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Concerning the reconnoitring forays of our ancestors at the time of the Hungarian Conquest and its aftermath, we can rely on assumptions rather than exact data. Yet, one thing is for sure, however, that it was absolutely vital to know what the other tribes, the states were aiming at, what forces they were able to mobilise. Were it not for scouts, the Magyar Conquest 1 and the following military expeditions would have failed. The first written evidence of the counter-intelligence efforts made by Hungarians dates back to the fights of 1041 AD between Kings Samuel Aba 2 and Peter Orseolo 3. In order to keep a large scale mobilisation in secret King Samuel Aba sealed the Western borders of Hungary; thus no travellers or merchants, not even envoys were allowed to leave the country. There was no need for clandestine activities at the time of the knightly battles of the 14th century in Hungary since places and time of fights were agreed upon beforehand. Hardly any information is available on the role of intelligence gathering under the reign of the Anjou dynasty 4. It is fairly interesting that there is no definite evidence on espionage in the history of the 58 military expeditions of King Louis the Great 5. Since all but one of these took place on foreign territory it is quite improbable that the king did not send out an apt number of spies and scouts on each occasion. Unfortunately, many details of these military campaigns are unknown up to this date, and the lack of records on espionage further increases the number of obscure details. The Turkish Occupation 6 entailed an abundance of secret events in Hungary. It was the time of continuous fights, when raids and forays continued along border strongholds even in peacetime between larger military campaigns. The outcome of these military encounters largely depended on thorough scouting of the enemy.
Captain-generals, the leaders of the military administration of the Royal Hungarian Army, were entrusted with the organisation of the "information services" of the country. Captains of border fortresses of higher importance were also instructed to have the intentions of the enemy scouted by their reliable people and to share the information with captains and captain-generals of the neighbouring fortresses. The castle of Gyula, a stronghold of strategic importance, was threatened with the attack of the Pasha of Temesv�r. Since information on the hostile intentions and military movements were equally important for both the defenders of Gyula and the captain generals of the whole Northern Hungarian region, spies were sent out monthly to all the Turkish border fortresses. Numerous spies targeted the key fortresses, even at distant places, such as Buda, Belgrade, Sophia or Constantinople. Captains paid Hungarian spies, whereas Turkish informants were paid by the captain-general himself. Contemporary "accounts" are the witnesses of differences in the intensity of espionage and counter activity conducted in different territories under Turkish occupation. For example in Eger between 1549 and 1562 the largest annual sum paid to spies was 105 Forints and 71 Dinars, while in Gyula 1292 Forints were spent on spies in 1565. Presumably, neither the number of "reliable people" employed nor the size of territory being scouted was behind those around Eger. When preparing for battles, the troops of R�k�czi 7 also relied on information provided by the inhabitants of the surrounding villages, craftsmen from the castles and merchants. Peasants and R�k�czi's soldiers disguised as peasants gave accounts of the location and number of trenches they had been ordered to make upon the order of Austrian military commanders. Closed fortresses were less vulnerable targets of espionage. Nevertheless, plenty of mercenaries and soldiers, who had been recruited by force and served in the fortresses of the Austrian Empire, willingly supported R�k�czi's soldiers with information. Concerning the secret activities of the R�k�czi-led War of Independence the extensive use of cryptography is worth mentioning. At that time couriers or the postal service that forwarded orders and reports on military actions often fell victim of raids and the enemy seized the documents. Cryptography was the only way to prevent the disclosure of secrets. Since the codes of that time were simple and easy to break, they were not used for long. No one could have known the codes but for the sender and the addressee. In R�k�czi's court a well prepared code system was in use, out of which 90 different code keys went down to posterity. The prince used coded crypts, in fact, he drew up code charts himself. He wrote coded documents and he decoded letters, which were of importance to him. At the same time, his spies managed to get hold of several of the secret mails of the Austrian court, all of which were fully or partly decoded for him by his officers.
The Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-1849 was a significant period concerning the history of secret services in Hungary. It is evident from documents how important Lajos Kossuth 8 considered secret information gathering and the sufficient payment of spies. "Good spies, above all!" he wrote in a letter to General G�rgey 9 in November 1848, asking the general to make all possible efforts to obtain important information, "even if it costs a much as 20 000 Forints". Besides intelligence, the government paid special attention to counterintelligence. Bertalan Szemere, Minister of the Interior, organised the state police with great caution. His expectations are known from a manuscript on the appointment of a police inspector, dated 12 May 1849. Through his police inspectors, he wanted to learn about all events, if they demanded measures to be taken by the government for the security of the country. Practising the administrative and executive power, the government required the police to be the "eye and ear" to provide, via the Ministry of the Interior, every information necessary for the execution of governmental duties. Following the suppression of the War of Independence of 1849-49, Hungarian secret service activities paused for a long time. The Imperial and Royal Secret Service began to take shape in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. From the 1850s the General Staff of the Monarchy had a separate department to deal with espionage. In 1878 a draft was submitted to the Monarch, stating "The knowledge of the military preparations of foreign powers is of high importance even in peacetime, therefore it needs to be constantly observed. Additionally, the intentions of foreign powers to scout the domestic military conditions should be prevented by all possible means�"
They wished to achieve the above goals by severely supervising the tourist traffic, by precise regulation and control of issuing passports and reporting obligations, by surveillance of suspicious people and the staff of foreign representations, the restriction on private telegram circulation and by continuous control of private correspondence". Receiving the draft, the Hungarian Prime Minister, K�lm�n Tisza 10 objected to monitoring private mail, opening letters and the restriction of the freedom of press. He deemed these measures applicable only pursuant to sufficient legal authorisation. The Monarch respected several of the Hungarian Prime Minister's suggestions and issued a decree that became the basis of the military and civil intelligence activity of the following years. Unfortunately secret events of World War I were hardly recorded. It is an irrecoverable loss for researchers of the history of secret services, of military history and of historical knowledge in general. Nevertheless, a significant Hungarian aspect of the era is known, a uniquely quick and reliable decoding result that was achieved by Hermann Pokorny staff captain who managed to decipher the secret codes of the Russians. As a result, throughout the war he decoded all the tapped coded military telegraphs of the Russians. The High Command of the Austro-Hungarian army could make full use of the information he had obtained. Later, Pokorny was promoted to lieutenant general and had a long and successful military career. He served as an outpost in the Crimean (1920) and was the head of deciphering within the Defence Ministry (1922).
In the history of the secret services the existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic may seem to be just a political intermezzo because it barely lasted for four months. On 30 March 1919, shortly after the resignation of Prime Minister Mih�ly K�rolyi 11 and the declaration of the proletarian dictatorship the Commissariat of the Interior issued a decree on the formation of the Red Guards. The organisation was expected to carry out political investigation. In fact, the overthrow of the Hungarian Soviet Republic on 2 August prevented the setting up of the organisation. Act III of 1921 gave legal foundation for countering activities endangering the law and order of the state and society. Between the World Wars the main tasks of the political police, the gendarme and the department of inspections of the Ministry of the Interior were to counter left and right wing extremism, and the intelligence activity of the Little Entente countries. The Peace Treaty of Trianon 12 prohibited the establishment of a General Staff in Hungary and the sending out of military attach�s, so the Military Chief Directorate 6 of the Defence Ministry was developed into Chiefs of Staff. Its 2nd Department (6/2), which also operated a network of undercover military attach�s, became the centre of intelligence and counter-intelligence. The Hungarian Royal