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Passive-Aggressive Nonviolence

You have heard it was said, “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.” But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. (Matthew 5:38-41)

Jesus’ prohibition on retribution in the Sermon on the Mount has received various defences against charges that it encourages passivity. Perhaps most frequently, the admonition to “turn the other cheek” is said to be the victim’s invitation to the aggressor to “man up” and strike the victim in such a way that indicates a degree of respect, that is, not with the back of the hand. As someone unqualified to comment on how the cultural practices of the ancient Near East might inform the interpretation of Scripture, however, I have noticed something else about these admonishments. Each one is not merely an act of nonresistance, but also an invitation to the aggressor to continue their actions with ways that leave them susceptible to legal prosecution.

The admonition to “turn the other cheek” would seem to invite further assault against the victim. But this might well have consequences for the aggressor. Should the victim be killed by the second strike, the aggressor would obviously be on the hook for murder. But even if the victim was injured severely enough to prevent him or her from working, the aggressor would be responsible for making up the wages lost by the victim during coalescence, as well as covering any medical or other costs incurred during the victim’s recovery, as per Exodus 21:18-19.

The case of the coat and the cloak also involves putting the aggressor on the wrong side of the law. Suing somebody for an article of clothing is a rather strange practice on the surface of it. However, when dealing with subsistence farmers such as were common among Jesus’ audience, it makes sense to think that the coat was being treated as security for a financial sum, rather than an end in itself. According to the terms of the suit, the plaintiff might have kept the defendant’s coat until the defendant had repaid his or her debt to the plaintiff. The defendant likely possessed very few liquid assets if most of his or her wealth was tied up in land or commercial apparatus. The coat would then be held by the plaintiff as collateral until the defendant was able to repay the plaintiff in cash. Accepting a person’s cloak (rather than a coat) as security was subject to strict conditions under Jewish law (Exodus 22:26-27 and Deuteronomy 24:12-13, 17). If the plaintiff accepted the defendant’s cloak, he or she would be forced to visit the defendant every day in the morning and the evening so that the defendant could sleep in the cloak at night. Again, Jesus’ suggested response threatens the aggressor with legal liability.

The matter of going the extra mile, as is well established, refers to the Roman practice of impressment, or angaria, in which civilians could be forced to carry soldiers’ equipment for a certain distance, generally believed to be a mile and no more. An example of this is found in the Passion account, when Simon of Cyrene is impressed to carry the cross of Jesus (Matthew 27:32, Mark 15:21, Luke 23:26). The Roman government made some attempt to punish soldiers who abused their powers of impressment, in an effort to contain the popular displeasure spawned by the practice. [source] As a result, someone who went the extra mile would undermine Roman efforts to make themselves out to be tolerable rulers, and therefore put the soldier in question at some risk of punishment.

The common thread tying these three examples of nonresistance together is that they are really only superficially non-resistant. In fact, all three are passive-aggressive moves, egging the aggressors on to extend their actions to reprehensible, illegal levels. The inclusion of the third example suggests that this isn’t just a response to Jewish law and culture in particular, but rather to legal and social systems in general. This passive-aggressive pattern of nonresistance appears elsewhere in the New Testament, too. Paul cites Proverbs 25:21-22 in his exhortations to Christians to refrain from avenging themselves, saying that  by treating their enemies well they “will heap burning coals on their heads” (Romans 12:20). Whether this is a reference to shame or damnation doesn’t matter; either interpretation is still transparently passive-aggressive.

Even Jesus’ death and resurrection bears marks of the passive-aggressive. Jesus’ cryptic answers to the interrogating authorities and his non-response to many of the questions asked of him are classic traits of passive-aggressive behaviour. Moreover, the whole business of letting his enemies kill him, and then shrugging off and subverting their murderous attacks on him by rising from the dead, is perhaps the most theatrically outrageous passive-aggressive response to oppression ever recorded.

Perhaps this suggests a model for people looking to practice resistance to injustice without recourse to violence.

Published in: on February 11, 2011 at 00:59  Comments (1)  
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Separated at Birth?

How the origins of the Mennonite Brethren and the General Conference Mennonite Churches account for their differences

The year 1860 was a momentous year for Mennonites. The fires of revival had permeated the insular Mennonite settlements, and there was an appetite for change among some members of the old Mennonite churches. Desiring to follow God’s commands more closely, wishing to keep fellowship with like-minded brothers and sisters in the faith, and being thwarted in these desires by the intransigence of existing church structures, documents were drawn up and signed which established a new body of believers, within the Mennonite tradition but clearly distinct from the churches from whence they came.

The reader of the description above, if not tipped off by the title of this piece, might be forgiven for thinking that the text describes a single movement. In fact, it applies to two church bodies: the Mennonite Brethren (MB’s), formed in Russia, and the General Conference of Mennonite Churches (GC’s), formed in North America. Yet despite the historical parallels between the two groups, they have not been famous for their unity and collegiality. Rather, they have been known to identify themselves in opposition to one another in the North American context. This can be traced to various factors surrounding the birth of the two movements. Specifically, the Mennonite Brethren were born of a separatist impulse in an autocratic political context, whereas the General Conference was the fruit of an ecumenical impulse in a democratic political context.

A comparison of two early accounts of the origins of the two movements will begin to illustrate this point. H. P. Krehbiel, an eminent figure in the General Conference, published a two-volume history of the General Conference in 1898. This account was only 38 years removed from the founding of the conference, and was partially the product of the recollections of its founders as recounted to the author.[1]

The origins of the conference system in North America in Krehbiel’s account were in a trio of local conferences of Mennonite ministers in Pennsylvania, the first being the Franconia conference, founded in 1760. He described them as “local in nature … their deliberations also were of but local interest.”[2] Krehbiel was critical of these early conferences, saying that “In character these conferences were not progressive but conservative, not constructive but purifying, not tolerant but exclusive … Erroneously it was held that union must rest on an absolute likeness in doctrine and customs.”[3] Factionalism wrested many Mennonite churches apart, and drove many Mennonites into other faith traditions. Such conditions persisted up until the mid-nineteenth century.[4]

However, 1855 saw the formation of the Conference Council of the United Mennonite Community of Canada West and Ohio for the purpose of facilitating coordinated evangelical work. Though it was still a regional body, the Canada-Ohio Conference was born out of an inter-Mennonite ecumenical influence.[5] Moreover, while Krehbiel didn’t mention it, the timing of the event coupled with its being driven by evangelism suggests that it may well have been influenced by the Second Great Awakening of ten years earlier. Mission work also drove the formation of a similar conference among Mennonites in Iowa in 1859.[6] These groups would be the nucleus of the later General Conference.

