entered crisis, many encountered the coercive power of the state in ways they had not before, including through violence. But recognising this as a beginning risks obscuring the much longer histories of resistance that made this moment legible in the first place.

The contrast was visible throughout the weeks of protest. While the CJP occupied the national imagination, activist Amit Bhatnagar and Adivasi communities were also on an indefinite hunger strike against the Ken-Betwa river-linking project, which threatens widespread displacement and ecological destruction.

Their protest site was dismantled by police before dawn with little national attention or public outcry.

This is not an argument against the protesters, nor is it a competition over suffering. Clearly, some struggles become nationally legible only when they enter the social and emotional universe of those with greater cultural visibility, while others continue for years at the margins of public attention.

For many, the CJP was the beginning of political awakening. For others, it was another chapter in a struggle that had never paused.

How the CJP will be remembered

The CJP had reached a rare moment of political power. Thousands of young people had mobilised, the protests had captured national attention, and the state had been forced to negotiate. This should have led to a refusal to allow the government to define the limits of what the movement could demand.

Instead, the protests were called off at the government's behest, and an unusual opening for broader political challenge came to an end.

The CJP may eventually be remembered not only for what it achieved, but for what it revealed. It reminded us that people are still willing to organise, still willing to occupy the streets, still willing to risk police violence for a different future. But it also revealed how desperately India's opposition has come to mistake moments for movements, symbolism for strategy and hope for organisation.

The RSS did not spend a century building Hindutva through isolated protests or reactionary demands; it patiently established institutions, ideology and cadre. The opposition cannot afford to respond only when another crisis erupts, or another movement captures public imagination. It must do the slower, less glamorous work of building an alternative political imagination, one rooted in ideology, organisation and solidarity.

Hope may bring people to the streets. But organisation determines what it leaves behind.

Shrishti Khanna is a political activist, writer and former mental health worker based in Mumbai, India. Having worked in government psychiatric wards and as a teacher, her work focuses on India-Israel relations, authoritarianism, digital surveillance, Palestine and Chronic Illness/disability. She has been published in The Wire and Azad Essa's Hostile Homelands newsletter, and writes her own newsletter on Substack. Her activism and writing have been featured in publications including Middle East Eye, Maktoob Media, Article 14 and Free Speech Collective, among others.

Prashant Pundir is a political activist and published poet based in Mumbai, India. His work focuses on anti-fascist organising, Palestine, anti-caste justice and Trans Queer rights. Together with Shrishti Khanna, his activism and writing have been featured in publications including Middle East Eye, Maktoob Media, Article 14 and Free Speech Collective, among others. They also maintain an active social media presence documenting political developments in India and Palestine. 

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz visited southern Lebanon on Wednesday, vowing to destroy infrastructure and keep troops in a so-called "security zone" as well as in Syria and Gaza.

The comments came almost two months after Israel and Lebanon agreed to a US-sponsored framework deal that involves the disarmament of Hezbollah, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon's south and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the region, starting in test areas known as "pilot zones".

The United States plans new talks in early September in Rome between Israel and Lebanon.

Katz and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have repeatedly vowed not to withdraw from the "security zone" in southern Lebanon - territory where Israeli forces operate that reaches around 10 kilometres (six miles) into Lebanon.

"As the prime minister and I have clearly stated, we are not withdrawing from this security zone," Katz said during a visit to troops, according to a statement from his office.

The Israeli military "is here to protect the northern communities and its own forces. We will clear this area and guarantee the security of the residents of the north. We will in no way withdraw from the security zones: not in Lebanon, not in Syria, and not in Gaza," he added.

In southern Lebanon, Katz said the military was "destroying the underground infrastructure" in the area and "destroying all the houses".

Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in early March with rocket fire aimed at Israel to avenge the killing of Iran's supreme leader in US-Israeli strikes.

Israel responded with massive airstrikes and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon.

Israel has also carried out repeated incursions and bombings in Syria since the overthrow of longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad, saying it sought to establish a demilitarised zone in the country's south.

In Gaza, Israeli forces occupy more than 60 percent of the war-battered territory.

Last week, Netanyahu rejected a US-led plan for Gaza endorsed by Hamas, saying the Israeli military "will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed, and will continue to thwart threats against our forces and our citizens".

(AFP)

More than 30 nations, including France, the United Kingdom and Canada, on Wednesday condemned Iran's use of capital punishment, saying in a joint statement the Islamic republic was executing protesters to "silence dissent".

The countries, joined by the European Union's top diplomat, "condemn in the strongest terms the ongoing executions of protesters and use of the death penalty" by Iran.

"The use of capital punishment to silence dissent, intimidate communities, and punish individuals exercising their human rights can never be justified," the statement said.

"The people of Iran must be free to exercise their rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly without fear."

After the initial 26 countries and the EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, "other countries joined this declaration" bringing the number of signatories up to 32, the French foreign ministry told AFP.

Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Italy, Germany and numerous other European nations were among those calling for Iran "to immediately end the use of the death penalty and release all those arbitrarily detained".

The statement joins growing alarm from the United Nations and rights groups over a surge in executions in recent months, after Iran was rocked by nationwide anti-government protests earlier in the year and the start of the Middle East war in February.

Earlier in August UN rights chief Volker Turk said the death penalty was being used by Tehran to "instil fear".

According to the UN, since 19 March, at least 56 people have been executed on national security-related charges, including 27 people in cases linked to the protests.

More than 100 others are at risk of being put to death on similar charges, Turk said.

The UN and rights groups have warned of a lack of fair trials and forced confessions.

In late December last year, a protest movement initially sparked by the high cost of living exploded into widespread anti-government demonstrations.

Iranian authorities reported more than 3,000 deaths, but attributed the violence to "terrorist acts" orchestrated by the United States and Israel.

Rights groups based abroad recorded a far higher toll and said the security forces had fired on demonstrators.

"Seven months after the mass atrocities committed against the Iranian people, who rose up to demand justice and dignity, the regime continues to shed blood by carrying out a growing number of executions," French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said in an X post with the statement.

The United States and Israel launched a joint attack on the country weeks on 28 February, triggering the Middle East war.

Since then, arrests and executions have multiplied in the country, linked to both the conflict and the protests.

Last year, Iran put to death over 2,150 people, according to Amnesty International, making it again by a huge margin the world's most prolific executioner after China.

(AFP)

Gaza's civil defence agency said the strike in Beit Lahia in the northern Gaza Strip targeted civilians riding in a tuk-tuk.

The strike killed Mohanad Saada, whose body was "torn to pieces", and wounded five other people, according to the civil defence agency and Al-Shifa Hospital.

A witness said Saada was among a group of workers who were repairing a wall damaged by Israeli shelling.

In Khan Younis, an elderly man and a child were injured after an Israeli drone dropped a grenade on a gathering of civilians, a medic at Nasser Hospital said.

"It is true that Israeli airstrikes and assassinations had almost completely ceased for over a week, but today the occupation resumed its aerial bombardment," civil defence spokesman Mahmoud Bassal told AFP.

The Israeli military claimed it targeted a Hamas commander, charging that he had been planning attacks against Israeli forces occupying the devastated territory.

Israel had not carried out airstrikes in the Gaza Strip since 3 August, following US President Donald Trump's announcement of a "major milestone" in his plan to end the war.

Hamas had announced that it would disarm by giving its weapons to a nascent Palestinian governing committee. Trump's "Board of Peace", in charge of implementing the ceasefire deal, had initially announced that Israel in turn would start a phased withdrawal from much of the Gaza Strip.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday publicly rejected the deal and vowed no Israeli pullout, even after the Board of Peace reassured him that Israel would not have to withdraw until complete Hamas disarmament.

Netanyahu, who faces pushback from his far-right base on Gaza ahead of tight elections in October, had until Wednesday avoided major strikes though Israeli forces have continued to shell areas of Gaza close to the line of contact.

Israel has refused to comply with the US-backed ceasefire in October, and has continued to launch daily attacks on the territory.

Israeli operations in Gaza have killed 1,259 Palestinians and injured more than 4,000 others since the ceasefire was supposed to come into effect, according to the local health ministry.

(AFP and TNA staff)

"The U.S.A. has total control over the Strait of Hormuz. I THINK WE WILL KEEP IT!" Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. "Our Naval Blockade is being called, by everyone, 'A WALL OF STEEL,' and there is nothing Iran can do about it."

Trump has repeatedly claimed the United States controls the strait, which is vital for the flow of energy and other commodity shipping through the Middle East.

However, Iran effectively controls much of the waterway and intends to impose a toll system in response to the US war launched by Trump on 28 February.

Late Tuesday, Trump told reporters: "We have total control over the Hormuz Strait right now. They don't have control. We have total control. We own it."

Trump's latest remark came as regional mediators pushed for the two countries to restart peace talks ahead of the expiry of the 60-day memorandum of understanding on 17 August.

Both sides declared the agreement dead in the water last month after the US resumed attacks on Iran and Tehran targeted tankers in the strait.

US and Israeli forces have heavily bombed Iran's military and killed a swath of the country's leadership so far in the nearly six-month war, launched initially with goals including forcing Tehran to abandon its nuclear power program and regime change.

Iran has resisted with missile attacks on US bases in the region, Israel and targets in US-allied Gulf countries.

Its most effective response has been to strike shipping in Hormuz, effectively snarling the trade route, rattling the world economy.

With his political popularity sinking at home ahead of the November midterm congressional elections, Trump has backed off threats to escalate the war in search of a decisive victory.

That leaves the war in a standoff.

However, the Republican says that the United States is prepared to focus on blockading Iranian ports in a strategy that he told Axios was "low-keying."

"We are only semi-negotiating with them. We are just watching Iran with its huge inflation and the fact they have no money," Trump told Axios on Sunday.

(AFP and TNA staff)

The shortlist emerged from US-mediated talks in Rome last week, the latest round of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon on implementing a June agreement that ties Israel's phased withdrawal from Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah.

The countries could help define the mechanism's scope, provide personnel to oversee its implementation or contribute troops to observe or take part in inspections verifying disarmament, three sources said.

A Lebanese official told Reuters on Friday that Israel and Lebanon had agreed on a list of potential countries that could send troops to verify disarmament, but declined to identify them, saying the US would decide which of them would take part.

Lebanon and Israel in late June agreed to a US-mediated framework as part of Washington's efforts to end the latest round of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, triggered in March when the  Lebanese armed group attacked Israel following US and Israeli war against Iran.

A source with direct knowledge of the matter said discussions surrounding the shortlisted countries were in the early stages but said that they were "cautiously optimistic" the effort would proceed.

Switzerland's foreign ministry told Reuters it was exploring ways to support "various stabilisation processes", but declined to provide details. A British foreign ministry spokesperson said Britain was ready to support efforts to de-escalate tensions and long-term security, particularly in southern Lebanon, without elaborating.

The Israeli prime minister's office had no immediate comment. The Lebanese presidency and Indonesian foreign ministries did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Israel wants raids on private homes

Israel's military occupies what it describes as a security zone extending 10 kilometres into southern Lebanon and has said it will not withdraw unilaterally until Hezbollah is disarmed.

Two sources said that under the proposed mechanism, villages in southern Lebanon would be inspected and verified as being free of weapons. Israel wants those inspections to include private homes, they said.

Lebanon's army has resisted pressure over the last year to search private properties, fearing such searches could spark tensions in the south and with Hezbollah more broadly. Security officials have told Reuters the army would need warrants for each house.

A foreign security official said the question of private properties would need addressing, including how and by whom they would be searched. The official said the extent of foreign troops' freedom of movement would also need to be clearly established.

A mandate for the presence of foreign troops in Lebanon would have to be agreed, the sources said, with the most likely scenario being that they would be formally invited by the Lebanese government under a framework endorsed by Israel.

The US and Israel were unlikely to accept UN involvement, the sources said, while European nations may oppose oversight by US President Donald Trump's so-called Board of Peace. 

(Reuters and TNA staff)

Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam on Wednesday condemned Israel's "systematic destruction" in the country's south as a violation of international law, as Israel's defence minister said its military was "destroying all the houses" there.

Salam said Israeli "attacks, incursions, demolitions and the systematic destruction of homes", infrastructure, government buildings and places of worship "represent a serious violation of the principles and rules of international law and international humanitarian law".

Claiming that villages and towns "are entirely 'military facilities' does not stand up to any logic and cannot be used as an excuse for destroying them, displacing their inhabitants and preventing them from returning," he said in a statement.

Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz visited southern Lebanon on Wednesday, vowing to keep troops in a so-called "security zone" there and saying the Israeli military was "destroying the underground infrastructure" in the area and "destroying all the houses".

Hezbollah drew Lebanon into the Middle East war in March by attacking Israel, which responded with heavy airstrikes and a ground invasion that Lebanese authorities say have killed more than 4,300 people.

Israeli officials vowed to carry out similar levels of destruction to Gaza and the military subsequently razed entire villages to the ground.

A framework deal reached in late June between Lebanon and Israel involves the disarmament of the Iran-backed group, a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon and the deployment of the Lebanese army to the region, starting in "pilot zones".

While violence has significantly decreased since the signing of a US-Iran memorandum of understanding in June and the Lebanon-Israel deal, Lebanon still reports intermittent Israeli strikes and ongoing demolitions.

Lebanon's state-run National News Agency (NNA) on Wednesday said Israeli troops carried out detonations in southern villages including in Zawtar al-Shariqya, which abuts one of the "pilot zones".

Lebanon's army said Israel had blown up "the municipal building in Zawtar al-Shariqya" as well as "a public school, a health clinic, a children's nursery and a number of homes".

Also on Wednesday, Lebanon's army chief Rodolphe Haykal met visiting US General Joseph Clearfield, who heads a coordination group involved with the June agreement.

The pair discussed "developments in the south and security arrangements" relating to the deal, the Lebanese military said, as well as "the difficulties the army faces in carrying out its missions, primarily due to the continuing attacks, bulldozing and destruction by the Israeli occupation".

President Joseph Aoun also met Clearfield, his office said, and discussed the implementation of the framework deal.

Israel and Lebanon are to hold an eighth round of US-sponsored negotiations next month, in Rome.

(AFP and TNA staff)

Tuesday's remarks by Abdellatif Ouahbi to Asharq TV marked the first time Rabat has publicly raised the contentious issue since Ceuta's border crisis in late July, during which an estimated 72,000 migrants briefly crossed into the enclave. At least 96 people died in the mass border rush.

Ouahbi said his country always raised the issue of the cities' status in negotiations with Spain, with a long-term goal of achieving a resolution through dialogue.

Since its independence in 1956, Morocco has regarded Ceuta and Melilla as occupied by Spain, arguing sovereignty over them should ultimately be transferred to Rabat. Madrid considers them integral parts of its territory since the 17th and 15th centuries, respectively.

"Ceuta and Melilla aren't just Spanish; they're super-Spanish and cannot be touched," Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles told reporters in Ceuta when asked about Ouahbi's comments.

"Any attack on Ceuta and Melilla is an attack on Spain as a whole. It must never happen again," she added, referring to the border crisis.

The Spanish government has largely praised Moroccan authorities for their cooperation in repatriating the migrants, blaming the crisis on people-smuggling mafias.

In a separate statement, Spain's Foreign Ministry said Spain's territorial integrity "has not been, and will never be, discussed with anyone".

Separately, Morocco's Interior Ministry said on Wednesday it had stepped up security near the borders with Ceuta and Melilla over online calls for another mass crossing attempt on August 15, warning it would prosecute organisers and participants.

"The ministry calls on everyone to remain vigilant and responsible and not to be drawn into such suspicious and misleading calls, given the risks they may pose to people's lives," it said in a statement, also urging Spain to accelerate the return of unaccompanied Moroccan minors in Ceuta.

Last week, Spanish Youth Minister Sira Rego said Madrid would evaluate Morocco's offer to repatriate the children on a case-by-case basis.

(Reuters)

On Tuesday, Damascus’ Fourth Criminal Court handed down the verdict in absentia against Assad, convicting him of premeditated murder, torture and crimes against humanity committed during the Syrian Civil War, in a landmark case one and a half years after his ouster. The deposed Syrian leader was sentenced alongside his brother Maher, former defence minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij, and his cousin, Atef Najib, who was tried in person.

Presiding Judge Fakhr al-Din al-Oryan said that Assad’s role in these crimes was that of the "ultimate decision-maker", stressing that he had mobilised state apparatuses to carry them out.

Speaking to The New Arab, legal expert and human rights advocate Samer Daie said that the ruling provides the Syrian state with "official legal grounds to take further action, whether by issuing or activating arrest warrants, submitting extradition requests, or contacting relevant international judicial cooperation bodies".

Daie added: "The verdict against Bashar al-Assad was issued in absentia, unlike Atef Najib, who was tried in person. This will have significant implications if Assad is later brought before the Syrian judiciary, particularly regarding the rights of the defence and the possibility of a retrial according to applicable procedural rules."

Moscow granted Bashar al-Assad asylum on humanitarian grounds after his arrival in December 2024, where he is living a secluded life away from political and media attention, according to reports.

Daie stressed that granting asylum "does not erase criminal responsibility, nor does it grant the individual absolute immunity from prosecution". He explained, however, the complications that may arise from this.

He said the primary effect of asylum is that it complicates extradition from a legal and political standpoint, because Russia will deal with any Syrian request according to its domestic law, the bilateral treaty, and the legal status it granted Assad, in addition to the political considerations related to the relationship between the two countries.

Regarding the existence of an extradition treaty between Syria and Russia, and its applicability in the case of Assad, Daie explained that this treaty was signed between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg on 29 June and ratified by the Russian President in April 2023. He added: "There is essentially a bilateral framework upon which Syria can base its formal extradition request. However, the existence of the treaty does not automatically obligate Russia to extradite Assad upon receiving a request from Damascus."

Extradition is a judicial and sovereign process that is subject to specific conditions and procedures, and there may be legal grounds that allow the requested state to refuse.

The expert highlighted that the Syrian death penalty ruling differs from a custodial sentence, further complicating this process.

"This could complicate the extradition process, as the death penalty constitutes an issue distinct from the establishment of the crime itself in the context of international judicial cooperation."

He added: "In international practice, the state from which extradition is requested may require guarantees that the death penalty will not be carried out — or that it will be commuted — before agreeing to the extradition. Thus, while the death penalty verdict represents the most severe form of conviction under the national penal system, it may simultaneously create an additional obstacle to executing the extradition request abroad."

Daie said that Russia has not carried out the death penalty for many years; consequently, the issue of the penalty could arise during the assessment of any extradition request — alongside considerations regarding asylum, trial guarantees, and the fact that the verdict was issued in absentia.

"This does not mean extradition is impossible; rather, it means the drafting of the Syrian request will be crucial, and it may need to include guarantees regarding how the penalty would be handled should extradition take place," Daie said.

He also argued that the verdict against Assad transforms the issue of his presence in Russia from a purely political question into a legal one as well: "How will the state that granted him asylum respond when it receives a formal extradition request from another state — his country of origin — for an individual who has been convicted by its judicial system?"

The legal expert urged against overstating the verdict's immediate enforcement impact, stating that the ruling is "not a magic wand to bring Assad back from Moscow, but it fundamentally alters the legal nature of the case". He emphasised that the next phase involves more than simply sending a copy of the verdict to Moscow — it requires preparing a comprehensive extradition dossier that outlines the legal basis for jurisdiction, the nature of the crimes, the integrity of the proceedings, trial guarantees upon extradition, and the handling of the death penalty.

Assad’s sentencing was welcomed by Syrians in the country and in the diaspora, oppressed and exiled following years of a brutal civil war which saw numerous war crimes carried out, the jailing of dissidents, the devastation of the country’s infrastructure and economy, and isolation from the international arena.

The sentence, the first given to an Assad family member following decades of Ba’athist rule, has been interpreted as an important symbolic acknowledgment of what happened under the former president. It has, however, triggered some concerns among rights advocates who have cautioned that justice for Assad's crimes still requires a credible, fair judicial process.

In a statement issued on Wednesday, the justice ministry said that Amnesty's criticism of the trials does not reflect the judicial procedures of the cases or the safeguards guaranteed by Syrian law, according to state news agency SANA.

The ministry said that the trials were held at specialised civilian criminal courts under qualified judges, with the attendance of both victims and their representatives.

It further stated that the proceedings were conducted under constitutional and legal safeguards under the principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, and that the rulings were based on facts and evidence gathered, with defence and appeal rights also guaranteed.

Amnesty, however, said on Tuesday that the trials "should take place before ordinary civilian courts, with the participation of victims and without resorting to the death penalty", adding that they should also be part of a victim-centred process ensuring truth, justice and reparations.

In the same statement, the group also called on the government more generally to "abolish in absentia trials, end the use of the death penalty, criminalize core crimes covered by international law in domestic legislation, and undertake comprehensive judicial reform to ensure that all judicial proceedings fully respect fair-trial guarantees, international law, and international standards".

This, it said, would allow the country to "truly turn the page on the horrors of the past".

The trial against Assad, which was held in absentia due to his self-imposed exile in Russia, is part of the first trials against former regime officials beginning in April, who are accused of crimes against humanity committed during the civil war, which resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

This includes around 160,000 people who were forcibly disappeared, mostly by the regime.

Alongside Assad, six other regime members were also given the death sentence, including his brother Maher and cousin Atef Najib, who was the only person present at the trial.

Najib, who headed political security in the southern province of Daraa in 2011, launched a deadly crackdown on protests in the province that later led to the uprising that began the civil war.

Former defence minister Fahd al-Freij and Louay al-Ali, head of the military intelligence of Daraa, were also convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The defendants have 30 days to appeal the decision, Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais told state TV.

In the letter, delivered by Syria’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Ibrahim Alabi, Damascus expressed its strong condemnation and categorical rejection of the Colombian government’s decision.

This comes after Colombia’s far-right government recognised the Israeli claim over the Golan Heights, just days after far-right President Abelardo de la Espriella assumed power.

The announcement, made on Monday, makes Colombia and the US the only nations to recognise Israel’s annexation of the region in 1981.

Damascus said the recognition constitutes a clear violation of the UN Charter and UN Security Council Resolution 497 of 1981, and carries no legal effect or consequence.

Damascus stressed that the decision does not alter the legal status of the Golan Heights, which it considers occupied Syrian territory, Syria’s official news agency, SANA, reported.

Syria also expressed hope that Colombia would reconsider its position and withdraw its recognition.

Mohamed Ahmed Al-Yamahi, the president of the Arab Parliament, criticised Colombia’s announcement on Wednesday, describing it as a blatant violation of international law and an unacceptable disregard for international legitimacy and UN resolutions.

Al-Yamahi emphasised the Arab Parliament’s longstanding position that the Golan Heights is “occupied Arab Syrian land,” stressing that no position or declaration issued unilaterally by any state can change its legal status or affect Syria’s established rights over the territory.

He called on the Colombian government to reconsider its decision and immediately reverse it, while urging Bogotá to adhere to the principles of international law and relevant UN resolutions.

He also reiterated the Arab Parliament’s support for Syria’s efforts to restore its sovereignty over the entirety of the occupied Syrian Golan Heights.

On Tuesday, Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates had also hit out at Colombia’s recognition, which follows the US making a similar move during Donald Trump’s first presidency.

In a statement, the Syrian ministry stressed that the Golan Heights is “occupied Syrian land” and an integral part of the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

It added that measures taken by Israel to alter the legal, demographic or administrative status of the Golan have no legal effect and are considered invalid.

Israel has occupied most of the Syrian Golan Heights since the June 1967 war and unilaterally annexed the territory in 1981, a move that has not received broad international recognition.

That same year, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 497, declaring Israel’s decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights “null and void and without international legal effect.”

Hamas recently agreed with the Trump-backed organisation to surrender its weapons if Israel ended its attacks on the strip and committed to withdrawing its troops.

But Netanyahu has refused to agree to the plan amid far-right backlash, and on Sunday ruled out any withdrawal until Hamas had been fully disarmed.

In discussions this week, mediators told Hamas officials they should disregard Netanyahu's comments as "merely statements" and that the agreement remained unchanged, according to the sources, who requested anonymity.

They said the mediators reassured the group that the Trump administration is serious about reaching a solution in Gaza "even if that angers Netanyahu", and that the agreement would go ahead without any changes.

They added that decisions on outstanding issues and disputes could be postponed until after the Israeli general election.

This coincides with a report by Israel’s public broadcaster Kan, which quoted an Israeli official as saying that Israel’s rejection of the document was "unrealistic and made under pressure".

US officials have pressured Netanyahu to reduce attacks on Gaza and view his comments as campaign rhetoric ahead of the 27 October election.

Israeli attacks in Gaza have slowed since Netanyahu’s meeting with Trump's Gaza envoy Nikolay Mladenov earlier this month. Airstrikes have stopped, though artillery shelling and gunfire attacks near the Yellow Line remain a daily occurrence.

Hamas has said it remains committed to its agreement with the Board and the mediators.

In a statement this week, the group pressed for the deal to be fully implemented, leading to a complete ceasefire, Israel's withdrawal, the opening of border crossings, the start of reconstruction, and the transfer of power to the Board's Palestinian-led transitional authority.

It called on the mediators and the Board to uphold the deal and prevent Israel obstructing its implementation.

Mohammadawi emerged publicly and assumed his post after his predecessor, Jamal Jaafar, known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was assassinated in a US airstrike in January 2020.

The sources told The New Arab on Wednesday that other changes are also expected, representing the first steps towards further integrating the PMF into Iraq's regular security and military system.

The changes come amid US pressure on Baghdad to regulate the PMF's status and restrict the weapons of Iran-aligned factions incorporated into and funded by the PMF itself.

The sources told The New Arab that "the committee for restricting weapons to state control, which was formed in March, has finally reached several measures concerning the Popular Mobilisation Forces, including changing the PMF uniform and providing it with new clothing, insignia and ranks, under the heading of replacing its visual identity, so that it is closer to the visual identity of the Iraqi army and the rest of the security branches, and preventing the use of religious and sectarian propaganda during tours and security and military operations when the PMF carries them out".

They also spoke of "organising the status of older personnel, as the issue of retirement from the PMF remains complicated and confusing because this matter has not been regulated through clear legal procedures".

The sources added that "the latest directives call for the inclusion of army officers with senior ranks in the PMF ranks to restructure security duties, the deployment map and disciplined compliance with military orders".

"The directives also included redistributing fighters among brigades and provinces after an electronic database was restructured and made subject to military procedures, with no mediation from brigade commanders or factions incorporated into the Popular Mobilisation Forces as part of eliminating intermediary directives and establishing the final relationship of affiliation with the armed forces' leadership, rather than with the leaders and formations that emerged with the establishment of the PMF and which exploited the PMF for political and electoral purposes."

According to political sources who spoke to The New Arab, "Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, backed by Shia political movements and parties, is seeking to implement these measures after removing Faleh al-Fayyad, who is clinging to the post and unwilling to leave it, despite political efforts on more than one occasion to remove him".

The sources also referred to accusations made by political forces that Fayyad exploited PMF brigades and formed new brigades to support his electoral list and his party, the Ata Movement.

They noted that "the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group, which surrendered its weapons and announced its separation from the Popular Mobilisation Forces and its decision to focus solely on political activity, has renewed its demand for the position of chairman of the Popular Mobilisation Forces and for Fayyad to be removed".

They added that despite the persistent efforts and numerous media campaigns waged by Asaib against Fayyad, Zaidi's view is to replace Fayyad with a military commander from within the "Popular Mobilisation Forces" who believes in the Iraqi state.

Three candidates for the post are not affiliated with a political party or entity.

Regarding Abu Fadak, commander of the PMF's staff, the sources said that "he is among the security changes proposed by the Zaidi government, which are in line with changing plans and bringing in new blood".

"But the real reason behind his replacement is to comply with the US desire not to allow those it has sanctioned over allegations of corruption and terrorism to remain in positions in the Iraqi state," they said.

They expected that "the position of chief of staff of the Popular Mobilisation Forces may pose a difficult situation in the coming period because the post is considered the second most important position within the PMF, in addition to being of great benefit to the factions, particularly Hezbollah Brigades, which is close to Abu Fadak".

Over the past weeks, the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement, led by Qais al-Khazali, has resumed discussing failures within the PMF as part of a campaign against Faleh al-Fayyad and efforts to push for his dismissal.

The campaign intensified after Saudi-US airstrikes targeted PMF headquarters in more than one Iraqi province at the end of July, killing and wounding about 60 PMF members.

This was followed by leaks claiming that "Zaidi had informed Fayyad to evacuate the headquarters before the bombing, after receiving information about the planned strikes, but Fayyad did not take any precautions to prevent the PMF fighters from being killed".

Asaib Ahl al-Haq used this issue as part of its campaign to remove Fayyad from his post.

Sheikhani: Fayyad should be questioned after PMF headquarters bombed

Commenting on the issue, Hussein al-Sheikhani, a member of the political bureau of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement, said Zaidi "had informed the leaders of the Coordination Framework of the details of the strike during a meeting attended by Fayyad, but an unclear matter that we do not know about prevented the latter from taking measures to protect the Popular Mobilisation Forces fighters".

He told The New Arab that "Parliament is required to question Fayyad after the incident in which PMF headquarters were bombed by Saudi Arabia and then move towards dismissing or holding those responsible accountable according to the results of the questioning and the official investigation".

First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Adnan Faihan, a leader in Asaib, had previously called for a committee to investigate whether the government had prior knowledge of the timing of the Saudi-US targeting and failed to take the necessary measures.

The committee was expected to submit its report within a week. However, the results have not yet emerged.

The restructuring of the leadership of the PMF appears to have already begun, particularly after the Interior Ministry announced the closure of 71 headquarters described as "fake" and claiming affiliation with the PMF.

This prompted the PMF to issue a clarification confirming that those headquarters had no connection to it.

This indicates the emergence of a dispute between the prime minister and PMF chairman Faleh al-Fayyad.

In a statement, the PMF said that "the measures to close and monitor those headquarters were carried out by the General Directorate of Security and Discipline at the Popular Mobilisation Forces as part of the work of the Permanent Committee for Restricting Weapons".

The Interior Ministry's statement did not mention the specific body that carried out the closure of the fake headquarters.

Security and political affairs researcher Abdullah al-Rakabi said that "the security changes Zaidi made in the security agencies over the past weeks excluded the Popular Mobilisation Forces, given the sensitivity of the organisation".

