The Trinity

Classical trinitarian theology affirms relations that are real, intrinsic, and irreversibly ordered under constraints excluding composition, temporality, causation, and interaction. A companion study located this ordered non-reversibility under manner of subsisting as intrinsic, non-productive orientation (rhemantic modality). The present paper argues that such orientation is not merely admissible but necessary and non-derivative. Asymmetry without intrinsic direction is incoherent, and once direction is fixed under the given constraints it admits no prior explanatory ground. The question of source therefore resolves into identity (...) rather than derivation: the ordering is identical with the one essence as the relations subsist under intrinsically ordered modes. The result specifies the minimal form under which ordered non-reversibility can be both intrinsic and explanatory without adding ontology or relaxing classical commitments. (shrink)

Classical trinitarian theology preserves relations that are real, intrinsic, and non-reversible, yet leaves unclassified the ontological respect under which their fixed directionality is borne. This paper argues that the gap is not doctrinal but classificatory: the grammar secures the feature, but its location in being is not specified. Let x denote a feature that is real, intrinsic, ordered, and non-reversible. If x is to function determinatively, it must be borne under an admissible ontological respect. Proceeding under the classical constraint set—excluding (...) composition, temporality, causation, and interaction—the argument exhausts the available forms of determination. Productive, sequential, structural, and nominal accounts are ruled out by the constraints themselves. Relational opposition, even when taken as intrinsic and subsistent, secures distinction without independently locating directional fixation. The available ontological space is thereby exhausted. What remains is manner of subsisting. If mode is to bear ordered non-reversibility without violation or remainder, it must do so intrinsically and non-productively—as orientation rather than mechanism. This yields rhemantic modality as the minimal admissible classification: the determinate respect under which the direction already affirmed in theological grammar is borne. The result neither revises doctrine nor multiplies ontology. It completes a classification the tradition’s own commitments require and renders the classical account of Trinitarian relations stable under the constraints it already affirms. (shrink)

The core of a Trinitarian model is the internal layout of intra-Trinitarian relations. Depending on different metaphysical interpretations of the nature of the relations, various patristic authors have produced different and oftentimes incompatible Trinitarian models, and, consequently, conflicting expositions of the doctrine of the Trinity. In order to elucidate the differences in their Trinitarian theologies, I demonstrate the divergence in their understanding of the divine relations using the contemporary philosophical taxonomy of relations. I analyze the models of Basil of Caesarea, (...) Gregory Nazianzen, and Boethius, and their attempted synthesis by Thomas Aquinas. Each of the patristic Trinitarian models, in spite of being fully orthodox, uses completely different types of relations, which makes them incompatible. One of the results of this incompatibility is the problem of the filioque, which cannot be resolved without addressing the metaphysics of relations. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the Incarnation of the Son of God, understood in a traditionally orthodox way, is incompatible with an atemporalist concept of God. First, I explain what I mean by atemporalism, namely the idea that God exists outside time. I also show the main corollaries of that doctrine, most notably that all of God’s life occurs eternally simultaneously. Second, based on New Testament teaching and widely accepted creeds, I spell out philosophically what I mean by the (...) Incarnation. In short, I take it to be the doctrine that the Second Person of the Trinity at some point in time took on a human body as part of a fully human nature. I then proceed to my central argument, which derives a contradiction from the definitions of the Incarnation and of atemporalism, respectively. In the last section, I shall treat some possible objections to my argument and show that they do not solve the problem satisfactorily. (shrink)

This paper briefly proposes a weak relative identity strategy for the doctrine of the Trinity called the general partnership model. This model develops a logically consistent metaphysical constitution for the orthodox Christian doctrines of one divine substance and three divine persons. Moreover, the model rejects the rigid use of absolute identity in Trinitarian doctrine while modeling relative identity with an analogy of general partnerships in the United States.

Članak za cilj ima uokvirenje središnjeg paradoksa – Bitak kao "ništo" —istražujući teologiju Ivana Skota Eriugene, Heideggerovo odbacivanje onto-teologije, Przywarina analogia entis i kontrast između arborescentne i rizomatske metafizike kroz filozofiju Jean-Luc Mariona. Izraz "Deus est nihilus..." predstavlja jedinstveni izazov u smislu jezika i filozofije, kako možemo govoriti o nečemu što „nije“. Ideja "teologije bez bitka" Jean-Luca Mariona je kljućna za ovo istraživanje, jer sugerira način govora o Božanskom koji nadilazi tradicionalne jezične strukture. Heideggerova vlastita evolucija u mišljenju, od prvobitnog (...) isključivanja pojmova poput "duha" i "Boga" do pisanja o njima, također naglašava važnost jezika u oblikovanju našeg razumijevanja Božanskog. Stoga, ovaj će rad istražuje Eriugeninu filozofiju i teologiju, s potkrepljenima iz djela Ericha Przywara, Martina Heideggera i Jean-Luca Mariona, kako bi se ispitao njegov pristupi jeziku i pojmovima ništavila, bitka, i Boga, kroz objektiv suvremene ontologije. Istražuje načine na koje Eriugenine ideje o bitku i ništavilu doprinose našem razumijevanju onoga što znači govoriti o nematerijalnom i Božanskom. (shrink)