Indeed, it was the Iowans who hosted the first General Conference of the Mennonite Church of North America on May 28-29, 1860. The resolutions of that first conference addressed two general principles. Six resolutions addressed the ecumenical nature of the conference, allowing for “minor” differences between member congregations, setting up demanding scriptural standards for heresy charges and excommunications, and allowing members of individual congregations at odds with that congregation’s beliefs and customs to transfer their membership without hindrance to another congregation within the conference. A second set of resolutions established co-operation regarding missionary and publishing activity, as well as provisions for establishing a denominational school.[7]

Krehbiel’s summary of the particular nature of the General Conference provides an early example of the self-conception of the General Conference church. His six point list includes admission to all churches who follow the teachings of Menno Simons; opposing divisions among Mennonites; and that the conference not rule over individual congregations, but rather coordinate missionary work.[8]

The origins of the Mennonite Brethren share a revivalist history with the General Conference, but otherwise the two stories are rather different. Jacob P. Bekker, one of the eighteen signers of the Document of Secession that marked the beginning of the Mennonite Brethren, began recording his recollections of the secession and founding of the denomination in 1890, eight years before Krehbiel’s account was published.[9] These were translated and published as Origins of the Mennonite Brethren Church in 1973.

Bekker described the Mennonites in the settlements in Russia as particularly dissolute, especially in their opposition to bible societies and tolerance for alcohol production and consumption. However, they came into contact with the Lutheran minister Eduard Wüst, a minister to a group of separatist, millennialist Lutherans who had settled near the Mennonites in Württemberg. Wüst’s preaching drove various heterodox beliefs out of the Württembergers, and he proceeded to begin preaching among the neighbouring Mennonites, where he taught repentance and conversion.[10] (Wüst himself was influenced by the American Methodist minister Wilhelm Nast in the mid-1840’s,[11] thereby connecting him with the Second Great Awakening.) Wüst’s preaching led to various conversions, as well as revived church leadership in the village of Gnadenfeld. Many converts concluded in light of their experiences with Wüst and the ministers from Gnadenfeld that the ministers elsewhere were “spiritually blind.”[12]

After Wüst died in 1859, a group of people influenced by his teaching, including Bekker and some other Mennonites, concluded that “[w]e could no longer feel justified in observing communion with an apostate church membership. By the breaking of bread together, we were testifying that we were one body with the unconverted and godless”.[13] This went beyond Wüst’s teaching; in fact, Bekker criticized Wüst himself for administering communion to the reprobate. They therefore practiced communion separately from the larger church. This led to persecution; Bekker describes converted wives being beaten by unconverted husbands, and people being put out of the church for practicing separate communion. Several leaders of the converted group then met at Elisabethtal and signed a letter of secession on January 6, 1860. This is considered the founding date of the Mennonite Brethren church.[14]

Bekker went on to describe that the first response of the elders of the Mennonite church was to turn the seceded members over to the Russian government for prosecution under a law banning secret societies. Thirty-two men were imprisoned.[15]

The Mennonite Brethren also adopted the practice of baptism by immersion, seeing the alternative as invalid and thus submitting to rebaptism by immersion.[16] Bekker recounted facing violent opposition from both Mennonite civil authorities and local mobs.[17] Consequently, the Mennonite Brethren, though they lived among other Mennonites, were alienated from the Mennonite church, and cooperated with the Baptists in the area in such concerns as missionary work.[18]

A comparison of the accounts of Krehbiel and Bekker of the origins of the General Conference and Mennonite Brethren illuminates several similarities between the two groups, but also a good many differences. Both groups were the product of revivals, were critical of perceived faults and deadness in the pre-existing Mennonite churches, and were in some way connected with the Second Great Awakening. However, at that point the similarities of the two accounts end. Krehbiel saw the uniting nature of the General Conference as a solution to the undue fractiousness and factionalism of the Mennonite churches. Bekker understood separation, rather than unity, to be the appropriate response to the problems in the then-united Mennonite church (the Kleine Gemeinde notably excepted). Where Krehbiel saw churches being unreasonably strict in matters of doctrine, Bekker saw the church being unacceptably lax in tolerating unrighteous living among its members.

It is also worth noting that these two accounts illustrate that the institutional choices made by the two reforming groups mirrored the political systems of their host countries. The General Conference arose in the democratic contexts of the United States of America and Canada West, where religious toleration was the norm and the state did not regulate religious practice. In the same way, the General Conference explicitly promised to tolerate any particular or unique practices that might be present among its constituent congregations. The Mennonite Brethren, in contrast, arose in the last years of feudalism in Russia; the state regulated and restricted the exercise of minority religions such as the Mennonites. This, coupled with legal difficulties in establishing a government-approved church and resistance from neighbouring Mennonites, is likely to have contributed to the Mennonite Brethren’s adoption of relatively rigorous institutional forms from their very beginning.

The ecclesial contexts of the two movements should also be distinguished. The Mennonites in Russia appeared to be organized and united, even if only through state-mandated bodies existing to govern the Mennonite colonies. In North America, the Mennonites were known for their atomization and lack of cooperation between congregations. As a result, the two bodies pushed in opposite directions on the question of church unity. Advocates of the General Conference wished to refrain from passing judgment on the practices of other congregations in order to foster unity. Contrariwise, it was disgust with the practices of existing churches that led to the founding of the Mennonite Brethren as a protest against an institutional unity that tolerated unacceptable conduct.

The distinctions outlined above are not merely factors in the history of the two groups. The historiography of the two denominations has reinforced the postures present at the foundings of the two movements. An article dating to 1956 included in the Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online’s entry on the General Conference states in its evaluation of the contemporary state of the conference that

A … characteristic of the conference was the emphasis on freedom and autonomy—Christian freedom, not license, for the individual, and autonomy for the congregation. Each believer stood before God Himself in faith as a free individual, uncoerced by other believers.[19]

Elsewhere, the same article describes the polity of the General Conference as resembling that of the Baptists and the Congregationalists more than any other non-Mennonite group – that is, General Conference polity was essentially congregationalist.[20] This may well be a reflection of the influence of American religion in general. It also offers a contrast with the Mennonite Brethren, whose style of church governance was more presbyterian.

Some years later, in 1975, Samuel Floyd Pannabecker’s Open Doors: A History of the General Conference Mennonite Church captured in its title the continuing emphasis on openness within the self-understanding of the General Conference. He described “broad powers of local congregational control and hearty cooperation in matters of mutual concern.”[21] Pannabecker went on to describe the contemporary characteristics of the General Conference as consisting of cooperation, congregational independence, wide diversity, free borrowing from the outside (in terms of things like Sunday schools and evangelistic meetings), relative freedom from disruptive controversies, inter-Mennonite activities, and laxity in the exercise of discipline.[22] With the exception of the last point, these characteristics have all been deliberately present since the beginning of the conference. The original Mennonite Brethren were concerned with something like Pannabecker’s last point in their own context, namely that the preservation of the form of unity might serve to obscure un-Christian practices and beliefs within the church.