"But the coming period may witness major changes within the PMF institution, particularly the position of chairman, as there are political parties that have objected to Fayyad's presence in his post for about 10 years," he said.

"His dismissal may also not cause political problems and is not difficult because Fayyad does not have political backing. It appears that the same applies to PMF chief of staff Abu Fadak."

Speaking to The New Arab, he said that "there are many political disputes over Fayyad. As for Abu Fadak, he is rejected by the US, and the two may be replaced before Sept. 30 as part of the US-Iraqi agreement to end the factions' weapons and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraq".
 

How were the Popular Mobilisation Forces established?

The Popular Mobilisation Forces are an umbrella organisation bringing together more than 70 armed formations and factions in Iraq.

The roots of its establishment date back to June 2014, when the Iraqi government decided to organise volunteers to repel Islamic State's invasion of Mosul and its surrounding areas.

This came before religious authority Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling for "defensive jihad", urging those capable of carrying weapons to volunteer in the security forces.

This prompted thousands to join the armed formations later known as the "Popular Mobilisation Forces", which also included factions that were already active.

In February 2016, the Popular Mobilisation Forces were reorganised under a cabinet order.

In November of the same year, the Iraqi parliament passed the Popular Mobilisation Forces Law No. 40, which made it part of the armed forces and placed it under the authority of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The move came amid objections and a boycott by lawmakers from Sunni political forces.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.
 

Najib, a cousin of ousted president Bashar al-Assad, was convicted by the Fourth Criminal Court in Damascus on Tuesday over his role in the repression of protesters in the southern province of Daraa.

The court found him guilty of crimes including murder and torture, including the torture of children, and responsibility for killings during the 2011 crackdown.

Unlike Assad and several other former officials sentenced alongside him in absentia, Najib is in Syrian custody and appeared in court during his trial. His prosecution is one of the most significant involving a senior Assad-era security official since the former government was toppled in December 2024.

But who is Najib, and why has his name been associated with the beginning of Syria's uprising for more than 15 years?

Who is Atef Najib?

Najib, 66, is a former brigadier general and cousin of Bashar al-Assad through the former president's mother, Anisa Makhlouf.

He served in several branches of Syria's powerful Political Security Directorate before becoming its chief in Daraa, where he was accused of corruption, extortion and abuse of power. Syrian records show he previously served in Political Security branches in Damascus and Tartous.

But it was his role in the events of March 2011 that made him one of the most notorious figures of Assad's security establishment.

What happened in Daraa?

Najib's grip on Daraa was such that he reportedly used the phrase “I am God in Daraa” to describe his authority over the province.

In March 2011, a group of schoolchildren were detained after anti-government slogans were painted on their school walls in Daraa.

The children were allegedly tortured in detention, including accusations that their fingernails were pulled out. Najib, then head of Political Security in Daraa, became one of the officials blamed for their treatment and for the authorities' response to demands for their release.

When families and local dignitaries appealed for the children to be freed, accounts from Daraa say Najib responded with insults and threats, further inflaming anger.

Protesters soon began chanting against him and demanding his removal.

Demonstrations erupted in Daraa on 18 March 2011, and security forces opened fire on protesters. The unrest quickly spread across Syria, transforming local anger into a nationwide uprising against Assad's rule.

The government's violent suppression of those protests eventually developed into a devastating war that killed hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions.

Najib was subsequently removed from Daraa and transferred to Idlib. The US sanctioned him in April 2011 over human rights abuses, followed by European sanctions the following month.

How was Najib caught?

Najib largely disappeared from public view during the war, but resurfaced following Assad's overthrow in December 2024.

Syrian security forces arrested him near al-Haffah in Latakia province on 31 January 2025, making him one of the most senior former security officials captured by the new authorities.

His public trial began in Damascus in April 2026.

The court heard evidence linking Najib to the interrogation and torture of detainees, the security campaign against civilians and the storming of Daraa's Omari Mosque, which became an early centre of the uprising.

Najib denied the accusations. The presiding judge said he showed no remorse or offered an apology when confronted by victims during the proceedings.

Why does his conviction matter?

Najib's conviction is one of the first major tests of Syria's attempts to hold senior Assad-era officials accountable for abuses committed under the former government.

Its symbolism is particularly powerful because of his connection to Daraa.

The arrest and alleged torture of the schoolchildren, followed by the government's violent response to demonstrations demanding their release, are widely regarded as among the events that triggered the Syrian uprising.

Najib is also unusual among the senior former officials now facing Syrian justice because he is actually in custody. Assad, his brother Maher and other defendants sentenced on Tuesday were tried in absentia.

For Syria's transitional authorities, the case therefore represents more than the prosecution of one former security chief. It is an early indication of how the country intends to confront the abuses of the Assad era and deliver justice for their victims.

The berth, which was handed over to the Syrian government following the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Russia on Sunday, received its first commercial ship on Tuesday, according to state news Sana.

The berth, which has a 360-meter waterfront and a draft that ranges between 10 and 13 meters, is expected to add capacity to the port, with head of the Operations and Investment department, Youssef Arnous, saying that its specifications allow three large vessels to dock at the berth simultaneously and accelerate services for users.

Alongside the reopening of the berth, two cranes from the Dubai-based logistics company and port operator DP World also arrived on Tuesday as part of a modernisation of port facilities.

DP World signed a 30-year concession valued at $800 million in July 2025 that would see the company operate the port and invest in its infrastructure.

It is not immediately clear if the company will take control of Berth Four, though it has the concession to develop civilian operations at the port.

Jad Baghdadi, a Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on political economy issues in both Syria and Lebanon, told The New Arab that there were several economic benefits of the opening of the new berth at the port, but cautioned it may not see wide-reaching effects for Syria's people, who continue to suffer from high levels of poverty.

"In principle, that can lower the cost of bringing goods into the country, though whether that reaches ordinary people is harder to say."

"Since any saving at the quayside still has to survive exchange-rate swings, fuel, inland transport customs costs, and where a few importers dominate a sector, the lower costs can end up as wider profit margins rather than cheaper prices in the shops," he added.

Syria's civil war, which ravaged the country for close to 15 years, saw widespread destruction across much of the country, with vital infrastructure such as roads, housing, schools and hospitals all being severely affected.

Though the IMF has said that it expects Syria's GDP growth to exceed 10% in 2026 through the recovery of the agricultural sector, oil and gas production, improved electricity and the expansion of trade services, the country still needs significant help, including continued international humanitarian and development support alongside the maintenance of fiscal and monetary policies.

The reintegration of the berth from Russian control "sits alongside a broader choice by the new authorities to hand the country's main ports, and increasingly its energy and other strategic sectors, to foreign operators on long concessions," Baghdadi noted.

Alongside DP World's control of Tartous' port, which has been agreed to alongside the operation of Latakia's port by France's CMA CGM Latakia and is part of a wider effort to integrate Syria into regional supply chains, circumventing the blockaded Strait of Hormuz, other sections of the economy have also been given to foreign operators.

This includes Syria's oil and gas sector, with US gas firm ConocoPhillips signing a deal with the Syrian government to revive the country's gas production.

"That model can pull in investment very quickly, which Syria badly needs given the scale of reconstruction, but the risk is tilting the economy towards becoming more dependent on imports and foreign operators, and less reliant on its productive sectors," Baghdadi said, noting that the agricultural and industrial sectors need serious support, with a 2025 drought impacting production, and cheap industrial imports leading to the closure of factories.

"For most Syrians, whether farms and factories recover and start producing again matters far more."

You can track events from earlier today by heading to our old live page here.

These were the updates on Wednesday:

•    Mediators are pushing Iran and the US to resume negotiations ahead of the expiry of the 60-day memorandum of understanding on 17 August.

•    Both countries are continuing to claim control over the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump on Wednesday said US forces will "keep" control over the strategic waterway, while Iran reiterated it will remain closed until the US ends the blockade, releases frozen Iranian assets and upholds a regional ceasefire.

•    Yemen’s Houthis targeted a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in the Bab al-Mandeb strait and has hit several sites across Yemen.

•    Israel is continuing to launch attacks in Gaza, the West Bank, south Lebanon, and southern Syria.

This marks a departure from the political “pink-tide” that guided many Latin American countries in solidarity with Palestine after October 2023.

Nicaragua, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba and Belize all intervened in support of South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), while Colombia went one step further, placing a total ban on coal exports to Israel and terminating its bilateral free trade agreement.

On 31 January 2025, Colombia, Cuba, Bolivia, and Honduras also became founding members of The Hague Group. In response to Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza and occupation of the West Bank, they committed to “coordinated legal and diplomatic measures in defence of international law and solidarity with the people of Palestine”.

But in the aftermath of right-wing presidential victories, Bolivia and Honduras have both withdrawn from The Hague Group, and Chile and Honduras have returned their ambassadors to Israel.

The new president of Colombia, Abelardo de la Espriella, is ready to renew ties with Israel by ramping up security coordination, resuming coal exports, and withdrawing from The Hague Group.

This week, the new right-wing government also recognised Israel's claim to the occupied Golan Heights, which it captured from Syria in 1967, becoming only the second country to do so after the Trump administration in 2019.

“To learn about international experiences that have yielded results will be fundamental to strengthen our security policy and our penitentiary system,” De La Espriella posted on 10 August, days after entering office.

“Israel will find in Colombia a friend and a determined ally in the fight against terrorism and organised crime.”

In longtime pro-Palestine Venezuela, meanwhile, Israel and Caracas this week agreed to resume consular relations after diplomatic ties were cut in 2009. This comes in the wake of the US' military capture of Nicolás Maduro in January, marking a striking shift in Caracas' foreign policy.

A new alignment in Latin America

Bolivia and Honduras' withdrawal from The Hague Group on 4 March 2026 revealed the limitations of non-aligned movements in the absence of political will.

“The Hague Group was an important, organised response from states that were tired of waiting for countries in the UN Security Council to act,” María Alejandra Gómez, a legal researcher at Law for Palestine, told The New Arab.

At that time, the US had already utilised its veto power in the UNSC to block four ceasefire resolutions in Gaza.

“Every single state in the world is bound to prevent and punish genocide, regardless of what treaties they have signed,” she explained to The New Arab. “The Hague Group only did what it was obliged to do.”

Nonetheless, “the enforcement of international law is always subject to the political will of states, so if they change governments, they tend to change their stance,” Gómez said. “This is a structural problem with international law; it is not just about The Hague Group.”

In fact, months before their withdrawal, Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Gideon Sa'ar and his Bolivian counterpart Fernando Armayo had already signed an agreement to renew diplomatic relations.

Similarly, on 3 June, Honduras and Israel signed an addendum to their pre-existing cooperation agreement. With a renewed focus on agriculture, water management, health, education and security, Israel’s Ambassador to Honduras Nadav D Goren called it “another milestone in the bilateral relationship between Israel and Honduras”.

Chile's turn towards Israel

On 3 August, the new right-wing governments of Chile and Honduras returned ambassadors to Israel nearly three years after they were recalled by former presidents Gabriel Boric and Xiomara Castro.

The appointment of Chilean Ambassador Gabriel Zaliasnik, a self-proclaimed “proud Zionist”, by President José Antonio Kast, was unequivocally denounced by the Palestinian community of Chile.

In June, they described the decision as “contrary to the national interest, incoherent with Chile's history of defending international law, and deeply offensive to the hundreds of thousands of Chileans of Palestinian origin”.

“Today, relations between Chile and the State of Israel have been normalised across all sectors,” Nelson Hadad, a Chilean lawyer and former ambassador to Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, told The New Arab. “The outlook is very bleak.”

In fact, “during a recent World Health Organisation vote, Chile, for the first time, abstained from supporting measures regarding public health and the delivery of humanitarian aid to Palestinians facing starvation in the Gaza Strip,” said Hadad.

Such pro-Israel foreign policy is particularly daunting in Chile, home to the largest Palestinian community outside of the Middle East and North Africa.

Last week, upon visiting relatives in Beit Jala, a Chilean-Palestinian named José Nicolás Khamis was detained at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv.

“He was interrogated for 36 hours without the right to a defence or to call a lawyer,” said Hadad. “Ultimately, he was accused of being involved in far-left, communist terrorist activities and was subsequently deported on national security grounds.”

These security concerns were "false and baseless,” said Hadad. As such, “this constitutes a serious violation of diplomatic reciprocity between the two nations and reflects a clear bias against Chileans of Palestinian or Arab origin”.

Enter 'El Tigre'

With even more vigour than his neighbours, Colombia’s President Abelardo De La Espriella, who calls himself ‘El Tigre’, has pledged to nullify his predecessor’s anti-Zionist legacy.

Before winning the elections in June, he proposed an “unprecedented offensive against organised crime in Colombia based on strengthening strategic alliances with the United States and Israel”.

Dubbed “a second Plan Colombia”, an homage to the 1999 US-Colombian military project to combat drug cartels and destroy left-wing guerrilla groups, it emphasises Israel’s value as “a leader in artificial intelligence applied to defence, drone surveillance systems, cybersecurity, and military training”.

After all, the State of Israel “is doing what must be done to defend its people,” declared De La Espriella during an interview in June. “And that is exactly what I am going to do to defend Colombia.”

Since then he has pledged to resume coal exports and leave The Hague Group, to withdraw Colombia’s intervention from South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ, to terminate plans to establish a Colombian consulate in Ramallah, and recognise the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

He has previously outlined plans to relocate the Colombian embassy to Jerusalem, flagrantly disregarding the city’s divided status under international law. 

Unsurprisingly, one day before he entered office on 7 August, Gideon Sa'ar was right by his side.

“I had the privilege of meeting him in his office in Barranquilla,” wrote Sa’ar, describing their discussion about “the immediate establishment of diplomatic, security, and economic relations.”

“The golden age in relations between Colombia and Israel begins today,” he confirmed.

The battle moves beyond governments

Given former President Gustavo Petro's outspoken opposition to Israel, this realignment is momentous.

As co-founder of The Hague Group, Colombia and its keffiyeh-donning leader had highlighted the fundamentality of political will when enforcing international law.

His most brazen act of solidarity occurred at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2025, when he proposed invoking UN Resolution 377 A, also known as Uniting for Peace, to “establish a peacekeeping force” to defend Palestine.

But “it was not just the will of the president,” pointed out Gómez, describing the impact of public pressure from activists and civil society. In fact, “it is not just about the states of The Hague Group. Activism all over the world will enable states to take more coherent action towards Palestine”.

Latin American domestic courts provide another essential avenue to uphold international law, regardless of a government's political position or a president’s personal interests.

“Their impartiality enables us to force governments to comply with their international obligations,” Gómez told The New Arab.

“For example, when the government of Argentina, under President Javier Milei, invited Benjamin Netanyahu to visit, the Prime Minister of Israel had to cancel his trip because Argentinian courts were [preparing] to issue an arrest warrant.”

Similarly, “in Colombia, we have something called the constitutional bloc which means that many international laws are considered to be incorporated into our constitution,” said Gómez. This gives them the same credence as constitutional laws, she explained.

Meanwhile, despite the difficulties, The Hague Group has continued to gain momentum. With 40 states in attendance at its most recent conference, this was the largest gathering since its founding.

“Participants reaffirmed the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations and the international legal order as the foundation of peaceful and just relations among states and peoples,” read the official statement.

With Colombia ready to withdraw, abandoning its role as co-chair, “The Hague Group must find ways to reinvent itself,” said Gómez.

In that process, “the role that activists and citizens will play in order for there to be more accountability in the international arena is going to be transcendental”.

Ana Maria Monjardino is an independent journalist and writer from London

Follow her on X: @ammonjardino

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

Australia became the first country in the world to prohibit children under 16 from accessing several major social media platforms, while France has since passed legislation banning children under 15 from using social media, with implementation due to begin later this year. 

In the UK, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced plans in June to introduce similar restrictions that would prevent children under 16 from accessing platforms including Snapchat, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, X, and Facebook by 2027.

But in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where online spaces have long been shaped by government regulation, censorship and surveillance concerns, experts warn that child safety measures could take on a very different meaning.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the first Arab and Muslim-majority country to prohibit children under 15 from creating or operating personal social media accounts. 

The UAE government said the policy aims to address concerns over children's exposure to inappropriate content, unsafe online interactions, excessive social media use and the collection of personal data.

Authorities have also been empowered to "take all necessary measures [against platforms] in the event of non-compliance", raising questions over whether other MENA governments will adopt similar measures.

Saudi Arabia has since emerged as a potential next adopter, with its Shura Council calling for age-verification requirements and restrictions on social media use by those under 16.

While countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey have previously tightened restrictions on young people's use of social media, outright bans on underage users still remain rare.  

Nonetheless, governments worldwide have increasingly focused on protecting children from cyberbullying, harmful content and online exploitation; however, rights groups have warned that age verification systems can also create new risks, particularly in countries where privacy protections and independent oversight remain limited.

The New Arab examines whether MENA states are likely to follow the UAE's lead, and whether restrictions designed to protect children could also deepen existing patterns of digital control.

How MENA states have traditionally governed online spaces

The UAE is the first country in the Arab world to introduce a minimum age for social media accounts. 

However, governments across the region have long maintained extensive frameworks governing online platforms.

These approaches have traditionally focused less on age restrictions and more on content monitoring, website blocking, government requests for user data and broad cybersecurity legislation.

Rights groups have highlighted that many MENA governments have enacted digital laws that grant authorities significant powers over online speech, often justified by national security, public order, or morality concerns.

In June 2023, the League of Arab States announced a unified social media regulation strategy reportedly influenced by the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) and Germany’s Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG).

However, digital rights organisations have warned that regulatory models adopted from Europe do not automatically come with the democratic safeguards that underpin them, including judicial oversight, independent regulators and protections for freedom of expression.

"Historically, MENA states relied on site-wide content blocking rather than granular age verification. However, this is evolving," Ramy Raoof Halim, a Nonresident Fellow on Surveillance & Technology (MENA) at The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, told The New Arab.

Halim said the UAE's introduction of social media restrictions for users under 15 reflects a wider shift towards identity-based systems.

"This means moving away from simple, self-declared age gates towards more stringent identity-based assurance," he said.

"Legislation specifically targeting child online safety is emerging but remains nascent. While some states have existing provisions within broader data protection or media laws regarding minors, these are often secondary to state-led censorship mandates."

He added that the UAE’s Child Digital Safety Law, which came into force in January 2026, marked a move towards more formal obligations for platforms to protect children.

As more than 20 countries worldwide consider restrictions on children's access to social media, experts say MENA governments are moving at different speeds on digital regulation.

Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have emerged as regional leaders in developing digital regulation frameworks.

"The UAE has established a centralised 'Regulatory Intelligence Office' and sophisticated legal frameworks for child safety and data protection," Halim said.

"Saudi Arabia, through the Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority (SDAIA), has aggressively modernised its data protection and AI governance infrastructure."

Asia Anwer, Digital Rights Researcher and Project Coordinator at the INSM Foundation for Digital Rights (INSM Iraq), said Gulf countries have made the most significant progress in strengthening digital regulation.

By contrast, she described Iraq's digital governance framework as "fragmented and underdeveloped."

"Gulf countries have rapidly expanded privacy and data protection legislation, while Jordan has recently implemented a comprehensive Personal Data Protection Law," she told The New Arab. 

"Iraq, however, remains among the countries where digital rights protections continue to lag behind regional developments."

Palestine and the risks of identity-based verification

For Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories, debates over online safety and digital regulation take place within a wider context of unequal access, surveillance concerns and restrictions affecting digital expression.

Lama Nazeeh, Advocacy Manager at Palestinian digital rights organisation 7amleh (the Arab Center for the Advancement of Social Media), said existing digital policies demonstrate how political realities shape online spaces.

"The occupation that fragments Palestinian land now fragments Palestinian connectivity," she told The New Arab.

Nazeeh argued that Palestinians experience a form of digital inequality, with Israeli users, including settlers, having access to more advanced connectivity infrastructure while Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza face significant restrictions.

She said the destruction of telecommunications infrastructure amid Israel's genocidal war on Gaza had further intensified these challenges.

"The genocide [in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023] that UN bodies have named is also waged on infrastructure," she said.

Nazeeh also warned that stronger age verification requirements could create additional barriers for Palestinians who already face difficulties accessing digital services.

"We have documented surveillance technologies tested on Palestinians and exported worldwide, and leaked evidence of mass coordinated takedowns," she said.

"We do not want to hand any actor a cleaner map of who is speaking."

She argued that identity-based verification systems could exclude people who lack recognised documentation.

"Many Palestinians lack the recognised identity documents these systems expect, which would deepen an exclusion they already face, having been shut out of basic digital and financial services," she explained. 

"In Gaza, where most of the network is destroyed, layering verification burdens on people who can barely get online is its own cruelty."

Nazeeh stressed that protecting children online remains important, but warned that safeguards must not be built on systems that increase surveillance.

"Child safety is a real goal. It must not be built on architecture that surveils and excludes the most vulnerable users."

Morocco, Egypt and the politics of 'child safety'

Dima Samaro, Executive Director at Skyline International for Human Rights, cautioned that debates over children’s access to social media in the MENA region cannot be separated from the wider history of digital regulation.

"This is not a new wave of digital regulation," she told The New Arab. "It is an acceleration of something governments here have been doing for years, which is using technology law to consolidate control over what people can say, read, and organise around."

Samaro said governments across the region have repeatedly used different justifications to regulate online spaces.

"The justification changes, but the impulse does not. During COVID, it was a public health issue. Before that, it was national security or protecting public morality. Now, increasingly, it is children’s online safety."

She pointed to Morocco as a key example of how European-inspired digital regulation could be introduced in a country where concerns over freedom of expression remain.

Morocco has been developing legislation to regulate social media platforms by expanding the powers of its broadcasting regulator, HACA, while drawing heavily on the language of the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA).

The DSA aims to increase platform accountability, require greater transparency and protect users from illegal content.

However, Samaro argued that when similar frameworks are adopted elsewhere, the safeguards that underpin European regulation may not always accompany them.

"But what does not get borrowed is everything that makes the DSA meaningful in practice: the courts that can challenge it, the press that can scrutinise it, the civil society that can push back against it," she said.

"What travels across borders is the regulatory architecture. The safeguards that make it work stay behind."

She argued that Morocco's Gen Z 212 protests in late September 2025 demonstrated why governments across the region increasingly view social media platforms as both communication tools and spaces for youth mobilisation.

The movement, one of Morocco's largest youth-led protest movements in recent years, relied heavily on platforms such as TikTok, Discord, and Instagram to organise demonstrations.

According to Samaro, young Moroccans increasingly moved towards platforms such as Discord because they believed mainstream platforms were vulnerable to state pressure.

"Young people organised through Discord because mainstream platforms had a well-documented record of handing over user data and removing content at government request," she said.

"For a generation that watched content about Palestine and war crime documentation systematically disappear from Instagram and Facebook in real time, that lesson did not need explaining."

Samaro said the response to the protests highlighted why digital regulation cannot be viewed solely through the lens of child protection.

This included Moroccan authorities launching a crackdown that resulted in mass arrests and the deaths of three demonstrators.

Jordan subsequently blocked Discord, while Iraq banned Roblox, with both governments citing child protection and online safety concerns.

"At Skyline, we have documented how governments across the SWANA region blocked platforms like Discord and Roblox, citing child safety, while the timing and targets of these bans point clearly to a different motive entirely," she said.

"After Morocco showed what a generation could do when it organised on apps the state cannot monitor, other governments in the region moved quickly to block those same apps before their own youth could do the same."

Egypt offers another example of how child online safety measures could be introduced within a wider environment of digital restrictions.

In January, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi urged authorities to review age-based restrictions on minors' access to digital platforms, prompting Egypt's House of Representatives to begin drafting legislation to tackle what lawmakers described as "digital chaos".

The proposals have since been compared with child online safety frameworks introduced in countries including Australia and the UK.

However, rights groups have warned that introducing such measures in Egypt would take place against the backdrop of existing restrictions on online expression.

"If you already know who is saying what, and you have laws that criminalise criticism of the government, age verification is not protecting young people. It is making them easier to find," Samaro said.

Halim similarly argued that online regulation in Egypt and across the wider region is often influenced by state security priorities alongside efforts to address genuine digital harms.

He said governments frequently rely on broad cybercrime and counterterrorism laws that frame online activity as a matter of national security and public order.

"In Egypt, for example, there have been many cases where content creators on different social platforms are targeted with harsh sentencing and police arrests for violating ‘family values’," Halim told The New Arab.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s age verification model

Saudi Arabia is emerging as one of the countries most likely to follow the UAE's approach to regulating young people's access to social media.

Earlier this year, the country's Shura Council called on the Communications, Space and Technology Commission (CST) to establish age-verification requirements and usage restrictions for social media platforms used by those under 16.

Officials said the proposed measures could help address concerns over children’s exposure to harmful content and excessive social media use.

However, ALQST for Human Rights reported that both cybersecurity and counterterrorism laws have been used to restrict freedom of expression online. 

"Saudi authorities also block access to many websites they deem to be in violation of Saudi law," the organisation told The New Arab. 

The independent grassroots organisation, established to promote and protect human rights in the Gulf kingdom, added that Saudi authorities have prosecuted individuals over their online activity, including a journalist who was executed this year over posts published under a pseudonym.  

The group also highlighted cases involving people sentenced for social media posts, including a British national who was detained in Saudi Arabia during a visit over content he had posted online while in the UK.

Meanwhile, digital rights groups have warned that stronger identity requirements could create privacy risks in countries where independent oversight remains limited.

"The concern about children's wellbeing online is real and deserves honest policy engagement," Samaro said.

"But age verification systems require identity documents to be tied to online activity. In countries with functioning independent institutions, that is a serious privacy risk that can at least be contested, litigated, and revised. In much of SWANA, the same system becomes a surveillance tool with a child protection label on the front."

She argued that many countries in the region either lack comprehensive data protection laws or have weak enforcement mechanisms.

"Most countries in the region either lack data protection laws entirely or have frameworks that are outdated, poorly enforced, and offer no meaningful barrier between the data platforms that collect data for age verification and governments that demand access to it."

The UAE's restrictions on under-15s include mandatory verification requirements involving digital identity checks and AI-supported technologies. Self-declaration of age will not be considered a valid form of verification.

Emirati authorities have said the policy aims to protect children from inappropriate content, unsafe online interactions, excessive use and the collection of personal information.

Lisa Dittmer, Amnesty Tech's researcher on children's and young people's digital rights, warned that implementing bans requires identifying users online.

"We know that the only way to implement these bans is through age verification," she told The New Arab.

"To ban children, we need to know who the children on the internet are. And that means in some way or another, we will need to identify people."

Dittmer warned that requiring users to submit identity documents could have consequences beyond child protection.

"One solution for that is actually identity documents. And that dramatically increases the risk of age verification being abused as a sort of smoke screen for de-anonymising people, for tracking them online, even if there are privacy protections in place."

She added that identity checks could discourage users from participating online.

"People knowing that they have submitted documents, that they have ID'd themselves at one point, there's a chilling effect, where people aren't quite sure what's being done with their data and how they’re being tracked and whether this data could be passed on to their governments."

Have social media bans worked elsewhere — and could they work in MENA?

As governments worldwide move to restrict children's access to social media, questions remain about whether such policies can achieve their intended aims.

Australia's landmark legislation, which came into force after becoming the first country to ban social media access for under-16s, has become a key test case for whether age-based restrictions can be effectively enforced.

However, researchers remain divided, as evidence on nationwide social media bans is still limited and long-term data on their impact are yet to emerge.

Early indications suggest that implementing such restrictions may prove more difficult than introducing them.

A study by software testing firm KJR, which previously advised the Australian government on age assurance, found that major platforms were not consistently verifying users’ ages months after the ban came into force.

KJR found that none of the 50 test accounts declaring the user to be 16 were asked to provide proof of age, raising questions over whether age verification systems can reliably prevent underage access.

The findings renewed criticism that users may bypass restrictions by entering false birth dates or using alternative platforms.

Amnesty Tech's Lisa Dittmer said banning children from social media entirely risks failing to address the wider problems associated with online harms.

"Simply shutting children and young people out will prove ineffective ultimately because children and young people are tech-savvy and they will know how to get around this," she told The New Arab.

Instead, she argued governments should focus on creating safer online environments through stronger platform accountability, improved design and digital literacy.

"It's a core issue around the world that these bans are being rolled out very fast without adequate consultation with children, young people, civil society and all the experts who have been doing research on this for decades."

Dittmer said that while concerns about children's online safety are legitimate, bans risk offering a simple solution to a complex problem.

"These teen bans seem to offer a simple solution but actually fail to address the core issues."

In the MENA region, Halim believes more governments are likely to introduce restrictions on young people's social media access, but warned that the motivations behind such policies may differ from those seen in Western countries.

"While Western models focus on protecting minors from algorithmic harm or commercial exploitation, MENA regimes may adopt these bans to consolidate control over the digital environment, using 'child safety' as a socially palatable justification for tightening access and enforcing state-managed digital identities," he said.

Halim said the effectiveness of any future restrictions would depend on several factors, including governments' ability to implement age verification systems, the availability of digital infrastructure and the role social media plays in young people's daily lives.

"Governments must balance their desire to restrict platforms with the necessity of these tools for economic modernisation and state-sanctioned messaging," he said.

He added that social media has become central to youth culture, political discussion and news consumption across the region.

“There is significant tension between the desire to protect traditional social values and the reality that social media is now the primary space for youth cultural expression, political discourse, and news consumption.”

For Skyline International's Dima Samaro, the challenge for governments is not whether children should be protected online, but whether those protections can be achieved without creating new risks.

"The answer to protecting children online is not less access and more restrictive regulation but better design, stronger platform accountability, and genuine investment in digital literacy and in helping families and young people in the region navigate online spaces safely," Samaro said. 

She argued that governments should focus on addressing the underlying problems behind online harms rather than relying primarily on restrictions.

This includes requiring platforms to improve moderation systems, increase transparency, tackle harmful content and give users greater control over their online experiences.

A new digital divide?

The debate over social media bans in the MENA region reflects a wider global struggle over how governments should balance child protection with digital rights.

Few experts dispute that children face genuine risks online. Research has linked excessive social media use with concerns around mental health, cyberbullying, exposure to harmful material and exploitation of personal data.

However, rights groups warn that the methods used to address these risks matter.