General Staff was established in 1932. At the same time, Department 6/2 was turned into the 2nd department of the General Staff. Increasing attention was paid to the fight against communism, so the gendarme and the police forces were ordered to observe all civil organisations that might have endangered the regime. In consequence, informants were recruited from members of these societies and organisations. The unified State Defence Centre was established in the midst of World War II, in 1942. After Hungary's unsuccessful attempt to pull out of the war, the Centre gradually went under German and fascist influence. The Military Political Department of the Defence Ministry was formed on 12 March 1945 with the permission of the Soviet president of the Allied Supervisory Commission. Its activity reflected the interests and requirements of Moscow. The Prime Ministerial Decree 1690/1945 of 10 May 1945 dissolved the gendarme and established the Hungarian State Police. On 10 September 1948, the state security forces were subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior, thus the State Defence Authority (�VH) came into being. In the following decades the history of the secret services was mainly shaped by political changes related to the Soviet influence and the formation of the Eastern Block. After 1948, the tasks assigned by the single party regime were also fulfilled with the assistance of Soviet advisors. Law had not defined the execution of these tasks. In 1949 the military intelligence and the border guards were also integrated into the State Defence Authority (�VH), which became an independent agency on January 1, 1950. In 1949-50 the Minister of the Interior directed the �VH, while on 1 January 1950, it was subordinated to the Council of Ministers. Later, upon the decision of the state party the �VH was integrated into the Ministry of the Interior. The further reorganisation of 1952-53 resulted in the formation of chief directorates. During the reforms of the armed forces and organs "political reliability" was preferred to professionalism and personal skills, hence mostly non-professional, undereducated and uninhibited careerists took high positions.
Politicians, members of the State Defence Authority (�VH) operatives and ordinary working class people fell victim to trials based on trumped-up charges. Operating without any civil control, the organisation generated public fear especially as methods of forced interrogation that were used to make innocent prisoners plead guilty transpired. Hungarian people lived in total uncertainty of existence and property, in fear of denouncers, police relocations and compulsory delivery of agricultural products. The state propaganda tried to disprove that the secret services were a group of ruthless people estranged from their fellow citizens. At the same time, the press played a key role in maintaining the portrayal of the enemy and a constant feeling of endangerment. In the course of the revolutionary events, the State Defence Authority (�VH) was dissolved on 28 October 1956. After the fall of the revolution, the restoration of the communist movement resulted in the foundation of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP). The MSZMP, defining the consolidation of the state power and the stabilisation of the economy as its main objectives, criticised the former activities of the �VH. Nevertheless, the critiques touched upon surface phenomena only, and the contents of the security work did not undergo basic changes since the ideological bases were left untouched. The new organisational concept of the secret services was worked out by the late 1960s, utilising the experiences derived from the trials based on trumped-up charges. In June 1971 the 3rd Chief Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior was formed and charged with state security tasks under the supervision of a deputy minister. The organisation operated until 1990 under the direct control of the state party, ruled by secret internal directives and commands. After the collapse of the communist regime in Hungary, the secret services were fully reorganised. However, prior to the accomplishment of the reforms, they had to face the most severe scandal of their history, known as the Duna-gate case. On 5 January 1990, the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) and the Alliance of Young Democrats, (FIDESZ) the newly established parties of the opposition held a press conference. They announced that the state security organisation of the Ministry of the Interior had collected information about the opposition parties despite the prohibition laid down in the 1989 amendment of the Constitution. Illegal information gathering was evident from copies of reports gained under clandestine circumstances.