Rodney J. Sawatsky delivered a series of lectures in 1985, since published, on the occasion of discussions regarding the potential union of the General Conference and the (Old) Mennonite Church, which eventually came to fruition a decade and a half later. Sawatsky therefore engaged in a deliberate comparison of the General Conference with its future partner, and in so doing spelled out many of the distinctives of the conference in its last years. He saw the General Conference being defined by its rejection of the authority of bishops who enforced a sectarian separation from the world, its embrace of the American evangelical activist impulse, a form of unity without uniformity, and “the authority of individual religious experience over against the authority of traditional religious communal conformity”[23] – something he saw as a common thread between the General Conference and the Mennonite Brethren.

The authority of religious experience, however, clearly worked in one primary direction in the General Conference. Specifically, it worked against the principle of the authority of bishops, as was made manifest by the limited powers given to the conference itself. The Mennonite Brethren, however, did not abandon the eldership model they inherited. Rather, they saw the authority of religious experience as a test of the legitimacy of individual elders.

The Mennonite Brethren, like the General Conference, have retained many of the perspectives that launched the denomination in the nineteenth century. Writing in 1987, Peter M. Hamm said of Canadian Mennonite Brethren that they had maintained their original doctrinal beliefs exceptionally well, though their commitment to Anabaptist principles was not so robust. Perhaps most notably for the purpose of this study, Hamm wrote that “empirical measures of ethics [among Canadian Mennonite Brethren] indicate a more restrictive life-style in personal issues than the General Conference Mennonites from whom they seceded”.[24] (Strictly speaking the Mennonite Brethren did not secede from the General Conference, but most members of the Mennonite church from which the Mennonite Brethren originated joined the General Conference after immigrating to North America.) This may indicate that the Mennonite Brethren insistence on purity in ethics was rather persistent, or that General Conference teachings about personal autonomy and accountability took precedence over cultivating particular ethical behaviours.

Hamm also found that “widespread involvement in leadership roles guarded against hierarchy; yet distinctly local and national leaders give its [the Mennonite Brethren’s] many organizational structures needed directives.”[25] This suggests that rather than adopting the congregationalist polity of the General Conference, Mennonite Brethren have cultivated a broad-based but presbyterian polity, one that in that respect resembles that of the original Mennonite Brethren as well as the antecedent Mennonite churches in Russia.

Somewhat earlier, in 1975, John A. Toews’ A History of the Mennonite Brethren Church noted that the Mennonite Brethren viewed themselves as a whole as a church, rather than seeing individual congregations as churches. This was, he said, the result of “brotherhood-consciousness,” as reflected by the use of the term “brethren” in the name of the denomination. Toews saw this phenomenon receding when he wrote, and blamed “American individualism” as one of the factors causing this decay.[26] That the General Conference, with its American origins, practiced the congregationalism Toews decried might reasonably be thought to be more than coincidental.

One particularly illuminating historical look at the Mennonite Brethren can be found in Richard Kyle’s 1985 doctoral dissertation, entitled From Sect to Denomination: Church Types and Their Implications for Mennonite Brethren History. Kyle analyzes the Mennonite Brethren in terms of Ernst Troeltsch’s sect-church-denomination typology. In this system, a church is a kind of totalizing, geographically bound social institution along the lines of the Catholic Church in pre-Reformation Europe, a sect is a voluntaristic breakaway group with an emphasis on purity in its distinctives among its members and a denunciation of outsiders as inferior, and a denomination considers itself to be one of many ecclesial vehicles bearing God’s truth. Kyle found that the Mennonite Brethren arose as a sect reacting against a church, evolved into a church themselves, and eventually transformed into a denomination. However, even in their early sectarian period they exhibited qualities of a denomination, in that they were not as exclusivist as a true sect. As a denomination in later years, the Mennonite Brethren still exhibited some sectarian qualities, particularly in their demands for purity in the lives of members.[27]

While Kyle’s evaluation pertained directly to the Mennonite Brethren, the typology he uses invites comparison with the General Conference, if some anachronism may be permitted in matters of classification. The General Conference, with its policies regarding tolerance and internal diversity, always lacked the rigor to be labelled a sect. Similarly, its insistence on the autonomy of individual congregations indicates that it was not a church, either. The General Conference was therefore clearly and intentionally a denomination from the start, one that deliberately resisted the forms of the church and the sect. Given that denominationalism arose as a distinctly English phenomenon that became the standard mode of North American religion,[28] this is hardly surprising and further reinforces the essentially North American nature of the General Conference. The sectarian roots of the Mennonite Brethren, which still coloured Mennonite Brethren experience long after denominational traits became predominant, might explain the more robust doctrinal and ethical unity of the Mennonite Brethren, along with their more vigorous practice of church discipline.

From this study it is then apparent that although the General Conference and the Mennonite Brethren both share certain influences from the Mennonite heritage and nineteenth-century revivalism, their origins and continuing practices placed them on different paths in a number of areas. The General Conference always practiced a congregational polity, taught the importance of autonomy for the Christian, cooperated primarily in ministry and mission, and believed that churches should be united on the basis of an ecumenical principle. These qualities are reflections of the North American democratic and individualist context in which the General Conference was formed. In contrast, the Mennonite Brethren have been effectively presbyterian, taught Christian brotherhood, were united to establish doctrine as well as do mission and ministry, and believed churches were united by like practices. These stronger mechanisms of control bear the marks of the authoritarian Russian environment in which the Mennonite Brethren came into being. To put it more pithily, the General Conference practiced unity through tolerance, while the Mennonite Brethren practiced unity through consensus. Perhaps these differences might help to explain why the two denominations have been pitted against each other, rhetorically or otherwise, in the past.


[1] Henry Peter Krehbiel, History of the Mennonite General Conference (St. Louis: A. Wiebusch & Son, 1898): vii.

[2] Ibid: 7.

[3] Ibid: 7-8.

[4] Ibid: 8-10.

[5] Ibid: 18-19.

[6] Ibid: 30-32.

[7] Ibid: 56-60.

[8] Ibid; 68-69.

[9] Jacob P. Bekker, Origin of the Mennonite Brethren Church, trans. D. E. Pauls and A. E. Janzen (Hillsboro, KS: Mennonite Brethren Historical Society of the Midwest, 1973): v.

[10] Ibid: 18-25.

[11] Cornelius Krahn, “Wüst, Eduard (1818-1859),” Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online, http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/contents/ wust_eduard_1818_1859 (accessed January 25, 2011).

[12] Jacob P. Bekker, Origin of the Mennonite Brethren Church: 27.

[13] Ibid: 31.

[14] Ibid: 36-41.

[15] Ibid: 48-65, 79.

[16] Ibid: 73.

[17] Ibid: 102-03.