A study of the methods, approaches, prayers, etc to realize the 'unity experience' with THE ONE REAL SELF (Vedanta, Hinduism, ) God (Judaism), Gottheit (Christianity), Buddha mind (Buddhism), The Beloved (Sufism, Islam) of a number of mystics from several religious traditions. I wrote about this in a number of books and articles, for example about methods, techniques, practices and methodology here: as well as exploring and illustrating the subject-matter of philosophizing here: Explorations, questions and searches not put down on paper (...) are probably more important than the ones mentioned above. These were occurrences for almost as long as I can remember. They took many forms, endless questions about everything under the sun, unsatisfied with unexplained socio-cultural institutions, communities, social relationships, social roles, behaviour, values, norms and much more – I had to question them rather than merely submit to them or act in accordance with them. Although I expressed these questions and queries about the status quo in many areas such as sport, art, social sciences, endless reading and marginal groups and relationships I realized that they form part of the philosophical discourse. Not the discourse that has become the expression of the professionalization of philosophy the last few hundred years, but of the not-institutionalized practice of original thinking, of creative philosophical thinking. As examples of the latter, Socrates, of course, the pre-Socratics, Plato, Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Plotinus, writers on Mysticism such as Meister Eckhart, van Ruysbroeck, John of the Cross, Teresa of Avila, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, from Advaita, Zen and other Buddhist schools, Wittgenstein, Hume, German Idealists, Rumi, novelists and poets, Paul Klee and other visual artists and many names who form part of the seeking for the unity-experience as explored in History of Mysticism (those who seek the unity experience, to become ONE with THE ONE, Godhead, the one real Self, Buddha mind, Sophos, etc). History of Mysticism *was first published by Atma Books in 1987, now and is a unique compendium of the lives and teachings of the world's best known mystics. They are presented in chronological order, and include representatives of every religious tradition, revealing the broad universality of genuine religious experience. expanded and revised Thirtieth Anniversary edition is available as a free downloadable PDF document on this website at my Downloads page. This book is fundamental for seasoned scholars of philosophy and religion as well as anyone new to the study of Mysticism. (shrink)

Christian metaphysics advances a surprising thesis about the nature of fundamental reality: the fundamental level of reality is triune (in some sense). Certain Christian traditions maintain that there is a hierarchical structure within the trinity, and recently it has been proposed that such relations should be explicated in terms of the notion of metaphysical ground. This paper is a systematic exploration of the viability of a ground theoretic account of this conception of fundamental reality. We argue for two claims. First, (...) the only adequate ground theoretic accounts must involve laws of ground and must take them to play distinctive explanatory roles. Second, taking the laws of ground to play these distinctive explanatory roles raises a dilemma: either fundamental reality isn't triune in the way demanded by the Christian account or it makes poor predictions about the modal status of certain facts about the laws of ground. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a philosophical argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism, which is the teaching that there is one God, the Father, and two, relationally distinct, divine persons, the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousious (i.e., of the same substance, nature, and/or essence) with the Father, through the causal theory of reference developed by Saul Kripke and Gareth Evans. A deductive argument for Conciliar Trinitarianism (formally known as 'Monarchical' Trinitarianism) is proposed, termed the 'Semantic Argument', which enables one to (...) affirm the veracity of this position, and also preserve monotheism and divine equality, while avoiding modalism and tri-theism altogether. This is that, the article demonstrates that if the proper name 'God' was baptismally fixed to the Father through Scripture and the first two ecumenical councils (with further ratification being made by the other five ecumenical councils), then any attempt to apply this same proper name nominatively to the Son or Spirit creates what I term the ‘Trinitarian Dilemma’, which is an unavoidable choice between modalistic collapse and tri-theistic fragmentation. Common (‘Egalitarian’) Trinitarian approaches, including social models and Latin Trinitarian strategies, face this dilemma inescapably, and so the solution thus lies in adopting Conciliar Trinitarianism and, therefore, recognising that the Father alone bears 'God' as a proper name (as the dominant source of the Godhead), while the Son and Spirit are called 'God' predicatively (by virtue of possessing the divine substance, nature and or essence) or metonymically (as perfect representatives of the Father). This semantic framework thus successfully preserves both the full equality of all three Trinitarian persons and the strict monotheism confessed by the Church. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a metaphysical elucidation of a specific model of the doctrine of the Trinity: Monarchical Trinitarianism, within the formal, neo–Aristotelian ontological and metaphysical framework of Jonathan Lowe (i.e. his four–category ontology and serious essentialism). Formulating the model through this ontological and metaphysical framework will enable us to explicate it in a clear and consistent manner, and the important 'multiple–natures' problem raised against the proposed model will be shown to be ineffective.

Within the space of monotheistic options, trinitarian monotheism holds a puzzling place. It asserts that God is a single being who is, somehow, also three distinct persons. This form of monotheism has regularly been charged with being either inconsistent, unintelligible, or undermotivated – and possibly all three. While recent explorations of trinitarian monotheism have tended to rely on work in metaphysics this paper turns to the philosophy of mind, showing that functionalist theories of mind prove to be surprisingly hospitable to (...) trinitarian monotheism. This paper will address only the inconsistency and unintelligibility objections, showing that if role-functionalism (or something near enough) is both consistent and conceivable, then it is both consistent and conceivable that: God is a single being who is exactly three distinct persons because there is one primary divine person who interacts with exactly one system-sharing re-realization of his own person-type. (shrink)

Christians commonly respond to the problem of evil by defending a theodicy according to which God’s creating us for the purpose of participating in a loving relationship with him requires his giving us libertarian freedom. As I demonstrate, this response to the problem of evil commits many of its proponents to a striking conclusion: the Trinitarian persons have libertarian freedom to participate in the Triune communion of love (TrLF). Whether TrLF is a problematic conclusion to be committed to ultimately depends (...) upon the strength of the arguments for and against it, neither of which have yet been developed. I will partially rectify that here by sketching out a preliminary biblical case for TrLF. (shrink)

