Something is rotten in the state of Turkey.
Surely, something important is going on behind the scenes, but I don't really believe that the governing AKP is splitting now. The latest developments may only be regarded as hints that the Ergenekon case is about to be downsized by the AKP.
There are still dozens of civilians and soldiers in Turkish prisons, who are all accused of planning to overthrow the government although the prosecution failed to link them all with sound evidence about this Ergenekon conspiracy. I don't have any insider information, but putting the latest news into the big picture is enough to make a prediction about the future of the case:
1) Many independent observers have been repeatedly warning that the Ergenekon and related investigations have been turning into a witch-hunt on the ranks of the opposition. Mass arrests of journalists, including prominent ones, further tarnished the international image of the case, as well as the AKP government.
2) Recently, Paul Auster criticized Turkey’s treatment of journalists and authors, too. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan harshly rebuked Auster, triggering widespread condemnation in the American media, which has been generally covering Erdoğan-related topics in a favorable light for his party in the past, aligning with the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
3) Some of the Ergenekon-related allegations were deemed as ridiculous, but the latest political statements are even more tragic-comic. Bülent Gedikli, a deputy chairman of the AKP government, claimed that Auster was involved in the Ergenekon conspiracy, alongside Shimon Peres, Benjamin Netanyahu, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy! The Western European media is now criticizing Erdoğan and the Ergenekon case more and more, as the EU leaders may begin re-evaluating the AKP men.
4) Several figures in the AKP publicly insist that some "foreign elements" are trying to destabilize the Turkish government, which still manages to steer the national ship successfully on a heavy sea of international crises. The real conflict, however, seems like internal, even if some foreign elements also try to take advantage of it. This conflict is crystalized when National Intelligence Organization (MIT) Undersecretary Hakan Fidan was summoned as a suspect to testify in the ongoing terror probe on the PKK-related organization that is called the KCK.
5) Hakan Fidan, the right-hand man of Prime Minister Erdoğan, was recently accused in the Uludere incident, as well as the leaked negotiations with the PKK. Who was behind the blunder in Uludere and who did leak the audiotape of the PKK negotiations? No answers, yet. But we know that the harshest critics of Fidan in recent days, who was also criticized by Israel in the past, have been a few pundits, who have close links to the police intelligence, as well as the Gülen movement that is well-organized in the police.
6) Some commentators argue that the Gülen movement couldn't control the MIT because of Erdoğan's protection on Fidan. It is also said that the Gülen movement designed a policy to disintegrate the PKK, but Fidan is siding with the establishment figures who would like to see the conflict sustain, instead of taking risks which may divide the country. Other critics, on the other hand, insist that it is actually the Fidan method that could really finish off the PKK, if the government allies had supported him instead of siding with his critics whose interests are linked with a surviving PKK.
7) Hence, some say, the Gülen movement crossed out Erdoğan and will start to support President Abdullah Gül instead. It may mean that they will stop lobbying for a new constitution which will pave the way for Erdoğan to continue governing the country as the leader of a presidential system. Instead, they defend, the movement would prefer to see Gül as the Prime Minister in the future in a parliamentary system again, with Erdoğan as a retired politician.
To summarize, I personally believe that such an internal conflict in government circles, Erdoğan-Fidan vs. Gülen-Gül, is an exaggeration at this stage, if not solely an example of wishful thinking by the political opposition. A more realistic commentary on the latest developments now can be made only on the Ergenekon case and the international image of the AKP.
Although it would be naive to think that most of the Ergenekon suspects would be released soon, it is remarkable that many people now believe that one of the underlying causes of the internal conflict is Erdoğan's intention to loosen the leash of the opposition, even as those pundits who are close the police and the Gülen movement staunchly oppose it. Other government figures, including Erdoğan's leading aide Beşir Atalay, seem like they support such a legislative move.
That's why I believe that these developments may lead a redefinition of the Ergenekon case, in relation to the results of the changing balance between the factions in the AKP. Will Turkey be more or less democratic? I don't think that any of the players of this political game really cares about the answer, but we'll soon see what is rotten in Ankara and if we would get rid of it for a better democracy or not...