[18] Ibid: 175.

[19] Edmund G. Kaufman and Henry Poettcker, “General Conference Mennonite Church (GCM),” Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online, http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/G4647ME.html (accessed January 25, 2010).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Samuel Floyd Pannabecker, Open Doors: A History of the General Conference Mennonite Church (Newton, KS: Faith in Life Press, 1975): 185.

[22] Ibid: 382-85.

[23] Rodney J. Sawatsky, Authority and Identity: The Dynamics of the General Conference Mennonite Church (North Newton, KS: Bethel College, 1987): 6-7.

[24] Peter M. Hamm, Continuity & Change Among Canadian Mennonite Brethren (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1987): 247-48.

[25] Ibid: 248.

[26] John A. Toews, A History of the Mennonite Brethren Church (Hillsboro, KS: Mennonite Brethren Publishing House, 1975): 372.

[27] Richard G. Kyle, From Sect To Denomination: Church Types and Their Implications for Mennonite Brethren History (Hillsboro, KS: Center for Mennonite Brethren Studies, 1985): 92.

[28] Ibid: 15.

Published in: on January 31, 2011 at 12:10  Leave a Comment  

Plato And Racism

It is common nowadays to argue that racism is a relatively recent invention in human history. It is said to be a creation of European imperialists justifying their conquering, enslaving and colonizing other parts of the world. It was necessary, the argument goes, that the Christian conquerors of the Americas and enslavers of Africans needed to provide justification for the economically profitable subhuman treatment of the diverse people they encountered. Since European colonial adventurers tended to stake their claims in non-neighbouring lands, on account of Europe being hemmed in by the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the robust Islamic world, and Orthodox Russia, they found the peoples there to be different in appearance as well as in customs, languages, religion, and other practices. By making white, Christian Europeans into the paragon of humanity, the story goes, the colonial powers could justify paternalism and exploitation of the indigenous populations, who were “less than human” and not worthy of the same respect as another European.

All of this is true in so far as it describes how Europeans constructed justifications for treating non-Europeans as inferior. But it simply does not describe any sort of meaningfully new phenomenon.

The  following excerpt is from Plato’s Republic, Book V, page 469.

First take slavery. Is it right that Greek states should sell Greeks into slavery? Ought they not rather to do all they can to stop this practice and substitute the custom of sparing their own race, for fear of falling into bondage to foreign nations?

That would be better, beyond all comparison.

They must not, then, hold any Greek in slavery themselves, and they should advise the rest of Greece not to do so.

Certainly. Then they would be more likely to keep their hands off one another and turn their energies against foreigners.

Page 470:

Is it not also reasonable to assert that the Greeks are a single people, all of the same kindred and alien to the outer world of foreigners?

Yes.

Then we shall speak of war when Greeks fight with foreigners, whom we may call their natural enemies. But Greeks are by nature friends of Greeks, and when they fight, it means Hellas is afflicted by dissension which ought to be called civil strife.

Substitute “Greeks” for “whites” and this text reads like the most detestable white supremacist literature out there. Plato’s Greece and European Christendom are similar in other pertinent respects, too. Both were political disunities, filled with many states that warred amongst themselves, yet had a common religion and antagonism towards barbarians (Macedonians or Lithuanians, for example) and strong, neighbouring empires (Persian and Islamic, respectively). In both cases visionary figures dreamed of civilization that, if not unified, at least enjoyed fraternal relations among its constituent states. Both regarded “barbarians” or “savages” as inferior. In Europe the advocates of such figures are well known; in ancient Greece, Aristotle held these views.

This shows the problem with claims that racism is an invention of modern Europe. Unfortunately such viewsare all too widespread, and obscure demonstrably universal tendencies towards racism. For example, in a recent book review, J. Kameron Carter, author of the widely praised 2008 book Race: A Theological Account, writes that

We must remember that it was a form of theology … that gave birth to the modern/colonial/racial world in the 15th and 16th centuries, which then perfected itself in the 19th and 20th centuries when modern knowledges were consolidated as Wissenschaften.

Here Carter as theologian appropriately looks for historical antecedents to the racial thinking that arose in early modern Europe in theology. However, his statement is only accurate inasmuch as it is understood as referring specifically to the particular kind of racism that first arose in early modern Europe. This particular form of racism is conspicuous in its effects around the world today, and is certainly something worth studying, understanding, and fighting. However, if someone reads it and understands that “racism happened for the first time in 15th and 16th century Europe,” that person has believed wrongly. (In this case, it is also wrong to believe that Christian or monotheistic faith is what leads to racism, given that Plato was neither.) In fact, I believe this particular historical error is based on a racist assumption. It fundamentally depends on the myth of the “noble savage,” that superior, “natural” person untainted by Western civilization. That belief itself depends on a sort of “Western exceptionalism,” in which European civilization has produced a people fundamentally more developed than their counterparts in the rest of the world. Inverting this exceptionalism to claim that that development was a bad thing may be helpful in reducing bigotry, but it perpetuates prejudicial treatment of non-whites and thus reinforces racial categorization.

Racism is not, in fact, something all that different from what gets called “tribalism” when practiced on a smaller scale. Most people have, on some level, greater solidary with some sort of “in-group” defined over and against a group viewed as being “other.” Racism locates this all but universal human instinct specifically in ethnicity rather than (though sometimes coupled with) language, religion, city, or state. But it isn’t as unique as it’s made out to be. And since it is but a particular manifestation of a common prejudice, it is appropriate to treat it seriously without viewing it as some sort of historical anomaly.

Published in: on October 5, 2010 at 09:34  Comments (10)  
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Canon and Apostolic Succession

I’ve been thinking for some time about the authority of the Bible, which was assumed in my previous post about Mennonite theological trumps. In particular, I’ve been thinking of the Roman Catholic critique of the Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura, on the grounds that the Christian scriptures are a product of the church. The church was responsible for producing the constituent documents of the New Testament, and was also responsible for determining the canon. Moreover, the canon was formed hundreds of years after the church’s beginnings, which demonstrates that the church is not dependent on the canon for its existence. How, then, can scripture be held up as the church’s single most authoritative teaching when it was not available for the earliest formative years of the church’s existence?

Protestants use the Bible, along with creeds and confessions, to determine who and what is inside or outside Christian orthodoxy. In the early church, this function was played to a significant degree by the phenomenon of apostolic succession. For instance, the First Epistle of Clement, from the late first or early second century, charged that the removal of church elders in Corinth who had committed no moral crime was improper, because those elders had been appointed by apostles. The understanding was that the true Christian faith was received. Therefore, if you can trace the passage of your received faith back to Jesus’ original apostles, you were assured that you had received the true faith. If you could not trace your faith to Jesus, it was clearly received from elsewhere, and was therefore not authentically Christian. The Catholic and Orthodox churches still hold to this sort of doctrine.