The Is and the AM: Presence, Identity, and the Ground that Holds is a metaphysical essay on the structure of human existence, the nature of the present, and the grounding of contingent reality. It argues that lived experience is organized through memory, anticipation, and a present threshold of decision in which potential becomes actual. -/- This threshold, described as the micro-gap, is presented as the phenomenological site of freedom, responsibility, and moral orientation. Using the lemniscate (figure-eight) as a symbolic model (...) of temporality, the essay explores how identity is shaped not only by isolated acts but by the accumulated direction of the will and by relations that constitute the self through encounter, obligation, and love. -/- Against accounts that treat time as ultimate or self-sufficient, the work proposes that contingent actuality does not fully explain its own persistence, pointing instead toward a non-derivative ground of being. Within the biblical tradition, this ground is contemplated through the divine name revealed in Exodus: “I AM WHO I AM.” Integrating phenomenology, ontology, literary reflection, and theological interpretation, the essay presents personhood as communal, relational, and oriented toward a sustaining source beyond temporal succession. (shrink)

El Es y el SOY Presencia, Identidad y el Fundamento que Sostiene es un ensayo metafísico sobre la estructura de la existencia humana, la naturaleza del presente y el fundamento de la realidad contingente. Sostiene que la experiencia vivida se organiza mediante memoria, anticipación y un umbral presente de decisión en el que lo posible se vuelve actual. -/- Este umbral, descrito como la micro-brecha, es presentado como el lugar fenomenológico de la libertad, la responsabilidad y la orientación moral. Utilizando (...) la lemniscata (figura de ocho) como modelo simbólico de la temporalidad, el ensayo explora cómo la identidad no está determinada solo por actos aislados, sino también por la dirección acumulada de la voluntad y por relaciones que constituyen al yo mediante el encuentro, la obligación y el amor. -/- Frente a las visiones que consideran el tiempo como último o autosuficiente, la obra propone que la actualidad contingente no explica plenamente su propia persistencia, lo que apunta hacia un fundamento no derivado del ser. Dentro de la tradición bíblica, ese fundamento es contemplado a través del nombre divino revelado en el Éxodo: “YO SOY EL QUE SOY”. Integrando fenomenología, ontología, reflexión literaria e interpretación teológica, el ensayo presenta la persona como realidad comunitaria, relacional y orientada hacia una fuente sustentadora más allá de la sucesión temporal. (shrink)

The central focus of this article is resolving the ‘Ontological Subordination Problem’, produced by a joint affirmation of the aseity of a divine being and the doctrines of eternal generation and the monarchy of the Father, which are central to Conciliar Trinitarianism, through a reformulated Intrinsicality Solution. By applying Gene Witmer’s Simple Theory of Intrinsicality, this article argues that aseity is an extrinsic rather than intrinsic property—and is able to do so without being subject to the objections raised against the (...) original Intrinsicality Solution that is grounded on Rae Langton and David Lewis’ combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality. This reformulation reconciles the doctrines of eternal generation and the monarchy of the Father with the ontological equality of the divine persons, thus addressing a key tension in Trinitarian thought. (shrink)

Sometimes people posit "beliefs" to explain mundane instrumental actions (e.g., Neil believes the switch is connected to the light, so he flipped the switch to illuminate the room). Sometimes people posit "beliefs" to explain group affiliation or identity (e.g., in order to belong to the Christian Reformed Church Neil must believe that God is triune). If we set aside the commonality of the word "belief," we can pose a crucial question: Is the cognitive attitude typically involved in the first "light (...) switch" sort of case the same as the cognitive attitude typically involved in the second "Trinity" sort of case? Or: Is mundanely believing the same cognitive relation as groupishly believing? In this essay, I argue that the answer is no. Mundane Beliefs play their instrumental roles well if they are true, and their manner of processing is accordingly sensitive to evidence. Groupish Beliefs play their identity-constituting roles well if they are distinctive, and their manners of processing accordingly allow for and often support distortions of evidence and truth. The manners of processing are thus so different that--despite the common word "belief"--philosophy of mind and epistemology would do well to recognize distinct cognitive attitudes. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that the Trinity is part of natural theology although it is a contradictory doctrine because, even if all the “solutions” for the Trinity’s aporias are unsatisfactory, anyone wondering about the nature of God comes to think in a trinitarian way. Given this theoretical impasse (our reason should state both that God must be Triune and cannot be Triune) a “Kantian-inspired argument” allows us to still believe in the Trinity. This Argument is based on the (...) assumption that we and antinomic situations in the ontological realm of fundamental entities and in the realm of God’s nature. This is our common way of knowing and, thus, the Trinity is a plausible metaphysical option. The Argument implies a rethinking of our metaphysics and of our religious epistemology, but it could also inspire new interesting research agendas in contemporary Philosophy of Religion. (shrink)

Does the Council of Nicaea still matter for developing Asian trinitarian ontologies? Yes. This paper examines the development of a faith-based ontology of a triune God, the centerpiece of the Nicene Creed. I advance the claim that the Nicene Trinitarian ontology is rooted in faith revelation that frames a novel construal of consubstantial (homoousios). From this, one can propose the concept of relation as a co-principle in being. Giulio Maspero calls this the objective genitive sense of the term trinitarian ontology: (...) Christian thinkers made innovations on the dominant metaphysics of their time by discerning God’s being according to revelation. Part of the failure of those who did not subscribe to the Nicene Creed (e.g. Arius) is their unbelief in a triune God. This unbelief, I will explicate, promoted ontologies that the Council would later anathematize as heresies. They are examples of ontology-driven faiths. This lesson from the Nicene case is necessary, so I shall argue, in developing sound Asian trinitarian ontologies. (shrink)

