I don't automatically blog about every new report from CNAS, but I am particularly struck by one being issued this week about what future defense budget cuts might be and what their effects might be. Bottom line: They say that if the cuts go beyond about $550 billion, it will be difficult to carry out the basic American policy since World War II of being engaged internationally.

Lotsa people are rattling on these days about defense in an age of austerity, but the report's authors -- retired Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, Nora Bensahel, and Travis Sharp -- do a good job of doing more and showing how the meat will come off the bones. They look at four levels of budget cuts: About $350 billion, about $500 billion, about $650 billion, and about $800 billion.

They don't quite say so, but they seem to favor the first two -- which is significant, because they (at "the Obama Administration's favorite think tank") are saying they could live with $500 billion in cuts. Go much deeper than that, they say, and we start creeping toward isolationism.

The report bursts with provocative thoughts and suggestions. Surprisingly for a study whose lead writer is a retired Army general, it favors the Air Force and Navy over the Army and Marines. It wants to cut both ground forces back to their pre-9/11 sizes. In the deeper cut scenarios, it basically wants the Marines to get out of fixed-wing aviation, both lift and strike. It also wants the Marines out of tanks, and wants the Army to reduce its number of tanks, and to move a lot of the heavy Army force into the Reserves. It wants to radically cut back on buying new weapons, but instead to keep alive R&D until a new threat emerges.

The report also says we will be focusing less on the Middle East in the coming years and more on the Asia/Pacific rim.   

I asked Barno about how the report is going down at the Pentagon. "We did find the Army's reaction a bit more sparky than the other services'," he said. No word yet on whether they are cutting off his pension. Barno also said that operationally, the services are joint, but in budgeting, they have failed to become so.  

Travis Sharp, who reminds me of John Hamre maybe 15 years ago -- someone who really understands the interaction of budget and strategy -- commented that "the services are in a full defensive crouch" right now.

Yesterday I mentioned that I'd heard that the Air Force had decided to close its Strategic Studies Quarterly. Here is a comment on the possible institutional implications of that decision.

By "Alejandro Estéban Teixeira Castillo"
Best Defense guest PME columnist

In times of relative fiscal austerity, organizations are likely to focus on their core competencies, those tasks and processes that define their essence. The American military services have been directed to reduce their projected budgets substantially over the next decade and they, in turn, have been determining where funds have been allocated for nonessential tasks. The USMC, for instance, has determined that it will cut five of its 88 general officer positions and that these billets will be those on the Joint Staff.

As the Services prepare for a peacetime operations tempo, resting, resetting, and renewing their forces for the next conflict, they ought to devote more resources to thinking about how to more effectively and efficiently achieve the political goals of the nation. While certainly commanders' action groups (CAGs), the Service staffs, and the Joint Staff will focus on vision statements and meeting budget caps, they will likely rely on the musings of external thinkers to provide arguments and justifications for their decisions. But where do these ideas come from?

One of the key venues for stimulating thought and presenting arguments to the professional community is the professional journals of the services. The USAF's Air University started this genre when it published its Review in 1947, coinciding with the founding of the USAF as an independent service. As General Muir S. Fairchild's memorandum establishing the Review demonstrated, service leaders at the time realized that a professional journal was essential to shaping the debate about the profession of arms so as to make room for air-centric thinking. The Naval War College followed suit in 1948 with its own Review, perhaps realizing that strategic thought needed to be encouraged at a time when nuclear weapons and fiscal austerity threatened the service's budget. The U.S. Army was a latecomer to this genre, having suffered through being downgraded to a supporting element of national strategy with President Eisenhower's policy of Massive Retaliation and the indignities of the loss in Vietnam. It began publishing Parameters in 1971 so as to help reinvigorate the professionalism of its force and to shape strategic thinking amongst the defense establishment. In doing so, it adopted a more strategic tone than either the Air University Review of the Naval War College Review, and quickly set the standard for the profession.

Read on

I see where a Chinese navy ship tried to confront an Indian navy ship that was steaming off the coast of Vietnam.

Just when you think China is becoming a great power, it starts acting like a chump. Or like an early 19th-century example of unbridled capitalism -- with police beating to death a teenager who was caught near a protest against a land grab involving a Communist Party official who was playing footsie with a real estate developer who was plowing up the graves of locals' ancestors.

And don't forget that Chinese general's 15-year-old son driving a customized BMW without a license. 