This essentially made orthodox Christianity dependent on an oral tradition, rather than a written one. Sure, there were Christian texts circulating, but they did not define the Christian community  in the way that, say, the Qu’ran defined Islam in the years immediately following the death of Mohammed. The problem with being dependent on an oral tradition is that these traditions do not remain reliable over time. For example, even by the second century, Christian leaders firmly situated within the apostolic tradition were making errors regarding the life of Jesus. For instance, Irenaeus believed Jesus lived to be around 50 years old. He may well have been sincere, but he was also mistaken. This particular error does not imperil the core message of the Christian Gospel. But it does demonstrate that factual error had crept into the apostolic tradition by roughly the halfway point between the foundation of the church and the establishment of the canon at Nicaea.

The brilliance of the canon, then, is to establish an acceptable record of the earliest form of the apostolic tradition. Rather than leaving the church reliant on the traditions of a clergy growing ever more chronologically distant from the roots of the faith, the canon offers a view of early Christian tradition against which later traditions can be brought to measure. Even if the canon is not an exhastive record of the original Christian tradition, it arguably contains the most essential elements. More usefully, it became possible to use the canon to discern whether a particular tradition was in keeping with the earliest tradition, or whether it was an accretion. If it turned out to be an accretion, it could then be thrown out.

As a doctrine of Scripture, I prefer this view to one that gives the Bible authority because it is “God-breathed” or contains “the very words of God” or other such things. Such a view turns the Bible into a talisman, a holy object descended from heaven, perfectly and fully formed, like Athena from the forehead of Zeus. (Incidentally, such a view strongly resembles the Islamic understanding of the inspiration of the Qu’ran.) Rather, for the New Testament at least, its authority is derived from its historicity. If Jesus is really the Son of God who came to live, die, and be resurrected among us, thereby saving us from sin and death, then any record we have of him is vitally important and authoritative. And since we have none of his own writings, it is imperative that we take seriously the records of those who knew him, followed him, and learned from him.

And so, along with the Roman Catholics, I accept that the New Testament is a deeply human document, one that postdates the church and is not constitutive of it. However, because I accept its substantial veracity, I hold along with the Protestants that it stands above the church as a fixed guide and authority and prophetic witness. It is a standard against which we do well to judge ourselves against, and one to which we should not append even questionably contrary traditions lightly.

Two Mennonite Theological Trumps

Christian theology is an enormous subject, in which a great number of clearly contradictory claims are made. Christian communities have therefore decided that certain principles, ecclesial bodies and processes, or doctrines play a crucial role in determining the admissibility, faithfulness, or orthodoxy of a broader set of theological claims. For instance, Roman Catholicism places its Magisterium in a gate-keeping theological role, while many Protestant traditions under the influence of sola scriptura will give particular weight to certain doctrines derived from the Bible. For example, Lutheran thought gives primacy to the importance of faith, while Reformed types give a similar governing authority to doctrines of God’s sovereignty.

As a Mennonite, I believe that we, too, have historically developed a set of “theological trumps.” This post is an effort to outline what I understand these trumps to be.

The Anabaptist movement was labelled the “Radical Reformation” at least in part because of its particularly close embrace of the sola scriptura doctrine, and thus the Mennonite trumps bear little resemblance to the magisterial authority of Catholicism. However, that particularly close hewing to the Biblical text precluded the development of doctrinal trumps as sophisticated as those used by the early continental reformers, either. Rather than determine a central set of doctrines or a guiding body, the Mennonites have developed two central principles around which their theology is built: The centrality of Jesus, and the elevation of plain readings of Biblical texts.

The centrality of Jesus has considerable currency outside the Mennonite world. One particularly conspicuous example of this sort of Christocentrism as a theological trump can be found in Tony Campolo’s book Red Letter Christians: A Citizen’s Guide to Faith and Politics. The actual content of the book is not so important to this argument as the label itself. It is a reference to those printed editions of the Bible in which the words of Jesus are printed in red. Campolo’s label, then, says that Jesus is the most important part of Christianity. Obvious as this may sound, there are real differences present in the Christian faith. Martin Luther, for instance, is said to have favoured the epistles of Paul over the synoptic Gospels as being of greater importance for Christians, on account of the more “theological” text contained therein. (What this really says is that Luther, an academic by training, wasn’t comfortable with finding meaning or significance in narrative texts. The same can be said for many other scholarly Christians, including Calvin.) What this means in practice is that if two competing beliefs or practices are being considered, and one can be justified by Bible texts closer to Jesus, than that option is the preferred one, all other things being equal. This notion of proximity creates a hierarchy of authority within the Bible, or as it is sometimes said, a “canon within the canon.” While materials from the Gospels are arguably the most important, it also justifies elevating the New Testament above the Old in importance, since the New Testament was written in the light of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection.

The second trump, that of giving precedence to plain readings of the Bible, is perhaps less common in the broader Christian community. Probably the most prominent contemporary group espousing similar principles might be various forms of Christianity labelled Fundamentalist, expressed in the slogan “God said it – I believe it – That settles it.” Again, the particular beliefs of contemporary Fundamentalists are not important to understanding this principle. (In fact, the common Fundamentalist conceit that they hold a “flat reading of scripture,” privileging no part above another, is egregiously false. It serves to hide the Fundamentalists’ own theological trumps from themselves.) This principle might be illustrated as follows.

Suppose that the Bible contains the statement in passage Q, “Do not do X.” Suppose a theological argument is made in which passages A, F, R, and W, which do not explicitly mention X, can be synthesized to provide a justification for doing X, after which passage Q is argued to be irrelevant, or conditional, or an adaptation to a particular (and by implication, past) time. According to this second Mennonite theological trump, the explicit message of passage Q is more important than the “Rube Goldberg theology” constructed from passages A, F, R, and W, and that it is therefore wrong for Christians to do X.

To put it another way, Mennonite theology is suspicious of theological arguments that are equivalent to a Rube Goldberg machine, using a great number of complex arguments, sources, and readings, when a simpler option is available. Instead, Mennonites take Occam’s Razor to theology, preferring the simplest possible readings and arguments that will adequately account for the relevant witness of scripture.

To illustrate, the peace position of Mennonites is obviously preferable to Christian just-war theory on the basis of both of these theological trumps. Whereas the just-war theory relies on heavy weighting of Old Testament conquest and warfare narratives and certain statements of Paul in particular regarding the appropriate Christian relationship with the state, the peace position can appeal directly to the words of Jesus contained in the Sermon on the Mount and other places in the Gospels. The peace position’s key texts can therefore be placed closer to Jesus than those of the just-war theory.