As MENA governments debate whether to follow the UAE's lead, the central question remains whether new restrictions will genuinely protect children — or risk creating new systems of surveillance in a region where digital freedoms are already contested.

Lebanon's parliament Wednesday passed a controversial general amnesty law, a day after a majority of legislators voted to become the first Arab state to formally abolish the death penalty.

Lawmakers who backed the bill call it a beginning to correcting past overreach by the judiciary and security agencies and help reduce prison overcrowding, but critics say it is skewed and largely benefits Sunni Islamist prisoners.

The initial proposal, debated since 2019, has exposed sectarian tensions among the country's multitude of Islamic and Christian sects.

A sweeping law with exceptions

The last time Lebanon approved a similar amnesty was in 1991, when the majority of the country’s combatants and militia leadership were absolved of any atrocities and possible war crimes following the country's devastating 1975-90 civil war that killed about 150,000 people and left 17,000 missing.

The new law replaces death sentences with long prison terms, reduces life sentences, and frees some convicted militants and drug dealers. It excludes rape, trafficking, corruption, terror funding, and premeditated murder, but reduces sentences for killing Lebanese troops. Some detainees will be released immediately.

Repeated drug offenders and Lebanese who have been convicted of collaborating with Israel were excluded from the amnesty.

It also remains unknown if the amnesty applies to Lebanese families who took refuge in Israel after occupying Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 but who were not involved in military operations against Lebanon.

Released foreign prisoners, mainly Syrian Islamist militant prisoners, would be transferred to Lebanon’s General Security intelligence agency that is responsible for enforcing immigration laws. It wasn't immediately known if they would be deported.

The fate of extremist Islamist prisoners

While the law was debated in parliament, lawmakers from various sects made different demands.

Sunnis wanted the release of Islamist militants while Shias demanded drug dealers, mostly from Lebanon’s eastern Baalbek region where cannabis is planted, to be freed. Christians required amnesty for hundreds of Lebanese who fled to Israel after the Israeli withdrawal. Many have links to the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army militia, which collapsed following the withdrawal.

However, the most controversial point in the yearslong debate was the fate of extremist Islamist prisoners, including firebrand cleric Ahmad al-Assir.

Al-Assir gained support in southern Lebanon for his vocal criticism of the powerful Shia militant Hezbollah group’s involvement in Syria's uprising that turned into civil war. In 2013, clashes between his supporters and opponents killed 18 Lebanese soldiers. He was sentenced to death in 2017.

His fate remains unclear, but Lebanese lawmaker Waddah Sadek, a Sunni Muslim and supporter of the law, told The Associated Press al-Assir could be released "between a year and a half and two years."

Some celebrate while others feel wronged

Sunni legislators largely celebrated the law passing.

Bilal Abdullah, who represents the Druze-led Progressive Socialist Party, said the amnesty law is not intended to benefit just one sect.

"We are turning a political page where (Sunnis were) targeted, justly and unjustly," Abdullah told reporters in parliament. "Targeted by a regime, security agencies, and unfortunately the military tribunal with some of its unjust convictions."

Supporters of detained Islamists claim their sentencings came at a time when the Shia Hezbollah group had greater political power in the country and larger sway over its security institutions and judicial system, directly targeting the country's Sunni Muslims.

They also said the detainees weren't allowed a fair trial and some were held for too long in pretrial detention due to Lebanon's swamped courts.

Videos circulating on social media showed Islamist prisoners in the notorious Roumieh prison chanting "God is great" in celebration once the law was approved.

The families of the killed Lebanese soldiers have called the law a grave injustice, saying that the perpetrators behind the death of their loved ones should remain behind bars or even be sentenced to death.

Civil society and reformists have largely been critical of the move.

Activist and lawyer Nizar Saghieh, who co-founded the watchdog group Legal Agenda, said justice "comes through accountability and building institutions, not a general amnesty."

Saghieh criticised lawmakers who called the amnesty a form of justice due to what they said were unfair trials in military and civil courts. However, they haven't made any real structural reforms, he said. "They talk about injustice in military courts, but they are still functioning as before."

The move is an attempt to shift the issue from an executive decision for which the government alone bears responsibility to a legislative process backed and supported by parliament.

It would also give the state broader legal cover in confronting factional weapons. This reflects the complexities facing the issue, as al-Zaidi stressed that uncontrolled weapons pose "the greatest threat" to the state because they undermine the authority of the law and weaken the standing of security institutions.

Al-Zaidi held a meeting with the parliamentary security committee on Tuesday evening, 11 August, attended by its chairman, Khaled Meteb al-Obaidi, and members of the committee, according to a statement issued by al-Zaidi's office.

"The meeting reviewed the situation in the country and the efforts being made by the security services in their various branches and formations to impose security and stability and protect the country's borders and airspace against various threats, particularly in light of the events and repercussions taking place in the region," it said. 

It said al-Zaidi "directed the preparation of a bill to restrict weapons to the hands of the state, in accordance with constitutional procedures".

"The greatest threat to the state is uncontrolled weapons, as they undermine the authority of the law and weaken the standing of security institutions," al-Zaidi said at the meeting.

"The importance of strengthening the position of the state through its sovereignty, standing and constitutional institutions and enhancing the capabilities of the military institution to ensure internal stability linked to economic, political and security stability in a way that safeguards the security and safety of Iraq and the resources of its people," he reportedly stressed. 

In this context, al-Zaidi called for "integrated work and coordination between the executive and legislative authorities to enhance stability, enact laws and provide legislative cover for government development plans and programmes", stressing "the importance of holding regular meetings with the parliamentary security and defence committee to complete these issues".

Parliamentary backing

An informed government source, who requested anonymity, told The New Arab, "Al-Zaidi's move towards a law to restrict weapons aims to legislate the issue and give it legal and political cover and to secure parliamentary support, preventing the issue from remaining solely in the hands of the government and ensuring it is not left alone to confront factions that reject the decision".

"The government is currently facing major complications over the issue, given the factions' overlap with political systems and external links, as well as the influence and political representation they enjoy," he explained.

"Passing a parliamentary law would make the issue of restricting weapons a legislative obligation binding on state institutions rather than merely a government programme open to political disputes," the government source added. "It would also allow the government to rely on a legal provision when making decisions towards factions that refuse to cooperate on the issue."

This point appears to be particularly important for al-Zaidi, as any confrontation with the factions could entail major security risks.

Meanwhile, the existence of a law enacted by parliament would give al-Zaidi a significant opportunity to move forward with the issue, because the government would be implementing a constitutional and legislative mandate issued by the Iraqi state rather than a personal decision by al-Zaidi.

But, passing the law will not be straightforward.

Parliament itself reflects political balances, while factions and forces linked to them have significant parliamentary influence, making it difficult to pass legislation restricting weapons.

For his part, parliamentary security committee member MP Sherwan al-Doberdani affirmed his committee's support for al-Zaidi's directives to restrict weapons to the hands of the state.

Doberdani, who attended the meeting, said that "the committee expressed its readiness to cooperate on the issue of restricting weapons, as sovereignty and the law must belong to the state".

He warned in a press statement that "after Sept. 30—the deadline set by the government to end the issue of weapons outside the framework of the state—factions have to choose either the state or the non-state” . 

The above developments comes at a highly sensitive time, as debate grows inside Iraq over the future of armed factions.

In this context, Ismail Qaani's visit to Baghdad two days ago, as commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, takes on particular significance.

This is especially the case given the series of separate meetings he held with several leaders of the Coordination Framework and Iraqi armed faction commanders during an unannounced visit.

These meetings appear to be influential in the course of the issue, which topped Qaani's discussions, particularly as the end of September approaches.

It is a deadline that has raised growing concerns that the Iraqi government could resort to tougher options, potentially including the use of force to impose its decision on armed factions.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

Saied was met with angry protesters during a visit to Chatt Essalam earlier this week, an area located in the northern part of Gabes, near the Tunisian Chemical Group chemical complex. The complex processes phosphate, the main cause of the city’s environmental woes, where residents have been suffering from higher rates of cancer and respiratory illnesses.

Saied made an unannounced visit to the Gabes Governorate to inspect the environmental concerns there, where he stressed that the environmental crisis is a "national cause".

He said that Gabes has paid a heavy price due to the chemical complex—an entity that previous governments had planned to dismantle and sell off at cheap prices, a practice pursued since 2011 and even earlier.

But, Kais stated  that Tunisia’s public institutions and facilities were "not for sale or disposal".

The president was met with angry chants from dozens of locals, most vocally: "Leave, leave, leave," and "The people want the units dismantled," in reference to the chemical complex units.

Police forces were seen trying to control the crowd as Saied met with local officials.

He was also confronted by several residents who voiced fury over the issue, with one man going up to Saied and saying, "We have the highest rate of illnesses here, Mr. President. We can’t have children anymore."

Visibly under pressure, Saied responded to protesters, assuring them that the units will be dismantled, and also called for urgent, effective measures alongside the development of long-term solutions for the structural problems.

He could then be seen discussing this with one of the local officials, stressing the need for "clean and pure air" in the region, where phosphate production has caused alarming rates of pollution, and for the city to return to how it was before the environmental crisis.

In January this year, Saied had emphasised the need to begin implementing the required measures—covering technical, financial, and structural aspects— to address the sources of pollution and halt its consequences—though very little progress has been made, given the residents' anger.

The city of Gabes and its surroundings have been plagued by an environmental and health crisis since the 1970s due to the chemical complexes processing phosphate into agricultural fertilizer.

The state-owned phosphate complex has provoked frustration among the local population over what they have described as a failure to protect public health.

Phosphate production and the subsequent toxic fumes is know to have led to higher rates of respiratory illnesses such as asthma, as well as osteoporosis and cancer. Marine life and livelihoods in the coastal town have also been damaged as industrial waste continues to be discharged into the sea.

Protests against the state-owned phosphate company in Gabes over economic grievances and unemployment in the sector have been occurring since the mid-2000s, but those related to the environment and public health intensified in October 2025 after a gas leak sent dozens of residents, including children, to hospitals.

The leak reignited long-standing concern in Gabes over the rising cancer rates in the coastal town, which was once home to a thriving and unique ecosystem.

The last major wave of protest took place in December 2025, which saw dozens of activists arrested.

It’s March 4 in Baghdad. The operations room at the command headquarters of the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) is bustling. Faces are tired and tense, eyes darting between screens connected to thermal cameras deployed across operational sectors and tablets displaying military maps. It is 9:00pm, and all indications suggest that the night would be as long as the ones before it.

Most officers in the room are monitoring developments at sites targeted by US and Israeli aircraft, while the rest engage in detailed discussions about the operational landscape, trying to predict the targets of the jets that night.

Amid heated discussions about the flashing lights that represent incoming aircraft, a flood of cables pour in from various units. Unlike the previous cables, the content of which summarised the casualties and damage from enemy airstrikes, these cables report that thousands of fighters received SMS and WhatsApp messages from foreign numbers on their personal mobiles. The messages either threatened them, or urged them to turn on their commanders.  

“Your support for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s operations will not go unpunished. We will find you,” one of the SMS reads.

“Our ability to strike you is limitless. Every step you take brings you closer to your destruction,” read another.

The potential impact of the messages on fighters’ morale did not overly concern an “ideologically driven force” such as the PMF, one of its commanders told The New Arab (TNA). Broadcasting a single recorded speech of the assassinated Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would reportedly “revive the fighters’ morale and push them to sacrifice themselves,” he continued. 

The instructions given to PMF troops were clear and simple: do not reply, report immediately to your direct officer, document the SMS and the sender's number, then block it, PMF commanders told TNA.

The flood of messages did not stop. They arrived in waves, once or twice a week throughout the course of the war, commanders said.

“Your leaders have abandoned you. They are enjoying the money they stole and living luxurious lives with their families, while they leave you to be killed for their own interests,” another SMS read. The messages were directed primarily at detachment and battalion commanders, fighters, and mid-level administrators rather than senior commanders or officials, suggesting a pattern of selective targeting. 

The messages alarmed the Iraqi Joint Operations Command (I-JOC), the body that coordinates all branches of the Iraqi armed forces. They requested an investigation to determine the source of these messages, the extent and scope of the security breach, and the resulting damage, military officials told TNA.

“The PMF rejected a request to let us investigate the incident, so we asked them to conduct an internal investigation,” a member of the Iraqi Joint Military Operations Command told TNA. 

Preliminary PMF probes found that around ten thousand fighters had received such messages. Geographically, units deployed in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Anbar were among the most heavily targeted. Most of the attacks that targeted US military installations in Iraqi Kurdistan had originated from these areas, leading Iraqi commanders to believe this explained why personnel deployed there were the key targets of the messaging campaign, a member of the I-JOC told TNA. 

Fighters and commanders affiliated with Iranian-backed armed factions were the target of these messages despite the deployment of army and federal police forces in the same areas, a military commander familiar with the investigation told TNA. 

Investigators began examining possible data sources that could explain the potential pattern of messages and recipients' selection; the findings pointed to the PMF’s centralised personnel and payroll database.

“The [leaked] information actually came from the payroll database,” a Joint Operations Command officer familiar with the investigation told TNA, “[the PMF] have a [payroll] database that includes sector deployments, tasks, and affiliations, and then the leads are connected.”

Over the past five months, The New Arab sat down with an array of high-ranking military and security officials in Iraq, who were all relatively confident that access to this specific database had enabled the psyop (psychological operation) against the Iran-backed PMF. Although the operation was not successful in turning low-ranking soldiers against their commanders, our findings suggest that K2 Integrity - a financial intelligence firm with ties to the US Treasury and Israel - could have played a role in granting Iran’s foes access to a goldmine of information on its allies in Iraq. 

As the US-Israeli war on Tehran rages on, K2 Integrity’s operations sprawl across the region - including Libya, Lebanon and Iraq - and, in line with the vision of its founders, continue to serve as an asset in Washington’s financial War on Terror.

‘Ghost’ imports

For years, US officials expressed frustration over the continued flow of large numbers of US dollars - sold through the Central Bank of Iraq’s dollar auction - to Iran and sanctioned entities. 

Discussions during periodic meetings between the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) often revolved on the need for effective mechanisms capable of tracing dollar transfers and identifying the ultimate beneficiaries.

Restricting participation in the foreign currency auction to holders of Iraqi Chambers of Commerce Union ID cards, as had been the practice before 2011, or to registered companies thereafter, did not prove effective in limiting dollar flows outside Iraq. 

“We [...] identified the problem, but fixing it is difficult,” a former senior CBI official told TNA, “we have open trade with China and Turkey. This is clear and transparent, but [...] those who trade with Iran buy dollars from the parallel market because it is a sanctioned country, so there is always demand and pressure for dollars outside the official [banking] sector.”

The gap between sales through the CBI’s foreign currency auction window, Iraq’s main channel for accessing official US dollars, and the country’s recorded imports illustrates the scale of dollar flows. The CBI sold approximately $180 billion through its foreign currency auction window between 2018 and 2021. Around 85 percent of these funds ($155 billion) were allocated to financing imports, although Iraq only imported  $87 billion worth of goods of services in that same period.

Iraqi and US officials attributed the difference to fictitious or “ghost” imports used to facilitate the transfer of dollars abroad.

In March 2021, Washington started pushing for the creation of an electronic system linked to the CBI’s foreign currency auction window. 

Four months later, CBI announced the launch of a platform to exchange documents and data with all banks. All licensed banks were instructed to subscribe by 15 August 2022. 

Iraqi and US officials agreed that the platform would start operating on a trial basis at three banks - Baghdad Bank, al-Mansour Bank, and the Trade Bank of Iraq - while the foreign currency auction window would continue operating in parallel to mitigate the potential disruptions to the dollar exchange rates in the markets . 

A full transition to the electronic platform as the sole channel for obtaining official dollars was scheduled for the beginning of 2023, but this timeline was soon abandoned.

In October 2022, former acting Finance Minister Ihsan Abdul-Jabbar revealed the theft of more than $2.5 billion in tax deposits held in an account at the state-owned Rafidain Bank. 

Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani publicly acknowledged that a significant amount of the stolen funds had been smuggled out of the country; Iran-aligned actors reportedly played a key role in the embezzlement.  

The scale of theft from the government purse, “The Heist of the Century”, likely hardened the US authorities’ stance towards Iraq. Washington demanded the immediate shutdown of the foreign currency auction window and the adoption of the electronic platform as the sole channel for accessing US dollars. 

 “After a month and a half of operation [of the platform], [US officials] said: ‘It's over, the platform is in control,” a former senior CBI official involved in talks told TNA.

Enter K2 Integrity

Since 2004, Iraq’s oil revenues have been deposited in an account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, managed by CBI on behalf of the Iraqi government.

By late 2022, dollar auction sales sharply declined as a result of banks and exchange companies’ reluctance to participate in the newly instituted electronic platform and be subjected to further scrutiny. 

The growing shortage of dinars, which the central bank obtains from the sale of dollars to the private sector, quickly evolved into a broader financial crisis in which the government was left struggling to pay public sector workers’ salaries. 

The Iraqi government attempted to mitigate the disruption domestically by increasing cash-dollar sales and offering banking facilities to traders and investors seeking access to the dollar auction, but to no avail. 

Iraqi officials were concerned that failure to meet the US demands would ultimately jeopardise Iraq's access to funds held at the Federal Reserve.

“They twisted our arm,” a former senior CBI official involved in talks with the US officials told TNA, “we can't refuse or they will turn off the tap [of dollars]”.

By late 2022, a major shift had taken place in the US approach toward Iraq’s banking sector. Officials moved beyond monitoring dollar outflows and began requesting to trace the source of the dinars used to purchase dollars and the institutions and channels through which they moved, Iraqi officials told TNA.

“The Americans aren’t currently concerned with tracking the dollars, because if they originate from CBI, this means they were laundered and dried,” a former senior CBI official told TNA, “they want to know the source of the dinars that purchased the dollars.”

US officials required the appointment of an international firm to audit foreign currency transfers and trace the origin of dinars used in these transactions. 

K2 Integrity, a US financial investigations firm, was among the proposed companies. KPMG, one of the Big Four global accounting firms and the CBI’s technical adviser at the time, recommended the US company. 

Unlike the Big Four auditing firms, K2 Integrity specialises in investigations, sanctions compliance, and illicit finance. Many of its senior staff are former officials of the US Treasury. Iraqi bankers said the company was viewed as particularly capable of navigating Washington’s compliance demands.

“[K2 Integrity] knows how Treasury and Federal Reserve officials think, which makes matters easier and helps mitigate the reactions of US officials to any disasters that may be uncovered during audits,” a former government financial adviser told TNA. 

Negotiations with the company began in November 2022, with a preliminary understanding that operations would begin in February 2023.

The shift

As Iraqi dinar shortages worsened, the government expanded electronic payments requirements as part of a broader effort to reduce reliance on cash transactions and keep larger amounts of money circulating within the banking sector. 

Then Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, asked the CBI governor, Mustafa Ghalib, to lower the official dollar exchange rate, Ghalib rejected the request, arguing that the crisis was temporary. To his mind, lowering the exchange rate further would have intensified that demand, reduced government revenues, and driven up consumer prices. 

By late January, the crisis had further intensified with the black market exchange rate reaching unprecedented levels and consumer goods prices rising sharply.

Al-Sudani summoned Ghalib again to the presidential palace and renewed his request for a rate adjustment, but the meeting ended with Ghalib submitting a request to be relieved of his duties.

Hours later, Sudani announced his dismissal and the appointment of Ali Mohsen al-Alaq as his successor.

Al-Alaq, who had previously served as governor of CBI,  maintained longstanding ties with US financial stakeholders. Iraqi officials said the prime minister viewed him as better positioned to restore communication channels with Washington. 

Immediately after his appointment, al-Alaq moved to contain the crisis between the CBI, the US Treasury, and the Federal Reserve. Within two weeks, he finalised negotiations with K2 Integrity and signed an agreement on behalf of CBI. 

At the same time, the CBI introduced a package of measures to expand access to dollars through official channels for certain businesses, and requested a reduction in the official exchange rate.

Negotiations between Washington and CBI produced a major shift in the regulatory framework governing Iraq's dollar transfer system: Iraqi and US officials agreed to replace the existing post-review mechanism - which reviewed transfers after dollars had already been released - with a pre-transfer review system.

“Post-audit means oversight. Prior-audit means decision. That is, there is a decision [from the US] to oversee and investigate [transactions],” a former Iraqi prime minister told TNA.

A new tracing system

Unlike post-auditing review, the shift to pre-audit review required an integrated verification framework linking the CBI to multiple government databases, allowing transaction data and supporting documentation to be cross-checked against identity, company registration, tax, customs, payroll, and other administrative records before approval.

Within the CBI, this requirement was addressed through the expansion and redesign of the electronic platform: under the supervision of K2 Integrity and KPMG, the Financial Institutions Transaction Reports (FITR) was developed as a unified system for data collection, verification, and auditing. 

A report published by CBI in June 2026 identified K2 Integrity as responsible for reviewing foreign currency transfer requests submitted by Iraqi banks on a daily basis.

No public information is available about the first contract concluded by the CBI with K2 Integrity. However, a former senior CBI officials familiar with the terms of the first agreement signed in February, told TNA that the bank had granted the company access to the FITR system. The contract was annual, they said, and valued at nearly $12 million per year, said a former CBI official. 

The June report revealed that the CBI had signed a second contract with the company in August 2023,  and a third in September 2024. 

Bankers familiar with the process told TNA that K2 Integrity’s work was largely focused on reviewing historical transactions involving sanctioned banks. The third contract tasked K2 Integrity with monitoring 20% of US dollar remittances and 100% of UAE dirham remittances.

The New Arab contacted the CBI and K2 Integrity, seeking comment on this story, but we haven’t received any response in time for publication.

The role of exchange and intermediary companies, previously central to dollar distribution, became limited to cash sales for travel, medical, and education purposes. Their operations, along with daily cash transactions, were routed through FITR and subject to the platform’s approval.

Rather than relying on a one-time review of submitted documents, the FITR system continuously cross-checked records against linked government databases and maintained an updated profile for each applicant.

Iraqi officials described the platform as a turning point, arguing that it had fundamentally strengthened the monitoring of financial transactions and curbed abuse of the official dollar window.

“The platform has become a tracking and verification system for every dinar [used to buy foreign currency] and dollar that moves within Iraq,” a senior Iraqi official told The New Arab, “it is one of the best systems that [...] ended the smuggling of official dollars.”

Yet, traders interviewed by TNA offered a more nuanced assessment. 

“The electronic platform has benefited legitimate traders but eliminated hundreds of small traders, retailers, as well as fictitious ones. It has also burdened us with excessive paperwork,” Ahmed al-Fahad, an importer and owner of a general trading company told TNA. 

Despite the extensive verification and compliance measures imposed by Iraqi authorities since February 2023, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the international standard-setting body for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, placed the country on its grey list in June 2026. Baghdad will need to formulate and implement further reforms to be whitelisted.

Shortly after the FATF’s decision, Iraqi authorities launched a sweeping arrest campaign targeting senior officials on allegations of corruption and abuse of public funds. The investigations reportedly led to the seizure of billions of Iraqi dinars, and tens of millions of US dollars, in addition to dozens of properties and kilos of gold, underscoring that major laundering networks remained active despite all the recent restrictions.

Digitising a trove of information… in one database  

A significant share of Iraq’s income is tied to public sector employment and state-funded transfers. State employees’ salaries, pensions, and welfare payments represent the primary source of income for more than ten million of the country’s 46-million-strong population.

This level of dependence positioned payroll systems as a fundamental component of fiscal governance and financial inclusion. It also made them a critical tool of state oversight. 

In late 2016, with the aim of curbing widespread frauds, the Iraqi government issued the first directive to digitise payroll systems. Subsequent cabinet decisions established a unified employment identifier for all public-sector employees. The programme was later expanded to include retirees and private sector employees.

But Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) commanders expressed strong resistance to the digitalisation of their personnel’s salaries, arguing that the system would comprise their safety. To mitigate these concerns, the government introduced a set of arrangements aimed at regulating access to payroll data and controlling its processing. 

“We wanted to control corruption and the ghost fighters,” a senior Iraqi official involved in the process told TNA, “the money was distributed in bags, and some fighters received only a quarter or a third of their salaries.”

Under this arrangement, the PMF payroll system operated through a separate payment structure. Starting in 2019, the Finance Ministry funded the Popular Mobilisation Forces’ account at Rafidain Bank, while Qi Card, Rafidain Bank's electronic payment partner and Iraq’s largest card issuer, would allow troops to access their salaries.  

Implementing the arrangement immediately exposed a problem: the salary distribution process relied on fragmented personnel records maintained by formations' commanders. Hence, Qi Card was tasked with building the PMF's first unified electronic database.

PMF units were instructed to provide the company's teams, which had relocated to the group’s headquarters for the project, with detailed financial, military and personal information on their personnel.

Unlike conventional payroll systems, the PMF payroll database incorporates extensive military and personal information, including salary records, mobile number, rank, unit, specialisation, and political affiliations, as well as family ties and marital status.

It also contains supporting documentation such as the educational certificates, the spouse’s national ID card, national ID cards for each child, and proof of continued education for children over the age of 18.

“[Keeping all these details in a single database] is a blatant security breach and a major scandal,” a senior military commander told TNA.

Unlike other government salary payments, however, PMF salaries continued to be processed outside the central bank’s platform for electronic transactions, also known as ‘the national switch’, placing them beyond CBI’s direct oversight. 

A blind spot emerged within the verification system: salary payments for more than 300,000 PMF fighters were reportedly processed through the banking channels, while the underlying personal records remained outside authorities’ view. 

“This blind spot makes the verification process stumbling and slow, and all the information produced from it is treated with suspicion,” a former government financial advisor told TNA.

The verification gap affecting PMF salary payments became one of the key issues raised by the US Treasury in its communication with Iraq over Rafidain Bank. The Treasury warned that the bank could face sanctions unless compliance deficiencies were addressed.

The New Arab contacted the US Treasury, seeking comment on this story, but we haven’t received any response in time for publication.

The pressure intensified at the end of April 2025, when US Deputy Treasury Secretary Michael Faulkender accused Rafidain Bank’s branch in Sanaa of processing payments for Yemen’s Houthis, whom Washington considers as terrorists. Iraqi authorities rejected the allegation, stating that the branch had ceased operations in 2017.

Amid growing concerns over US sanctions, Qi Card stopped distributing PMF salaries in June and withdrew from the arrangement. 

That same month, Qi Card entered a partnership with K2 Integrity to “enhance” its financial compliance standards across its operations in the UAE, Jordan, and Iraq.

Just weeks later in August, Rafidain Bank too signed a partnership with K2 Integrity, which a company executive described at the time as an opportunity to “transform its commitment to reform into a demonstrable and institutionalised financial integrity program”.

To shield Rafidain Bank from potential sanctions, the Iraqi government transferred responsibility for distributing PMF salaries to the state-owned Nahrain Islamic Bank in July. At the same time, all PMF personnel were issued new local electronic cards called Al-Muhandis cards, replacing the previous payment arrangement, PMF commanders told TNA.

Although the internal PMF investigation is still ongoing and has not yet reached conclusive findings, the pressure exerted by the US Treasury on Rafidain Bank and Qi Card, followed by subsequent compliance-related arrangements with K2 Integrity, reinforced the Iraqi security officials’ assessment that the data breach could be linked with the PMF payroll system.

Within the PMF payroll system, data transmitted to Rafidain Bank was encrypted and only included the Qi electronic card number and the corresponding salary amount. However, K2 Integrity is believed to have gained access to the PMF database through its review of transactions processed by Rafidain Bank through Qi Card. 

During K2 Integrity's audit of Qi Card and Rafidain, the company’s auditors would have had to review detailed records - including encrypted ones - to verify the authenticity of transfers, thereby revealing PMF personnel's identities, according to a banker familiar with the matter.

The New Arab contacted Rafidain Bank and Qi Card, seeking comment on this story, but we haven’t received any response in time for publication. 

“The source of the leak was almost certainly the payroll database. [It] is a goldmine for intelligence analysts,” a former senior Iraqi anti-corruption official told The New Arab.

“For anyone with access to that data,” he continued, “it becomes easy to reconstruct a person’s daily life, determine where he sleeps, when he visits the barber, and how he spends his time.”

Fact-checking and copyediting:

TNA Investigative Researcher/Journalist Jonathan Cole.

Commissioning, editing and supervision: 

TNA Investigative Editor Andrea Glioti.

For questions, comments and complaints please email Andrea Glioti andrea.glioti@newarab.com or TNA Investigative Journalist Jonathan Cole jonathan.cole@newarab.com.

Sensitive info and tips are to be sent via encrypted email to thenewarab@tutanota.com.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Wednesday he hoped more countries would join a defence agreement signed last week between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan aimed at stabilising a region wracked by conflict.

The so-called "Mecca Joint Defence Agreement" was signed on Friday as the regional grapples with fallout from the US-Israeli war on Iran which has dragged in regional players and disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea.

"Our vision for it is not limited to the three countries," the Turkish leader told the London-based Asharq Al-Awsat daily. "Rather we aspire for it to grow, and perhaps appropriate conditions will emerge one day for all countries of the region to gather under its umbrella."

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on Saturday said Turkey expected Egypt to join the pact "in the next stage", telling the Anadolu state news agency only "a few technical issues" stood in the way.

Egypt has not commented on the agreement nor on the remarks by Fidan, who will visit Cairo on Thursday and Friday.

Cairo has robust military cooperation with Ankara, but has given no indication it intends to sign up to the new security alliance, which contains a NATO-style clause saying any attack on one would be seen as an attack on all.

The five-month US-Israeli war on Iran war upended the security architecture in the region and forced a rethink of decades of conventional wisdom rooted in US military supremacy.

Erdogan said the pact emerged out of the "new circumstances" in the Middle East with regional players seeking to assume greater responsibility for their own security and stability.

"Regional issues should be resolved by regional actors, and with this action, we consider that we have taken a first step toward achieving that goal," he said.

"Resolving regional issues must be carried out away from formulas imposed from the outside. We know very well that solutions imported from abroad only bring disasters," he told the Saudi-owned newspaper.

The pact, which consolidates three major US allies into an alternative security architecture that rejects Israel's hegemony, seeks to boost security cooperation, while also opening the way for "developing joint projects in the defence industries", Erdogan said.

Since the onset of the war, Saudi Arabia has grown closer to Turkey, with whom it previously had fraught ties, with Erdogan saying Ankara and Riyadh would "take steps that will elevate relations between the two countries to much higher levels", without giving further details.

