Obstacles Facing US Wind Energy

In the United States, we have been working on scaling up wind energy but not getting very far. In 2010, wind energy supplied only 2.3% of electricity purchased.

Wind energy

Figure 1. Wind energy (dark green) is barely visible in a graph of US energy consumption by source. Based on EIA data.

Such slow progress seems strange for a product that seems to have such great promise. It can reduce CO2 emissions. It doesn’t require fuel. It is at least partly US made. The popular view is that it could eventually replace gasoline, but that view is very optimistic because electricity is very different from gasoline, and because of the scalability issue.

In this post, I discuss a few of the obstacles facing wind energy in the United States, and their implications for the expansion of wind energy.  Continue reading

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Can we invest our way out of an energy shortfall?

The world has many ideas for solving our energy shortfall, but they all seem to involve investment:

  • Drill for more oil and gas;
  • Develop alternative energy sources;
  • Build more efficient gas-powered cars or electric cars;
  • Fix homes and offices so they are more energy efficient.

I thought I would check through government data to see if we really have a chance of being able to invest enough money to solve our problems.

What I found was more than a little disturbing. United States’ “Net Savings,” as a percentage of Gross National Income has dropped greatly and is now below zero. This is a situation one website described as implying an “unsustainable path”.

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Figure 1. US Net Savings as a Percentage of Gross National Income, based on Bureau of Economic Analysis Data (Table 5.1)

Back in the 1950s and 1960s, when the Interstate Expressway System was built and the electric grid that we are still using today was built, Net Savings averaged close to 10% of Gross National Income. It has dropped since then, and is now negative.

Let me explain “Net Savings” by showing a second graph.

Continue reading

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OPEC says, ‘Don’t Count on Us’ for More Oil Supply

The results of OPEC’s latest meeting to set oil production quotas were announced this morning. Instead of production targets for individual countries, a group production ceiling of 30 million barrels a day was set. This amount is a bit less than OPEC produced in November 2011 (actual 30.367 mbd), according to its reckoning, and less than it would have produced most of 2011, if Libyan production had stayed on line, based on the amounts shown in its November Oil Market Report.

A recent history of oil production from the November Oil Market Report, both for OPEC and in total, is shown in Figure 1.

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Figure 1. Recent oil production for World and for OPEC, according to OPEC November Oil Market Report.

According to a Platts report of the meeting, Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez told reporters, “We are going to reduce the level of production of each country to make space for Libya.” That is not what people want to hear–Brent oil price is still over $100 barrel, even with what seems to be record production for both the world and OPEC, based on Figure 1.

The same Platts report also says, “OPEC on Tuesday said it expected demand for OPEC crude next year to average 30.09 million b/d.” Thus, the new production cap is slightly less than what OPEC sees as demand going forward.

It should be noted that the new limit includes Iraq in addition to the “regular” OPEC countries. Thus, the agreement says that if Iraq increases its production, other OPEC countries will reduce their production to keep total production to 30 million barrels a day.  Continue reading

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Saudi Arabia – Headed for a Downfall?

Saudi Arabia recently announced that it had halted a $100 billion oil production expansion plan to raise capacity to 15 million barrels a day by 2020. At this point, the country claims to have capacity of 12 million barrels a day. What does this mean for its future? Let’s take a look behind the figures.

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Figure 1. Saudi Arabian oil production and exports, from Energy Export Data Browser. Note that oil production is in grey, oil exports are in green, and the black line represents consumption.

The figure shows that Saudi Arabia has not been increasing its production for many years. At the same time, the country’s own oil consumption has been rising rapidly. The combination means that oil exports have already started declining. Continue reading

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Thoughts on why energy use and CO2 emissions are rising as fast as GDP

In a recent post, I discovered something rather alarming–the fact that in the last decade (2000 to 2010) both world energy consumption and the CO2 emissions from this energy consumption were rising as fast as GDP for the world as a whole. This relationship is especially strange, because prior to 2000, it appeared as though decoupling was taking place: GDP was growing more rapidly than energy use and CO2 emissions. And even after 2000, many countries continued to report decoupling.

I decided to sift through individual country results, to see if I could see a pattern emerging behind these changing results. When I did this, I found three major groupings of countries:

1. Southeast Asia, excluding Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. This group has been rapidly industrializing. In total, the group’s energy consumption has grown as rapidly as GDP in the last decade, and CO2 emissions have grown faster than GDP. This group includes China, India, Korea, Viet Nam, and a long list of other countries in Southeast Asia, including nearby islands.

2. Middle Eastern Countries. This group showed energy use growing more rapidly than GDP,  suggesting that it was taking more energy to extract oil and to pacify its population, over time. I included all countries in this group that BP includes in its Middle Eastern grouping, even though Israel (and perhaps some other countries) do not fit the pattern well.