Buddhists point to the soteriological value not only of the dispelling of ignorance, but the arising of insight or wisdom which constitutes the salvific goal of practice. Madhyamaka’s unique conception of the ultimate nature of reality makes this cognition of what is metaphysically ultimate distinct from other kinds of knowledge, as these soteriologically valuable cognitive states aim at something unlike anything else so known: the lack of ‘own- being,’ or emptiness, of all reality. After considering and rejecting some popular interpretations (...) of the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition regarding this soteriologically valuable epistemological state, I propose that a Thomistic conception of the Gift of Wisdom might provide a model that explains the unique nature of such insight into ultimate reality and its soteriological value. In short, wisdom involves a direct nonjudgmental veridical self-awareness arising from a good moral character, which is therefore also indirectly a direct nonjudgmental awareness of what ultimate reality is like. The final part will address the obvious dissimilarities between Christian and Buddhist metaphysics which might be thought to undermine these epistemological parallels and show, by contrast, that Christians are uniquely placed among theists in sharing many relevant features of Madhyamaka metaphysics that undergird parallels even in soteriological aims. (shrink)

This article aims to elucidate Conciliar Trinitarianism, the teaching that, in the Trinity, there exists one God, the Father, and two relationally distinct divine persons: the Son and the Spirit, who are homoousios with (i.e. of same substance as) the Father, through the novel metaphysical framework (or model) of Conciliar Aspectivalism. By integrating complex concepts from contemporary metaphysics, Conciliar Aspectivalism provides a coherent and philosophically robust framework for expressing the central tenets of Conciliar Trinitarianism in a way, however, that preserves (...) fundamentality of the one God, the Father, and the absolute unity and singularity of the divine substance that is equally shared by the Trinitarian persons. Hence, through this elucidation, Conciliar Aspectivalism offers a unique perspective for understanding and articulating the core teaching of the Trinitarianism that is expressed by the Seven Ecumenical Councils within a metaphysically coherent framework. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Trinity has become synonymous with mystery in the minds of many. How is it best understood? Is it logically coherent, or is it contradictory? In this book, four leading scholars take up these and other questions about the Trinity in a multidisciplinary approach spanning biblical studies, historical theology, and philosophy. The dialogue partners are: William Hasker, William Lane Craig, Beau Branson, Dale Tuggy. Each puts forth his own view, then in turn defends it from critiques. The (...) result is a wide-ranging, in-depth but accessible look at the doctrinal heart of the Christian faith. (shrink)

Este estudo explora a relação entre John Deely e o 'Cursus Conimbricensis', uma obra monumental produzida por filósofos portugueses do Colégio de Jesus (Coimbra) na transição do século XVI para o XVII. Diversas referências de Deely ao Cursus são analisadas. Através da sua análise, Junqueira revela a profundidade do pensamento de Deely e demonstra a importância do Cursus Conimbricensis para a semiótica contemporânea e a sua história.

Despite many warnings, the larger public has just now become aware that moderns are suffering from a crisis of meaning, in which everything we do and are can come to seem meaningless, futile, and absurd. We may doubt not only the meaningfulness of our lives, but whether meaning, value, and goodness exist at all. -/- That is where this book comes in. Within, forgotten elements of the Christian moral paradigm are described in their most basic details, and offered as a (...) solution to the meaning crisis. Far from being rare, meaning and value in life are, if Christianity is true, unavoidable. For all of creation—all of reality—is good, beautiful, loveable, meaningful and even divine. Our perception that life is meaningless is, then, merely a self-centered blindness, an inability to see what is right in front of us. (shrink)

The central focus of this article is to provide a new “Love Argument” for the necessary truth of the Latin “model” of the doctrine of the Trinity—termed “Latin Trinitarianism”—from an a priori standpoint. This new argument, called the Agápēic Argument, will be formulated in light of the metaphysical notions of a “trope,” introduced by D. C. Williams, and “multiple location,” posited by Antony Eagle, and the ethical concept of agápē, proposed by Alexander Pruss. Doing this will provide a specific argument (...) that provides strong grounds for affirming the necessary truth of the Trinity, without, however, being subject to the primary objections that have been often raised against the existing versions of the argument. (shrink)

In “Early High Christology and Contemporary Pro-Nicene Theology,” Steven Nemes raises a dilemma. Either one may affirm what the New Testament teaches about the Word “through” whom all things were created, or one may affirm that the Father and Son are consubstantial (as the Nicene Creed teaches), but not both. I show that Nemes’s argument begs the question and that Nemes fails to represent how pro-Nicene theologians interpreted such prepositions (for example, “through”) in the New Testament. Contrary to what Nemes (...) contends, there is no inconsistency in believing what John 1:3 teaches and that the divine persons are consubstantial. (shrink)