In a letter written to the UK's Middle East Minister, Labour MP Stephen Doughty, and seen by The New Arab, the ICJP welcomed his condemnation of settlement expansion and their illegality under international law.

The letter called on the UK government to "move beyond statements of concern and non-binding warnings directed at a limited number of organisations and address the settlement enterprise, and the economic relationships that sustain it, as a whole."

"We therefore urge you to use your position as Minister of the Middle East and secure targeted measures, without further delay, prohibiting trade with and economic support for illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory," it continued.

"Such measures should address not merely particular actors or transactions, but the broader commercial and financial relationship that contribute to the maintenance and expansion of the illegal settlement enterprise," the letter added.

"Sanctions are not a radical step–they are the bare minimum required to uphold international law, and the legal position on Israeli settlements is clear," Órlaith Roe, ICJP's Public Affairs and Communication Officer, explained.

"The question for the UK government is no longer whether it condemns settlement expansion, but what concrete measures it is prepared to take in response," she added.

The UK has frequently condemned the existence of illegal Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, alongside the accompanying rise of settler violence that is ongoing in the area.

On Monday, UK foreign secretary Ed Miliband held separate calls with both Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar and Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Moustafa.

In a statement released regarding his call with Sa'ar, Miliband said that he "raised the sharp escalation of settler violence and settlement expansion," adding that "Israel must crack down on violence in the West Bank."

Despite the words of condemnation and sanctions on individual settlers, Israeli settler violence has continued to grow, alongside Israeli government decisions to expand Israeli settlements, most notably the E1 settlement that threatens to split the occupied West Bank into two.

The expansion of Israeli state and settler violence, which has seen the forced displacement of tens of thousands of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, has been described by rights groups as a policy of state-sanctioned "ethnic cleansing".

ICJP noted in its letter to Doughty that the Israeli government approved 13 new settlements on 3 July, and £300 in funding for settlement expansion on 18 July, measures that "form part of an escalating effort to entrench Israel's unlawful settlement enterprise and create further irreversible changes on the ground."

It added that there was an expectation for the government to take further action, following a letter written by 140 Labour MPs to former Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper on 7 June which called for a ban on trade with settlements, and the announcement by the Charity Commission of an investigation into funding links between UK-based charities and settlements.

Roe told The New Arab that the ongoing changes on the ground in the occupied West Bank require immediate action from the British government.

"Sanctions have to be an immediate priority. With the E1 settlement tenders due to go live imminently, the window to prevent irreversible changes on the ground is rapidly closing," she said.

"This is also an important early test for Minister Doughty: how he responds now will set the tone for his tenure and show how seriously he intends to approach the UK's responsibility to uphold international law and prevent settlement expansion," she added.

Alongside pressure in the UK, the EU is also actively deliberating issuing of trade sanctions against illegal Israeli settlements, though efforts to push through bloc-wide sanctions have so far failed.

ICJP's own letter ended by saying that the implementation of sanctions on Israeli settlements would "demonstrate that the United Kingdom's stated commitment to international law carries real and measurable consequences."

The tanker was moving slowly toward Somalia when a gunman was spotted near the bridge. EU naval officials soon concluded he was not acting alone.

The MT Asana is the fourth ship suspected pirates have hijacked off Somalia since April, in a crisis that has triggered renewed fears about maritime security around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea region. 

Piracy off the Horn of Africa cost more than $400 million in ransom payments between 2005 and 2012, according to a joint study by Interpol, the United Nations, and the World Bank, which recorded 179 ships hijacked over that period before an international coalition brought the crisis under control.

At the height of that earlier crisis, in 2010 alone, pirates hijacked 53 vessels and took 1,090 crew hostage, according to a report by the advocacy group Oceans Beyond Piracy. By June the following year, it counted more than 500 seafarers still being held at once.

The last time there was an uptick in incidents, from 2011 to 2016, it took a large multinational naval coalition to beat it back, made up of NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, the EU’s Operation Atalanta, and a British-led task force called Combined Task Force 151.

The incidents also reshaped the region, prompting Japan, Italy and eventually China to establish military bases in Djibouti, whose coastline faces Yemen across the mouth of the Red Sea. The US had already maintained a base there, tied to its post-9/11 operations.

Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh said at the time that many countries with bases in the country were focused on “protecting their commercial and investment interests”, in a 2024 interview with the Saudi-owned news outlet Asharq Al-Awsat.

Incidents fell from 237 in 2011 to almost none within five years. 

In addition to the naval task force, Benoit Lefevre, a French naval intelligence officer, argued that better-guarded ships made it “too risky, too uncertain to stay reliably profitable” for pirates.

The shipping industry was confident enough in that fix after a sustained lull that it formally lifted its “high risk” designation for the Indian Ocean only in 2023.

Since April this year, however, the French navy’s Mica Centre, which monitors the region, has recorded 18 piracy incidents and had three vessels still held for ransom, even before the MT Asana was added to the count.

A new opening at sea

The trigger was the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in February. Tehran began restricting passage through the Strait of Hormuz following US-Israeli strikes, later implementing a full blockade of the waterway, which carries 20% of the world’s oil and gas.

Whilst the fighting pulled naval and diplomatic attention to managing and resolving the conflict, merchant ships have been pushed closer to Somali waters, creating a target-rich environment.

Some incidents, however, have occurred far from Somalia, including the MT Asana hijacking near Yemen’s coast, with pirates increasingly relying on GPS and other technologies to track ships and monitor their movements.

“One thing that pirates, the Houthis, the IRGC and others have demonstrated is that chokepoints are highly vulnerable to small-scale attacks capable of crippling global supply chains,” Jatin Dua, a maritime security scholar and author of Captured at Sea: Piracy and Protection in the Indian Ocean, told The New Arab.

“What we’re seeing is low-tech and also ways for non-state actors as well as state actors to make chokepoints bend to their will,” Dua added. 

This diversion of focus is felt most acutely in Puntland, the semi-autonomous northern Somali region where most hijackers come from and where they bring their captured ships.

Jethro Norman, a Somalia specialist at the Danish Institute for International Studies, told The New Arab that the revival of hijackings off the Somali coast was being misread as an international maritime security problem, when it should instead be understood as part of the broader challenges facing Puntland.

Norman said three factors, beyond the international naval coalition, had helped suppress the hijackings at their source, though they had done little to address the underlying incentives driving the attacks: the region's coastal police force, the PMPF; local clan elders; and courts in the regional capital, Garowe. 

“All these things depend on Puntland’s state capacity,” he said, “and this is what has all fallen apart.” 

Since last year, Puntland has deployed a large share of its forces, including members of the PMPF, to a separate offensive against the Somali branch of Islamic State (IS) operating from the region’s mountains.

A rift with Somalia’s federal government has further strained Puntland’s resources, culminating this week in the forcible takeover of three bases in the region housing federal troops.

The economics of piracy

This has dovetailed with broader economic challenges within Somalia related to the Iran war.

Somalia imports around nine-tenths of what it consumes, and the disruption to Hormuz sent fuel and food prices sharply higher within days of the war’s start in February. Inflation has since persisted across the economy, with the Consumer Price Index rising 8.1% in June, according to the national statistics bureau.

Norman told The New Arab that the pirates were deliberately going after fuel tankers rather than selecting ships at random, because the same price rises squeezing Somali households have made fuel cargo unusually valuable. “It is not just opportunism,” he said.

A Puntland security official told the news agency AFP in April that those who seized the cargo ship Sward were mostly poor young men from the coastal town of Garacad, armed and angry over illegal fishing as much as drawn by ransom.

Puntland’s fisheries minister, Mohamed Abdulkadir Salah, said in June that illegal fishing was costing Somalia approximately $300 million a year, with roughly half of those losses occurring in Puntland.

A second official said the group all belonged to the same clan and sub-clan, which is different from that of Puntland’s president, making any crackdown a potentially destabilising move in a region where delicate clan balances need to be maintained.

“That’s why negotiations are best to defuse this kind of situation,” he told AFP. “But it also plays into the hands of the pirates.”

The surge has turned outside attention back toward the Somali coast, from Washington to Brussels to Cairo. Egypt's foreign ministry said in June it was working through its embassies in Mogadishu and Riyadh to secure the release of Egyptian sailors held aboard the tanker Eureka, seized off Somalia in May. 

In mid-July, the EU's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, signed a new Status of Forces Agreement with Djibouti, renewing access for both Atalanta and a second EU mission, Aspides, which patrol the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

While Saudi Arabia’s initiative to establish a Red Sea naval task force was likely prompted by Houthi attacks on its ships, a broader group of countries, including Somalia, has since joined the effort.

Abdel Aziz Aluwaisheg, the Gulf Cooperation Council’s assistant secretary-general for political affairs, called for “more support” for the Somali government to help it “contribute effectively to fighting piracy”. 

On 2 August, Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni signed an agreement in the port city of Bosaso with a US delegation led by Major General Claude Tudor of US Africa Command, expanding the US military presence there and pledging closer cooperation on maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

These measures, however, only address one element of the broader challenge, says Norman.

“Unless the international community directly resources the Puntland institutions that police this coastline,” he said, “neither the immediate threat nor the political economy sustaining it gets resolved.”

Faisal Ali is a freelance journalist covering Somalia and East Africa

Follow him on X: @FaisalAHAli

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

The Foundations of Zionism by Sabri Jiryis takes the reader on a tour of Jewish interreligious debates, from early Zionist settlers to the end of the British Mandate in 1948.

Jiryis, an 87-year-old Palestinian lawyer and writer fluent in Hebrew, with decades of activism, was the director of the Palestine Research Centre of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1970s and 80s.

His activism would lead to his being placed under administrative detention, or imprisonment without charge, by Israel before being exiled to Lebanon.

A major activist intellectual, his role as head of the Palestine Research Centre gave dispossessed people a chance to grow intellectually, academically and to explore their own history.

In 1982, Israel invaded Beirut and looted the Centre’s historical archives and this set Palestinian educational institutions back a step.

The Foundations of Zionism was originally published in two volumes in Arabic in 1977 and 1986, with the first volume first appearing in Lebanon and the second in Cyprus.

A single-volume, newly translated edition of the book will give English readers direct access to a towering work of historical writing.

Jiryis writes: "My encounter with Zionism began at a young age. As a child in my village of Fassouta, in the Galilee, I witnessed the Nakba of 1948 when I was 10 years old, and saw people from nearby villages fleeing to Lebanon. I was among the 160,000 Palestinians who remained on our land, and I grew up under Israeli military rule and discrimination. Early in my life, the question plagued me: “Who are these people? Why did they come here?"

Those two basic questions that animated the young life of Sabri Jiryis feel like the guiding motivation for producing this work.

What we find in the book is not a simple picture of what Zionism is and how history unfolded. Jiryis does not shy away from complexity, nuance and historically rooted analysis.

The Foundations of Zionism gets into the weeds of the debates Zionists had in the late 19th century and the 1940s, as well as the background for why they were happening.

The book begins by examining the development of Judaism before Zionism and the impact of European Christian persecution of Jews from the 15th century onwards.

Jiryis puts forward a well-documented case that Zionism is born out of European antisemitism — he examines the different manifestations of antisemitism in different places, regimes and ideologies and how this impacted Jewish life.

As Jiryis observes, events like the trial of the Jewish-French Army officer Alfred Dreyfus, falsely accused of treason, convinced many Jews that despite an era of equality and integration, their Jewish heritage would not be forgotten.

"The writings of many Zionist leaders and thinkers revealed a great disappointment with antisemitism, which prompted them to fundamentally reconsider their positions. In doing so, affected by the very racism inherent in anti-semitism, they adopted racist hypotheses of their own to counter it." They concluded that Jews needed to leave Europe and establish a country made up of fellow Jews.

A key takeaway from the book is that Zionism had several different beginnings in the late 19th century, and that the synthesis of these different parties was the source of constant tension.

In the chapter on Theodor Herzl, who authored The Jewish State and was an important Zionist leader, we find that many of his ideas were contentious among other Zionists.

"In his book, Herzl also called for drafting a constitution for the Jewish state, and suggested that this state should take the form of an aristocratic republic."

Herzl stated his position was explicitly against democracy in the new state. Herzl's involvement with the Zionist Congress, which brought together various pro-Zionist factions, drew scrutiny, as he was often accused of being insufficiently practical.

Herzl was opposed to the settlement of Jews in Palestine before receiving political support from regional powers.

Some, including the Lovers of Zion faction, wanted a movement to embrace Jewish settlements that were taking place at the time.

There was also suspicion that Herzl was willing to settle for any land, regardless of its location, and that he lacked commitment to the Palestine project.

Reading these arguments and how they evolve later on offers us a trace of what Israel would be formed out of.

The Foundations of Zionism introduces English readers to an important Palestinian intellectual as he dissects and makes sense of the history of Zionism.

It will challenge many to take the intellectual work of Palestinians seriously and offer piercing insight into how they make sense of the world around them.

The book dispels myths and unveils the history and trajectory of Zionism. Essentially, reading is for anyone looking for a deeper understanding.

Usman Butt is a multimedia television researcher, filmmaker and writer based in London who read International Relations and Arabic Language at the University of Westminster and completed a Master of Arts in Palestine Studies at the University of Exeter

Israeli media reported on the communications between Washington and Tel Aviv after video emerged on Monday of what appeared to be two Syrian Sukhoi SU-22 aircraft conducting a flight in the northwestern province of Idlib.

The aircraft, which are remnants of the airforce of Syria's deposed Baathist government, were designed in the Soviet Union during the 1960s.

Israel's public broadcaster Kan, quoting a senior official, said Israel's concerns were being shared with the US.

It added that alongside the establishment of a new Syrian air force, Israel was also concerned about the movement of Turkish air defence systems into the country.

Nanar Hawach, Senior Analyst for Syria at the International Crisis Group, told The New Arab that "Israel can probably live with a Syrian air force of two ageing jets, few pilots and no spare parts", though is probably more alarmed by Ankara's involvement.

"What concerns it is the Turkish military presence taking shape around that force," he said, noting that Turkish training and defence agreements, as well as reports of basing plans, give their presence cover.

In late July, Syria's air force held a graduation ceremony for 1,000 cadets which saw the flight of a 1960s Czech-built L-39 trainer aircraft.

"It raises the question whether Turkish air defences and radars will follow, which would constrain Israeli operations over Syria in a way no salvaged Sukhoi can," Hawach said.

Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International and senior analyst at the Swedish Defence Research Agency, agreed that the "ancient" Sukhoi aircraft pose little danger to Israel, and are likely more useful for monitoring, suppressing internal threats, acting as symbols of prestige for the military, and providing training for pilots.

"It's not a realistic threat to Israel, which has a world-class, very modern air force with F-35 stealth fighters," he told The New Arab. "In so far as Israel protests this, it's hardly out of a sense of danger."

Rather, there are three other reasons why Israel might complain about the ongoing reconstitution of the Syrian Air Force, one of which is Israel's future use of Syrian airspace to bomb Iran, which a new air force would prevent.

"They [Israel] don't want Syria to have fighter jets or air defences and radars, at all. They might as well try to nip any reconstruction effort in the bud"

The second is on Israel's ongoing negotiations over Syria, which is largely focused on Israel's occupation of southern Syria following the toppling of the Assad regime in December 2024.

"Israel may want to raise the issue with the United States to extract whatever favours and benefits it can, since they're already negotiating over other things related to Syria."

Lund also pointed to Israel's desire to keep Syria "weak and dependent".

"Even an old, small air force could make the Syrian military better positioned to overpower the Israel-backed Druze groups in Suwayda. Israel does not want that."

Amid these conditions, archaeologists have warned of possible collapses at the site, which contains royal tombs of rulers of the Kingdom of Kush and more than 200 pyramids built between the eighth century BC and the fourth century AD.

Signs of deterioration, according to Associated Press in a recent report, include structural cracks affecting several pyramids, the growth of weeds at the archaeological site, and the crystallisation of salts inside the sandstone, threatening ancient inscriptions and sculptures with erosion.

With the antiquities authority's limited ability to carry out regular maintenance, climate fluctuations throughout the year, such as seasonal floods and winds, have become significant threats to archaeological landmarks.

The damage caused by the war has affected Sudanese antiquities both at open-air sites and in museums, such as the National Museum and the Ethnographic Museum in Khartoum and the Khalifa House in [Omdurman], according to a UNESCO report in April.

The report recorded damage to more than 100 cultural and archaeological sites and the looting or destruction of 22 museums.

In addition to the direct damage caused to antiquities by the war and the suspension of archaeological teams, the lack of security at archaeological sites has led to the growth of illegal excavations.

Sudanese teams and international partners have made limited attempts to save archaeological sites, including removing sand, improving water drainage and restoring damaged sections.

These efforts have also included documentation work ultimately aimed at recovering looted artefacts, according to another UNESCO report issued last July.

Meroe Island, which has been on the World Heritage List since 2011, includes three archaeological groups: the royal city, the Meroe cemeteries and the Naqa site.

These groups contain pyramids, temples, palaces and water facilities that document the history of the Kingdom of Kush.

Meroitic architectural styles combine Mediterranean and Egyptian influences, as the rule of Kushite kings extended north to Egypt, while caravan routes crossing the Nile intersected there.

Because of its location, it also linked the African interior with Egypt and the Red Sea and served as a gateway for many peoples to the Mediterranean world through a network of commercial and cultural interactions.

The city, like the Nile Valley, witnessed developments in the history of ideas and religions.

Over more than 700 kilometres north of Khartoum, sites documenting successive eras are scattered across the region, according to a study by researchers Habbab Idris Ahmed and Geoff Emberling.

The study, titled "Archaeology and Cultural Heritage in Wartime: Sudan 2023–2025", was published in the British archaeology journal Antiquity in its October 2025 issue.

Sites documented by the study include the Kerma archaeological site, one of the oldest urban centres in Africa and the centre of the first phase of the Kingdom of Kush.

They also include Jebel Barkal, Napata, the cemeteries of El-Kurru and Nuri, and Christian Nubian kingdom cities such as Old Dongola.

The study also documents many sites dating to Islamic history, such as Suakin and Soba, among others.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

The lawsuit, which will be filed on Wednesday, 12 August, has three plaintiffs: Palestinian-New Zealand engineer Yasser Abdel Aal, information technology expert Maher Nazzal, and Maori-Tongan doctor Timoti Te Moki.

According to the statement of claim, a copy of which was obtained by The New Arab, the lawsuit is based on the plaintiffs' direct harm from Israel's genocidal war.

Abdel Aal lost more than 85 members of his extended family due to Israeli airstrikes on the Gaza Strip. His two sisters and their families are currently living in tents lacking the most basic humanitarian necessities in the Al-Mawasi area of the Strip.

Maher Nazzal, head of the Palestinian Forum of New Zealand and one of the plaintiffs, told TNA that he was taking part in the case because he believed that "New Zealand bears a moral and legal responsibility for what is happening, and it is not acceptable to ignore the possibility that technology launched from our territory is being used to support military operations that lead to more suffering and killing of Palestinians".

"I have seen the suffering of Palestinians myself, including members of my family who were displaced during the 1967 Naksa. What is happening today in Gaza and the West Bank is not something we can stand by and do nothing about," he continued.

"This case is not about opposing the space or technology sector but about holding the government accountable for its decisions and its duty to ensure that what is launched from New Zealand is not used to provide information or capabilities that could help target Palestinians," he stressed. "We are not asking our government to do the impossible. We are asking it to assume its responsibility, act in accordance with New Zealand's obligations under international law, and put the protection of human rights above commercial or political interests".

"I am proud to be part of this legal action, and I hope this case will lead to greater transparency and accountability and send a clear message that New Zealand will not turn a blind eye when there is a possibility that its capabilities or territory could be used to support serious violations against the Palestinian people," he added. "Silence is not a neutral position when people's lives and rights are at stake".

Allegations of 'deliberate disregard'

The legal action is supported by the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA), which had formally raised its concerns with former space minister Judith Collins in November 2024 over Israel's use of data from these satellites.

The network's spokeswoman, Renad Tamimi, described the ministry's position as "deliberate disregard", stressing that the minister and officials at the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) raised no questions about whether Israel was an end user of the services when the permits were granted in December 2023.

"All the minister had to do was pick up the phone and ask whether the Israelis were part of the deal, but they feared getting an answer they did not want," Tamimi added in a statement.

These concerns are supported by reports published by French magazine Intelligence Online in July 2024, which revealed the existence of a secret $150 million contract under which Israel was the "main foreign client" of BlackSky, providing it with high-resolution and frequently updated images and analysis of the Gaza Strip.

International obligations, national interest

On the legal side, Sam Vincent, one of the lawyers representing the plaintiffs, said in a statement on Tuesday, 11 August, that the case against the former minister and the government centres on the failure to consider New Zealand's obligations under the Genocide Convention and international human rights law when approving the launch of those space payloads through "Rocket Lab" from the New Zealand launch site at Mahia.

"It is no secret that Israel systematically relies on geospatial intelligence to identify its military targets, and there is a strong possibility that it has used and continues to use these satellites for this purpose," he added.

Lawyer Ruby Hazin, for her part, cited reports by the independent United Nations Commission of Inquiry and international organisations such as Amnesty International, all of which concluded that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza.

"Since January 2024, the International Court of Justice has formally notified all states of their duty to act to prevent genocide, and New Zealand is legally bound to meet this obligation," she added in the statement.

Unravelling

Groups supporting the case linked the legal action to a recent ruling by the Federal Court of Australia that ordered the Australian defence minister to disclose information on arms exports and F35 aircraft spare parts to Israel.

Commenting on the connecting, Renad Tamimi said, "There is a general pattern of secrecy surrounding Western arms exports and military services to Israel, but this pattern is now unravelling; complicity has been exposed, and our government is unfortunately part of this systematic deception".

Through the case, the plaintiffs are seeking a historic court ruling that would reshape the standards for granting space licences in New Zealand and force authorities to review and scrutinise the end-user lists of technology companies to ensure that New Zealand territory is not used as a launch point to facilitate the commission of international war crimes.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

Drones attacked the Sudanese capital and two northern cities at dawn on Wednesday, in what appeared to be a coordinated strike after months of calm in Khartoum.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been ravaged by war between the Sudanese military, led by its chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the UAE-backed paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, commanded by Burhan's former deputy Mohamed Hamdan Daglo.

The capital Khartoum, which was recaptured by the army last year leading to the return of 2.3 million people, has been targeted by drone strikes before but enjoyed relative calm for months.

An AFP correspondent in the city reported a drone attack at 5 am (0300 GMT) along with the sound of anti-aircraft missiles from the direction of the army's Wadi Seidna base, just north of the twin city of Omdurman.

Witnesses in the northern cities of Atbara and El-Damer—both also under army control—gave similar reports of hearing explosions and seeing drones in the sky.

There were no immediate reports of casualties.

Across the country, aid workers estimate more than 200,000 people have been killed in what the UN calls a "war of atrocities". The conflict has also caused the world's largest hunger and displacement crises.

Burhan and Daglo, allies until they fell out in a bitter power struggle, have spent most of the war in a relative stalemate, unwilling to hold negotiations while vying for a decisive battlefield advantage.

The RSF last year consolidated its hold on the vast western region of Darfur, and has since pushed to seize territory in the southern Kordofan region and along the southeastern Ethiopian border.

The army holds the country's centre, north and east, and last month clinched a victory in Kordofan by pushing the RSF off a key highway leading to the capital.

Daglo in the aftermath said he would "unleash" his fighters—already accused of war crimes including genocide—and his forces have since repeatedly threatened a large-scale retaliatory attack.

Iran remains under sweeping US and international sanctions, and it has yet to reach a peace deal to end the current conflict with the US and Israel, giving Tehran added incentive to seek alternative financial channels outside the dollar system.

Iran joined BRICS in 2024 as the group expanded, in a move aimed at deepening economic ties among emerging economies, and it has since made clear its desire to become a member and shareholder of the NDB.

The bank was set up by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa in 2015 to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects. It has since expanded its membership to include the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and other emerging economies.

"The most important result of cooperation among BRICS member countries is the establishment of the New Development Bank, and our country will soon become a member of this bank," Hemmati said, according to state media.

Hemmati is attending the first meeting of BRICS finance ministers and central bank governors, hosted by India, which holds the rotating BRICS chairmanship this year.

BRICS members have sought to reduce reliance on the US dollar by promoting trade and financial transactions in national currencies.

Hemmati said Iran believed BRICS members could conduct trade using their national currencies and was seeking bilateral and trilateral monetary cooperation with other members. 

This compares with a Pentagon assessment that two civilians were killed and two were injured by US military operations in 2024.

A Pentagon report submitted to the US Congress and published by US media said that all the death and injury tolls against civilians recorded in 2025 were due to three US strikes in Yemen.

The Pentagon report said the US Central Command had assessed that the three strikes in April 2025 in Yemen "more likely than not" resulted in civilian harm.

The Pentagon report also said that as of February 2026, there were 15 other incidents in Yemen that the US Central Command was currently assessing in response to reports received through non-governmental organisations.

The US military says it aims to degrade the capabilities of Iran-backed Houthi militants in Yemen.

The Pentagon report did not include any casualties from US strikes in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.

The report said as of 1 February 2026, the US Southern Command assessed that "there were no incidents in which civilian casualties more likely than not resulted from U.S. military operations in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility in 2025."

President Donald Trump's administration has struck vessels that it accuses of transporting narcotics in the Eastern Pacific, casting its targets as "narco-terrorists."

The ​US military's strikes on such vessels have killed more than ‌200 ⁠people since September 2025, according to a tally of death tolls published after each strike.

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International consider such strikes unlawful extrajudicial killings. The American Civil Liberties ⁠Union ​casts the assertions by the ​Trump administration against those it targets as "unsubstantiated, fear-mongering claims."

These were the key events earlier on Wednesday:

•    US President Donald Trump claimed that US forces are in "total control" of the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Iran demanded a complete end to the US war and blockade, the release of its frozen assets, and a regional ceasefire before it reopens the Strait of Hormuz.

•    Qatar said negotiations between Oman and Iran over the future of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz are making major progress.

•    Yemen’s Houthis targeted a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in the Bab al-Mandeb strait and has hit several sites across Yemen.

•    Israel is continuing to launch attacks in Gaza, the West Bank, south Lebanon, and southern Syria.

Oil prices gained and global shares retreated amid renewed pessimism about a quick end to the conflict. Brent crude futures climbed 1.4% to settle at $88.91 per barrel and U.S. crude rose 1.3% to $83.20.

Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis, who said on July 20 they would impose a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea, attacked a Saudi ship carrying military equipment in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Houthi-run news agency Saba reported.

There was no immediate Saudi confirmation of that attack, but Yemen's coastguard on Tuesday said four sailors aboard the cargo vessel -- identified as the "Tihamah" -- were among the dead along with two members of the forces deployed during a rescue mission to evacuate the ship.

The initial salvo targeting the ship "caused a fire to break out aboard the vessel and inflicted extensive damage, in addition to causing deaths and injuries among its crew, including three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national killed," the coastguard said in a statement.

The US military, meanwhile, said a US Navy MH-60 helicopter fired two Hellfire missiles to disable the steering gear of a Panama-flagged cargo ship after it ignored repeated warnings to stop violating a naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Maritime sources told Reuters news agency the ship was hit off Pakistan while sailing into the Gulf of Oman.

STEPPED UP RHETORIC

Both Iran and the United States have stepped up rhetoric in the past two days.

Iran's top security official, Mohsen Rezaei, said on Tuesday that the vital Strait of Hormuz shipping route will remain closed unless the U.S. accepts Iran's conditions to end the war - the release of Iran's frozen assets and an end to wars throughout the region, including in Lebanon and Gaza.

That followed a new demand from US President Donald Trump on Monday that Iran should pay compensation for people killed in 50 years of wars, attacks and protests.

Throughout the conflict, Trump has alternated between threats of escalation and claims that a peace deal is imminent. In an interview released late on Monday, he suggested the current uncertainty could last for a while, saying he might just "bop along." "I'm sort of negotiating," Trump told Real America's Voice.

"They're very devious negotiators." The comments from Rezaei, appointed on Sunday as second-in-command of the body that coordinates Iran's security and foreign policy, were the strongest indication the Strait of Hormuz would not reopen to shipping anytime soon.

The waterway handled a fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas flow before the war.

"As long as America does not change its behaviour and does not accept Iran's conditions, the Strait of Hormuz will not be opened," Rezaei said, according to the semi-official Tasnim news agency.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on Iran's latest comments.

Thousands of people have been killed in the conflict since the US and Israel launched attacks on Iran on February 28.

Iran struck US assets and infrastructure in countries including Oman, Jordan, Kuwait, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

Raising the prospect of further escalation, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, an adviser to the commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, said on Iranian state TV on Tuesday that the corps was developing the ability to carry out operations "on enemy soil."

"We need to be able to move the operations to the enemy's soil, whenever this is needed and ordered," he said. "This is the characteristic of the offensive doctrine that has to be attained."

The US Navy MH-60 helicopter fired on and disabled the M/V Vela Nova "after the ship's civilian crew ignored repeated warnings from American forces," US Central Command (CENTCOM) said on X, adding that the vessel "is no longer transiting to Iran in violation of the US blockade."

It was the third time the United States, in a months-long war against Iran, has forcibly halted a vessel since reinstating the ports blockade on July 14.

CENTCOM said it has redirected 55 ships that tried to run the blockade and boarded two others as of Tuesday.

US forces previously blockaded Iranian ports from April 13 to June 18, during which time they disabled nine ships and redirected more than 140, according to CENTCOM.

Iran has demanded that the United States end the ports blockade as part of its conditions to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a key conduit for oil and gas shipments before the war that has seen traffic plummet due to Tehran's attacks on ships in the area.

Egypt's health ministry had earlier said there were 47 casualties, including around 30 injured, in the crash in the Dawawis area of Ismailia governorate.

Dangerously overcrowded pick-ups are a regular mode of transport for millions of Egyptian informal workers, despite the danger they pose, including to child labourers.

Jomana Waleed, a 16-year-old survivor of the crash, said her sister's last words were "I want to see mama".

"And then she stopped breathing, she was dead," she told AFP outside the Al-Qasasin Hospital, her eyes red with tears.

Waleed said she was asleep -- exhausted "because we have to wake up at 5:00 a.m." -- when the pick-up truck she and her siblings were in crashed.