As a result of the investigation launched after the press conference, the Chief Directorate III/3 (internal security) of the Ministry of the Interior was wound up as its activity proved to have breached the Constitution. The Council of Ministers empowered the Chief Directorate III/2 (counter-intelligence) with the most important state security tasks. The decisions of the government met the basic demands of the opposition in connection with the reorganisation of the Ministry of the Interior and speeded up further structural changes with regard the national security and public order. Act X of 1990; the interim regulation of the authorisation of special clandestine methods was significant. Later it served as a basis for the interim regulation (Council of Ministers' Decree 26 of 1990) on performing national security tasks. The documents enjoin the establishment of the National Security Office and the Information Office, as civilian, and the Military Information Office and the Military Security Office as military services. Afterwards, the six parliamentary parties began negotiations on the draft of a single act on national security, passed later as Act CXXV of 1995. The National Security Service is an armed service established to fulfil national security tasks. It operates under governmental direction, with a nation wide scope of authority and a budget of its own. Its duties are defined by constitutional base rules and requirements and other laws. Besides the fundamental principles defined in the Constitution the actual tasks are laid down in specific legal regulation. The constitutional supervision is exercised by the Parliament. The Minister Leading the Prime Minister's Office executes the governmental direction and control. The National Security Office, like all the national civilian and military services of the Republic of Hungary, is responsible for the security of the country and its citizens. 1. The Magyar Conquest refers to the migration and wanderings of Hungarian tribes. It started around 895 when Prince Arpad crossed the saddle of Verecke. Towards the end of 900 Hungarian tribes managed to occupy the whole territory of the Carpathian-basin and the final settling of the tribes began. 2. King Samuel Aba was a king of the Arpad dynasty and ruled the country between 1041-1044. He was a close relative of the first Hungarian king, King Stephen. During his whole reign he relied mainly on commoners. 3. Peter (Orseolo): King of Hungary between 1038-1041 and 1044-1046, son of King Stephen's sister and the Venetian Doge Otto. After his father's death he came to the Hungarian court. When Stephen's son, Imre died he named Peter as his successor. In 1044, assisted by the German emperor Henry, he managed to defeat Samuel Aba and seized the throne himself. 4. The Anjou dynasty was of French origin. It was founded in 1246 by the youngest son of King Louis IX. In the 14th century the dynasty became the ruling house in Hungary. 5. King Louis the Great (1326-1382) was a descendant of the Anjou dynasty. He was crowned in 1342, after his father's death. Between 1344-1370 he led numerous military expeditions. In a law issued in 1351 the equality of noblemen was stated. During his reign courtly customs were very widespread. 6. The Turkish Occupation of Hungary lasted about 150 years. The Turkish army, however, had endangered the security of the country well before, from the 14th century. Hungarian kings and their generals fought many victorious and some less glorious battles against them. Throughout the 16th century Turkish ravages became permanent. In 1606, according to the peace treaty of Zsitvatorok, the main Turkish expansion was halted. The final liberation of the country gained a momentum in 1686 when the castle of Buda was reoccupied. 7. Ferenc R�k�czi II (1676-1735): prince of Transylvania. In 1705 he became the ruling prince of Hungary. He was also the leader of the insurrectionist army of the Kurutz, who were fighting against Habsburg oppression between 1703-1711. After the fall of the freedom fight he was exiled and died in Rodosto (Turkey) in 1735. 8. Lajos Kossuth (1802-1894): jurist, journalist and politician. In 1849 he became the governor of the country. Because of his illegal journalistic activity he was arrested in 1837 and was imprisoned for four years. Later he was appointed Minister of Finance of the first responsible Hungarian government. 9. Artur G�rgey (1818-1916): general and Minister of War. In the freedom fights of 1848-49 he managed to capture the castle of Buda. After the repression of the fights he received amnesty. 10. K�lm�n Tisza (1830-1902): Prime Minister of Hungary between 1875-1890. He was against the Compromise of 1867. In 1875 he founded the so-called Liberal Party which was a rather organic, unified governing party. Tisza introduced a centralised internal policy. 11. Mih�ly K�rolyi (1875-1955): politician, statesman. Before World War I he opposed the politics of the ruling Hungarian classes. Being a very progressive politician he urged social reforms. He was also a pacifist. Later he became Prime Minister and finally, in 1919 president of the republic. 12. The Peace Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920 at the so-called Little Trianon palace in Versailles. In World War I, Hungary fought on the side of the defeated party and as a result was summoned to provide war compensation. According to the treaty, the size of the country was reduced from 238 000-sq. km to 93 000-sq. kms, while its population from 18.2 million to 7.6 million. Western Hungarian, Upper Northern Hungarian and Southern parts of the country, as well as Transylvania were disannexed. |