Lessons from the 1995 Chicago heat wave.
Fuller Park, on the South Side, saw the equivalent of 92 heat-related deaths per 100,000 residents, the highest rate in Chicago. In Woodlawn, the ratio was 73 heat-related deaths per 100,000 people. Of the top 10 community areas with heat-related deaths adjusted to a population of 100,000 people, 8 were overwhelmingly African-American, with 5 of those communities being 99 percent black.
At the same time, Latinos in Chicago fared much better than other racial groups, according to Klinenberg. They represented just 2 percent of the heat-related deaths that year, but 23 percent of the city's total population.
Klinenberg offers two primary reasons to explain this, and he compares adjacent communities on the Southwest Side--North Lawndale and South Lawndale, or Little Village, to make his case. North Lawndale and Little Village were in 1995 black and Latino areas, respectively, as they are today.
For all the challenges a working class, immigrant-heavy neighborhood like Little Village faced in 1995, it had not had to grapple with what Klinenberg calls the "particular constraints of ghettoization," as had black residents of Chicago. Those constraints left a frayed social fabric in poor black neighborhoods bearing the burden of "rapid and continuous abandonment of institutions and residents ... arson and violence." A "local social ecology" that could have protected seniors--that did protect seniors elsewhere--was destroyed.
Background on the media response back then, from Steve:
"The Tribune also says today that the city 'came under severe scrutiny' for its handling of the 1995 heat wave. Really? Not by the local media, according to Klinenberg's exhaustively researched book, published in 2002. It was Klinenberg, not the local press, who reported nauseating nuggets like this one from a 'key member' of the Department of Health:
"'When Daley denied the Chief Medical Examiner's reports, he defined everything that the city would do on this for the next six months. You have to understand, there were nine refrigerated trucks holding bodies in the parking lot of the morgue, a long line of police cars delivering more, and there is the mayor - mayor of the third-largest city in the United States - denying that people were dying, or later denying that the deaths had anything to do with the heat. Imagine what the mayor's position on the heat wave did for the morale of other city employees and city agencies, or how it limited their capacity to do their work. Once the mayor took the position that the death rates were overstated it became impossible for city employees to say anything else. We were forced to find all sorts of ways to reframe the issue or to talk around what was happening. We couldn't contest his position, and in this case that meant we couldn't be fully explicit about what we were finding.'
This is the kind of weather makes even people with adequate options to cool off go Gaius-Baltar, fighting-with-the invisible-aliens-in-your-head crazy, so add in chronic neglect of the parts of the city Michigan and Wisconsin don't visit, and you've got a recipe for disaster not just once but over and over again.
A.





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