"Next thing I knew we were flipped over on the ground," she said, her sister dying next to her.

Waleed was released from hospital Tuesday with a slight injury to her back, while her brother Mohamed was sent to another hospital, their grandmother Nour Ahmed Abdulkader told AFP.

Families gathered outside the Al-Qasasin Hospital in Ismailia Tuesday, AFP reported, desperate for news of their loved ones.

Child labour

A medical source told AFP that "most of the dead are children 13 and 14 years old", but could not immediately provide exact figures.

Local media Al-Masry Al-Youm reported the youngest victims were two 10-year-old girls.

At least 1.3 million minors are engaged in some form of child labour in Egypt, according to official figures, and children are regularly the victims of commuter accidents.

The workers, mostly from two villages in the Nile delta governorate of Sharqiya, were employed on an Ismailia farm, a local security source told AFP.

Local media reported that President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had directed authorities to immediately investigate the cause of the crash.

Informal labour accounts for nearly 67 percent of employment in Egypt and almost the entire agricultural sector, according to the International Labour Organization.

Between eight and 13 million people are estimated to work as "irregular" day labourers -- mostly in agriculture, construction and manufacturing -- and lack robust wage and safety protections.

Road accidents are common in Egypt, where traffic rules are unevenly enforced and many roads are in poor repair.

Accidents often involve underage labourers travelling to work in rural areas.

Two staff members of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan have been arrested by the country's intelligence agency, the world body told news agency AFP on Tuesday, adding that it had no access to them for two days.

"We confirm that two Afghan UNAMA male staff members were detained by officials of the de facto General Directorate of Intelligence on Sunday, 9 August," in the western province of Herat, the mission said in a statement.

The Afghan government did not immediately comment following the latest claims.

The office of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres called for the staff members' special status to be respected.

"We have not been informed of the charges against them or permitted to see them," Guterres' spokesman Farhan Haq said. "We call on the de facto authorities to ensure compliance with the privileges and immunities of the UN and its officials."

The arrests come just days before the fifth anniversary of the Taliban's return to power, following the capture of Kabul on August 15, 2021.

Multiple UN agencies operate across Afghanistan in a host of areas including health and humanitarian response.

This week, UNAMA published a report in which it recommended the authorities clarify "the rules governing the use of force, arrest, detention" by the security institutions and "strengthen accountability".

The country has been governed for almost five years by the Taliban authorities, which rule according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law.

Afghan women are banned from UN premises, including those who are staff, as well as a host of other places.

About 20 aid workers were arrested in June near the Iran border in Herat province by Afghanistan's morality police, because their beards were not long enough.

They included staff working for organisations that partner with the UN, according to an internal memo reported by AFP, and were subsequently released.

Dozens of women were also detained by the Taliban government's morality police in early June on accusations they were violating official dress codes by not wearing the body-cloaking chador or burqa.

That included a hospital worker employed by Doctors Without Borders (MSF), which strongly condemned the detention.

A rare protest against the restrictions was violently dispersed with at least two people killed, according to the United Nations.

Afghanistan has been hit hard by international aid cuts and faces multiple challenges, including the arrival of millions of its citizens from Iran and Pakistan in recent years.

Venezuela, which ended relations 17 years ago over Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip, has strengthened ties with Israel-allied Washington since the US captured President Nicolas Maduro in January, pushing it away from its historic alignment with Iran.

Venezuela's government, now led by Interim President Delcy Rodriguez, said an Israeli humanitarian delegation visited the country after deadly earthquakes in June and discussions took place among senior officials from both nations, leading to the deal to resume consular services.

On Monday, Venezuela updated the toll from the quakes, putting the number of dead at 6,301 as rescue teams and family members continued to sift through the rubble in search of more victims.

"Both governments recognize the importance of the relationship between the State of Israel and the Jewish community in Venezuela, which constitutes an important historic bridge of friendship between the two countries," Venezuela's government said in a statement, which was also issued by Israel's foreign ministry.

Iran for years has allied itself with Venezuela, a fellow global oil producer that had similarly suffered under years of US sanctions, and condemned Washington's recent intervention in Caracas.

The move makes Colombia only the second UN member state, after the United States, to recognise Israel's claim to Syrian territory it seized by force in 1967 and later unilaterally annexed in a move rejected by the international community.

Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt condemned the recognition on Tuesday, stressing that a declaration by Bogota cannot alter the Golan Heights' status as occupied Syrian territory.

The decision represents a dramatic reversal in Colombian foreign policy just days after President Abelardo de la Espriella took office, and is among the clearest signs yet of his government's rapid rapprochement with Israel.

His predecessor, Gustavo Petro, severed diplomatic relations with Israel in 2024 over its war on Gaza and backed South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

De la Espriella has instead moved swiftly to rebuild relations with Israel, with the Golan recognition placing Colombia alongside Washington and against the longstanding international consensus on the occupied territory.

Colombia's foreign ministry sought to justify the decision by citing instability in the Middle East and the Golan's alleged strategic importance to Israel's "security", adding that Israel had a "right to protect itself" from supposed external threats.

But Israel's security claims do not alter the territory's status under international law.

Israel captured most of the Syrian Golan Heights during the 1967 war and imposed its laws, jurisdiction and administration on the territory in 1981. The UN Security Council responded unanimously with Resolution 497, declaring Israel's move "null and void and without international legal effect".

Damascus condemned Colombia's decision "in the strongest terms", highlighting that it was a flagrant violation of the UN Charter and international law.

Syria's foreign ministry stressed that the Golan remained "occupied Syrian territory and an inseparable part" of the country, saying Bogota's recognition could neither legitimise Israel's occupation nor change the territory's legal status.

Saudi Arabia also called on Colombia to reverse the decision, warning that it entrenched "the logic of imposing a fait accompli" and undermined efforts towards regional peace.

Riyadh said Israel's attempts to change the legal status of occupied Syrian territory created no rights and conferred no legitimacy on its control.

Qatar accused the move of helping Israel disregard UN resolutions governing the occupied Golan, stressing that recognition by individual governments could not change the fact that the territory remained occupied Arab land.

Doha also warned that unilateral recognition of Israeli sovereignty would pose a "major obstacle" to peace and reiterated its demand for Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.

Jordan described the Golan as an inseparable part of Syrian territory and coupled its condemnation with criticism of Israel's continuing attacks and incursions inside Syria.

Egypt similarly rejected Colombia's decision as contrary to international law and an infringement on Syria's established territorial rights.

For decades, virtually the entire international community refused to recognise Israel's annexation of the Golan.

That consensus was first breached in 2019 when US President Donald Trump recognised Israeli sovereignty over the territory, overturning decades of American policy and making Washington the only country to recognise Israel's claim.

Lebanon wanted them released. Israel, however, tied progress on the issue to demands reaching back more than four decades, asking Beirut to locate the remains of Lebanese Jews killed or disappeared during the civil war and provide answers about Ron Arad, an Israeli airman who vanished after his aircraft went down over Lebanon in 1986.

For the Lebanese delegation, the problem was fundamental: Beirut says it does not possess the information Israel is demanding and may have no means of obtaining it.

"Israel demanded during the negotiations the return of the remains of Lebanese Jews killed during the civil war, and to know the fate of those who went missing, in addition to revealing the fate of the Israeli pilot Ron Arad or handing over his remains," an official Lebanese source told The New Arab.

"These are demands that the Lebanese delegation considered extremely difficult, and closer to impossible conditions, especially since Lebanon has no information about them," the source added.

The conditions have further complicated negotiations already strained by Israel's continuing military operations in Lebanon and its occupation of Lebanese territory. They have also transformed what Beirut regards as a present-day humanitarian issue into a search for answers buried in some of the most chaotic years of Lebanon's civil war.

"We know that Israel is trying to put obstacles in more than one place, and the negotiations are certainly not easy, and the process is long," the Lebanese source said.

"But there is Lebanese insistence on holding to its demands, whether in terms of releasing all prisoners, completely stopping military operations, or Israel withdrawing from all Lebanese territory."

A prisoner deal tied to decades-old remains

The Lebanese government has disclosed relatively little about what happened inside the Rome talks, saying publicly only that progress had been made on the prisoner and border files.

Lebanese and Israeli reports, however, described discussions over a possible arrangement under which remains of Jews buried in Lebanon, particularly in Jewish cemeteries in Beirut's Wadi Abu Jamil neighbourhood and the southern city of Sidon, would be transferred in exchange for Lebanese civilians held by Israel.

Israel was also reported to have divided the Lebanese detainees into categories, distinguishing civilians from fighters and Hezbollah members, raising the prospect that some could be released while others remained in Israeli custody.

The question of remains has a basis in the framework agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel on 26 June. Article 13 called for efforts to locate and return remains and release detainees, but did not specify whose remains were being discussed, leaving the provision open to vastly different interpretations.

Israel has now brought Arad into that discussion. The Israeli airman disappeared after his aircraft went down over Lebanon in 1986, and successive Israeli governments have spent decades trying to determine his fate.

In March, Israeli forces carried out a raid in Nabi Chit in eastern Lebanon as part of their search for information about him, but failed to locate either Arad or his remains.

By raising his case alongside those of Lebanese Jews who disappeared during the civil war, Israel has effectively tied the release of people currently in its custody to Beirut's ability to resolve disappearances dating to the 1980s.

Thirty-four Lebanese prisoners

The Lebanese Association for Prisoners and Liberated Prisoners says it has documented 34 Lebanese prisoners held by Israel.

Three cases predate the latest conflict: Yahya Mohammed Skaf, whose case dates to 1978; Abdullah Khalil Alyan, missing since 1981; and Mohammed Adel al-Farran, a fisherman who disappeared in 2005.

Of the remaining 31, 12 are resistance fighters, including two nurses, while the others are civilians taken from their homes, according to Ahmed Taleb, the association's president.

"Of the 31 prisoners, there are 12 resistance fighters, including two nurses, and the rest are civilians who were abducted from their homes," Taleb told The New Arab.

Another 37 people who were near the front line from 2024 onwards remain unaccounted for, according to Taleb, leaving their families uncertain whether they are imprisoned, dead or whether their bodies are being held by Israel.

Against that uncertainty, Israel's reported attempt to distinguish between civilians and fighters has caused particular concern among groups representing the prisoners.

"This file is humanitarian, and it is not permissible to distinguish in this way between a civilian, a [Hezbollah] member and a fighter," Taleb said.

He added that neither his organisation nor the families had been consulted about the negotiations.

"No official body has contacted the association or the prisoners' families, and everything that reaches us about what happened in the Rome negotiations comes from the media," he said.

Taleb also disputed suggestions that Beirut lacked a definitive list of prisoners, saying the association handed the names to President Joseph Aoun in December 2025.

A demand involving Lebanese citizens

Particularly contentious is Israel's reported demand concerning 11 Lebanese Jews, people who were Lebanese citizens rather than Israelis.

"The Israeli is demanding, according to what has been reported, the remains of 11 Lebanese Jews, and these are Lebanese, not Israelis, and it has no right to demand them," Taleb said.

"From here, we consider that raising this file in the first place falls within the framework of impossible conditions."

The demand reaches into one of the murkiest periods of Lebanon's civil war, when the central government's authority had collapsed across much of the country and kidnappings, assassinations and disappearances were widespread.

Between 1984 and 1987, several prominent members of Lebanon's Jewish community were kidnapped in central Beirut, particularly around Qantari and Wadi Abu Jamil, historically a centre of Jewish life in the capital.

They included Salim Mourad Jamous, a former secretary-general of the Jewish community; Isaac Sasson, its president; Elie Hallak, its vice-president; and businessman Elie Srour.

Their kidnappings were attributed to a group calling itself the Organisation of the Oppressed on Earth, which announced that some of the men had been executed. Four decades later, the whereabouts of their remains are still unknown.

That history is central to why Lebanese sources regard Israel's condition as so difficult to satisfy. Israel is not merely asking Beirut to transfer known remains. It is asking the Lebanese state to establish the fate and whereabouts of people who disappeared during a war in which the government had little or no control over large parts of its own capital.

Asking today's Lebanon to solve the mysteries of the civil war

Khaled al-Hajj, a researcher and political writer, said the passage of four decades had made establishing what happened to the missing extraordinarily difficult.

"Among those kidnapped were Lebanese Jews whose remains are unknown, as is the case with Ron Arad, which makes the task of knowing their fate or identifying them after this long period of time extremely difficult," Hajj told The New Arab.

"The Lebanese state is not responsible for them, and if the party was responsible, then those responsible would certainly have been from its first generation, most of whom were targeted by Israel, unless information remained as part of military secrets."

Lebanon's civil war left thousands of people from different communities missing. Many of their families still do not know where they were killed or buried, meaning Israel is effectively asking the Lebanese state to resolve cases that Lebanon has been unable to resolve even for many of its own citizens.

Hajj also questioned Israel's claim to the remains of Lebanese Jews simply because some of their relatives later lived in Israel.

"The Israeli is demanding the remains of Jews in cemeteries in Beirut on the grounds that they have families in Israel," Hajj said.

"But in form and substance, it is demanding Lebanese citizens, from well-known families who lived in what was called 'West Beirut' during the civil war, such as the Hallak and Srour families and others who denied belonging to the Israeli Mossad."

Israel was additionally demanding that Lebanon search for their remains, Hajj said, "and this is an impossible condition given the long period of time that has passed".

Decades of prisoner exchanges

Prisoners and remains have repeatedly been exchanged between Israel and Lebanon, including during periods of open conflict.

In July 2008, Israel released Lebanese prisoner Samir Kuntar after nearly 29 years in prison as part of an exchange with Hezbollah. Israel received the remains of two soldiers captured at the beginning of the 2006 Lebanon war.

The exchange also returned the remains of Lebanese and Palestinian fighters, although the identities of some were disputed. Families maintained, for example, that the remains of Palestinian fighter Dalal Mughrabi and Yahya Skaf had not been conclusively returned.

Other Lebanese cases remain unresolved. Alyan's fate is unknown, while al-Farran disappeared in 2005. His bloodstained boat was subsequently handed to the Lebanese army through UNIFIL. Israel said it had found the boat empty, according to Taleb, who argues that Israel bears responsibility for establishing his fate because its forces had fired at it.

Those cases underscore the imbalance now at the heart of the negotiations.

Lebanon is seeking the release of people currently held by Israel, an end to ongoing Israeli military operations and a withdrawal from Lebanese territory. Israel, meanwhile, has tied movement on the prisoner file to Beirut producing remains, information and answers from a civil war that ended more than 35 years ago.

Some of those answers may no longer exist.

Lebanese officials have consequently described the Israeli conditions as "closer to impossible", warning that a humanitarian prisoner file risks becoming hostage to demands that the Lebanese state has no realistic means of fulfilling.

Rita El Jammal is a journalist and reporter for Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, The New Arab's Arabic-language sister publication

The effort has gained momentum against the backdrop of Israel’s deteriorating international image following the Gaza genocide and the attacks on Lebanon. But it has been building for months, if not years.

In late 2025, Israel allocated up to $4.1 million for a campaign targeting evangelical Christians in the United States, while in December its foreign ministry helped bring more than 1,000 evangelical pastors and Christian influencers to Israel.

For over a decade, Netanyahu has touted Israel as a place where Christians “thrive”, contrasting it with their “persecution elsewhere in the Middle East”, most recently in an April Easter message. Weeks later, the Israeli Foreign Ministry appointed George Deek as its special envoy to the Christian world.

What about Palestinian Christians?

Yet many of the people at the centre of this “diplomatic campaign” tell a very different story. The Israeli state presenting itself as Christianity’s protector has presided over the erosion of one of the region’s oldest communities, Palestinian Christians.

The Christian presence in Palestine predates the arrival of Islam by centuries, and many of today’s Palestinian Muslims are rooted in the same indigenous population that gradually converted to Islam. This continuity is visible in towns like Bethlehem and Beit Jala, where Muslims and Christians have lived and thrived alongside each other for centuries.

This long Christian presence makes their marginalisation a relatively recent phenomenon, closely intertwined with the political transformations of the modern era. European powers repeatedly invoked the pretext of protecting Christian communities to justify imperial intervention in the Middle East. But the decisive rupture, and the onset of their demographic decline, came with Zionism.

After decades of transformation driven by Zionism and facilitated by the British Mandate authorities, the Nakba of 1948 displaced roughly 750,000 Palestinians, setting Palestinian Christianity on a trajectory of decline from which it has never recovered.

Christians in Palestine numbered roughly 89,000 in 1931, about 9% of the population, rising to 145,000 by 1946. The Nakba shattered this thriving community, and around 90,000 Christians were displaced, churches closed, and homes and property lost, alongside their Muslim compatriots.

The 1967 occupation deepened the process. When Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Christians in the two territories numbered more than 42,000, around 6% of the population. By 1997, they were roughly 40,000 (1.5%); their share fell to 1.2% in 2007 and roughly 1% by 2017, even if their numbers increased slightly.

The contradiction is perhaps most stark around the places Christianity holds sacred. In 2002, Israeli tanks surrounded Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity for 39 days, and did not hesitate to fire at the compound and set part of it ablaze. It was an unsettling tableau, Christ’s peaceful sanctuary encircled by Merkavas, engulfed in smoke.

The impact of genocide

During the Gaza genocide, the Israeli knife was sharper and pressed harder against everyone’s neck. Christian or Muslim, church or mosque, there was nowhere to hide from the slaughter and blind bombs. Gaza’s Saint Porphyrius Church, one of the world’s oldest continuously active Christian churches, was struck by Israeli warplanes, killing 19 people sheltering there. The pattern continued in July 2025, when the Israeli army fatally bombed Gaza’s Holy Family Catholic Church.

Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, the contradiction is visible at street level. Spitting at Christian clergy and pilgrims has become a recurring form of harassment, particularly among some Jewish extremists. That alongside verbal abuse and vandalism.

Taken together, the decline cannot be explained simply by birth rates or religious tensions. Palestinian Christians live under the same occupation as their Muslim compatriots, facing restrictions on movement, land confiscation, settlement expansion and political insecurity. These conditions have also constrained economic opportunity, making emigration increasingly attractive to a community with established networks abroad.

And this history is precisely what Israel’s Christian diplomacy seeks to obscure. Its effort to present itself as the protector of Christians serves two interchangeable purposes: separating Palestinian Christians from the Palestinian national story and, second, recasting the conflict in religious terms. 

The first requires erasing a history that contradicts the state’s narrative. Ignoring that Palestinian Christians were deeply involved in the national movement long before the Nakba.

The role of Palestinian Christians in the liberation struggle

Khalil al-Sakakini, an Arab Orthodox intellectual from Jerusalem, became one of Palestine’s prominent nationalist voices, while Issa and Youssef al-Issa founded Falastin in Jaffa in 1911, an influential Arabic newspaper that opposed Zionism. Even the term “Nakba” was popularised by the Christian Palestinian intellectual Constantin Zureiq.

This role continued into the 1960s and 1970s, when Palestinian Christians were prominent in the secular, Arab-nationalist and Marxist currents of the resistance, and within the PLO. George Habash, a Palestinian Christian, for instance, founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

That tradition continues today. Palestinian Greek Orthodox Archbishop, Atallah Hanna, remains an fierce critic of the occupation, and had his share of Israeli abuse. Much like Palestinian Christian journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, whose killing by Israeli forces in Jenin in 2022 was followed by the violent desecration of her funeral in Jerusalem.

Meanwhile, the second purpose of ejecting Palestinian Christianity from local history is to portray the Palestinian struggle for freedom as essentially Islamist. Within this framework, Palestinians become less a national population resisting dispossession and more Muslims confronting Jews.

The framing is straightforward. Once a conflict is coded primarily in religious terms, people tend to interpret its participants through those categories. This places Israel within the Western narrative of the struggle against Islamic extremism. Netanyahu has repeatedly cast Israel as part of a broader Western struggle against “militant” or “radical Islam”, portraying Israel and the West as confronting a common civilisational threat.

Contradictions

The Islamisation also gives anti-Semitism a broader political reach, allowing Israel to invoke Western sensitivity to antisemitism as a form of political leverage.

A Palestinian Christian disrupts that mental shortcut: he is Palestinian, but not Muslim; Arab, but Christian; and capable of sharing the same national grievances as his Muslim neighbour.

But once the intellectual debate is put aside, what remains most contradictory in Israel’s narrative is the lives of many Palestinian Christians themselves. And most of us Palestinians have a story or two to tell about that.

I still think of our next-door neighbour in Gaza, Fadi, who was killed by an Israeli bullet while taking part in a demonstration against the occupation during the First Intifada. I did not even know he was Christian until his funeral.

None of that mattered. What joined us was not only that we were Palestinians, but the shared experience of affliction and dispossession. The grievances shared by Fadi’s family were no different from ours; their stories of displacement were ours. His grandparents and ours had walked the same Via Dolorosa after being driven from their towns and villages during the Nakba, hunted down by Jewish militias. 

Fadi was carried to his final resting place on the shoulders of the same youngsters who had carried the local mosque attendant, killed by Israel a few weeks earlier.

We used to say, Fadi baptised the land with his blood. 

That is perhaps the simplest answer to Israel’s claim on Christians.

Dr Emad Moussa is a Palestinian-British researcher and writer specialising in the political psychology of intergroup and conflict dynamics, focusing on MENA with a special interest in Israel/Palestine. He has a background in human rights and journalism, and is currently a frequent contributor to multiple academic and media outlets, in addition to being a consultant for a US-based think tank.

Follow him on Twitter: @emadmoussa

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@newarab.com

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

The appointments, announced on Monday, fill some of the most powerful positions in Iran's security apparatus following the deaths of senior military leaders in US-Israeli strikes that began on 28 February.

They also offer an early indication of the figures Khamenei is turning to as Iran rebuilds its military command after the war.

The reshuffle came a day after Khamenei appointed IRGC veteran Mohsen Rezaei as head of the Supreme National Security Council. Rezaei served as commander-in-chief of the IRGC from 1981 to 1997.

So who are the six commanders taking on some of Iran's most important military positions?

Ahmed Vahidi, commander of the IRGC

Brig Gen Ahmad Vahidi has been promoted to major general and formally appointed commander-in-chief of the IRGC.

Vahidi has been a prominent figure within the organisation for more than four decades and previously commanded its overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, for about a decade before Qassem Soleimani took over in 1998.

He later moved into government, serving in several senior positions, including as defence minister and interior minister.

Vahidi is regarded as a central figure within the IRGC's hardline establishment and had acted as its de facto leader since Maj Gen Mohammad Pakpour was killed on the opening day of the war.

Israel and Western governments have accused Vahidi of involvement in overseas attacks, including the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires.

Ali Abdollahi, army chief of staff

Maj Gen Ali Abdollahi has been appointed to lead Iran's regular armed forces, known as the Artesh.

Abdollahi has served in both the regular military and the IRGC and most recently commanded the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, a body central to coordinating Iran's military operations.

He replaces Lt Gen Abdul Rahim Mousavi, who was killed during the initial US-Israeli attacks on 28 February.

Hossein Taeb, head of the Basij

Cleric Hossein Taeb has been appointed head of the Basij, the IRGC's volunteer paramilitary force, which has played a central role in suppressing domestic dissent and enforcing the Islamic Republic's social restrictions.

Taeb is one of the most powerful figures to have emerged from the IRGC's intelligence and surveillance apparatus.

He headed the organisation's intelligence arm for 13 years before leaving the position in 2022.

Mostafa Izadi, deputy commander of the IRGC

Maj Gen Mostafa Izadi has been named deputy commander-in-chief of the IRGC, serving directly under Vahidi.

Izadi is a veteran commander who has held positions across both the IRGC and the Artesh since the late 1980s.

His appointment makes him the second-highest-ranking commander in the Revolutionary Guards under its newly installed leadership.

Kioumars Heydari, army deputy chief of staff

Brig Gen Kioumars Heydari has been appointed Abdollahi's deputy in the Artesh.

Heydari most recently served as deputy commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters. Before that, he commanded the army's ground forces for nine years.

Israel reportedly attempted to assassinate Heydari during the Twelve-Day War in 2025.

Ali Azmaei, IRGC navy commander

Adm Ali Azmaei has been appointed commander of the IRGC navy, putting him in charge of the force at the centre of Iran's military operations in the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, Azmaei has spent the past two decades in senior naval positions and served as deputy commander of the IRGC navy before his promotion.

He replaces Alireza Tangsiri, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike in March.

The IRGC navy has assumed particular importance during the current confrontation because of Iran's efforts to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world's most important shipping routes.

Brig Gen Esmail Qaani held a series of separate meetings with senior figures in Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework and leaders of armed factions during the hours-long visit, according to sources familiar with the talks who spoke to The New Arab.

But the discussions extended beyond the increasingly fraught question of the factions’ weapons. Iraqi officials also used the meetings to press Tehran for firm guarantees that Iraqi oil tankers would be allowed to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the sources said, as mounting financial pressures begin to weigh on Baghdad’s ability to meet its obligations, including public-sector salaries.

The request underscores Iraq’s precarious position as it tries to insulate its economy and domestic politics from a widening regional confrontation while navigating its close relationship with neighbouring Iran.

At the centre of Qaani’s visit was one of Iraq’s most politically sensitive issues: the government’s effort to establish a state monopoly over arms.

Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government has set 30 September as the deadline for Iran-aligned factions to hand over their weapons, however the process has so far produced little visible evidence of disarmament.

According to the sources, Qaani urged faction leaders to avoid any armed confrontation with Iraqi security forces, amid concerns that Baghdad could resort to tougher measures, including force, if groups refuse to comply.

But Qaani gave no indication that Tehran had accepted the demand for the factions to surrender their weapons. Instead, he portrayed the disarmament push as driven by American pressure, the sources said.

He also stressed the importance of preserving the factions’ military capabilities in the face of what he described as growing US threats against the Iran-led regional alliance known as the “Axis of Resistance”.

The message appeared to reflect the difficult balance Tehran is seeking to maintain in Iraq: protecting the armed groups that have long formed an important pillar of Iranian influence while preventing a confrontation that could pit those factions against the Iraqi state or US forces.

Hussein al-Asaad, an expert on strategic affairs, said Qaani’s personal intervention showed how seriously Tehran viewed the debate over the future of Iraq’s armed factions.

“The Iranian intervention in this issue is not new, but the presence of the Quds Force commander personally in Baghdad at this stage sends a message that Tehran considers the factions’ weapons a strategic issue affecting its influence and interests in Iraq,” Asaad told The New Arab.

Iran, he said, appeared to be seeking a compromise under which the factions would avoid fighting Iraqi forces without entirely surrendering their military capabilities.

Such an arrangement could involve reorganising the factions’ relationship with state institutions while preserving some of their influence, he added.

The stakes have risen as the September deadline approaches. Despite government claims that some groups have already begun handing over weapons, no images of arms being transferred have been made public, including by factions that have said they are prepared to comply.

The government has also not disclosed what types or quantities of weapons have been surrendered, or issued detailed statements documenting the process.

Several of Iraq’s largest and most heavily armed factions continue to resist the demand, raising questions over what Baghdad intends to do if they refuse to comply.

During a visit to Washington in mid-July, Zaidi said after meeting US President Donald Trump that some factions had already surrendered “many weapons” and that after 30 September there would be no need for any armed factions to remain.

He provided no further details.

Asaad warns that the dispute could move from political negotiations to confrontation on the ground if no agreement is reached.

Iranian calls to avoid clashes could reduce that risk, he said, but they should not be interpreted as Tehran accepting the complete disarmament of its Iraqi allies.

“Iraq faces a real test of its sovereignty and its ability to make security decisions free from the influence of outside powers, whether Iran or the United States,” he said. “The decision to place weapons exclusively in the hands of the state must be an Iraqi decision.”

For Baghdad, however, the dispute over weapons is unfolding alongside a more immediate economic concern.

During Qaani’s meetings with political leaders, Iraqi officials sought what the sources described as a “real and serious” Iranian commitment to guarantee the passage of Iraqi oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.

The request reflects growing concern over Iraq’s finances and the vulnerability of an economy heavily dependent on oil exports. The pressures have already begun to raise concerns about the government’s ability to meet financial commitments, including the payment of state salaries, according to the sources. 

On Monday, the Labour Muslim Network (LMN) launched a survey of current and former Muslim Labour members and supporters, seeking to measure attitudes towards the party under its new leadership and what it would take to win them back.

"The election of Andy Burnham MP as Labour leader and Prime Minister presents us a unique opportunity to reset the Labour Party's relationship with Muslims across Britain," an LMN spokesperson told The New Arab. "We know that many Muslims have lost trust in our Party over the last few years. New leadership gives us a new chance to win back their support and trust."

The survey offers an early attempt to quantify the scale of that challenge.

Respondents are asked how positively they view the Labour Party and Burnham, how likely they are to vote Labour at the next general election, and which issues matter most to them, including the Gaza war and the cost-of-living crisis.

They are also asked how they would like to see Labour change its approach to Gaza, an issue that became one of the most damaging fault lines between the party and Muslim voters under Starmer.

The survey comes almost a month into Burnham's time in office, during which he has pledged to reach out to supporters lost under the previous government, particularly those in Britain's "forgotten" regions.

But repairing Labour's relationship with Muslim voters means confronting the legacy of nearly two years under Starmer, during which the party lost significant numbers of supporters to independent candidates and the Green Party, while Reform UK made gains among other parts of Labour's traditional electoral coalition.

Starmer's 2024 election victory delivered Labour a landslide parliamentary majority of 172 seats. But beneath the scale of that victory was a sharp erosion of support among Muslim and left-wing voters, leading some observers to describe the result as a "Pyrrhic victory".

Much of the anger among Muslim voters centred on Gaza.

Starmer faced intense criticism over his early support for Israel's war, particularly after an October 2023 interview with LBC in which the then opposition leader said Israel "had the right" to withhold water and power from millions of Palestinians.

Labour also resisted calls for an immediate ceasefire during the early months of the war.

After rejecting a Scottish National Party motion calling for an end to the war, Labour called for an "immediate humanitarian ceasefire" days later, prompting accusations that the party had been playing politics with the issue. By then, Israel had killed at least 29,000 Palestinians in Gaza.

The political consequences became visible at the ballot box.

Labour's position on Gaza was widely seen as helping fuel the rise of pro-Palestine independent candidates, particularly in parts of northern England and constituencies with large Muslim populations.