Over the weekend I was re-reading a terrific lecture Marine General James Mattis, now head of the Central Command, gave at the Naval Academy in 2004, and was particularly struck by these passages:

...if we are to keep this great big experiment called America alive-and that's all it is, an experiment-we need cocky, macho, unselfish, and morally very straight young men and women to lead our forces against the enemy.

...Okay, it's not a perfect world, but America is worth fighting for on its worst day. So, if you have got the guts to step across that line, as each of you have, then just go out and enjoy the brawl. Just have a damn good time. Train your men well. Go beat the crap out of people who deserve it, and when they throw down their gun, then you have won.

Tom Donnelly responds to the British official.

By Tom Donnelly
Best Defense directorate of American exceptionalism

I'm all for taking Slim as a model, but he was much more the exception to the rule rather than the logical product of the interwar British system of leadership. Remember that the title of his wartime memoir was Defeat Into Victory. It began with an acknowledgement of defeat, and in Slim's case -- for he helped to rescue the remnants of the Indian Army on its retreat through Southeast Asia -- something he saw at close hand. Unlike the officers who planned strategy and led British forces in the region, Slim did not underestimate the abilities of the Japanese.

Two further observations. Another way in which Slim differed from the norm of British pre-war officers was his appreciation of the fighting potential of the Indians, Burmese, Malayans -- even, occasionally, Australians -- who actually comprised the bulk of his force. He was a big proponent and practioner of what we now call "Building Partner Capacity." His
predecessors emphatically were not. Secondly, he knew how to win a long, hard slog. His brilliance was more reflected in perseverance than in lightning maneuver; he did practice a kind of "mission command," and was, for example, more forgiving of Orde Wingate and his raiders than most British senior officers, but he was in no position to conduct a Guderian-like blitzkrieg, a one-campaign war. Rangoon only fell in May 1945 and the war ended before the campaign to retake Singapore, Operation Zipper, began. The Japanese were ground down, at terrible cost.

And Slim's actions when he became British chief of staff were to shake up the system. He took over from Bernard Montgomery, who, true to form, used the occasion of the change of command to whine about things. Slim's response: "What have YOU done?!" A succinct but scathing indictment of the British system of leadership.

Tom Donnelly just is, OK?

That's what I am hearing on the PME street. Anyone know more about this?

If it is true, I would say this is the very beginning of a long round of cuts. I suspect the U.S. military is on the verge of several years of head-spinning cuts. For example, I've heard talk of big cuts in ground forces...

Not a good sign if the Kurdish militia is stepping to in the province as the Americans are heading for the exits.

This seems to me not to be not quite part of our recent Auftragstaktik discussion, but it sure is related to it, because both are about the issue of how senior leaders handle their subordinates.

By Col. Michael Shaler, USA (Ret.)
Best Defense guest personnel issues columnist

Leaders at all levels in the Army play a crucial role in the retention of high potential junior leaders -- but leaders at the battalion level and above, because of their experience and 'reach' in the institution -- play an absolutely crucial role.

The Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors; DA Civilians at Grade GS-12 and above; Chief Warrant Officers 4 and 5; Command Sergeants Major and First Sergeants have the opportunity and the duty of identifying those with above average potential and taking part in their further development. This does not in any way diminish the responsibilities of all these leaders for the development of all the Soldiers and leaders entrusted to their care - but the focus on retention of high-potential junior leader is the subject of this discussion.

Some suggestions for leaders include:

1. Understand the leadership climate in your organization.

Develop methods for assessing (and re-assessing periodically) the leadership climate existent in your organization. Be alert for 'toxic leaders' and take necessary action.

2. Engage your subordinate leaders.

Understand the decision process that these junior leaders are involved in, provide advice where appropriate, and timely encouragement. Listen carefully and use your deeper set of experiences to clarify the situation. Understand how your position in the organization will affect the perceptions of 'approachability.'

3. Make timely decisions and communicate them clearly.

4. Demand ethical behavior and honest reporting.

5. Build and maintain the TEAM.

6. Clearly articulate the standards of the organization.

7. Maintain full involvement in the Senior Rating process.

Assessing performance, identifying talent, and ensuring the institution fully understands the situation are essential to the long-term health of the Army. The performance counseling and feedback associated with the appraisal process are key components of the leader development process.

8. Focus on the Future. The task of 'Creating the Future' of the U.S. Army is a task that is widely shared -- and it begins with ensuring that the available talent pool for selecting future leaders is composed of the very best junior leaders we can retain.

Mike Shaler served 30 years as an Armor Officer and established the Steamboat Leadership Institute in 1993. This column is excerpted from a longer essay, reachable here.