Similarly, the just-war theory generalizes from particular war stories in the Old Testament that war may be something God calls his people to in the present, and extrapolates from Paul’s and Jesus’s none-too-specific directives to give due respect to the government that Christians have an obligation to obey their governments. Meanwhile, the peace position claims that Jesus’ commands to abstain from violence and Jesus’s and Paul’s commands to renounce vengeance mean rather simply to not exercise violence or vengeance upon other people, a position which precludes being a soldier.

Clearly, some theological questions are more difficult to resolve using these hermeneutical principles as theological trumps. Questions regarding the roles of women, for instance, may square certain plain misogynist Biblical commands against Biblical narratives in which women are plainly treated as equals with men, or perhaps even treated with special privilege. It also may well serve to de-emphasize certain questions of Christian theology. Arguments regarding the Trinity and Jesus’ human and divine nature, for instance, are without exception extraordinarily complex and inferential. On that basis, they might be treated as being of relatively little importance by Mennonites, except perhaps as a sort of inherited shibboleth. I’m hoping to explore some of these thornier questions in future posts.

I’d also like to hear from people who would argue that Mennonites don’t actually think as I’ve described here, as well as from people who think that this set of theological trumps is inappropriate or problematic.

Published in: on September 22, 2010 at 20:14  Comments (17)  

Exploring a theodicy of creation

Lately I’ve been struggling with questions of why God would even bother to create a world so thoroughly shot through with pain, suffering, sin and evil. This post, then, is a record of how I’ve been processing these thoughts. They are patterned after the style of the arguments in the Summa Theologica of Thomas Aquinas not because I think I am thinking on that level, but rather because that particular form is one I find helpful for organizing my thoughts.

Does creation demonstrate that God is good?

Objection 1. God created humanity in their own image, as an overflowing of God’s fundamental goodness. (Genesis 1, Aquinas.) Sin and suffering entered the world through the actions of humans. (Genesis 3) Therefore, the image of God is responsible for the presence of evil in the world.

Objection 2. The new creation is claimed to be free of suffering. (Revelation 21:4) If such a creation is possible, there is no reason why the first creation should not have been omitted and the new creation should have been the first one. The second creation has a stronger claim to being good than the first one, which is itself called good. (Genesis 1) Therefore the existence of the first creation is evidence of an incompleteness of God’s goodness, since it is not the best example of what God could do.

Objection 3. Furthermore, it is clear that God is not principally concerned with quantitative matters, but with qualitative ones. God is not simple in terms of God’s own quantity; while God clearly asserts the unity of the Godhead (Deuteronomy 6:4), God is also referred to as plural (Genesis 1) and is understood by Christians to subsist of three persons (Nicene creed). Moreover, it is the qualitative characteristics of one’s actions, rather than their quantitative ones, which are generally indicative of their goodness (Acts 5:1-11). Therefore, even if one allows that souls must be formed in this creation in order to inhabit the next, permitting the passage of time to allow for the creation of a greater number of redeemable human souls is not any sort of reasonable grounds for God to allow creation to persist in its present, fallen form.

Objection 4. The Scriptures tend to abandon rational argument and instead appeal to authority when God’s goodness is questioned. (Job 38-41, Romans 9:19-24) A rational person might therefore conclude that in light of these problematic characteristics of God’s creation, the creation is not good in spite of God’s declarations to the contrary. (Genesis 1) And if creation is not intrinsically and thoroughly good, God may not be intrinsically and thoroughly good either, if it is appropriate to judge God by God’s own standard. (Ezekiel 24:14, 36:19; Matthew 7:2)

I answer that, if it is true that God is primarily concerned with qualitative characteristics rather than quantitative ones, then it is the qualitative nature of goodness and evil that is crucial to this problem. The relative quantities of goodness and evil are therefore not helpful distinctions in terms of what they say about God. If it is assumed that sin is privation, a distortion or deficiency in goodness without any independent being or ontological status, then the presence of evil does not in any way negate the presence of goodness. Moreover, if evil is a distortion or deficiency of goodness, its presence indicates the commensurate presence of goodness. (Romans 5:20) The existence of goodness, in any quantity or state of purity, is therefore sufficient grounds for divinely ordained existence.

Reply Objection 1. Since we bear the image of God, we therefore bear the qualities of God. However, as an image we do not necessarily bear these qualities without blemish or in all possible clarity. (1 Corinthians 13:12) This difference allows us to act in ways that are not aligned with the actions appropriate for God, and are consequently evil. Therefore, the implication of God’s image in the introduction of evil to the world does not require that God’s nature is itself responsible for evil.

Reply Objection 2. If God is not principally concerned with quantities, but rather with qualities, then the existence of any goodness whatsoever in a created work is sufficient reason for its creation. The existence of a creation with goodness x does not invalidate another creation with  goodness x/2, because the mere presence of any quantity of goodness is adequate justification for its creation at the hands of a good God.

Reply Objection 3. The allowance of the passage of time to create more human souls is indeed irrelevant to whether the existence of this creation is justified. However, the mere existence of such humans in any quantity, bearers of the image of a good God, is sufficient reason for the existence of this creation, and for the continuing production of such images in human form. For even if the quantity of such images is unimportant, each one that exists is intrinsically valuable for the goodness borne within it.

Reply Objection 4. If the goodness of the Creator allows for less than total goodness in creation, particular instances of evil are not sufficient grounds to question the goodness of the Creator. Complaints about such particular instances, though they may be grounded in real evil, overreach if they claim that such evil is a sufficiently potent contagion as to justify denial of the goodness of the Creator. Evidence for or against the goodness of creation can be founded only in the presence of goodness, rather than its absence. The complaints of Job and the rhetorical interlocutor in Romans may therefore be genuine and valid complaints, but are not sufficient reason to impugn God’s goodness.

The line of argument in this post is by no means something I feel is firmly established. I certainly don’t hold to it dogmatically myself, at least not yet. Comments on whether this seems sound, or the presence of weaknesses or omissions, would be greatly appreciated.

Published in: on July 3, 2010 at 23:20  Leave a Comment  
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Theology Fail: Guns in Churches

From the New Orleans Times-Picayune:

BATON ROUGE — The [Louisiana] Senate revived legislation Tuesday that would allow congregants to carry concealed weapons on church property as part of a security force.

Thank goodness actual church leaders in Louisiana think this is a terrible idea, and the law won’t force churches to tolerate firearms on their property. Still, laws don’t just pop up out of nowhere. Somebody, somewhere, must have lobbied state legislators to put this bill on the order paper. And in a state in which 90% of the population professes Christianity and only 2% belong to other faiths, odds are it was Christians doing this lobbying.

When Christians are claiming the right to defend their own explicitly Christian communities with lethal force, in direct contravention of the explicit instructions of Jesus, we have a massive cultural problem.