In Leicester South, independent candidate Shockat Adam defeated Labour's shadow health secretary, while elsewhere pro-Palestine candidates came close to unseating prominent Labour figures, including Wes Streeting.

Once in Downing Street, Starmer's relationship with Palestine activists deteriorated further.

His government oversaw a wider crackdown on protest freedoms, particularly around Palestine activism, and proscribed the direct-action group Palestine Action in July 2025, placing it on the same legal footing as groups including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State group.

Thousands of protesters were subsequently arrested amid demonstrations opposing the ban and Israel's genocide in Gaza.

Can Burnham win them back?

Burnham has sought to draw a line between his leadership and some of the decisions that alienated those voters.

He has acknowledged that Labour "didn't get it right" on Gaza, remarks widely interpreted as an olive branch to Muslim communities and other voters who abandoned the party over its handling of the war.

But the new prime minister has stopped short of accepting one of the central demands of many Palestine campaigners, resisting calls to recognise Israel's actions in Gaza as genocide, despite that conclusion being reached by UN experts, leading human rights organisations and genocide scholars.

That leaves Gaza as an early test of how far Burnham's promised reset will go.

The LMN survey asks respondents not only how important the issue remains to them, but what Labour would have to change about its approach.

The answers could provide an early indication of whether a change of leader is enough to repair a political relationship damaged over several years, or whether Muslim voters expect a more fundamental break with the policies of the Starmer era.

For LMN, the opportunity presented by Burnham's arrival is clear. Whether that opportunity translates into renewed support is the question the organisation is now putting directly to Muslim voters.

The results are expected to be published in several weeks.

Mohammed Ali Taha, head of the Reconciliation Committee that was brought in after the parties struggled to agree among themselves, urged Ta'al leader Ahmed Tibi to reconsider his rejection of the proposed joint electoral list.

"From a moral and social perspective, in the interests of our people, in order to fight violence and this oppressive government and replace it with a less harmful one, to increase voter turnout, and for the sake of unity, everyone who signed must, as a matter of principle, honour their signature and implement the decision of the Reconciliation Committee," Taha told TNA.

The appeal came after Tibi rejected the proposed list on Sunday, throwing renewed uncertainty over an alliance that Palestinian political leaders had spent months trying to revive.

Ta'al, the Jewish-Palestinian leftist Hadash and the Palestinian nationalist Balad announced in May that they would contest the election together, reviving a political alliance that at its peak won 15 seats in the Israeli parliament.

But agreeing to reunite proved easier than deciding who would represent them.

After negotiations over the ordering of candidates reached an impasse, the three parties handed the task to the Reconciliation Committee, effectively asking an outside body to settle a dispute they had been unable to resolve themselves.

Now the committee's proposed solution has itself become the source of the latest crisis.

Taha told TNA that the committee had weighed a series of politically sensitive considerations when drawing up the list, including the relative strength of the parties and representation for Palestinian communities in the Naqab desert, where Bedouin communities face displacement and home demolitions by Israeli authorities.

Tibi was given second place on the proposed list and the chairmanship of the parliamentary bloc, Taha said, despite Balad having a larger constituency.

Two members of the Reconciliation Committee have since resigned following the breakdown in negotiations.

Ta'al declined TNA's request for comment, but has publicly described the committee's proposal as "unfair, strange, and objectionable".

'It's still not too late'

Hadash is also pressing Tibi to reverse course.

A Hadash spokesperson shared a statement with TNA from the party's new leader, Yousef Jabareen, who warned against abandoning the alliance.

"It's still not too late. We must not ignore the will of the public. We must not give up on the hope for real change: the hope for a strong, broad, and united joint list," Jabareen said. "I am optimistic. I believe we can find a formula that will be acceptable to all three lists, and together reach 10 seats."

For Jabareen, the stakes extend beyond the number of Palestinian representatives elected to the Knesset.

"This is the best way to ensure that the Netanyahu-Ben Gvir-Smotrich government does not return, and it is also the best way to build a shared future for all the citizens," he added.

Balad, which also declined TNA's request for comment, called on all three parties to meet on Monday to formally announce the joint list and approve a political programme and strategy for the election campaign.

Earlier, Balad issued a statement announcing its commitment to the Reconciliation Committee's decision. It stressed that “the negotiations phase is now behind us, and the priority is to formally announce the list, immediately launch the political and electoral campaign, and form the working teams within the next two days.”

Balad said that “throughout the past month, it chose to refrain from media statements and public disputes over the details of the negotiations, based on its conviction that the priority at this stage is not to preoccupy our public with internal disagreements, but rather to prepare for one of the fiercest and most important electoral battles facing our Arab community in decades, amid the rise of fascism, racism and incitement, and given the scale of the political challenges facing our people.”

It called on “the leaders of the three parties and their teams to meet immediately… to formally announce the three-party list, establish the political, media, organisational and field teams, and approve the political programme and strategic campaign plan, based on the discussions and joint efforts carried out over the past year.”

The National Democratic Assembly, Balad, also stressed that “now is the time for action, and the success of the list will not be measured solely by completing its composition, but by its ability to restore hope and confidence among our public, increase voter turnout and Arab representation, and transform electoral unity into a political and grassroots force capable of confronting the expansion of fascism and the racist Zionist consensus against the Arab parties, bringing down the right-wing government and its project, and resisting attempts to impose military conscription.”

From 15 seats to fragmentation

The proposed list would place Jabareen first, followed by Tibi and Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh, according to Israeli media, citing a Hadash spokesperson.

Hadash's Jafar Farah would take fourth place, followed by Balad's Bakhar Awadeh and Hadash's Ofer Cassif and Youssef Atauna.

Balad's Maha Karkabi would be eighth, followed by an unspecified Ta'al candidate and Hadash's Nihaya Washahi. Balad's Hassan Nassasra, another unspecified Ta'al candidate and Hadash's Ayas Natour would occupy the next three positions.

If the alliance secured the 10 seats Jabareen believes are within reach, Hadash would receive five, Balad three and Ta'al two, despite Tibi occupying the second position on the overall list.

That allocation is now at the centre of a dispute threatening a political reunion that its architects hoped would reverse years of fragmentation among Palestinian parties.

The Joint List was once one of the largest blocs in the Knesset.

Hadash, Ta'al, Balad and Ra'am ran together in 2020 and won 15 seats, demonstrating the electoral strength Palestinian parties could command when united.

But the alliance subsequently fractured.

Mansour Abbas's Ra'am broke away and later joined the coalition government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid in 2021. Balad then ran separately in the 2022 election.

The renewed effort by Hadash, Ta'al and Balad to run together in October had been intended to overcome those divisions at a moment when Palestinian political representation could again prove consequential to the formation of Israel's next government.

It is also unfolding as Palestinian citizens of Israel face mounting pressure from the country's government and as far-right ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich wield significant influence over policies affecting Palestinian communities.

For the Reconciliation Committee, the dispute now comes down to whether the parties will accept the compromise they had asked it to produce.

Taha's message to them was that the consequences of failing to do so extend beyond who occupies which place on an electoral list.

The Trump administration, which rejects the ICC's authority, has imposed travel bans and asset freezes on several judges and prosecutors, primarily over their investigations into key US ally Israel.

In a New York court filing, four groups including Human Rights Watch said the sanctions should be struck down as they violate laws including First Amendment free speech protections.

"This is an unlawful abuse of power constituting a frontal attack on the rule of law, the independence of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, basic precepts undergirding the international legal order, and the principle of equal access to justice," the lawsuit states.

The 101-page complaint says the restrictions "cause grave damage to the ability to bring to justice the perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity."

The US sanctions, issued under an executive order Trump signed in February 2025, have targeted eight judges, three prosecutors, a UN expert and three human rights organizations.

The United Nations and the European Union previously urged Trump to reverse penalties against ICC officials.

Many of the measures were directly linked to an arrest warrant that The Hague-based court issued for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over the war in Gaza.

Washington has also criticized ICC probes into alleged abuses during the US-led war in Afghanistan.

'Irreparable harm'

Tuesday's complaint, filed by HRW, American Friends Service Committee, Center for Constitutional Rights and Open Society Institute, says the sanctions have caused "profound and irreparable harm."

It states that the four groups have been forced to stop fully engaging with the ICC due to fears of civil or criminal penalties, and of being designated for sanctions themselves.

Alongside Trump, the lawsuit names Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Attorney General Todd Blanche, and Bradley Smith, director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Established in 2002, the ICC prosecutes individuals accused of the gravest atrocities and acts as a last resort when countries do not have adequate legal systems to ensure accountability.

US reservations about the court predate Trump. The US, like Israel, has not ratified the international treaty that established the ICC, which is backed by nearly all Western democracies.

Russia is also not a member. Its President Vladimir Putin has been the subject of an ICC arrest warrant since March 2023.

Washington vowed last month to accelerate its campaign against the ICC beyond the existing sanctions -- accusing the court of posing "an intolerable threat to US sovereignty."

A State Department official told AFP news agency the effort would look to pressure other nations to withdraw from the court and cut off any financial support to the court.

In June, three ICC judges sanctioned by the Trump administration filed a lawsuit against the president and other senior US officials, arguing that the measures imposed on them were unlawful.

In a complaint filed in New York, Canadian judge Kimberly Prost, Uganda's Solomy Balungi Bossa and Benin's Reine Adelaide Sophie Alapini-Gansou said the sanctions were intended to "exert extrajudicial pressure."

The siege of the family home in Qusra, south of Nablus, began on Sunday, when Israeli settlers erected a makeshift tent inside the grounds of the property and blocked access to the house.

Activists who have since tried to bring food and medical assistance to the family say Israeli forces have not only allowed the settlers to remain but have prevented those attempting to reach the house from getting through.

Andrey X, an activist and journalist who has spent much of the past two years documenting settler violence across the occupied West Bank, travelled to Qusra on Monday in an attempt to deliver food to the family. Instead, he said, settlers attacked his group and an ambulance in full view of Israeli soldiers.

"The settlers attacked us in full view of the army. They attacked the ambulance, and the army, instead of doing anything to the settlers, detained us and took our IDs and keys and ordered us to get out of the village, and then held us for even longer, and only then released us," Andrey told TNA.

Andrey, a Russian-born activist who holds Israeli citizenship, has spent long periods living among Palestinian communities in the West Bank, documenting settler incursions and attacks and the role of Israeli forces accompanying them.

On Monday, he said, one of the soldiers preventing access to the house appeared to endorse the settlers' claim to the land.

"One of the soldiers told me, 'It's their land. This land belongs to them,' even though this is Area B. This is a blatant violation of the Oslo Accords."

Inside the house are homeowner Yousef Hassan, his wife and their two daughters, aged two and four. 

Hassan has said the family is running out of food and that his two-year-old daughter needs to see a doctor. He previously said settlers had cut electricity lines to the property.

But attempts to reach them have repeatedly failed.

Israeli forces and settlers have blocked access to the house, including for ambulances and journalists, while footage shared online showed Israeli soldiers praying alongside settlers at the makeshift encampment.

Several journalists have also been prevented from entering the area. Haaretz journalists said they were attacked by settlers while attempting to reach Qusra.

"The Israeli state is literally starving a family to death," Andrey said, describing what was happening at the house as "one of the most egregious examples of just blatant crimes against humanity being committed by the settlers and the Israeli army together".

'An attempted takeover'

Palestinian officials say the siege is part of an attempt to force the family from its property rather than an isolated confrontation.

Ameer Dawood, Director of Publishing and Documentation at the Colonisation & Wall Resistance Commission, described it to TNA as "an extremely dangerous act of settler terrorism and an attempted takeover of Palestinian property".

"The conduct of the Israeli occupation forces is particularly alarming," Dawood said, pointing to soldiers carrying out Jewish prayers alongside settlers and the prevention of an ambulance from reaching the house," he said. "This conduct provides protection and practical support for the coercive pressure being imposed on the residents."

Hassan said the pressure on his family began months before settlers established the encampment outside his home, with settlers first coming to the property and harassing them around seven months ago.

Dawood said Jabal Ras al-Ain, where the house is located, is an important agricultural area and one of Qusra's remaining spaces for natural and residential development.

"The same area has faced repeated attacks, electricity cuts and attempts to force families from their homes during recent months," he said.

The location of the confrontation is also significant.

Qusra lies in Area B of the occupied West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority exercises civil control while Israel retains overriding security powers.

Andrey had warned in an interview with TNA in June that settlers were increasingly pushing beyond Area C, which is under full Israeli control, and establishing outposts and carrying out attacks in Areas A and B.

"Setting up outposts in areas A and B was unheard of until the past few months," he said at the time. "But now they are popping up more and more."

He said those incursions could not be separated from the role of Israeli forces, describing a system in which "it's not just settlers, it's settler attacks with the support of the Israeli army who are always there".

The events outside the Hassan family's home reflect precisely the pattern activists and Palestinian officials have been warning about - settlers establishing a presence on Palestinian land while Israeli forces restrict those attempting to challenge or document it.

The siege comes amid a wider surge in Israeli settler violence and settlement expansion across the occupied West Bank, where Israeli settlements are illegal under international law.

Rights groups have documented repeated cases of settlers attacking Palestinian communities under the protection of Israeli forces, alongside land seizures, demolitions and the forced displacement of Palestinians.

Rights organisations have described the combination of settler violence and Israeli state policies as part of a broader process of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing of the occupied West Bank.

Dawood said the Palestinian Authority, which exercises limited authority in Areas A and B, cannot physically remove the settlers and was instead seeking intervention through international organisations and diplomatic channels.

"The urgency of international intervention is heightened by the conduct of the Israeli forces at the site," he said.

Yemen's coastguard on Tuesday said alleged strikes by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels on a cargo vessel killed at least six people near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off the country's southern coast.

The strikes are the latest in a number of deadly attacks against shipping in the entrance to the Red Sea since the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia last month.

The coastguard from Yemen's internationally recognised government said four sailors aboard the cargo vessel -- identified as the "Tihamah" -- were among the dead along with two members of the forces deployed during a rescue mission to evacuate the ship.

The initial salvo targeting the ship "caused a fire to break out aboard the vessel and inflicted extensive damage, in addition to causing deaths and injuries among its crew, including three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national killed," the coastguard said in a statement.

A second strike targeted the vessel as rescue workers carried out a mission to evacuate the ship.

"The attack struck the site of the rescue operation and resulted in deaths and injuries among the forces participating in the response operation," the coast guard added, saying 10 people were injured over the course of the strikes.

The statement came hours after the Yemen government's transport ministry accused the Houthis of launching the strikes that hit the vessel.

The ministry gave a slightly smaller toll, saying four had been killed.

The transport ministry in its statement said it "held the Houthi terrorist militias fully responsible for the deaths, injuries and damage inflicted on the commercial vessel 'Tihamah' as well as for the serious consequences resulting from these attacks".

There was no official comment from the Houthis about the alleged attack.

The incident comes after a years-long truce in Yemen's civil war between the Houthis and the Saudi-backed, internationally recognised government collapsed last month as fighting flared between Iran and the United States.

The breakdown of the UN-backed 2022 accord came as the Houthis announced a maritime blockade of Saudi Arabia, hitting Saudi tankers in the Red Sea and the kingdom's oil infrastructure, in parallel with Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

"The legacy reactor residue unlocks none of that," Nanar Hawach, senior Syria analyst at the International Crisis Group, told TNA, saying the nuclear file was largely separate from the disputes that have frustrated US attempts to broker an agreement between the two countries.

The assessment comes after US and Israeli officials told Axios that Syria had agreed to hand the material over to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under a US-brokered deal reached several weeks ago, following weeks of Israeli threats to bomb Syrian facilities.

The Trump administration and the IAEA had raced to secure the material amid concerns that the issue could provoke a new crisis involving Israel, Syria and potentially Turkey.

The stockpile is a remnant of a secret nuclear programme pursued under the Assad regime more than two decades ago. The material was reportedly connected to the Al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Deir Ezzor governorate, which Israel destroyed in 2007, although several storage and research and development sites remained intact.

A US official said the material included powdered uranium ore known as yellowcake, which can be enriched as part of the process of producing nuclear fuel or weapons and could also potentially be used in a "dirty bomb".

Six months after Bashar al-Assad's overthrow, Syria's new government agreed to give the IAEA unrestricted access to the facility and several other sites connected to the former government's nuclear programme.

But Israeli officials later said they had detected possible attempts by Syria's new authorities to access material at a facility known as Site 99 and suspected they were receiving assistance from Turkey.

When questioned by the Trump administration, Syrian officials said they had been unaware that nuclear material was stored at the site.

"We think everybody is happy with the result. Hopefully we will be able to kick off the removal process soon and end it before the end of the year," the US official told Axios.

The harder question of Israel-Syria talks

For Washington, removing the material may close one sensitive file inherited from the Assad era. But it does little to resolve the disputes at the heart of negotiations between Syria and Israel.

"I expect the handover to have little to no impact because it speaks to Washington's non-proliferation agenda while the negotiations themselves are stuck on territory, Israeli withdrawal lines, the demilitarised zone and the Druze question," Hawach told TNA. "The legacy reactor residue unlocks none of that."

Relations between Damascus and Israel have sharply deteriorated since Assad's overthrow. Israel seized strategic areas of southern Syria after his fall and launched extensive attacks that destroyed much of the country's remaining military capabilities.

Israeli forces continue to occupy parts of Quneitra, Daraa and Damascus provinces and carry out regular raids in villages near the occupied Golan Heights.

President Ahmed al-Sharaa has spoken favourably about reaching a security agreement with Israel, but negotiations have struggled to make progress amid disagreements over Israeli forces remaining on Syrian territory.

Hawach said the nuclear agreement could nevertheless strengthen the position of US officials advocating continued engagement with Syria's new authorities by demonstrating Damascus's willingness to resolve an inherited security issue through negotiation.

"The deal shows Damascus is willing to resolve inherited files through cooperation while Israel's approach continues to rest on indefinite deployment and strikes," he said.

Other Syrian analysts similarly see the agreement as part of a broader effort by Damascus to remove potential Israeli pretexts for further attacks while distancing the new government from the military programmes it inherited from Assad.

Rashid Hourani, a researcher specialising in security and military affairs, told TNA that Syria's new authorities had adopted a more open approach to the nuclear file and cooperation with international organisations, in part to demonstrate that Damascus does not pose a threat to neighbouring countries or the wider region.

The government also hopes its cooperation over the nuclear and chemical weapons files will help secure greater political and economic support for Syria's recovery, he said.

Hourani cautioned, however, that the new authorities could face difficulties establishing exactly what remains of the former government's nuclear programme, with conditions on the ground not necessarily matching existing documentation after the disorder surrounding Assad's fall.

Some documents or materials may have been removed by the former government or its allies during that period, he said, adding that cooperation with the IAEA could help resolve those discrepancies over the short and medium term.

Khaled Khalil, an expert on Syrian-Israeli relations, said Damascus's cooperation with the IAEA had also deprived Israel of one potential justification for military action.

He described the agreement as evidence of a Syrian policy based on "realism and clarity" in handling sensitive security issues, contrasting that approach with Israel's continued military operations inside Syria.

"Damascus sent messages of reassurance to the region and was not a source of concern," Khalil told TNA, arguing that Syria had increasingly presented itself as a partner in regional security.

Through active diplomacy, he added, Damascus had succeeded in "taking many cards out of the hands of the Israeli occupation", even as Israel continued trying to impose facts on the ground and intervene in Syrian affairs.

The Trump administration has meanwhile moved rapidly to build ties with al-Sharaa's government, lifting Assad-era economic sanctions, reopening its embassy in Damascus and supporting Syria's diplomatic and economic reintegration.

In a new statement, Yemen's coastguard on Tuesday said four sailors aboard the cargo vessel -- identified as the "Tihamah" -- were among the dead along with two members of the forces deployed during a rescue mission to evacuate the ship.

The initial salvo targeting the ship "caused a fire to break out aboard the vessel and inflicted extensive damage, in addition to causing deaths and injuries among its crew, including three Pakistani nationals and one Indonesian national killed," the coastguard said in a statement.

Earlier, Yemen's transport ministry said Houthi rebels fired three ballistic missiles at the Yemeni commercial vessel before launching an additional missile at rescue teams attempting to reach it.

The attack follows the collapse last month of a years-long truce between the Iran-backed Houthis and Yemen’s internationally recognised government, amid the US-Israeli war on Iran.

It comes as Pakistan’s Mohsin Naqvi has arrived in Tehran for talks with Iranian officials as the country's defence minister, Khawaja Asif, told Bloomberg News in an interview published on Tuesday that the United States and Iran are close to "some sort of an arrangement."

"Things are shaping up again in favour of a peace arrangement or a deal," Asif told Bloomberg News. "The signals in the last two three days are that we are close to some sort of an arrangement," he added.

Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi said Tehran is insisting that the Strait of Hormuz will not be reopened until the US meets its conditions, after Trump said he wants compensation from Iran “for all of the people that they have killed” in the past.

Araghchi told reporters that Iran has “astonished the whole world” in the war against the United States and Israel, proving “that it is a tough and invincible power.”

Iran effectively closed the strait by threatening shipping after Israel and the US attacked the country on 28 February.

Several Algerian media outlets reported the announcement. Some tried to explain what the office would do; others asked why the FBI was returning to Algiers now. However, to my surprise, the wider debate remained limited, as did the details of this new sub-office.

That said, this is likely because Algerian journalists have little freedom to interrogate decisions involving national security, foreign intelligence and sensitive diplomatic arrangements.

Old partners

It is important to point out that this isn’t the first time that the FBI has set up base in Algiers. The United States already had a full legal attaché office in Algeria following 9/11. Around 2010, when Algeria was considered safer and wealthier, it was moved to Tunisia, where Washington had a vested interest post-revolution.

The Tunisian authorities were also seeking support from several Western countries as they attempted to reform their judicial and security institutions, according to analyst Akram Kharief.

Nevertheless, the return of the FBI in Algeria is likely due to the efforts led by Ali Badaoui, who was appointed Director General of National Security in 2024. Soon after he started his role, the US was one of his major foreign engagements. He travelled there to meet with then head of the FBI’s New York Field Office, James Smith, to discuss transnational organised crime, law-enforcement cooperation and new operational methods.

This seems to fit into Badoui’s interest in extending practical police cooperation with foreign partners, including with Britain’s Home Office and National Crime Agency, Slovenia’s national police and Italy’s police leadership. The relationships cover biometric identification, criminal data exchange, forensic work, cybercrime, organised crime, and irregular migration.

What could Algeria gain?

In reality, criminal networks no longer respect national borders. Cybercrime, cryptocurrency fraud, terrorism financing, trafficking and money laundering frequently involve people, accounts and evidence spread across several countries.

A permanent FBI liaison officer could therefore make it easier for Algerian investigators to request information held in the US, trace suspicious financial transactions or coordinate cases involving American companies and digital platforms. The sub-office would be another liaison channel with the Algerian police, gendarmerie and ministry of justice.

Algerian authorities could also be seeking to benefit from the FBI’s specialist training and technical expertise.

Additionally, there may be a financial dimension to recent developments. Washington is possibly seeking to improve the international transparency of Algeria’s banking system. This would make sense given just last year Badoui was involved in the agreement signed between Algeria’s Directorate General of National Security (DGSN) and the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit over the exchange of information on money laundering, terrorist financing, and the financing of weapons proliferation.

Furthermore, when the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) decided to remove Algeria from its list of jurisdictions under increased monitoring, it was a highly mediatised event for the North African country.

The FBI sub-office was announced almost exactly one month later.

Whilst the timing does not prove that the two developments were part of the same agreement, it does suggest that financial crimes are likely to feature prominently in the new relationship.

Transparency?

Whilst partnerships related to policing and intelligence sharing may be increasingly common across borders, this does not remove the need for scrutiny.

There are several urgent questions that must be answered by Algerian authorities. Namely, what precise agreement governs the FBI’s activities in Algeria? Which Algerian institutions negotiated it? What information can be exchanged? Who authorises the release of citizens’ personal or financial data? Can information supplied to the FBI be passed to other American agencies or to a third country?

There is also the matter of parliamentary involvement in the FBI’s presence.

Not every form of diplomatic or police cooperation requires a parliamentary vote. Nevertheless, elected representatives should at least be able to establish the legal basis of a permanent foreign law-enforcement presence, the limits placed on it and the safeguards protecting Algerian citizens.

National security cannot be used to exclude the public and parliament from every discussion.

Ultimately, whilst the immediate reasons for the new FBI office may be operational rather than geopolitical, technical cooperation does not take place outside politics.

Even a limited American security presence fosters closer institutional relationships, regular exchanges and greater familiarity among officials on both sides.

This does lead us to question whether Algeria is therefore abandoning its traditional foreign policy or veering towards the Washington camp.

On the other hand, Algeria may simply be widening its diplomatic options and working with Washington where cooperation serves its interests. Nonetheless, Algerian authorities need to explain exactly what the country has agreed to, and who will ensure that the limits of the arrangement are respected.

Indeed, the FBI’s return is perhaps just a case of business as usual in diplomatic terms, but this does not make parliamentary scrutiny or public accountability any less necessary.

Rachid Sekkai is a journalist, media coach, and PhD researcher in identity and belonging.

Follow Rachid on X: @RachidSekkai

Have questions or comments? Email us at: editorial-english@alaraby.co.uk

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Maj-Gen (ret) Giora Eiland, a former head of Israel's National Security Council, condemned the Trump-backed Board of Peace's proposal to end the war as "very pro-Hamas" and urged the Israeli government to refuse to withdraw its forces from Gaza.

"Israel has no interest in Gaza being rebuilt. It is better for us if it remains destroyed for generations," Eiland said in a radio interview on Sunday.

"The greater the despair in Gaza, the greater the destruction, and the longer Gaza remains a monument to what they did on 7 October, the better."

His comments come as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejects the Board's 15-point plan and refuses to end attacks on Gaza or withdraw Israeli troops, which now occupy around 70% of the enclave.

The Board has belatedly called on Israel to comply with the ceasefire and withdraw to the Yellow Line, steps Hamas has set as conditions before it surrenders its weapons.

The Palestinian group's pledge to disarm has triggered a backlash among Netanyahu's far-right coalition partners, who fear that an agreement ending the war would kill off their ambitions to annex the territory.

Israel has largely ignored the October ceasefire agreement, continuing near-daily attacks on Gaza, expanding its occupation and maintaining heavy restrictions on aid shipments.

A history of genocidal statements

Eiland's latest remarks echo statements he made during the earliest weeks of the war, when he repeatedly argued that making life impossible for Gaza's civilian population should form part of Israel's military strategy.

He was among the most frequently quoted Israeli figures in South Africa's genocide case at the International Court of Justice, which cited statements by Israeli officials as evidence of alleged genocidal intent.

"Gaza will become an area where people cannot live," Eiland said in a radio interview on 12 October 2023, days after the war began, as he called for a "terrible, unbearable situation" to be imposed on the territory.

"Israel has no choice but to make Gaza a place that is temporarily, or permanently, impossible to live in," he later wrote in Yedioth Ahronoth.

The following month, Eiland went further, suggesting that the spread of "severe epidemics" could accelerate Gaza's collapse.

He also advocated the forced transfer of Palestinians from the territory, writing in the British pro-Israel journal Fathom that "the people should be told that they have two choices; to stay and to starve, or to leave".

Eiland has similarly erased the distinction between Palestinian civilians and combatants, describing "the entire Gaza population" as enemies of Israel.

Those ideas would later form the basis of a more formal proposal.

In 2024, Eiland was the lead author of the so-called "General's Plan", which proposed ordering civilians out of northern Gaza and treating those who remained as combatants.

The plan was ultimately not formally adopted, but its premise closely reflected the strategy Eiland had publicly advocated since the opening weeks of the war - applying overwhelming pressure on Gaza's civilians to force a the ingenuous population out.

The dead included women, children and health workers, according to Abdel Aty Mohamed al-Faki, the commissioner of Kurmuk in Sudan's Blue Nile state.

Al-Faki said the graves were discovered on Monday near Jebel Fankat during operations conducted after the Sudanese army retook the area from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and its allies. He said that the victims had been executed by the RSF during its occupation of Kurmuk.

The New Arab could not independently verify the circumstances of the deaths or responsibility for the killings.

The discovery comes more than a month after the Sudanese army retook Kurmuk on 8 July following fighting with the RSF and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.

The RSF and SPLM-N had seized Kurmuk on 24 March as part of an offensive across the Blue Nile region, opening a new front in Sudan's more than three-year war.

Jebel Fankat, where the graves were found, had been used by the RSF as a position for launching suicide drones during the battle for the town, according to al-Faki.

The reported presence of health workers among the bodies has also renewed attention on earlier allegations of attacks on medical facilities during the RSF's capture of Kurmuk.

In March, the Sudan Doctors Network accused RSF fighters of looting health facilities, destroying the town's main hospital and assaulting medical workers after entering Kurmuk.

The independent medical group said equipment and supplies were stolen and one health worker was critically injured, while thousands of residents fled the area. The RSF did not respond at the time to the network's allegations.

A new front in Sudan's war

Fighting in Blue Nile intensified earlier this year after the RSF formed a military alliance with al-Hilu's SPLM-N, pushing the war into territory along Sudan's borders with Ethiopia and South Sudan.

The alliance captured a string of towns and military positions before the army launched a counteroffensive, gradually advancing towards Kurmuk and retaking the town in July.

Kurmuk, close to the Ethiopian border, has long held strategic importance because of its position along cross-border routes. The town has repeatedly changed hands during Sudan's previous civil wars.

This year's fighting again sent tens of thousands of people fleeing Kurmuk and surrounding areas, placing further pressure on communities elsewhere in Blue Nile.

The graves reported this week are not the first to emerge from territory retaken during Sudan's war.

Bodies showing signs of execution have previously been found after government forces regained territory around Khartoum and Gezira, while rights groups and investigators have documented killings, torture and arbitrary detention by parties to the conflict.

Sudan's war began in April 2023 after the collapse of a power-sharing arrangement between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.

More than three years later, the conflict has spread across much of the country, killing tens of thousands of people and displacing millions. Both the RSF and forces aligned with the army have faced allegations of war crimes and other serious abuses.

But what will people across the Middle East and North Africa see?

The answer depends heavily on where they are.

No country in the MENA region lies within the path of totality on 12 August, meaning nowhere in the region will see the Moon completely cover the Sun.