3. Rest of the World. This group is the only group showing a favorable trend in energy growth relative to GDP growth, even in the last decade, although the pace of improvement has slowed. Two reasons for this favorable trend seem to be (a) continued growth of services, such as financial service, healthcare, and education, which use relatively little energy and (b) outsourcing of a major portion of heavy industry to Southeast Asia.

When we look at CO2 emissions broken out into these three categories, the shift over time is quite surprising:

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Figure 1. Carbon dioxide emissions emitted in year shown by the three major areas described (Southeast Asia, Middle East, Remainder), based on BP Statistical Data

The vast majority of the CO2 increase since 1980 has taken place in the Southeast Asia and the Middle Eastern areas!

The energy intensity of GDP (that is, the amount of energy consumed per trillion dollars of real GDP) has shown very different patterns for the three groups of countries:

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Figure 2. Energy Intensity of GDP by Area, based on BP Statistical Data regarding Energy Consumption in Barrels of Oil Equivalent, and USDA Economic Research Data regarding real GDP.

The World energy intensity of GDP has flattened in the last decade, reflecting a combination of the impacts of the three areas. The only area that has an improving energy intensity of GDP is the Remainder group. The Southeast Asia group is roughly flat. The Middle Eastern group is shows increasing energy use, relative to GDP growth.

Based on data in this post, I come to the following tentative conclusions:

1. The industrialization of Southeast Asia has allowed importers from around the world to reduce their energy intensity of GDP, but much of the savings has been offset by greater energy use (largely coal) in Southeast Asia. On a CO2 basis, we are likely  worse off, because of this transfer.

2. There is no evidence that the Kyoto Protocol reduced worldwide CO2 emissions. In fact, to the extent that it encouraged outsourcing of industrial production to the Far East and made goods from the Far East more competitive, it may have contributed to rising world CO2 emissions. It would appear that a different approach is needed that recognizes the fact that fuels are part of a world market. Fuel savings in one part of the world are not necessarily helpful for the world as a whole.

3. In my view, world industrial production has self-organized in a way that assigns different roles to companies operating in the three country groups I described above, as a way to minimize manufacturing costs. Over the long term, this particular version of self-organization cannot continue. The Middle East will reach a point where its oil exports drop rapidly. Southeast Asia will reach maximums on coal production/imports and on pollution levels. The “Remainder” is already reaching limits in competing with Southeast Asia. Unemployment rates are high, manufacturing wages are low, and many workers lack the  income needed to purchase additional services which might “grow” GDP. Continue reading

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Pipeline changes to fix WTI/Brent spread are likely to add new problems

For many years, Brent oil (a European grade) and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil, a US grade, sold at close to the same price. Starting in January 2011, WTI price dropped below Brent, at times by more than 20%.

When the price of WTI dropped, the prices of quite a few other grades of oil (especially in the Midwest, but perhaps elsewhere) were affected as well. To get an idea of how much the overall impact was, I compared the price refiners pay for oil to that of Brent and WTI (Figure 1).

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Figure 1. Average refiners acquisition cost, Brent oil price, and WTI oil price, based on EIA data.

I found that the drop in the prices refiners pay for crude oil prices is much more akin to the drop a person would expect if 40% of crude were affected, than the small drop one would expect if only WTI itself were affected. The price change during 2011 did not seem to be due to changes in average viscosity or in sulfur content either.

Some of the types of crude that have been hit by lower prices are those from the Alberta. Recently, there have been proposals by Canadian companies to try to fix the problem. Enbridge announced that it is buying a 50% stake in the Seaway pipeline, and will reverse its direction, so that it will carry crude oil southward, from Cushing to the Gulf, instead of northward, as soon as the second quarter of 2012. In addition, TransCanada has announced the it wants to build the segment of the Keystone XL pipeline from Cushing to the Gulf, possibly starting as soon as January 2012.

The question now is what impact the proposed pipelines will have. Will they even out the Brent/WTI price disparity, and, at the same time, cause the prices of other crudes, such as Canadian and Bakken crudes, to rise as well? Or will the pipeline adjustments fix only part of the problem, and add new problems at the same time? In my view, the latter seems more likely, for reasons I discuss in this post.

For those who are interested, I wrote a post in February giving more background, which can be found here.
Continue reading

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Is it really possible to decouple GDP Growth from Energy Growth?

In recent years, we have heard statements indicating that it is possible to decouple GDP growth from energy growth. I have been looking at the relationship between world GDP and world energy use and am becoming increasingly skeptical that such a decoupling is really possible.