Published in: on June 21, 2010 at 13:50  Comments (3)  

This looks like a good one…

Just last month, American professor of religion, culture, and social theory James Davison Hunter’s book To Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the Late Modern World was published by Oxford University Press, and it looks really, really interesting. The book contains three essays. The first points out that culture is not merely formed by individuals or artifacts, as is commonly believed among people agitating for change “from the grassroots,” but also in significant measure by institutions and elites, and that consequently attempts to change culture must be able to work their way into positions of power within these institutions and elite groups. The second essays is a critique of the politicization of three major groupings within American Christianity: the Christian Right, exemplified by James Dobson; the Christian Left, exemplified by Jim Wallace; and, perceptively, what he calls the “neo-Anabaptists,” represented by Stanley Hauerwas. I’ll say more about this bit later. The final essay provides an alternate model for engagement with culture, which Hunter calls “faithful presence” – an endeavour less forceful and teleological than those of the three groups he critiques.

There’s an interview with Hunter about the book in Christianity Today, along with a pair of responses from writers Hunter critiques as well as a review of the book in CT’s sister publication Books & Culture.

Here’s an excerpt from the interview in which Hunter explains why American Christianity is politicized:

All Americans think about power primarily in political terms. We tend to conflate our understanding of public life with political life; they occupy the same symbolic space. Politics involves the mechanisms of the state. Over the course of the 20th century, all Americans—and Christians, not the least—have turned more and more to the state to solve their problems. That’s true for the Left as well as the Right. Since law is the language of the state, we should note that law increases as cultural consensus decreases.

The state is the sole legitimate source of coercion and violence. When Christians turn to law, public policy, and politics as the last resort, they have essentially given up on a desire to persuade their opponents. They want the patronage of the state and its coercive power to rule the day. What makes this problematic, in my view, is that the dominant public witness of the church is political, rooted in narratives of injury and discourses of negation. The sense of deprivation among Christians leads to an ethic of revenge, or what Nietzsche called ressentiment. In different ways and to different degrees, the prevailing political theologies in American society today—the Christian Right, the Christian Left, and even the neo-Anabaptists—partake in that ressentiment and consequent will to power. And here’s the tragic irony: Whenever Christian churches and organizations partake in the will to power, they partake in the very thing they decry in society.

I think there’s probably some good theological grist for the mill here, in terms of how the politicization of Christianity and its resort to law in its public witness is an abandonment of the grace that liberates us from the law (which, after all, brought death).

And, from Andy Crouch’s review of the book in Books & Culture, explaining why the neo-Anabaptists are also implicated in the politicization of Christian thought:

In a trenchant analysis of the three most coherent Christian social movements of our time, he finds a shared fixation on politics, and on power conceived narrowly as political. Exhibit A, of course, is the Christian Right, which perennially survives the predictions of its demise. It is driven by nostalgia for Christian dominance and moral coherence. Exhibit B is the Christian Left, less well-organized but still vigorous, and driven by a desire for economic justice (and abhorrence of the Christian Right).

And Exhibit C, shrewdly presented, is the “neo-Anabaptist” faction carrying on the thought and work of John Howard Yoder, driven by a distrust for the ungodly violence of the market and the state. This last exhibit is Hunter at his best, arguing that in the very ferocity of their dissent from state power and Christian collusion with it, the neo-Anabaptists end up defining themselves in political terms just as much as the partisan movements they seem to oppose.

Ultimately, I think the charge against the neo-Anabaptists probably sticks to Hauerwas better than it does to Yoder. There’s just more of that ressentiment in Hauerwas, and Yoder’s work probably actually provides a model for the “faithful presence” Hunter advocates. But as someone who is immersed in a community that is more aligned with the neo-Anabaptists than anything else, this critique really rang true to me. I constantly hear that the kind of radical peacemaking of Jesus is an act of resistance against the evil empires of the state and big business, and that if we do it right we will “change the world.” This is exactly the kind of Nietzschean ressentiment and will-to-power that drives both the Christian Right and Christian Left.

So I’m hoping to read this one myself, and if I do, I’ll definitely post my thoughts on it when I’m done.

Published in: on May 17, 2010 at 22:59  Comments (3)  

Karma, Reincarnation, and Damnation

Some years ago, I met a man whom I’ll call by his initials, SR. At the time we spoke, he was a pastor at an evangelical Anabaptist congregation in Vancouver, BC. The story of how he came to embrace the Christian faith has fascinated me, and prompted a few pretty significant questions.

SR was born in India. His family was Hindu, of the priestly Brahmin class, and quite privileged. In keeping with family tradition, SR became a Hindu priest and a well-respected member of society. However, he eventually encountered a serious religious dilemma. As a Hindu, he believed in karmic reincarnation – that is, the balance of the good and bad things he did in this life would determine whether he was reincarnated in a higher or lower form. However, he was convinced that he was amassing negative karma in his present life, and was moving away from the goal of existence, which was unity with Brahman, or God. So he began to ask other people he knew if they were amassing positive karma in their present lives, and if so, how they were doing it.

He was very surprised to discover that everyone he spoke with admitted to precisely the same problem (except people who had well-deserved reputations in the community as scoundrels – an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect). Nobody was amassing positive karma! For SR, this brought on a full-blown crisis of faith. If everybody was amassing negative karma, nobody was going to achieve salvation, and everyone was doomed to live progressively worse and worse lives without any chance of escape.

So SR began looking at other religions, since he could find no hope in Hinduism. He considered the other major religions present in India. Though he was relatively favourably disposed towards Buddhism and Sikhism, they also held to karmic reincarnation, and were thus no solution to his problem. He told me he did not even consider Islam because of its violent history in India. This left him considering Christianity. He embraced it because it did not require him to earn his own salvation by the impossible task of being a good person. The sovereign grace of God, manifested in the generous sacrifice and life-giving resurrection of Jesus, allowed him to escape his own bad karma and attain salvation.

What intrigued me about SR’s story was that people readily admitted that they were amassing negative karma. In the West (and presumably the Middle East because Islam and Christianity are quite similar in this regard), the most common religious understandings assume that life is a one-shot chance followed by one of two dramatically different outcomes. It is incredibly rare for people shaped by such beliefs to openly admit that they expect that their evil deeds outweigh their good ones, and that they consequently expect to be damned to hell. But in Hinduism, where the possible outcomes of one’s living are more numerous, generally less severe, and allow the postponement of the attainment of salvation into a subsequent life, people can afford to be much more candid about their own shortcomings, and readily admit that  they aren’t actually “good people.”

The problem is that if SR’s observation that everyone is amassing negative karma holds, then nobody actually gets saved, and everyone is moving progressively further and further away from union with God.  When translated into Christian terms, this means that everyone is going to hell.

