Abstract
Following a lengthy review, the FOMC recently revised its long-run monetary policy strategy statement, largely in recognition of the persistent threat the effective lower bound (ELB) on policy rates poses to its dual mandate goals. Under traditional monetary policy strategies, the ELB imparts a persistent downward bias to inflation and inflation expectations; to offset this, new strategies are needed which will at times deliver inflation above 2%. The new framework addresses this issue and seeks to achieve inflation that averages 2% over time. It also emphasizes that maximum employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal, and that the FOMC should seek to eliminate shortfalls—rather than symmetric deviations—from maximum employment. The FOMC’s September policy statement provided forward guidance that is fully consistent with the new strategy. Historical retrospection of the 2015–2018 liftoff period suggests that, if it were in place over that time, the new framework and forward guidance likely would have forestalled rate increases and potentially delivered better macroeconomic outcomes. More, generally, to reduce employment shortfalls and average 2% inflation over time, the FOMC needs to have an “in it to win it” attitude toward our inflation objective. The September FOMC statement’s forward guidance that inflation should be at 2% and confidently on track for overshooting before we liftoff from the ELB is an important step in that direction.
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Notes
Federal Open Market Committee (2020a).
Federal Open Market Committee (2020b).
Details on these events are available online, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-fed-listens-events.htm.
The neutral, or equilibrium, federal funds rate is the funds rate associated with a neutral monetary policy (policy that is neither expansionary nor contractionary).
The equilibrium (or natural) real interest rate, or the rate consistent with full employment of the economy’s productive resources, is often referred to as real r*.
Brookings Institution (2020, pp. 26–27).
See Federal Open Market Committee (2015). While our objective is stated in terms of overall inflation according to the Price Index for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), core inflation—which strips out the volatile food and energy components—is a better gauge of sustained inflationary pressures and of where inflation is headed in the future.
Federal Open Market Committee (2018a).
Federal Open Market Committee (2018b).
Federal Open Market Committee (2020a).
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Speech delivered at the NABE Annual Meeting, October 5, 2020. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System or the FOMC.
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Evans, C.L. What does the new long-run monetary policy framework imply for the path ahead?. Bus Econ 56, 2–7 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-00197-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-00197-x