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Figure 1. Growth in world energy consumption (based on BP data) and growth in world real GDP

Prior to 2000, world real GDP (based on USDA Economic Research Institute data) was indeed growing faster than energy use, as measured by BP Statistical Data. Between 1980 and 2000, world real GDP growth averaged a little under 3% per year, and world energy growth averaged a little under 2% per year,  so GDP growth increased about 1% more per year than energy use. Since 2000, energy use has grown approximately as fast as world real GDP–increases for both have averaged about 2.5% per year growth. This is not what we have been told to expect.

Why should this “efficiency gain” go away after 2000? Many economists are concerned about energy intensity of GDP and like to publicize the fact that for their country, GDP is rising faster than energy consumption. These indications can be deceiving, however. It is easy to reduce the energy intensity of GDP for an individual country by moving the more energy-intensive manufacturing to a country with higher energy intensity of GDP.

What happens when this shell game is over? In total, is the growth in world GDP any less energy intense? The answer since 2000 seems to be “No”.

It seems to me that at least part of the issue is declining energy return on energy invested (EROI)–we are using an increasing share of energy consumption just to extract and process the energy we use–for example, in “fracking” and in deep water drilling. This higher energy cost is acting to offset efficiency gains. But there are other issues as well, which I will discuss in this post.

If GDP growth and energy use are closely tied, it will be even more difficult to meet CO2 emission goals than most have expected. Without huge efficiency savings, a reduction in emissions (say, 80% by 2050) is likely to require a similar percentage reduction in world GDP. Because of the huge disparity in real GDP between the developed nations and the developing nations, the majority of this GDP reduction would likely need to come from developed nations. It is difficult to see this happening without economic collapse.

Continue reading

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Financial Impacts of Reaching ‘Limits to Growth’

I gave a talk on expected financial implications of the oil limits that we are now reaching at a recent meeting of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA. My talk consisted of two parts:

  1. Why the impact of oil supply limits is expected to be more severe than simply a reduction in oil supply would imply. I believe we are really reaching a more general “limits to growth” because of the impact of high oil prices, interconnectedness of all of the systems, and the short-term inability to substitute one fuel for another. (Slides 2-11)
  2. What the short-term financial impacts might be (Slides 12-17).
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Slide 1

I have written about Limits to Growth previously. See this post for a longer version of why I believe we are reaching limits to growth. A PDF version of the slides can be found at this link: Financial Impacts of Reaching Limits to Growth. Continue reading

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Understanding our Economic Trajectory – 1952 to Today

This is a guest post by “Shunyata.” Shunyata has training in financial engineering, actuarial science, statistics, and mechanical engineering. While he does not work directly with structural economic theory, his background in financial engineering gives him insights. The observations below represent Shunyata’s personal opinions based on his study of economics and monetary policy to protect his personal interests. This post is not intended to represent investment advice.

Since 1952, US Nominal GDP has grown by about 6% per year. Why did this growth occur?

A. Did the economy discover new efficiencies and/or develop new natural resources?

B. Did Government monetary policy artificially inflate GDP?

C. Did Society borrow against tomorrow to purchase luxuries today? (…meaning that Society borrowed against tomorrow’s GDP to inflate today’s growth.)

Certainly reality is a mixture of all three mechanisms, but is one dominant? We would hope for (A). We can live with (B). But (C) would be troubling.

We can evaluate the impact of monetary policy by examining Real GDP trends. Figure 1 shows Gross GDP divided by CPI to bring everything to 2011 levels.

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Figure 1

Continue reading

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Personal News Items, including Upcoming Talks

Max Keiser Report

Last week, I recorded an interview with Max Kaiser on my post, The United States’ 65-Year Debt Bubble. The post can be found here. The video can be found here.

US Natural Gas Overview

Last week, I also gave a talk to a university class studying peak oil and related issues. A link to the slides (pdf) can be found at this link, US Natural Gas Overview.

Financial Impacts of Reaching ‘Limits to Growth’

On Friday, November 4,  I will be speaking on “Financial Impacts of Reaching ‘Limits to Growth’” at the meeting of the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA in Washington DC. This is a link to my slides (pdf): Financial Impacts of Reaching Limits to Growth. I expect to write up this talk as a post, after the presentation is over.

Oil Limits for Casualty Actuaries

I have spoken at a number of actuarial conferences recently. Next week, on November 7 and 8, I will be speaking at the Casualty Actuarial Society’s Annual Meeting in Chicago. This time, I will be part of a panel, with a woman named Terri Dalenta from Allstate talking more specifically on the insurance aspects. This is a link to my presentation: Reaching Oil Limits in a Finite World.

My Book

While I am at the ASPO-USA meeting in Washington DC later this week, I expect to meet with several folks with respect to my book. We have pretty much decided it needs more of a “Limits to Growth” theme than the title, “Beyond Hubbert: How Limited Oil Supplies Cause Economic Crises” would imply. So hopefully things can be moved forward on this issue.

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