The doctrine of the Trinity, proclaimed by Christians through the Nicene-Constantinople creed, is foundational to traditional Christian belief and worship of God. But is this doctrine logically coherent? How can there be three divine persons (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), each is God, and yet there is only one God? This is a fundamental question for philosophers, but theologians have additional questions. This Element addresses philosophical and theological issues concerning the Trinity: Hermeneutical and Logical problems, Personal Pronouns, Monarchy, Equality, the (...) Greek vs. Latin filioque debate, Real Relations, Unity of Action, Self-Knowledge in the Trinity, and Simplicity. Based on my recent rediscovery of the sixth ecumenical council's (Constantinople III) clarifications of Trinitarian doctrine, this Element introduces Conciliar Trinitarianism and shows how it responds to the issues, including a resolution to the fundamental logical question. It also compares Conciliar Trinitarianism with Miaphysite, neo-Sabellian, Social, and other models of the Trinity. (shrink)

Beau Branson rounds out the previous two chapters, by exploring the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra in the writings of St Gregory of Nyssa. This doctrine says that all the activities of the three hypostases of the Trinity, at least insofar as they relate to things outside of (“ad extra”) the Trinity, are not only qualitatively identical but numerically identical. Importantly, Branson focuses his attention on Gregory’s theory of action and the individuation of events that emerges from his theological (...) defense of the doctrine of inseparable operations ad extra. Through a heavy engagement with contemporary metaphysics, Branson shows that Gregory’s philosophy of action is not only coherent, anticipating current trends in the ontology of actions and events, but may provide novel solutions to longstanding problems in this field. (shrink)

Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers (...) to give explicit definitions of Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities. They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Aquinas’ account of analogy provides resources for resolving the prima facie conflict between his claims that (1) the divine relations constituting the persons are “one and the same” with the divine essence; (2) the divine persons are really distinct, (3) the divine essence is absolutely simple. Specifically, I argue that Aquinas adopts an analogical understanding of the concepts of being and unity, and that these concepts are implicit in his formulation of claims about substance (...) and relation in the Trinity. I then show how Aquinas appeals to key structural features of analogical concepts, notably, the simpliciter/secundum quid characterization, to resolve apparent conflicts between the unity of substance and distinction of relations in the Trinity. (shrink)

The problem of the Trinity is often framed as a paradox between some propositions central to the doctrine of the Trinity that seem to be logically in tension with each other. However, a problem of Paradox presupposes that we have a sufficient understanding of the meanings of the propositions (otherwise we wouldn’t even have any appearance of conflict between these meanings). My claim in this paper is that the main problem of the Trinity is more radical than a problem of (...) Paradox: it’s rather a problem of Meaninglessness, in the sense that the difficult challenge is to grasp a meaning for the central propositions of the doctrine (not to render logically compatible some meanings clearly grasped). I show how we can respond to the problem of Meaninglessness and how, once we have solved it, there is no need to try and dissolve the appearance of contradiction which constitutes the problem of Paradox. As far as the problem of Paradox goes, the solution adopted here is therefore a form of Mysterianism. (shrink)

This article seeks to consider the compatibility between the doctrine of the Trinity and the theory of the transcendental properties by offering a consideration of the notion of the ‘gift’ as a transcendental term. In particular, this article presents a re-reading of John Milbank’s influential theology of the gift through Colin Gunton’s project of developing ‘trinitarian transcendentals’. In addition to showing how Milbank’s notion of the gift could be systematically understood in terms of what Gunton calls a ‘trinitarianly developed transcendental’ (...) which nonetheless avoids many of the problems found in Gunton’s original project, this article argues understanding ‘gift’ as a transcendental term can not only provide us with new ways of reconceiving the relationship between the philosophy of transcendental properties and various traditional doctrines, it can moreover show us how the traditional and biblical names of the Holy Spirit as ‘the Gift’ and the Son as ‘the Word’ can offer new ways of developing distinctively trinitarian accounts of metaphysics. (shrink)

There is a lively debate in contemporary Analytic Philosophy of Religion about the consistency of the Trinitarian doctrine. In this context, the notion of ‘mystery’ has become crucial. However, although it is currently considered the main challenge of Trinitarian theology, its definition remains rather partial and superficial. After a brief description of today’s Mysterianism, I analyse three ‘emblematic’ positions in light of the current debate: Aquinas, Leibniz and Hegel present three ways to believe in a mysterious Trinity. I will point (...) out a few possible weaknesses in the positions of the first two authors in order to better highlight the usefulness of the Hegelian position, often underestimated in the contemporary analytic debate. I will also analyse the connection between the three positions and their respective metaphysics, showing the epistemological premises (e.g., analogy and univocity) that need to be better investigated in the future. (shrink)