The Christian doctrine of hell thus offers the same destiny as karmic reincarnation, except you skip all the lives you would have lived between your present one and your life of alienation from God. In fact, in conceptions of hell in which the damned are eternally retreating and pulling away from God in this life and the next (for one example, see The Great Divorce by C.S. Lewis), there is effectively no difference between damnation and karmic reincarnation at all. Karma justifies hell. Still, many Westerners seem to have little trouble believing that the justice of karmic reincarnation is perhaps a desirable way of experiencing life after death. But if it’s true that everyone is amassing negative karma, reincarnation offers a grimmer fate than even the least generous Christian theologies.

But I’d be in big trouble if Karma was going to finally be my judge. I’d be in deep shit. It doesn’t excuse my mistakes, but I’m holding out for grace. (Bono)

Published in: on May 12, 2010 at 00:01  Leave a Comment  
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Toward a Christian Aesthetic

Leo Tolstoy was nothing if not an idealist. The Russian author, aristocrat, and philosopher believed that good art in any discipline has two fundamental characteristics. The first is that good art is emotionally expressive, or communicative. The second is that the art should be ethically oriented; they should express the good, the holy, that which is of God.[1] This is a very difficult set of criteria to satisfy, and Tolstoy acknowledged this, considering his own monumental literary masterpieces to be less than great art. Such a restrictive description of good art is hardly workable in a world in which artistic objects and events are constantly being produced and are readily accessible in staggering quantity, but Tolstoy’s twofold criteria suggest a useful approach for evaluating art from a Christian perspective. Art can be evaluated both in terms of its expressive or communicative content and in terms of its ethical or moral content.

Ascertaining what art communicates, and how this is to be sought out, is itself an avenue of inquiry fraught with disputes and unworkable ideas. Tolstoy, a product of the Romantic period in, understood artistic communication as being primarily emotional, and then more specifically concerned with expressing the emotions of the artist. A good deal of art, particularly since the Enlightenment, might well be understood in this manner. However, while Tolstoy was by no means unusual in his day for his notion of the subject, tying artistic expression to the artist’s personal emotional life cannot account for a great deal of art. In particular, this understanding of artistic communication excludes teleological art from the realm of true art, as it communicates something other than the emotion of the artist. As such, this understanding excludes Dante’s The Divine Comedy from the realm of art, for example, because it serves both religious and political functions in addition to being an expression of Dante himself.

However, an opposite view of art is also quite limited. As an example, Aristotle’s Poetics suggest that art is valuable inasmuch as it imitates something recognizable. In other words, if Tolstoy’s Romantic view values art as it springs from the inner life of the artist, Aristotle’s Classical view values art as it springs from the world surrounding the artist. This account of art offers a good account of the many works of art that play on our expectations of the world around us, whether by fulfilling or subverting these expectations. It also acknowledges a good deal of the powerful symbolism present in much art. However, it does not account for works such as the abstract art of Jackson Pollock, for instance, or a good deal of instrumental music that bears little or no literal resemblance to non-musical objects, but instead relies on allusion and association.

A more comprehensive understanding of the communicative power of art can be found in what is sometimes called the Instrumentalist view of art.[2] According to this viewpoint, the communicative power of art is considered not in terms of the source of the artistic content, but in terms of the artwork’s capacity to engage the attention of an audience on specifically aesthetic terms. This understanding of artistic expression allows for art addressing subjects from any vantage point, and allows for subjective differences among the members of the audience of an artwork. It is also adaptable to the changes in artistic tastes that occur constantly with the passage of time. It is also a clearly demonstrable definition; the extent to which an artwork is able to captivate members of an audience on the basis of its aesthetic qualities is a measure of its effective artistic expression.

However, even if this is a satisfactory understanding of the first part of a Tolstoy-derived understanding of artistic value by offering a clear and experientially verifiable account of artistic expression, it does not address the ethical or moral content of art. The set of ideas known as Beauty theory has often been used to address this by claiming that only that which is beautiful can command the sort of aesthetic attention described above. Moreover, if Beauty is then understood to be a quality of God, this means that whatever is aesthetically engaging is also a participant in the very nature of God, and as such is certainly of good moral and ethical quality and is therefore commendable to the Christian.

Certainly, there is some merit to Beauty theory. Its identification of Beauty as a quality of God is theologically sound. Consequently, Beauty theory has within itself the capacity to recognize that what is of God in many diverse places, including those that are not explicitly Christian. It is therefore an important corrective to the notion that only Christians can produce good things, and reinforces the Christian doctrine that all people, regardless of their creed, bear the image of God.

Still, there are several problems that are insurmountable for Beauty theory as a comprehensive way of understanding art. These can be amply demonstrated by Picasso’s painting Guernica. This painting depicts the bombing of the Basque town of Guernica by German and Italian warplanes during the Spanish civil war, and specifically portrays the suffering of innocent civilians in the bombing. The painting certainly does not glorify its subject, but portrays it in grotesque and distorted ways in order to convey the horror and tragedy of the pictured events.

Beauty theory can approach this work in three untenable ways. If it claims that Guernica is beautiful, and claims that Beauty is a characteristic of God, it must render positive ethical judgment on the subject of the painting, the killing of civilians in war. This is incompatible with the God of Christianity, who is described in the Bible as viewing deaths in war as tragic and unfortunate, and something to be done away with when the world is renewed at the eschaton.  Alternatively, Beauty theory could deny that Guernica is beautiful, and therefore also claim that its content is unethical or immoral. While it is easy enough to say that the bombing of Guernica was unethical and immoral, there is no Christian justification to extend that judgment to the depiction of the events there. The Judeo-Christian scriptures are marked by graphic descriptions of horrific tragedy and responses of agonized lament, sometimes uttered by the voice of God himself. This is a tradition into which Guernica fits well. Finally, Beauty theory could avoid Guernica by denying that it is an aesthetically interesting work; the piece’s monumental status, sustained for over seventy years, makes this approach quite obviously ridiculous.

It is more reasonable, then, to establish the moral and ethical content of artworks by considering whether an artwork views its subject in a way that is congruent with the view of God. Guernica, because it portrays its subject as tragic and horrific, views its subject in the same way as God, and is thus a morally and ethically commendable piece. It is in this respect no less commendable than a work like Michelangelo’s Pieta, which has an equally tragic subject but is both readily described as beautiful and as explicitly Christian. Pieta might be more useful as a Christian devotional piece than Guernica on account of its subject, but this alone does not make it a better artwork than Guernica.

It is worth noting that this way of considering morality and ethics in art need not be done in binary fashion. It might well be possible for different artwork to have viewpoints that coincide with the perspective of God more or less fully. There may be distortions that obscure an artwork’s capacity to help us see something as God does. Nevertheless, Christians engaging with art can be mindful of both an artwork’s aesthetic engagingness and its moral and ethical content as they consider its impact, its merits, and its value.


[1] Earl Davey, class lecture, January 19, 2010, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

[2] Monroe Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981): 525-9.

Published in: on April 6, 2010 at 23:58  Leave a Comment  
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