Parts of the Maghreb, however, will experience a deep partial eclipse, with Algeria coming tantalisingly close to totality.

Where in MENA will the eclipse be visible?

Algeria will have the best view in the region.

In Algiers, the partial eclipse will begin at about 6:42pm local time, according to NASA, with the Moon eventually obscuring about 96% of the Sun.

Maximum coverage is expected at around 7:33pm, shortly before sunset at approximately 7:42pm.

That means the Sun will disappear below the horizon while still heavily eclipsed, potentially producing a striking crescent-shaped sunset for viewers with a clear western horizon.

Morocco will also get an impressive view. In Casablanca, the eclipse will begin at about 6:48pm and reach its maximum at 7:43pm, when around 87% of the Sun will be covered. The partial eclipse will continue towards sunset.

Tunisia sits further from the Moon's central shadow and will see a more modest eclipse. In Tunis, it begins at about 6:41pm and reaches its maximum at 7:11pm, with roughly 50% of the Sun obscured before sunset.

Mauritania is also expected to see a partial eclipse, although the amount of the Sun covered will vary depending on location.

What about the Middle East and Gulf?

For much of the rest of the MENA region, there will be little or nothing to see.

The Gulf states, Egypt, Iraq and most of the Levant fall outside the main observable eclipse zone, meaning the August 12 event will largely pass them by.

That includes Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman, as well as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Palestine.

The sharp regional divide comes down to the route taken by the Moon's shadow across Earth. The partial eclipse reaches northwestern Africa in the evening, but its shadow does not extend far enough east to produce a significant eclipse across most of the Arab world.

Where will the eclipse be total?

The total eclipse begins at 15:34 GMT, with the Moon's shadow sweeping across Greenland, Iceland, parts of northern Russia and the North Atlantic before reaching the Iberian Peninsula.

Spain will offer some of the most accessible views of totality.

Cities including León, Valladolid, Zaragoza, Teruel and Valencia fall within the path where the Moon will completely cover the Sun. Madrid and Barcelona are just outside it, but will still see around 99% of the Sun obscured.

For most people within the path, totality will last less than two minutes, although it can stretch to a little over two minutes in areas close to the centre of the Moon's shadow.

Around 15 million people are estimated to live within the path of totality, while hundreds of millions more across Europe, North Africa and North America will see at least a partial eclipse.

What exactly is a total solar eclipse?

A solar eclipse occurs when the Moon passes between Earth and the Sun, casting its shadow across part of the planet.

During a total solar eclipse, the Moon completely covers the Sun for observers standing within a narrow corridor known as the path of totality.

Daylight briefly dims and the Sun's corona, its normally hidden outer atmosphere, becomes visible around the Moon.

People outside that narrow corridor may instead experience a partial eclipse, in which the Moon covers only part of the Sun.

The coincidence is possible because although the Sun is roughly 400 times wider than the Moon, it is also about 400 times farther from Earth, making the two appear approximately the same size in our sky.

Is it safe to watch the eclipse?

Anyone watching Wednesday's partial eclipse in North Africa must use proper solar viewing protection.

Ordinary sunglasses, regardless of how dark they are, are not safe for looking directly at the Sun.

Eclipse glasses or handheld solar viewers designed for solar observation should be used throughout a partial eclipse.

The brief period when eye protection can be removed applies only to observers experiencing totality, when the Moon completely covers the Sun.

Since no MENA country lies in the path of totality on 12 August, viewers in the region should not look directly at the eclipse without appropriate protection at any point.

When will MENA get a total solar eclipse?

For people in the region disappointed by Wednesday's event, the wait will not be long.

The next total solar eclipse will take place on August 2, 2027, and its path will cut directly across North Africa and the Middle East.

The eclipse will cross parts of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt before continuing across the Red Sea and into Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

In June last year, Israel launched a war against Iran with the stated goal of degrading its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

The United States military briefly joined Israel during the 12-day conflict, and used its advanced aircraft to bomb three Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan.

The US and Israel then jointly launched a war on Iran on 28 February 2026, that still is ongoing, without achieving any of their proclaimed goals. 

"We toured the Fordow nuclear site many times to understand the site," Yossi Cohen, who led the Mossad between 2015 and 2021, claimed during a conference of local authorities on Tuesday, Israeli media reported.

He didn't elaborate on when exactly the visits took place or who made them, nor provided any further evidence behind the boast. 

According to Israeli media, Cohen said "the bombing of the site by the Americans was the fulfillment of all my dreams".

Iran's nuclear programme has long been a major point of contention between it and the United States, with Tehran consistently denying it is seeking to produce a nuclear bomb.

Cohen, who is close to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, played a prominent role during his time in office in achieving US-brokered normalisation deals between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco.

Cohen was linked to Israel's killing in 2020 of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, although Israel has not commented on the incident.

After finishing his term at the helm of the agency, he has remained in the public eye, giving frequent interviews to Israeli media and repeatedly hinting at a possible foray into politics, which has not yet occurred.

Her name is Fatima Al Youssef, and in 2017, she lost 25 members of her family in the Khan Sheikhoun chemical massacre, a loss that had a profound impact on her, leaving her with the memory of those she loved, the image of her martyred father, her wounded brother and the memory of the forced displacement she endured because of her revolutionary stance.

Now, years after surviving the attack, Fatima is one of 22 women who have entered Syria's first parliament since the fall of the former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Her presence, along with that of the other women appointed and elected, has raised questions about whether the new parliament reflects the role of women in Syrian society, or whether their limited representation marks a worrying setback.

On 1 July 2026, the head of the Higher Committee for Elections, Mohammad Taha Al-Ahmad, announced the names of the People's Assembly members appointed by Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa.

The announcement completed the formation of Syria's first parliament since the fall of Assad's regime in December 2024.

The parliament was formed under a mechanism set out in the Constitutional Declaration.

Under this system, two-thirds of the members, 140 people, were elected through electoral bodies, while the president appointed the remaining third, 70 members, to ensure fair representation and competence.

However, the process was not completed nationwide.

The three seats allocated to Suweida province remained vacant because elections were not held there, bringing the final total to 207 members out of 210.

The formation of the new parliament has brought renewed attention to the role of women in Syria's political future.

While women make up roughly half of Syrian society, they hold only a small proportion of seats in the new assembly.

The final figures showed that women hold 22 of the 210 seats, representing just 10.48% of parliament. Seven women were selected through the electoral bodies, while Sharaa appointed 15 women to his list.

Turning pain into action

For Fatima, however, her place in parliament is not about simply filling a seat or providing symbolic representation.

"The era of symbolism is over; people have paid a heavy price," Fatima, who holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and has worked in education and humanitarian organisations supporting women's rights and child protection, tells The New Arab. 

Her experience also includes working with the UN International Commission of Inquiry on issues relating to victims of chemical attacks.

Now, in her new parliamentary seat, she sees her role as a responsibility towards the 25 members of her family who were killed.

That sense of responsibility shapes how Fatima views her appointment through the presidential list.

"I do not believe in symbolic roles. Symbolism belonged to the past because Parliament was run from outside the chamber. Today, I see this as a responsibility rather than an honour. My role is not to sit and applaud. My role is to turn the pain I experienced as one of the survivors of the chemical massacre into laws that protect people and prevent such a tragedy from happening again," she says. 

"My appointment by presidential decree is a commitment, and my success will be measured after my work is done. How many protection laws have been passed? How many families have received justice? That is the real impact."

For Fatima, that responsibility is closely connected to the issues facing Syrian women. She says her priorities "do not stem from slogans but from the painful reality," adding that "Syrian women have paid the highest price: displacement, loss, widowhood and poverty."

She identifies four urgent areas for action. Her first priority is "a law to protect against domestic violence and discrimination."

She continues, "We need comprehensive legislation criminalising all forms of physical, psychological and economic violence, establishing protection units in hospitals and police stations, and creating a hotline. A woman who survived war should not have to fear inside her own home."

Her second priority is "the economic and legal empowerment of women, including labour legislation guaranteeing equal pay, maternity protection, and preventing unfair dismissal because of marriage or pregnancy."

She also calls for simpler procedures that enable widows and female heads of household to obtain housing and inheritance rights. Alongside this, she wants support for small businesses run by displaced women and widows through interest-free loans.

Her third priority concerns women and transitional justice, an issue that is particularly personal to her because of her experience as a survivor of the chemical massacre.

"As one of the survivors of the chemical massacre, this issue is deeply personal for me. Female victims must be represented in documenting crimes, compensation and reconstruction. There can be no justice without the voice of the woman who carried the wound and today carries responsibility for her family," she explains. 

Her fourth priority is "education and reproductive health, including returning girls who dropped out of school to the classroom; combating child marriage through strong legislation; and providing free healthcare for mothers and children, especially in affected areas."

For Fatima, these priorities are part of a wider demand for women to have a meaningful role in rebuilding Syria.

"I will not accept our role being merely symbolic. I want enforceable laws and real budgets because empowering women is not a luxury; it is half the road towards rebuilding the nation."

Building a new Syria

From Khan Sheikhoun to the halls of the University of Idlib, Dr Najwa Bahjat Qassas, who holds a doctorate in Arabic language and literature and previously served as deputy dean of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, sees her appointment to the People's Assembly as an extension of her educational mission.

"My mission is one: building people and building the nation, because reconstruction begins with people. Education has always been, and will remain, the first path to renaissance," Dr Najwa tells The New Arab. 

She speaks about Syria's exceptional transitional period: "I was appointed by the presidency, and discussions about the legitimacy of the parliament, representation and appointments are all exceptional because we are in a transitional and foundational phase for a legislative council after 60 years in which the parliament lacked both weight and purpose. Now the chapter of elections and appointments has closed, and the work of building has begun."

Expressing confidence in Syrian women's abilities, she says, "Syrian women possess the experience and high level of competence that make them essential partners in building the Syria we aspire to. They proved their capabilities during crises in the economy, education and humanitarian work."

Regarding her legislative priorities, Najwa calls for moving beyond a narrow focus on women's issues, encouraging women to engage fully in political life, participate in decision-making and contribute to all parliamentary committees.

On the question of appointments, she says, "The reason most of us were appointed may be that the electoral bodies were predominantly male, or because many qualified women were reluctant to enter politics during this transitional period."

She continues, "I see the future of women's representation in Syria as promising. There is active civil and political momentum towards including women, and the appointment of a woman to the office of the presidency within the People's Assembly is evidence of that.

"It reflects parliamentarians' recognition of the need for women's participation in decision-making and for complementarity within society. Most of the women who have reached parliament bring academic, social or political experience. They are not simply numbers but representation and responsibility expressed through their voices and work."

Women still face barriers

While female MPs appear united in their determination to prove themselves through their work, questions remain about whether appointing 15 women by presidential decision is enough to address the wider imbalance in representation.

For example, can one speak of a "new Syria" when women, who make up half of society, hold only around 10% of parliamentary seats?

These questions have prompted different perspectives from activists and experts, with some raising concerns about the current system and others focusing on practical solutions.

For civil society activist Ghalia Al Rahhal, presidential appointments can help address the immediate imbalance, but they cannot replace women's right to participate in elections and reach parliament through the will of voters.

"We do not reject appointing women as a temporary measure to correct the imbalance. However, appointments cannot replace women's right to stand, compete and reach parliament through the will of voters. Politically, an appointed woman remains linked to the authority that appointed her. What is needed is institutions that ensure women reach parliament as holders of rights and independent political actors, not as beneficiaries of power," Ghalia shares.

Ghalia notes that these concerns are part of a much wider set of barriers facing Syrian women who want to enter political life.

"The barriers are numerous and interconnected. Patriarchal culture still views politics as a male domain. Political parties and political life remain weak, direct elections are absent, financial resources are limited, and political violence, especially against women activists, persists. There are also the burdens of poverty, displacement and caring for families, alongside the exclusion of independent women's organisations with genuine community experience," she explains. 

"Syrian women proved throughout the war that they could manage organisations and initiatives and work in humanitarian relief, documentation, peacebuilding, mediation, rights advocacy and conflict resolution. The problem is not a lack of experience or competence. The problem is closed political doors and rules that do not guarantee them an equal opportunity."

These barriers also raise questions about whether women's representation will be protected under Syria's permanent constitution.

When asked about the future of a women's quota, Ghalia says there is still no certainty that one will be adopted, adding: "We cannot say with certainty that a women's quota will be adopted. The transitional constitutional declaration acknowledged women's role but did not establish a clear, binding guarantee of their representation. Therefore, unless the constitution and electoral law include a mandatory quota of no less than 30%, this decline may continue."

For Ghalia, however, a quota would be only one part of a much broader political reform.

"A quota is not a privilege for women but a temporary measure to correct a historic imbalance and give women a genuine opportunity to enter politics. However, a quota alone is not enough. It must be accompanied by free elections, democratic political parties, protection for female candidates, fair campaign financing, and guarantees that women are partners in legislation, oversight and decision-making, rather than merely a number or a decorative image," she says. 

Ghalia believes the current level of representation is not an achievement for the new Syria but a worrying regression.

"Women make up roughly half of society, yet they occupy only around one-tenth of the seats in the People's Assembly. This percentage is lower than women's representation in some Syrian councils before 2011 and below the average for the Middle East and North Africa, which itself remains below the global average," she says.

"Women currently hold about 10% of parliamentary seats, while the regional average stands at around 16.7% and the global average at 27.5%."

A seat is not enough

Judge Iman Shahoud approaches the issue from a legal perspective, arguing that the diversity of Syria's new parliament must go beyond "numbers" and "appearance" to produce meaningful policies.

Although women's representation has improved, she says it remains below expectations. She also argues that ethnic and religious diversity will have little value unless it is reflected in fair legislation that safeguards the interests of all Syrians.

Iman describes the presence of 22 female MPs as a positive but insufficient step. For her, what matters is not simply the number of women in parliament, but their ability to influence legislation and oversight through competence and independence rather than symbolic representation.

To improve women's representation, she proposes practical measures, including transparent criteria for selecting candidates, expanding women's participation in electoral bodies, investing in the political development of female leaders, and working gradually towards balanced representation that combines competence with fairness.

Iman also considers the diversity within the new parliament, including Kurdish members, Christians and women wearing the hijab, to reflect the reality of Syrian society.

However, she warns that this diversity will only be meaningful if it is accompanied by genuine participation in decision-making and translated into policies and legislation that represent everyone's interests without discrimination or exclusion.

Taken together, the views of the women inside and outside parliament point to a wider question about what representation will mean in the new Syria.

They believe that women's participation is not a political luxury, but a real test of the new state's commitment to justice and equality.

Syrian women have paid an enormous price throughout the years of war through loss, displacement, widowhood and poverty. For them, and for the country they are helping to rebuild, 22 seats out of 210 may not be enough.

Hadia Al Mansour is a freelance journalist from Syria who has written for Asharq Al-Awsat, Al-Monitor, SyriaUntold and Rising for Freedom Magazine

Usually, families search for hospital records, inquire about unidentified bodies, contact the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and prisoners' rights groups, and turn to social media for any clues.

Some wait for months; others spend years without answers.

For the family of Palestinian journalist Ehab Diab, the uncertainty ended on Sunday, nearly two years after his disappearance.

But the answer was not the one they had hoped for.

According to his family, Diab, 36, was arrested on 12 December 2023, in the Lababidi area of Gaza City during Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip.

Since then, his family lost contact with him and received no information about where he was being held, whether he was receiving medical care or whether he was still alive.

"Over two years, we repeatedly contacted organisations concerned with Palestinian prisoners, international institutions and the ICRC, hoping someone would provide information about Ihab," his brother Mohammed Diab remarked to The New Arab.

"Instead, we spent almost two years waiting. Israel prevented us from knowing anything about his fate," the brother said.

The family hoped Ehab would return to his wife and children, but that hope ended when the Palestinian Authority's Commission informed them that Israel reported Ehab had died in prison.

According to the information provided to the commission, he was believed to have died on 18 September 2024, nearly two years before his family learned of his death.

"Until Saturday, we lived in hope that my brother would return to his children, but everything ended now," his brother remarked.

Ehab was a journalist, a graduate of Al-Azhar University in Gaza, a husband and father of two. Two brothers of his were killed in previous Israeli attacks.

According to the Palestinian Prisoners Club, more than 250 journalists have been arrested or detained since the beginning of the war, while more than 260 have been killed in Gaza.

The Commission of Detainees and Ex-Detainees Affairs said Ehab's death brought to 328 the number of Palestinians who have died in Israeli prisons since 1967, including 91 since 7 October 2023, among them 53 from Gaza.

For the Diab family, however, the figures cannot capture two years of uncertainty.

A photograph brings relief, but leaves questions

A single picture released by an Israeli female soldier was the first indication for Mahmoud Drimli's family that he might still be alive, while raising new questions about his whereabouts.

Mahmoud, 24, disappeared on 2 November 2024, while attempting to return from southern Gaza to the north after a period of displacement.

His father, Attallah, searched hospitals, asked about unidentified bodies, contacted the ICRC and prisoners' rights organisations, and approached media outlets for information.

Every attempt ended without an answer.

Then, on 29 July, the family saw a photograph circulating on social media showing a young Palestinian man, handcuffed and blindfolded, standing between two Israeli female soldiers.

They recognised Mahmoud.

"When I saw the photo, my heart was relieved because I felt that my son was still alive," his mother, Aida Drimli, told TNA.

"But at the same time, my heart broke when I saw him handcuffed and blindfolded. That sight was devastating for any mother," the mother added.

The picture gave the family reason to believe Mahmoud had survived, but it did not tell them where he was being held, whether he was receiving medical treatment or when he might return.

"It was an indescribable joy, but a bittersweet one because we still don't know where he is or how he is doing," his mother explained.

"A mother never forgets her son," she added. "Every day I prayed to God to bring him back to me safe and sound. I missed him so much, and all I wished for was to hold him in my arms again."

When a family lost its men

For Um Mohammed al-Harazeen, from the al-Shuja'iyya neighbourhood of eastern Gaza City, the disappearance of her husband and son added to her pain. Three of her sons were killed by Israeli attacks.

On 23 January 2024, the family was forced to flee al-Shuja'iyya toward southern Gaza. During the displacement, Israeli forces stormed the school where they were displaced and separated men from women and children, leaving Um Mohammed to move south while her husband and son remained in the north.

Her 17-year-old son, Ahmed, chose to stay with his ailing father. 

For months, Umm Mohammed did not know whether her husband and son had been killed, arrested or remained alive.

She later lost three of her other sons in an Israeli attack after they returned to Gaza following the ceasefire. Um Mohammed was with them when the attack occurred and survived, while her three sons were killed.

"I wished  if I was killed with my sons," she remarked to TNA. "But the life wants me to stay and protect my grandchildren." 

She has no information about the fate or whereabouts of her husband and her soon, Ahmed.

"The hardest feeling is not knowing their fate. If we knew they were killed and buried them, it would be painful, but at least we would know where they are. We don't know if they are alive, arrested or killed in the street," she said.

The family has repeatedly sought information from institutions and authorities but received the same response: "We don't have any information."

Across Gaza, thousands of families are facing this uncertainity.

Gaza-based human rights organisations, including the Al-Dameer Foundation, estimate the number of those missing are at around 9,500.

Meanwhile, Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Israeli security officials were holding approximately 1,700 Palestinian bodies, citing two unnamed sources.

A Palestinian human rights organisation reported in October 2025 that Israel was holding approximately 1,500 Palestinian bodies at the Sde Teiman military camp alone.

Since October 2023, more than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza, according to the Gaza Ministry of Health, while thousands remain missing.

The remarks were the latest in a widening wave of anti-Muslim rhetoric from prominent Republicans following Egyptian-American Abdul El-Sayed's victory in Michigan's Democratic Senate primary, a historic win that has drawn increasingly inflammatory attacks from the president and members of his party.

Asked by a reporter what advice he would give Republican candidates running in November's midterm elections, Trump said a friend had encouraged him to make "jihadist" part of his political vocabulary.

"A friend of mine called up. He said, ‘You know, really, you should use the word jihadist because that’s what’s happening,’" Trump said. "We have jihadists being elected all over the place. We have this whether it’s communism, jihadism."

Trump did not identify any elected officials by name. But his comments came only days after El-Sayed won the Democratic Senate primary in Michigan, defeating an opponent backed and funded by the powerful pro-Israel lobby AIPAC.

Following El-Sayed's victory, Trump attacked him as a “communist loser who hates Jews and Israel", adding to accusations of Islamophobia that have followed the president's response to the result.

CAIR, the largest Muslim civil rights advocacy organisation in the United States, said Trump's rhetoric went beyond political attacks, warning that portraying Muslim public officials as threats could expose them to real-world danger.

“All Americans have the right to engage in public service, regardless of their race or faith. By describing American Muslim public servants as threats to our nation, President Trump is putting a target on the back of Muslim elected officials across our nation," CAIR National Deputy Director Edward Ahmed Mitchell said in a statement.

Mitchell linked the president's language to what CAIR says is a broader surge in anti-Muslim hostility in the United States. The organisation recorded 8,683 complaints of anti-Muslim discrimination and bigotry in 2025, the highest number it has documented.

“This type of dangerous rhetoric is fueling the surge in complaints of anti-Muslim bigotry that our civil rights organization has documented over the past three years," Mitchell said. "Anti-Muslim hate is out of control in large part because of politicians who hate America’s diversity and cannot stand the sight of American Muslims engaging in the political process."

CAIR said the attacks would only "embolden American Muslims to keep engaging in public service and speaking up for justice here and abroad".

But Trump's intervention has amplified rhetoric that had already intensified among Republicans since El-Sayed's victory last week.

Alabama Senator Tommy Tuberville claimed on X that Democrats had "voted to send a TERRORIST to the Senate", calling El-Sayed a "RADICAL ISLAMIST who will do everything he can to destroy America".

Representative Nancy Mace of South Carolina went further, casting suspicion not on a single candidate but on Muslims serving in government generally.

"Every single Muslim holding public office in America is a trojan horse, and a threat to both national security and our republic," she said.

The comments have drawn criticism even from within the Republican Party. Senator Bill Cassidy of Louisiana condemned the attacks by his colleagues during an appearance on CBS's Face the Nation.

"I condemn language like that…I condemn those statements, and everybody should be treated as an individual," Cassidy said.

Sources said she has agreed to return and hold concerts, pending the announcement of the visit programme and details.

Assala's return to Damascus carries particular significance given her political stance during the years of the Syrian revolution in which she declared her support for the opposition from its outset and attacked Bashar al-Assad's regime.

In the first months of the revolution, Assala wrote, "We must revolt, we must rise for ourselves, and if the self becomes insignificant to the whole world, it must not become insignificant to us." 

Her support for the revolution led to her being removed from the Artists Syndicate. 

The syndicate's former head, Zuhair Ramadan, said she "is not a member of the Syrian Artists Syndicate" and that she was practising her artistic work through a work permit, along with several other artists.

The possible return to Damascus comes as Assala strengthens her artistic presence connected to Syria. 

A week ago, Rotana music channel released her new song "Al-Assala", arranged by Fouad Junaid, in a collaboration that brings the singer back to the company that handles some of her concerts.

Assala is also preparing to release a full album in the Syrian dialect, featuring 14 songs inspired by Syrian folklore, to celebrate the cultural identity of her homeland. 

She has also sought to extend this approach to the visual aspect, appearing in the album's music videos in outfits inspired by the traditional clothing of several Syrian provinces. 

The album is scheduled for release after the end of her current tour, which began in Tunisia and Jordan, with expectations that its release will coincide with, or come around the same time as, her return to Damascus and her reunion with her audience. 

Her possible return comes as part of a new phase in which the singer is seeking to reconnect her artistic work with her Syrian roots, whether through music, visual presentation or appearing directly before audiences in Damascus.

Assala's latest album is "Dareebat al-Buad", released in summer 2025. It featured 10 diverse songs that achieved notable success.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

In June UN-backed experts estimated that almost a third of Somalis faced food insecurity, as the country -- long wracked by insecurity and now seeing political turmoil—saw one of its worst droughts in years.

Since January the international medical charity MSF has screened more than 21,000 children under five in Baidoa, finding "acute malnutrition levels of around 50 percent".

A July survey of 888 households across 14 displacement sites in southwestern Baidoa, found only two percent of families could afford three daily meals.

"It's not an understatement when I say that a severe humanitarian emergency is unfolding right now in Baidoa," Mitchell Sangma, MSF medical coordinator, told a press conference in Kenyan capital Nairobi.

"We are seeing an alarming increase in the number of malnourished children that we have admitted since January," he said, saying their facility had expanded from 50 beds to 120 in June.

Visiting Baidoa earlier this year, he described how "our ER, our paediatric ward, our nutrition ward, even part of our surgical and maternity wards are filled with malnourished children".

He said 90 percent of the children presented with severe medical complications, with the NGO recording "unnecessarily preventable deaths in our hospitals".

Exacerbating the issue was the downturn in global funding, MSF said.

"Somalia's humanitarian response plan has been reduced by 40 percent in 2026 and was still less than one-third funded by July," the NGO said in a statement.

As a result, Sangma said, MSF and other NGOs were prioritising their life-saving over preventative programmes, and were witnessing a "vicious circle" where patients were re-admitted to facilities.

His colleague, epidemiologist Chenoa Sankar, said re-admissions to MSF-backed programmes were over 60 percent.

"The mothers are very despondent when we speak to them because it's almost inevitable that the child is going to be readmitted at some point, and there's very little that they can do to control that," she said.

The UN said that in the first three months of 2026, more than half a million Somalis were displaced, with nine out of 10 caused by drought.

Somalia ranks among the world's most vulnerable to climate change, which scientists say is leading to more frequent and more intense incidences of extreme weather like droughts.

It is also facing increased insecurity as international funding falters, impacting the long-running battle against terror group al-Shabaab.

The source stressed that Cairo does not intend to become directly militarily involved or take hold of security matters in administering the Strip.

The source noted that Egypt's next-stage involvement could include continuing to train Palestinian police officers, alongside limited Egyptian participation in the proposed international peace or stabilisation force for the Strip.

However, Cairo's most prominent role would be in humanitarian, logistical and development sectors, particularly reconstruction, early recovery and the entry of necessities and materials needed to restore life in the war-battered coastal enclave.

Egyptian condition in Gaza

According to the source, Cairo views Israel's implementation of its commitments under the second phase as a key condition for greater Egyptian involvement in these arrangements.

Any expanded Egyptian role cannot substitute for the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the creation of conditions needed to begin a stable transitional phase inside the Strip.

The source stressed that the expected Egyptian involvement does not mean Cairo is prepared to assume responsibility for administering the Strip, militarily confront Palestinian factions or take on direct security responsibilities inside Gaza.

"The Egyptian vision is based on Palestinian administration of the Strip, while providing the support needed to ensure the success of the transitional arrangements," the source added.

The source said Egypt could play a supporting role in areas where it has expertise and practical tools, particularly training Palestinian police and facilitating the delivery of aid, relief supplies and reconstruction materials.

A report submitted by the Gaza-specific "Peace Council" to the UN Security Council last May confirmed that Egypt would be a key partner in training Palestinian police. 

The report also said the international force would coordinate with Egypt and Israel.

According to the Egyptian source, Cairo does not rule out limited participation in the international peace or stabilisation force.

However, it does not want this participation to develop into a large-scale Egyptian military presence inside the Strip.

Arrangements in return for commitments

Egyptian participation in this context appears, according to the vision conveyed by the source, closer to a limited supporting role than assuming responsibility for the Strip's security.

This would allow Cairo to maintain the room for manoeuvre it enjoys as a mediator between the various parties.

However, the source said the most important Egyptian role in post-war arrangements would not be security-related.

Instead, it would focus on reconstruction and early recovery, as well as bringing necessities into Gaza.

The source said the key point for Cairo was not to enter post-war arrangements separately from Israel implementing its commitments.

Moreover, according to the source, Egypt is prepared to help ensure the transitional phase's success, but only after ensuring there is a clear path to implementing the commitments linked to the second phase—including an Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza.

In this context, Raghda Ahmed Hassan, a former assistant foreign minister, told The New Arab that the second phase of the Gaza agreement requires Cairo to move from merely mediating between the parties to a more direct and influential role in post-war arrangements.

He said the nature of Egyptian interests linked to the security of the Gaza Strip and regional stability means Egypt has a direct stake in what happens inside the Strip.

He argued that Egypt's approach to Gaza is driven by two main factors: the first concerns Egyptian national security, while the second involves supporting the rights of the Palestinian people.

He noted that US President Donald Trump's ability to push Israel towards implementing the agreement would be a real test of how serious the US administration is about achieving a genuine settlement in the Middle East.

He said the success of these efforts could extend to other issues in the region, including the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the start of reconstruction, and the implementation of arrangements concerning southern Lebanon, as well as withdrawal from Syrian territory.

Meanwhile, Mohamed Hegazy, a former assistant foreign minister, told TNA that Cairo is already moving towards a more influential and direct role in arrangements for the second phase of the Gaza agreement.

Hegazy further argued that Egypt's role is no longer limited to mediation but extends to working to turn the agreed understandings and roadmap into practical steps on the ground, thereby consolidating the ceasefire and  transitioning to post-war arrangements.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

The declaration signalled a willingness towards diplomatic engagement amid mounting speculation around a Syrian intervention in Lebanon.

Questions about a potential Syrian invasion of Lebanon first arose in May, when the Syrian army deployed thousands of troops to the border.

Weeks later, Reuters revealed that the idea of a Syrian intervention against Hezbollah had been floated privately by the US last year, before being raised again after the US and Israel launched their war on Iran in early March.

Then, in June, at the G7 summit, Trump made a public statement on the topic: “If Israel can't do the job without killing everyone…he [al-Sharaa] will do the job,” he said.

In July, Trump reiterated the idea, this time next to Lebanese President Joseph Aoun during a joint press conference at the White House. Al-Sharaa would “like to come in and do something with Hezbollah,” Trump said, adding “he’s been fighting Hezbollah for a long time - I think he’d be very effective”.

Syrian officials - including al-Sharaa himself - have repeatedly denied intentions to intervene in their neighbour’s affairs. In a poll earlier this year, a majority of Syrians - 63 percent - firmly rejected any intervention in Lebanon. Among their Lebanese counterparts, only two percent said Syria should play an active role in their country.

Most analysts say it would be a fatal error for Syria to intervene in Lebanon. However, some contend an intervention - if limited in scope - could also be an opportunity for both countries.