Damiano Migliorini’s book offers a rigorous and original inquiry into the possibility of formulating a coherent trinitarian theism through the development of a relational ontology and a metaphysics grounded in the doctrine of the Trinity. Situated within the framework of analytic philosophy of religion, the work engages deeply with metaphysical questions surrounding the nature of being, substance, relation, and divine personhood, while proposing a speculative model capable of integrating theological tradition with contemporary ontology and epistemology. The book begins by addressing (...) the longstanding aporia between divine omniscience and human freedom, which has led some to embrace open or process theism. While recognizing the merits of these models, Migliorini aims to avoid their conceptual pitfalls—especially their tendencies toward monism or pantheism—by returning to the trinitarian dogma as a possible ontological key. He argues that divine relationality, when properly understood, may offer a path beyond the metaphysics of pure substance without abandoning the coherence required by rational theology. Chapters 1 through 3 provide a systematic reconstruction of the concept of relation in classical and contemporary thought, with particular attention to Aristotelian substance theory, modern critiques of substantialism, and the ontological implications of quantum physics and structural realism. Migliorini distinguishes various types of relations (internal, external, causal, transcendental) and addresses the problem of Bradley’s regress as it affects relational metaphysics. This historical and theoretical mapping reveals the inadequacy of traditional metaphysical categories in accounting for the dynamic, interpersonal structure of divine being as confessed in Christian theology. The central chapters develop the theological and metaphysical core of the project. Chapter 4 examines the Trinity as a speculative philosophical hypothesis, arguing that relationality and multiplicity must be considered transcendental features of being if the doctrine is to be rendered intelligible. Drawing from Aquinas, Kant, and contemporary analytic theology, Migliorini defends a model in which divine persons are conceived as “subsisting relations”—a notion that challenges classical logic but is not irrational if situated within a hyperphatic epistemological horizon. Chapters 5 and 6 articulate the author’s original metaphysical proposal: an “Eventist-Infinitesimal Ontology” (EIO), in which entities are fundamentally events or subsistents characterized by gunky, infinitely divisible relationality. This model is developed in dialogue with power ontology, process philosophy, and the metaphysics of quantum entanglement. Migliorini argues that this framework permits a speculative analogy with the divine perichoresis and offers a coherent ontology for theistic realism. The concluding vision is a “Trinitarian metaphysics” that affirms the irreducible relationality of all being, anchored in the triune God. Rather than eliminating contradiction, the project embraces it as a sign of metaphysical depth and the limits of discursive reason. The Trinity, thus, is not a logical anomaly but a rationally necessitated hypothesis for any ontology that seeks to account for both unity and multiplicity, being and becoming, immanence and transcendence. This work contributes significantly to the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and theological ontology by proposing a relational model of reality grounded in both rigorous philosophical analysis and Christian doctrinal insight. (shrink)

The book aims to examine how a Trinitarian Theism can be formulated through the elaboration of a Relational Ontology and a Trinitarian Metaphysics, in the context of a hyperphatic epistemology. This metaphysics has been proposed by some supporters of the so-called Open Theism as a solution to the numerous dilemmas of Classical Theism. The hypothesis they support is that the Trinitarian nature of God, reflected in a world of multiplicity, relationality, substance and relations, demands that we think of God as (...) dynamic, internally multiple and relational. However, if the expression «God is love» – understood as the formula of the Trinity – is the key to a new theism, it leaves a problem open: how can it be translated philosophically? The research develops on two different levels: first, it assesses whether the expression should be translated into the Trinitarian paradigm, and the aporias it generates; secondly, it tries to assess whether this paradigm (eminently relational) has a correspondence in ontology: is there a satisfactory Relational Metaphysics already available? The suspicion is that such Trinitarian-Relational Ontology, invoked by many as a solution to the incongruities of classical theism, has yet to be formulated in a satisfactorily manner, despite the existence of various attempts to formulate Relational Ontologies. In order to provide an evaluation of all these attempts and to outline some possible new perspectives, the thesis consists of five chapters. It is the aim of the present dissertation to evaluate such attempts, and to outline some possible new solutions. In the chapters some points have been established: 1. there must be at least one irreducible real relation (non-reductionist realism); 2. the relation must be equally fundamental to the substance: this means that it is both external and internal; 3. this relation must be able to account for contingent causality; 4. holism is a plausible position; 5. the Trinity is a good theistic model of the divine, apophatic but rational. The last chapter then returns to ontological questions: several Relational Ontologies are examined – including ontic structural realism and process (or eventist) ontology – together with their applications in philosophy of religion (e.g.: the Relational God, Process Trinitarianism, the Entangled God). This assessment shows how all these ontologies postulate real transcendental relations (subsistent relations), inside the substances or inside the powers, inside the tropes or the structures, describing them as monads or processes (or actual occasions). These relations are the same we need to describe the Trinity. Therefore, they are either possible for both domains – ontology and theology – or they are both impossible. It has been opted for the second conclusion. But they are both impossible and inevitable: the fundamental entities of the world and their interactions (causation) must be described as real transcendental relations because each ontology transforms entities or relations into real transcendental relationships at some point. Thus, neither relationalism nor substantialism are convincing: from the fall of these two dogmas (or, rather, from the fall of their naive interpretations) we can realise that the fundamental reality is something that lies between processism (relationalism) and substantialism. It is impossible to completely substitute the notion of substance with the notion of event, process, structure or relation, both in speaking of God and in speaking about the entities of fundamental ontology. Neither monism nor pluralism can be affirmed in their pure forms. The hypothesis proposed, then, is that the notion of gunk-junk is the only one that can translate the relationality hitherto sought in an ontological model. The central part of the chapter describes the merits and defects of an eventist-infinitive ontology (EIO) based on the concept of gunk, and its potentiality to generate new theistic accounts. Through the notion of infinityings it seems to be possible to find some solutions for the questions left open by the causal relation, and therefore to defend at least the existence of one relation (external and internal). Each fundamental entity is described, in this ontology, through four transcendentals: ‘entity’, ‘relation’, ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’. The co-primarity between substance and relations (borrowed from the notion of relatio subsistens) differentiates EIO from the process philosophies precisely because it does not pretend to eliminate the substantial principle, or the category of substance, but wants to think of it with the transcendental of relationality. Of course, EIO poses a challenge to the role, the method and the explicative capacity of metaphysics, because what we can state of the fundamental reality is antinomic. EIO tries to assume the antinomy as a result, to make it the basis of a kind of apophatic ontology. If our best ontology is gunky, then it is possible to confirm what has been said in chap. 4: the ‘how’ of individual substances is unknown to us at least as much as the ‘how’ of God. Even in the world we have the mystery of a distinction that is not division. However, the convergence of these antinomies can find an ultimate explanation in a theistic metaphysics (EIM): God creates inside of Himself and his Trinitarian substance is “contracted” into the worldly entities. They are made contingent and ontologically different by this self-limitation, but it is still the infinity of God that makes space in Himself for something new, even though He is totally present in every entity. It is not absurd to think that the substances of the world keep track of the divine nature, even in His “contraction”. Among the characteristics of the divine nature that each created entity maintains we have the subsistent relationality, the pericoretic indwelling (the infinite gunk-junk), the fact of being always one-and-many. If EIO and EIM are accepted as a good compromise between relationalism and substantialism, even in their apophaticity, then, on this basis, a Trinitarian Philosophy is possible. The picture of reality that emerges represents the world as multiple, substantial, contingent and intrinsically relational, forcing us to postulate the transcendental of relationality and multiplicity. Such transcendental leads us to think of the world and God (and their relations) in a Trinitarian way – With the necessary acknowledgement that this is a reasonable but apophatic discourse. (shrink)

