1 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Institute for the Humanities, University of Illinois at Chicago.

2 There is, unfortunately, considerable variation in the terminology used by moral philosophers to discuss these issues: contrast, for example, David Brink’s characterization of ‘realism’ as a meta-ethical theory ‘committed to moral facts and truths that are objective in some way,’ ‘independent of the evidence for them’ (and thus excluding moral constructivism and relativism), with Geoffrey Sayre-McCord’s more latitudinarian conception of ‘realism’ as just successful cognitivism, ‘not solely the prerogative of objectivists’ (and thus including moral constructivism and relativism). See Brink, David O. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 14, 17-18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Introduction to Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, ed., Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press 1988), 5, 16. To eliminate ambiguity, I will henceforth use ’objectivism’ stipulatively to include both realism (in Brink’s sense) and constructivism (idealized intersubjectivist cognitivism). Theories in the opposing, anti-objectivist camp would therefore include moral nihilism, noncognitivism (emotivism, prescriptivism), error theories, individual subjectivism, and ethical relativism. For our purposes, though, the important meta-ethical contrast is simply that between the umbrella positions of objectivism and anti-objectivism.

3 See, for example, Donald Clark Hodges, ‘Historical Materialism in Ethics,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1962) 1-22.

4 See, for example, Miller, Richard W. Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984)Google Scholar and Anthony, Skillen Ruling Illusions: Philosophy and the Social Order (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1978)Google Scholar.

5 For an interpretation of Marx as a global relativist, see Milton Fisk, Ethics and Society: A Marxist Interpretation of Value (New York: New York University Press 1980). George G. Brenkert, by contrast, defends a position which could be characterized as partial relativism, since he sees Marx as a historical relativist for some ethical values (such as justice), but not for others (such as freedom). See George G. Brenkert, ’Freedom and Private Property in Marx,’ in Cohen, Marshall Thomas, Nagel and Thomas, Scanlon eds., Marx, Justice, and History (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980) 80-105CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and also his Marx’s Ethics of Freedom (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul1983). Steven Lukes takes a somewhat similar line in his Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985).

6 See, for example, Acton, H.B. The Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism-Leninism as a Philosophical Creed (London: Cohen & West 1955Google Scholar) and Eugene, Kamenka Marxism and Ethics (London: Macmillan 1969)Google Scholar.

7 See, for example, Kai, Nielsen Marxism and the Moral Point of View: Morality, Ideology, and Historical Materialism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1989)Google Scholar.

8 My argument is developed in the following papers: Charles, W. Mills “’Ideology“ in Marx and Engels,’ The Philosophical Forum 16 (1985) 327-46Google Scholar; Charles, W. Mills and Danny, Goldstick ‘A New Old Meaning of “Ideology,“’ Dialogue 28 (1989) 417-32Google Scholar; Charles, W. Mills ““Ideology’ in Marx and Engels” Revisited and Revised,’ The Philosophical Forum 23 (1992) 301-28Google Scholar. Since I do not believe that Marx and Engels diverged theoretically on either the meaning of ‘ideology’ or the status of ‘morality,’ I will refer indifferently throughout to Marx/ Engels.

9 One important exception is Ziyad Husami’s ‘Marx on Distributive Justice,’ a reply to Allen Wood’s ‘The Marxian Critique of Justice,’ both anthologized in Cohen, et al., eds., Marx, Justice, and History, 42-79 and 3-41. In my opinion, Husami’s claims about the real significance for Marx of the ‘ideological’ nature of morality have received insufficient attention in the secondary literature. This paper is in part intended to retrieve, supplement, and develop his interpretation.

10 It should be noted, of course, that some philosophers have defended an objectivist view of Marx’s meta-ethics while simply bypassing the question of how this is to be reconciled with his apparent views on morality and ‘ideology.’

11 This is basically the solution of Brenkert and Lukes.

12 This is one of two approaches taken by Nielsen.

13 This is the second approach taken by Nielsen, and also the one taken by Husami.

14 Norman Geras, ‘The Controversy about Marx and Justice,’ in Alex, Callinicos ed., Marxist Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989), 232Google Scholar

15 See Joseph, McCarney The Real World of Ideology (Brighton, Sussex and Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Harvester and Humanities Press 1980Google Scholar), and ““Ideology’ in Marx and Engels“: A Reply; The Philosophical Forum 21 (1990)451-62,a reply to my 1985 paper. Nielsen cites McCarney as his main authority for the neutral interpretation. Note, though, that while the neutral conception of ‘ideology’ makes an objectivist view of morality possible, it does not, of course, require it, since, as indicated at the beginning of the paper, there are other reasons for thinking Marx would have been anti-objectivist. For McCarney’s own position on these matters, see his recent ‘Marx and Justice Again,’ New Left Review 195 (1992) 29-36.

16 The significant degree of overlap with the conventional interpretation of the term, which is also ideational and pejorative, partially accounts, in my opinion, for the fact that its real meaning has not generally been discerned. What commentators who have taken ‘ideology’ to be a global pejorative Marxist term for mystification have failed to notice is that Marx never categorizes ‘fetishism,’ his primary polemical target in the economic writings, as ‘ideology.’ On the standard interpretation this is quite puzzling, but on my reading it is simply enough explained: fetishism is not a variety of idealism / superstructuralism, but rather a kind of vulgar materialism.

17 For a more detailed discussion of the issue, see my ‘Is it Immaterial that there’s a “Material” in “Historical Materialism“?’ Inquiry 32 (1989) 323-42.

18 Note that the two positions are logically independent, since one could believe that ideas are brain events (ontological materialism) while endorsing a view of history as determined by the battle of ideas (sociological idealism).

19 I refer to the following sources, using these abbreviations: Karl, Marx and Frederick, Engels Collected Works (New York: International Publishers): Vol. 1 (1975)Google Scholar (CW, 1); Vol. 4 (1975) (CW, 4); Vol. 5 (1976) (CW, 5); Vol. 11 (1979) (CW, 11); Vol. 17 (1981) (CW, 17); Vol. 23 (1988) (CW, 23); Vol. 25 (1987) (CW, 25); Vol. 26 (1990) (CW, 26); Vol. 29 (1987) (CW, 29); Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works (in one volume) (Moscow: Progress Publishers 1968) (MESW). An ‘X’ after the page number indicates a passage that was crossed out in the manuscript.

20 Cf. Ziyad Husami: ‘If the spokesmen for a class justify their views by maintaining that their moral outlook is independent of historical development or of class interests, then they maintain false beliefs about their morality. Such false beliefs are called “ideological illusions.” The moral outlook itself, on that count alone, is not considered illusory’ (48).

21 E.g. to Conrad Schmidt (Aug. 5, 1890 and Oct. 27, 1890), Joseph Bloch (Sept. 21-22, 1890), Franz Mehring (July 14, 1893), and W. Borgius (Jan. 25, 1894): (MESW, 678-80, 682-96).

22 There have been various efforts to cash out this notion, which some critics have seen as an untenable hybrid position; for an interesting, unfortunately neglected attempt in the analytic tradition, see Geoffrey Hellman, ‘Historical Materialism,’ in John, Mepham and David-Hillel, Ruben eds., Issues in Marxist Philosophy, Vol. Two: Materialism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1979) 143-70Google Scholar.

23 Cf. Norman Geras on a specifically Marxist ‘moral realism’: ‘Marxism and Moral Advocacy; in Discourses of Extremity: Radical Ethics and Post-Marxist Extravagances (London and New York: Verso 1990) 3-19.