A potential Syrian intervention

Behind closed doors, the Trump administration is putting significant political pressure on Syria to intervene in Lebanon, says Ahmad al-Abdeh, Arabic Editor at Syria in Transition.

“An intervention is something that the Syrian government sees as something that it has to do rather than something that it wants to do,” he told The New Arab.

“However, what Trump isn’t saying [publicly] is that the Syrian government has put conditions on such an intervention,” al-Abdeh notes. These conditions, he says, include arming the Syrian military, as well as securing an Israeli withdrawal from southern Syria based on the 1974 borders.

Within 24 hours of the Assad regime’s fall in December 2024, Israel invaded the 150-square-mile demilitarised buffer zone separating the two countries, violating a 1974 ceasefire agreement.

Since then, Israeli forces have been steadily expanding their military footprint in the southern provinces of al-Quneitra and Daraa, placing pressure on the nascent Syrian government.

What is on the table is not a full-fledged military campaign but a “surgical operation” along the border areas to stop arms and drugs smuggling, al-Abdeh says.

“It's not about eliminating Hezbollah completely; it's about securing a large area along the borders until the Lebanese Army is able to take hold of them.”

Syrian forces would withdraw after disarming Hezbollah in the areas stretching from Homs to the outskirts of Damascus, he says, noting there is no appetite among any stakeholders for a long-term Syrian presence.

“Hezbollah doesn't have to be eliminated, it has to be contained to a point where there aren't any militias operating outside of government control,” al-Abdeh adds.

“Hezbollah can turn into a political party…and that will create some stability where the Lebanese government and army will have a monopoly on the use of force.”

The political and economic dividends of a stable Lebanon would be immense for both countries, he says. “It would create a new reality in both countries, using a combination of both of their expertise and manpower.”

A recipe for disaster

However, Sam Heller, a fellow at the Century Foundation, warns any cross-border incursion would get “pretty messy almost immediately as the Syrian army would encounter armed resistance from local residents: Shia clans that are semi-militarised”.

“These clans have relationships with Hezbollah, but are not themselves Hezbollah, and they can't necessarily be controlled by Hezbollah,” he explains to The New Arab. Last year, bloody clashes erupted between the Syrian army and some of these clans after the kidnapping and murder of three Syrian soldiers.

“Not only would a possible Syrian intervention in Lebanon be violent and messy, and likely inconclusive, it could additionally have destabilising effects inside Syria, as violence rebounded into Syria,” Heller notes.

Syria’s security landscape remains fragile. The Islamic State (IS) has carried out a spate of attacks since the beginning of the year, including last month’s bombings in Damascus. Other threats include former insurgents associated with the Assad regime, as well as Israel.

“A Syrian intervention in Lebanon against Hezbollah would result in a reaction by Iran and most likely its regional allies, notably Iraq, creating instability within Syria,” Joseph Daher, a Swiss-Syrian academic, tells The New Arab.

Moreover, Damascus would first need “strong political allies on the ground,” Daher says. “Without a call from the Lebanese state for a Syrian intervention, like what happened in 1976, I don’t see any of these scenarios happening.”

In 1976, Lebanese president Suleiman Frangieh and other prominent Maronite figures called for Syrian intervention against Palestinian and leftist factions during its civil war. Syria would not withdraw from Lebanon until 2005, leaving behind widespread resentment against its repressive rule.

“People remember Syria's nearly three-decade-long occupation of Lebanon, and they are not keen to repeat that,” Heller says. “There are also concerns about this new Syrian regime in particular, and what it might entail if this new Syria's forces intervene in Lebanon.”

The Lebanese government has made clear its rejection of a Syrian role in Lebanon. In early July, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun explicitly said he had not “asked for a Syrian intervention,” dismissing claims otherwise as “rumours.”

“Aoun’s main discourse in Lebanon is about claiming sovereignty and the monopoly of violence, the monopoly of force,” Daher adds. “So it doesn't look good when you have a foreign president calling on another government to enter Syria to disarm Hezbollah.”

The relationship of the Lebanese army - previously led by Aoun - with Syria’s armed forces is particularly fraught. Between 2013 and 2017, the Lebanese army engaged in periodic clashes with Syrian rebel factions along the Arsal-Qalamoun border. These factions included the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda affiliate previously led by al-Sharaa.

Some of these groups took Lebanese Army soldiers captive and executed a number of them.

“For Aoun and others who remember that the idea of inviting a latter-day incarnation of Jabhat al-Nusra back into Lebanon is a non-starter,” Heller says.

Natacha Danon is a Damascus-based journalist with Syria Direct

Follow her on X: @natacha_danon

Edited by Charlie Hoyle

He stressed that the military and security integration process had been completed and that the current phase had moved from "integration" to "harmony" within official institutions.

He added, in comments to Al-Youm TV, that SDF forces had been integrated into the Syrian army with a strength of four brigades, noting that the Syrian government would take over administration of the region. 

He stressed that "there cannot be two administrations in one state", reaffirming the principle of unified state institutions and administrative authority.

Hamo, a former senior commander in the SDF, added that the next phase would address political and legal issues, foremost drafting a new constitution and enacting legislation that guarantees equality among all Syrians, as well as their rights to express their identities and languages and live with dignity.

For his part, Kurdish political analyst Abdel Halim Suleiman said that describing what is happening as "surrender, handover or dissolution" does not reflect the reality of the integration process between the Syrian government and the SDF. 

Suleiman told The New Arab that the military and civilian integration process was nearing completion, considering what is happening to be a "partnership" between the two sides across various state institutions, which is being expanded, particularly within the military institution.

Suleiman added that Syria was witnessing a gradual transition from the stage of military factions to that of a national military institution, explaining that this process also included other factions that took part in the "Victory Conference" following the fall of the regime but had not yet completed their full integration into the army. 

He further said completing the integration process was primarily linked to technical and practical considerations on the ground rather than political considerations, noting that implementation procedures would determine when the final announcement would be made.

On 4 August, informed Kurdish sources told The New Arab that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani met with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed, head of the foreign relations department of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration, in Damascus.

 The sources added that the meetings discussed progress made in integrating institutions and forces under the Jan. 29 agreement signed between the Syrian government and the SDF, as well as the next steps to complete implementation of the agreement's provisions.

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

An official Lebanese source told the Qatar News Agency (QNA) on Tuesday that negotiations had remained on track and that an eighth round was provisionally expected in early September, pushing back against reports that Beirut was considering abandoning the US-mediated process altogether.

"There is no freeze on the negotiations, and no one has officially spoken about this matter," the source stressed, adding that the Lebanese, Israeli and US delegations had tentatively agreed during last week's talks in Rome to meet again on 1 September, although the date has yet to be formally confirmed.

Behind that commitment lies growing unease in Beirut over a widening gap between the diplomatic process and events on the ground, where Israel has continued attacks, demolitions and bulldozing operations in southern villages despite months of negotiations.

The source described several recent developments as "concerning" and said Lebanon was pressing the United States, which is mediating the talks, to secure concrete steps before the delegations return to the negotiating table.

Beirut has presented Washington with a series of demands it wants addressed before the next round, chief among them an end to Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon, with the source saying the United States had pledged to work towards achieving progress on those issues.

Lebanon is now waiting to see what Washington can deliver, at a moment when questions about the value of continuing the negotiations without changes on the ground have become pronounced.

Official Lebanese sources told The New Arab on Monday that negotiations remained Beirut's preferred path towards a resolution, but cautioned that Lebanon could not continue participating in successive rounds without "tangible results", despite progress on issues including prisoners and the border.

Among the options discussed with US officials were temporarily suspending the talks, demanding that Israel take concrete measures before the next meeting, or securing guarantees that such steps would be carried out as a condition for Lebanon's continued participation.

At the centre of the dispute is Israel's refusal to withdraw from Lebanese territory it continues to occupy before it verifies Hezbollah's disarmament, while Lebanon has sought an end to Israeli military operations and further Israeli withdrawals as the negotiations proceed.

Beirut is also seeking an expansion of the so-called "pilot zone" arrangement, with Lebanese officials raising Khiam, Bint Jbeil and other southern towns as possible locations for future implementation.

Concerns about Israel's intentions deepened after the Israeli foreign ministry published a map depicting parts of southern Lebanon as Israeli territory, prompting anger across Lebanon and renewed calls from Hezbollah for Beirut to end direct negotiations. The Lebanese presidency raised the issue with both Washington and the United Nations, and Israel later removed the post on some of its social media platforms.

President Joseph Aoun was briefed on Monday by Lebanon's chief negotiator, former ambassador Simon Karam, on the seventh round of talks in Rome and the discussions held between Lebanese, American and Israeli officials.

Israel's war on Lebanon since March has killed more than 4,300 people, according to the Lebanese health ministry. 

Lebanon's parliament Tuesday abolished the death penalty, making it the first country in the Arab world to replace the sentencing with life imprisonment with aggravated hard labor.

The tiny Mediterranean country has committed to an unofficial moratorium on executions since January 2004. However, dozens of death sentences since then have been issued, but later suspended or commuted.

A majority of Lebanon's 128-member parliament voted in favor of ending the death penalty, with the exception of the parliamentary bloc of Hezbollah.

Justice Minister Adel Nassar, who was in Parliament, called it a "historic step" for the country.

Rights groups that have called for formalising the moratorium or ending the death penalty altogether have also celebrated the vote.

Ramzi Kaiss, Lebanon Researcher at Human Rights Watch, says Lebanon is "marking a final break from a cruel sentence that should never be imposed."

"Capital punishment is unique in its cruelty and finality and is plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error," he said.

It's unclear how aggravated hard labor would be enforced, as some legislators said the terms of the new punishment are not yet clear. Lebanon does have the punishment of hard labor written into law and court decisions, but even those have been rarely enforced in recent years due to cash-strapped Lebanon's lack of resources and capacity within its overcrowded prisons.

Lebanon's abolition of the death penalty comes as parliament is debating a controversial general amnesty law, the largest since the end of its 15-year civil war in 1990, that could reduce sentences or even release convicted militants and drug dealers, with some exceptions.

Family members of Lebanese soldiers and servicemen killed or attacked by Islamist militant groups have repeatedly protested against the law, some saying they had hoped to see the perpetrators who killed their family members executed rather than be issued reduced prison sentences.

Hezbollah did not immediately issue a comment about the landmark vote. Neither did Lebanon's diverse religious institutions, where the death penalty is considered legal in some their respective court systems.

Security measures in Iraq have entered a more stringent phase, following top-level directives to intensify searches at security checkpoints inside cities and between provinces.

The move indicates an Iraqi security strategy aimed at tightening control over the movements of armed factions.

Iraq's Interior Ministry spokesman, Maj Gen Miqdad Miri, said during a press conference for the National Permanent Committee for Regulating and Restricting Weapons to State Control that "the committee currently has an information database containing 6 million weapons across the country".

"There was initially a lack of trust, and registration for free weapons registration was low, but the situation has now changed, and participation has become high," he added.

Miri stressed that "reports about imposing a curfew across the country, coinciding with the end of the deadline for restricting weapons to state control at the end of next September, are incorrect (..). There was a precautionary technical measure, and currently there are no instructions concerning this matter".

"The deadline for registering weapons will end on Dec. 31, 2026, after which an unregistered weapons holder will be treated as being outside the law," Miri said.

"The ministry established 845 offices for weapons registration in all provinces, granted weapons and possession licences to more than 160,000 people, and seized and confiscated 143,000 weapons," he added. "It also uncovered the theft of 2,668 weapons, in addition to registering more than half a million weapons belonging to citizens."

He noted that at least "71 fake PMF offices were closed, and security forces will treat any drone flying without authorisation as terrorism, as well as those who launch them, regardless of their affiliations".

In response, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) said in statements to the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the fake offices announced by the Interior Ministry "have no connection whatsoever to them".

It stressed that "measures to close and monitor these offices were carried out as part of an operation conducted by the authority's General Directorate of Security and Discipline, within the framework of the work of the Permanent Committee for Restricting Weapons, formed by the commander-in-chief of the armed forces".

Strategic affairs expert Brig Gen Adnan al-Tamimi told TNA that "the decision to close offices falsely claiming affiliation or connection to the Popular Mobilisation Forces represents an important step towards controlling weapons and ending the practice of some armed factions exploiting the name of official institutions".

"The presence of such offices, particularly those spread across the capital Baghdad and several central and southern provinces, poses a challenge to the authority of the state and the rule of law," he added.

Al-Tamimi further said that "closing illegal or fake offices is based on precise legal and security procedures, after verifying the identity of entities using names and addresses that suggest an affiliation with state institutions".

He continued, "The Popular Mobilisation Forces are an official institution. Therefore, any entity without clear legal authorisation cannot use its status, symbols or offices to provide official cover for armed activities."

He added that "these measures will help restrict armed activity to legally authorised institutions, prevent multiple centres of security decision-making, and curb the exploitation of official status in carrying out activities that could endanger Iraq's security or its relations with neighbouring countries".

Al-Tamimi stressed that "security forces must treat any drone flying over areas of the country without official authorisation or clear identification as a potential security threat, regardless of the entity behind it or its affiliation".

He argued that "the danger posed by drones lies in how easily they can be used to carry out attacks, reconnaissance operations or transport materials".

"Dealing with them should be in accordance with the rules of engagement and applicable security laws and instructions, and legal accountability should extend to those who launch them and those behind their operation when their responsibility is established, without exceptions based on affiliation or political or factional status," he added.

The strategic affairs expert concluded: "Applying these rules equally to everyone sends a clear message that the decision to use force and weapons in Iraq must rest exclusively with the state and its authorised security and military institutions and that any violation of this principle should be met with deterrent legal and security measures".

Article translated from Arabic by Afrah Almatwari. To read the original, click here.

Among the more significant progressive wins were those of Donavan McKinney, who ousted establishment incumbent Shri Thanedar in Michigan’s 13th district; William Lawrence, a co-founder of the Sunrise Movement, who defeated two establishment-backed Democrats in Michigan’s District 7; and Abbas Alawieh, a leader of the 2024 Uncommitted Movement and former congressional staffer, who also beat an establishment candidate in a State Senate District 2.

"Democratic voters are saying they want to vote for something–not just against something," James Zogby veteran pollster and president of the Arab American Institute, told The New Arab. "The problem is the establishment doesn’t have anything to offer."

Michigan is the latest state where progressives have won key races over establishment candidates, a significant step in nationwide trend of Democrats leaning into their leftwing base in the 2026 midterms.

Multiple polls have found that progressive positions poll high among voters, even those who don't necessarily identify as leftists. Among the more popular positions are Medicare for All (universal healthcare), taxing billionaires, getting big money out of politics, and ending unconditional aid to Israel.

In a sign of the times, some of the country's leading progressives have not shied away from voicing their support for Palestinian human rights, often highlighting the issue in their campaigns.

On his campaign website, in a section labeled Palestine, McKinney says that the US needs to end military aid to Israel and pass the Block the Bombs Act, resume funding for UNRWA for humanitarian aid to Palestinians, and end the genocide and release detainees–a platform that would have been a rarity in a US congressional race just two years ago, but one that has been relatively standard in progressive campaigns in 2026.

"If you look at the polling, the programmes progressives are offering are what people want," said Zogby.

Many establishment candidates, meanwhile, have rallied around the "affordability" slogan, often without elaborating on concrete solutions to the cost-of-living crisis.

"The arguments progressives are making are more persuasive than in other elections," David Frank, a professor of rhetoric and political communication at the University of Oregon, told TNA. "All politics are local. When politicians understand people’s needs, then they're able to talk to people who are like them."

In addition to several progressive upsets in key races, incumbent congresswoman Rashida Tlaib handily won her race in Michigan's District 12, beating two other contenders who did not have sufficient financial backing or popular support to pose a serious threat to the "squad" member who was elected in the 2018 blue wave. In previous elections, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) have invested considerable resources in an effort to defeat her.

"They've given up. It's now a losing cause," said Zogby. "They're not indiscriminate. They pick the ones they think they can win."

Despite major gains for progressives in the 2026 midterms, the establishment infrastructure remains strong with a high success rate of endorsements. AIPAC, for example, which has been losing support in the party, has nevertheless seen a 94 percent success rate in their endorsements of Democratic candidates this cycle, compared with an 86 percent success rate for the Congressional Progressive Caucus and 65 percent for progressive icon Bernie Sanders.

Though progressives remain the underdogs in relation to the national Democratic establishment, recent wins in high-profile races show that they are making historic gains.

The Damascus Criminal Court convicted the nine men of offences including intentional killing, torture, arbitrary detention and crimes against humanity.

Najib, who is in Syrian custody, was sentenced in person, while Assad and the remaining defendants were sentenced in absentia.

Those sentenced also included Assad’s brother Maher, former defence minister Fahd Jassem al-Freij, Mohammed Ayman Ayoush, Louay Ali al-Ali, Qusay Ibrahim Mahyoub, Wafiq Saleh Nasser and Talal Fares al-Issami.

The ruling marks the first conviction against Assad since his government was overthrown in December 2024, ending more than five decades of Assad family rule.

Judge Fakhr al-Din al-Aryan said Assad’s role in the crimes was that of the “highest decision-maker”, accusing him of placing state institutions at the disposal of the crackdown.

The court found Assad guilty of the intentional killing of multiple people, including children, as well as torture, arbitrary detention and crimes against humanity.

Najib, Assad’s maternal cousin and the former head of the Political Security Branch in Daraa, was convicted over his role in the crackdown on protesters in the southern province, where the uprising against Assad’s rule began in 2011.

The judge said investigations and witness testimony showed that Najib had been involved in interrogating detainees after the protests began and had led security operations against civilians in Daraa.

The court also said the Political Security Branch under Najib’s command took part in the storming of the Omari Mosque alongside other security agencies.

Najib was convicted of offences including intentional murder, the killing of children under the age of 15 and torture leading to death.

The court described the acts attributed to him as crimes against humanity and imposed the death penalty.

Najib stood inside a courtroom cage wearing a prison uniform as the sentence was read.

Tuesday’s ruling came during the ninth session of his trial, which began on 26 April before the Fourth Criminal Court at the Damascus Palace of Justice.

The proceedings were among the first public trials of senior figures from the former Assad government under Syria’s new authorities.

Najib’s case was heard in person, while the court formally recorded the absence of Assad and the other defendants who remain fugitives.

During previous hearings, prosecutors had called for the death penalty against Najib, while the court heard witness testimony and examined evidence related to abuses committed during the early stages of the uprising.

The final session was attended by Syria’s public prosecutor, Hassan al-Turba, the head of the National Commission for Transitional Justice, Abdul Basit Abdul Latif, members of the commission, representatives of international legal and humanitarian organisations and relatives of victims.

Najib served as head of the Political Security Branch in Daraa between 2008 and 2011 and became one of the most notorious security officials associated with the government’s response to the first anti-Assad demonstrations.

He was later detained after Assad’s fall, becoming one of the highest-ranking former officials to stand trial before a Syrian court.

Assad and Maher fled Syria after rebel forces entered Damascus in December 2024.

Bashar al-Assad had ruled Syria since 2000, succeeding his father Hafez al-Assad.

His government’s violent response to peaceful protests in 2011 helped trigger a conflict that lasted more than a decade and killed hundreds of thousands of people.

A major gasoline reservoir in Libya's Zawiya, west of Tripoli, caught fire and collapsed on Monday after what authorities said was an attack by unknown perpetrators.

The National Oil Corporation (NOC) said the tank contained about 4.5 million litres of gasoline.

The reservoir is located at the second-largest oil refinery in Libya, with a refining capacity of 120,000 barrels per day.

"This evening, tank number 402-T, belonging to the Brega Oil Company and used for storing gasoline, was directly targeted, resulting in a severe fire before the tank completely collapsed," the NOC said in a statement.

Brega said in a statement that firefighters were working to contain the blaze, adding that "cooling operations are underway for adjacent tanks to prevent the fire from spreading".

The NOC condemned similar attacks in past days in Zawiya, including two drone attacks on a naphtha reservoir and a water desalination plant over the weekend.

Libya's emergency services agency said on Facebook that there had been "no serious casualties" and that most of the cases they were treating were of smoke inhalation.

The NOC declared a state of emergency and called for an investigation.

Separately, a Libyan parliamentary panel condemned the attack and called for stronger protection of oil installations.

"The House of Representatives' Energy and Natural Resources Committee condemns in the strongest terms the criminal attack targeting the Zawiya Refinery, one of the most vital facilities in the oil and gas sector that is a cornerstone of the national economy," it said in a statement.

Libya has the most abundant oil reserves in Africa but has been divided ever since it was plunged into war during the ouster in 2011 of former leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Two governments are currently vying for power: the UN-recognised administration in Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah and a rival in the east backed by military commander Khalifa Haftar.

In a statement, the Tripoli-based government said Dbeibah held a meeting earlier in the day with key officials, including the interior minister and the chiefs of some armed groups in the capital, "to follow up on the latest security developments".

Dbeibah "stressed the need to deal firmly with any transgressions or actions that threaten security or harm vital facilities and installations", the statement said.

Fawzi al-Mansouri was assassinated on Monday when an explosive stuck to his car detonated as he was leaving a local mosque at night, the statement said.

Reports said the killing occurred in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi.

Libya has remained divided since being plunged into war during the ousting in 2011 of former leader Muammar Gaddafi.

Two governments are currently vying for power: the UN-recognised administration in Tripoli led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah, and a rival in Benghazi backed by military commander and LNA chief Khalifa Haftar.

Khaled Haftar, the son of Khalifa, told news agency AFP in a statement that an investigation was opened, adding that "indicators point to a despicable terrorist tactic".

"Terrorism is a project targeting the entire region, not just Libya," the statement added.

The bombing was a setback to efforts by the Haftars to paint a picture of stability in the areas they control.

"An attack of this sophistication in an LNA stronghold is also a major blow to the group's security credentials," Hamish Kinnear, an analyst with UK-based Verisk Maplecroft, told AFP.

Reunification deal

"The intelligence required to target such a high-profile figure successfully is indicative of significant capabilities on the part of the responsible actor," Kinnear added.

Authorities have yet to identify the perpetrators.

In a statement, the LNA said it would "not cease fighting terrorism and will continue our struggle for the stability and security of Libya, as well as for the unification of its institutions".

Al-Mansouri's killing also came as efforts were under way to unify the country's executive powers under a Washington-mediated plan that the LNA has publicly backed.

"None of this bodes well for a US plan to re-unify Libya," Kinnear said, adding that under the roadmap, neither side "is likely to be satisfied with their respective positions for long".

"A new, destabilising power struggle could soon emerge."

Libya expert Jalel Harchaoui said the killing would "disrupt, or at the very least delay" the US-brokered deal.

"The agreement rests on two premises: that security reigns supreme in Benghazi, and that for senior officers, loyalty to Saddam (Haftar's son and heir apparent) guarantees protection in the Benghazi stronghold," Harchaoui explained.

But "a bomb that kills the head of military intelligence as he leaves a mosque undermines these premises," he said.

Prominent LNA figure

Meanwhile, reunification would "require some gestures of openness toward reform and change within the army", Harchaoui added.

The Tripoli-based government issued a statement denouncing a "terrorist attack" against al-Mansouri, saying it condemned the killing "regardless of one party's positions or alliances".

Authorities in Benghazi held al-Mansouri's funeral on Tuesday afternoon, publishing photos that showed armed men in military fatigues with the attendance of senior LNA officials at the ceremony, including Khaled and Saddam Haftar.

The LNA described al-Mansouri as a "heroic martyr".

Al-Mansouri was a prominent military leader with close ties to the Haftar family.

He played a key role in the LNA's fighting against jihadist groups, including the Islamic State, between 2014 and 2017 in parts of the country's east.

He was also a leading figure during Haftar's Russia-backed offensive to seize Tripoli in 2019, which was thwarted by forces in the capital with the support of Turkey.

Biden made the remarks during a wide-ranging interview on Monday on The Tucker Carlson Show, hosted by the former Fox News host and influential conservative commentator who has become an increasingly vocal critic of Israel and US military involvement in the region.

"If pointing out that Benjamin Netanyahu is evil incarnate is antisemitic, then I don't know what to tell people anymore," Biden said.

He also defended Carlson against accusations of antisemitism, telling him: "I know 100 percent that you’re not antisemitic", adding that such accusations were being used to shut down criticism of Netanyahu.

The two men also discussed the controversy surrounding Biden's laptop, which emerged shortly before the 2020 presidential election and became a major focus of Republican attacks against Biden and his father.

Biden suggested that several groups had been involved in obtaining or distributing his personal material, including Russian-Ukrainian actors, Americans and what he described as a "Netanyahu operation centre, the Israeli side".

Carlson also said that Israeli figures had been involved in spreading false claims about what was contained on Biden’s laptop.

The conservative commentator said a person "connected to Netanyahu" had approached a producer on his former Fox News programme and claimed the laptop contained abusive images of children.

"That came from the Israelis," Carlson said, before adding: "They were behind that."

No evidence has emerged that the laptop contained abusive images of children, despite conspiracy theories that circulated online following its emergence.

The laptop controversy erupted in October 2020, weeks before Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in the presidential election, after the New York Post published emails and other material it said came from a computer Hunter Biden had left at a Delaware repair shop.

Some emails contained in copies of the laptop data were later independently authenticated, but the material also became the subject of numerous unsubstantiated claims about Biden and his family.

Carlson, who at the time hosted one of Fox News's most-watched programmes, was among the conservative media personalities who repeatedly covered the controversy and attacked Biden over his personal life and years-long struggle with drug and alcohol addiction.

During Monday's interview, Carlson expressed regret for some of those attacks.

When Biden jokingly reminded him of "the things that you said about me", Carlson replied: "Deep regret".

Despite occupying opposing sides of US politics for years, Biden and Carlson also found common ground over Washington’s foreign policy and the US relationship with Israel.

Biden praised Republican Congressman Thomas Massie and former congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene, both of whom have broken with sections of their party over foreign policy, saying he was pleased that some conservatives had "woken up".

He also agreed with Carlson's criticism of Fox News over its approach to the war with Iran.

Carlson, once a prominent supporter of Trump, has become an increasingly vocal critic of the president over foreign policy, particularly Washington’s relationship with Israel and the US war with Iran.

Biden also used the interview to attack Trump, describing him as one of the most consequential political figures in modern US history "all for ill" and accusing him of deepening the country’s political divisions.

"I believe Trump is central to why this disease has gone from a local epidemic to a pandemic in the United States of America," Biden said.

Trump had boarded the presidential Boeing 747 in full view of television cameras after attending a NATO summit in Ankara on 8 July, appearing to begin his journey to Britain aboard Air Force One.

But minutes later, he and several aides were concealed inside a catering truck of the kind normally used to load meals and supplies onto aircraft and driven across the airport to an Air Force C-32A, according to The Washington Post.

The smaller aircraft then secretly flew Trump to RAF Mildenhall in Britain, while the Boeing 747 departed Ankara separately carrying journalists and White House staff who believed the president was travelling with them.

The deceptive operation was reportedly triggered by intelligence pointing to an alleged Iranian threat against Trump or his aircraft, the Post reported.

Trump’s real location was concealed not only from journalists but also from some White House staff and senior officials, who reportedly believed for hours that he was aboard the presidential plane.

Reporters travelling on the decoy aircraft were instructed to keep their window shades closed before departure.

When they later asked Trump why, he told them they had been “probably on a dangerous flight”.

“But if I go, you go,” Trump added.

The operation took place a day after US forces renewed strikes on Iran on Trump’s orders following the collapse of negotiations aimed at ending the months-long war between Washington and Tehran.

The New York Times and CBS News had reported last month that US intelligence agencies had reportedly detected a specific threat of an attack against Trump or his aircraft, prompting heightened security precautions.

The episode initially raised questions over whether the new Boeing 747-8 gifted to the United States by Qatar and converted for presidential use was sufficiently secure.

Trump had flown to Turkey aboard the Qatari-gifted aircraft on its first international presidential trip, but announced before leaving Ankara that he would travel to Britain aboard the older Air Force One “for old time’s sake”.

The White House said at the time that the new aircraft would fly separately to RAF Mildenhall so US service members stationed there could tour it.

But Trump was not aboard either of the two Boeing 747s during the first leg of his journey.

After boarding the older Air Force One in front of cameras, Trump was moved into a catering truck positioned at a door on the opposite side of the aircraft, away from view. The truck was then lowered and transported him and several aides to the waiting C-32A.

Flight-tracking data and other material reviewed by the Post showed that the Qatari-gifted aircraft departed Ankara first for Britain using the call sign “SAM 33”.

The older Air Force One, carrying journalists and White House staff but not Trump, later used the presidential call sign “AF1” during the flight.

Trump’s C-32A, meanwhile, flew under the call sign “RCH18”, or “Reach 18”, which is generally used for military transport missions. Systems that would have allowed the aircraft to be publicly tracked were switched off, according to the report.

The three aircraft arrived at RAF Mildenhall within minutes of one another.

Trump was subsequently seen descending the stairs of the older Air Force One, indicating that he had been quietly transferred back onto the aircraft after arriving in Britain.

He then greeted US service members before boarding the Qatari-gifted presidential jet for the final leg of his journey to Washington.

The White House had publicly maintained that Trump left Turkey aboard the older Air Force One, while his actual whereabouts remained secret during the operation.

Asked about the revelations, White House communications director Steven Cheung did not directly address the deception but defended the security of the Qatari-gifted aircraft.

Cheung said the plane had been fitted with “high-level security protocols” and added that the United States had “many enemies” targeting Trump.

“We use every tool at our disposal to address those threats,” he said.

Using a presidential aircraft as a decoy is not unprecedented. Bill Clinton employed a similar tactic during a visit to Pakistan in 2000, travelling aboard an unmarked executive jet while another aircraft served as a decoy.

Agencies contributed to this report.

Here are the latest updates of the day:

• President Donald Trump has added more conditions to talks with Iran, saying that the United States will seek compensation  for casualties in the war. The move came after Tehran demanded that Washington pay for damages from the five-month conflict as a condition for reopening the Strait of Hormuz
   
• Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met with Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei for seven hours, claiming that Khamenei is in perfect health despite making no public appearances since taking power
   
• Israel continues to launch attacks on Gaza, West Bank, and southern Lebanon despite any agreements or alleged "ceasefires" 
   

And so we continue our live coverage...