This article aims to introduce a new solution to the Logical Problem of the Trinity. This solution is provided by utilising a number of theses within the field of contemporary metaphysics in order to establish a conceptual basis for a novel account and model of the doctrine of the Trinity termed Monarchical Aspectivalism, which will provide the means for proposing an alternative reading of the Athanasian Creed that is free from any consistency problems.

This article aims to provide an explication of the doctrine of the monarchy of the Father. A precisification of the doctrine is made within the building-fundamentality framework provided by Karen Bennett, which enables a further clarification of the central elements of the doctrine to be made and an important objection against it to be answered.

In this chapter I want to focus on what it might mean to speak of the “Trinitarian friendship circle.” There are at least two ways to consider this friendship circle. One way is to consider the Trinity in itself, which is what theologians call the “immanent Trinity.” If we consider a “Trinitarian friendship circle” with regard to the immanent Trinity, then we would be talking about whether before the creation of the world, the three di- vine persons were in some (...) sense “co-lovers.” Another way is to consider the Trinity in relation to creatures, which is what theologians call the “economic Trinity.” The latter includes discussion of God the Son’s incarnation, and the work of the Holy Spirit among creatures. In what follows, I am interested in exploring what some medieval theologians, whom McCord Adams wrote so much about, had to say about this Trinitarian friendship circle with regard to the immanent Trinity. This is speculative stuff. Some theologians might object that this kind of speculation is unwarranted. They would contend that (e.g.,) the ecumenical councils were mostly focused on the Trinity with regard to creation. At most, we find in Nicaea I (325 CE) the claim that God the Father and God the Son are of the same essence (“homoousia”). This doesn’t signal anything specific regarding whether God the Father and God the Son each have their own act of loving the divine essence (or another divine person) in eternity past. This sort of view is what is today sometimes called Social Trinitarianism, according to which we should count the number of divine acts of knowing and loving according to the number of divine persons. On this Social Model of the Trinity, the Father loves the divine essence, the Son loves the divine essence, and the Holy Spirit loves the divine essence, and none of these acts of loving are numerically the same acts of loving the divine essence. There are three acts of loving, one by each divine person. (I should mention here that I reject this Social Model of the Trinity.) [...] -/- [...]. In what follows, I give a brief history of different interpretations of Augustine’s claim that the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit. This history supports my contention that a majority report among scholastics has it that the Holy Spirit, as a divine person, is not a unique object of an act of love, nor is any other divine person a unique object of an act of love. What the divine person’s love is their shared divine essence. This is what can be called a reductive interpretation of Augustine’s statement. A minority position, held by Henry of Ghent, is that the Holy Spirit (as the Holy Spirit) makes it the case that the divine persons love that they love the divine essence. Henry is distinctive in defending an interpretation according to which the Holy Spirit, as a specific divine person, uniquely contributes something to a certain act of loving that is shared by all divine persons. I believe Henry’s claim that a specific divine person can contribute something unique to an intellectual act or an act of will that can be used in the development of a “Latin” Model of the Trinity that accounts for the divine persons’ de se propositional knowledge. That is, a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity offers an account of how it could be that, e.g., God the Father can be aware of the proposition that I know that I love God the Son. Nonetheless, Henry himself does not develop a view in which a divine person has de se propositional knowledge. So far as I am aware, no scholastic teaches that a divine person makes use of “I” for self-reference (apart from, e.g., the Incarnation) or de se propositional knowledge. If one wanted to develop McCord Adams’s contention that the divine persons are mutual friends, then if we look at what Henry of Ghent has done then we can develop his insights into what I have labeled a “Latin Social” Model of the Trinity. While there are likely several ways that Henry’s moves can be developed into a Latin Social Model of the Trinity, I will summarize one way it could be done, that is, the way I have done it. (shrink)

Why I thought it useful to offer an explanation of Hegel’s doctrine on the Incarnation was so that the reader may be empowered to identify Hegel’s influence in modern accounts of this mystery. Even if, in my view, Hegel’s interpretation of revealed religion differs greatly from Catholic Doctrine, it is not surprising to find the presence of some of his concepts in modern theology. In truth, what matters is not the theologian’s self-identification as Hegelian or as non-Hegelian, but whether or (...) not the theologian adopts Hegel’s concepts. This paper offers an explanation of the internal dynamism of Hegelian concepts and their relation to Christian doctrine in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. This research may help to show in what way it is possible to explain Christian religious doctrine with a philosophy other than the Thomistic one and how, at least in Hegel’s case, religious doctrine is changed and reduced to an erroneous philosophical content. Also, an attempt is made to show the internal “coherence” of this Hegelian re-reading of Christianity so that theologians may become more cautious about accepting an explanation of Christian doctrine simply because the Christian language is preserved in that explanation. (shrink)

In a friendly interdisciplinary debate, we interrogate from several vantage points the question of “personhood” in light of contemporary and near-future forms of social AI. David J. Gunkel approaches the matter from a philosophical and legal standpoint, while Jordan Wales offers reflections theological and psychological. Attending to metaphysical, moral, social, and legal understandings of personhood, we ask about the position of apparently personal artificial intelligences in our society and individual lives. Re-examining the “person” and questioning prominent construals of that category, (...) we hope to open new views upon urgent and much-discussed questions that, quite soon, may confront us in our daily lives. (shrink)

In the essay I analyse Micheletti’s three theses concerning: (a) the notion of mystery in relation to the “evidentialistic claim”; (b) analogical metaphysics in relation to “univocist immanentism” and to the importance of developing an analogical theism; (c) the fallibilistic conception of reason in relation to natural law, universalistic ethics and the so-called “essentialism” applied to individual human nature. I will try to show how deep is the intertwining and mutual implication of mystery and analogy – in metaphysics and theology, (...) in epistemology and ontology, in anthropology and ethics – and how Micheletti’s works have been an important step in bringing these two notions back to the center of the discussion that introduces oneself in the “question of God” and in the “question of Human being”. (shrink)

I present Ned Markosian's episodic account of identity under a sortal, and then use it to sketch a new model of the Trinity. I show that the model can be used to solve at least three important Trinitarian puzzles: the traditional ‘logical problem of the Trinity’, a less-discussed problem that has been dubbed the ‘problem of triunity’, and a problem about the divine processions that has been enjoying increased attention in the recent literature.

The disagreement between William Hasker and myself includes discussion of Gregory of Nyssa’s Trinitarian theology, the relevance of Conciliar Trinitarianism for evaluating models of the Trinity, and the defensibility of my Latin Social model of the Trinity. I respond to Hasker’s recent objections regarding all three areas. I contest Hasker’s interpretation of Gregory and argue that Gregory is indeed a “one-power” theorist. I make historical connections between Gregory’s Trinitarian theology and Pope Agatho’s “one-power” statements that were endorsed by the Sixth (...) Ecumenical Council (680-681ce); and I make explicit the Sixth Ecumenical Council's interest in the general issue of how ‘ousia’ and ‘hypostasis’ pertain to the Trinity and the Incarnation. Lastly, I defend and develop the Latin Social model in response to Hasker’s five objections. In light of my findings in the Sixth Council, I retire the name ‘Latin Social Trinity’ for my model and replace it with a name more apt for my model, that is, the ‘Conciliar Social Trinity.’. (shrink)

This article offers a reading of Colin Gunton’s trinitarian theology in light of recent theological attempts to develop accounts of ‘new trinitarian ontologies’ in a strongly Christian Neo-Platonic vein. In particular, this article seeks to situate Gunton’s work within the broader context of late twentieth-century European thought by comparing his ‘trinitarian ontology’ to the anti-Platonic ontologies of Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze. By way of considering the ‘anti-Platonic’ aspects of Gunton’s trinitarian theology, this article presents his theological project as a (...) testcase which highlights the stakes in constructing ‘new’ trinitarian ontologies as well as possible objections to the affirmative attitude towards Christian Neo-Platonism in contemporary theological metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper deals with the possibility of an incarnation in the feminine in our age. In the first part, we discuss sexual genealogies in ancient Israel and address the problem of the extreme vulnerability of feminine life in the midst of an ancient sacrificial crisis. The second part opens with an analysis of Feuerbach’s interpretation of the Trinity. The triadic logic, as found within various religious contexts, is also affirmed. Based on our analyses from the first and the second part, (...) in the third part, we address the problems of feminine vulnerability and fragility on one hand, and triadic thinking on the other hand, and relate them to an original proposal for the future matrixial theology of incarnation. (shrink)

In “Unity of Action in a Latin Social Model of the Trinity,” I objected to William Hasker’s Social Model of the Trinity on the grounds that it does not secure the necessary agreement between the divine persons. Further, I developed a Latin Social model of the Trinity. Hasker has responded by defending his Social Model and by raising seven objections against my Latin Social Model. Here I raise a new objection against Hasker on the grounds that it is inconsistent with (...) Conciliar Trinitarianism, and I respond to the seven objections and in so doing further develop the Latin Social Model. (shrink)

Philosophical or analytic theology seeks to employ philosophical tools while studying topics in Christian theology and examining the logical consistency or intelligibility of some of the key doctrines of the Christian faith. In this accessible primer, An Introduction to Christian Philosophical Theology, authors Stephen T. Davis and Eric T. Yang first explain the scope, relevance, and value of philosophical theology and then applies its conceptual tools to examine each of the core Christian doctrines: -/- -Revelation and Scripture -The Trinity -The (...) Incarnation -Redemption and the atonement, -Resurrection and life after death -/- The final chapter briefly addresses some additional theological issues including petitionary prayer, eschatology, and original sin. -/- Designed for beginning students and non-specialists this guide provides the ideal entry point for not only understanding what philosophical theology is but also for how it can provide valuable insights for how we think about the core doctrines of the Christian faith. (shrink)