NATO exercises in Georgia go ahead

Later today I shall try to write about what might or might not have happened in Georgia yesterday and the whole row about Russian diplomats and NATO. For the moment, it is worth noting that NATO exercises in Georgia are going ahead without the participation of four countries: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Serbia.

Moldova has the odd problem or two of its own at the moment and the other three, presumably, do not want to antagonize Russia.

One hates to be rude about supposed allies but one cannot help asking whether the absence of those particular ones is of any importance. Far more important is the fact that the exercises are being carried out at Georgia’s Vaziani military base, where they took place in mid-July of last year, three weeks before the Russo-Georgian war.

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Update on that treaty

A bit of a slow news day for the time being - although matters are looking a little grim in Georgia - so it might be time to catch up on the latest developments (or otherwise) to do with the Constitutional Lisbon Treaty.

To absolutely nobody's surprise the Irish Minister for European Affairs, Dick Roche, has announced that the second Irish referendum will be held in the autumn.

He added that as part of the process of steering its way out of recession Ireland needed to secure its position within the European Union.

Speaking in Berlin to the German Council on Foreign Relations, the Minister said he wanted to deliver the message that Ireland was coming to grips with its problems and taking decisive action to bring the Government's finances under control, ensure the health of the banking system and improve competitiveness.

He remained a little vague on how exactly the treaty will improve Ireland's economic position but, perhaps, vagueness is all that one can offer at this stage.

Over on ToryBoy blog Jonathan Isaby, correctly in our opinion, is predicting a possible unwelcome headache for David Cameron as a result of the Irish referendum. Then again, the probability of an autumn vote has been very high for some time. David Cameron et al should have been prepared and the words "we shall not let matters rest there" are not exactly an indication of preparedness.

The Czech Senate will be voting on the treaty tomorrow (Wednesday, May 6) and it looks like it will pass, though there will remain the question of the presidential signature. President Klaus has, so far, insisted that he would wait for the second Irish result. Poland's President still has not signed it and Germany has not ratified either [scroll down to second question].

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Just a tad parochial

On the whole I spend less energy attacking other bloggers than the boss does, not least because I run into them fairly regularly in London and it is hard to attack people in those circumstances. However, one cannot deny that, for the most part, the British blogosphere is just a tad parochial, as the boss wrote quite recently.

Yesterday evening I was at an event for right-wing bloggers, organized by the Adam Smith Institute, an admirable institution by and large. There were two speakers and a fairly extensive question and answer session. The first speaker was Guido Fawkes of Order-Order, who explained in some detail how one can be a successful blogger just like he was.

Guido is certainly successful in that he is invited to the BBC and is taken moderately seriously by the Westminster Village where several of his stories, particularly about MPs' spending have developed into rather big ones. How many hits he gets he alone knows as there is no counter on the site.

Guido blogs exclusively about Westminster politics, diverging from time to time in a very diverting way on such subjects as anti-capitalist protestors getting beaten up by traders they incautiously attack.

The other speaker was John Redwood who told us in typically politician-like ringing tones how incredibly courageous and successful he was as a blogger. People seemed to want to read him, he explained because they did not believe the government's spin. On the whole, people do not believe any politician's spin but, to be fair to the Vulcan, when it comes to economic matters, he does strike out away from the obsessively paternalistic and statist consensus.

Incidentally, it is the same John Redwood who complained about nasty things being said about him as a politician.

Mr Redwood also blogs almost entirely about Westminster matters though, on occasion, he does talk about wider economic issues and he did come up with one posting about Russia and Georgia in which he took the pro-Russian side (but I have me doots about the authorship of that posting). [I wrote about that on the now defunct BrugesGroupBlog.]

Neither in the speeches nor in the discussion was there any reference to matters outside Britain and, especially, the Westminster bubble. The dreaded E-word was not mentioned. Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? Well, who is going to blog about that? Transn ational organizations? Samizdata writes about them regularly and, errm, that's it, really. Well, of course, we do.

Mr Redwood informed us that he was not using the blog for career purposes. Just as well really, as I do not thinkg the words career and Redwood can be put into the same sentence. But he wants to use it for his own campaigns, one of which will be under a Conservative government for greater power to Parliament as against Ministers.

Ahem, Mr Redwood, is there not another reason why Parliament has little power at the moment? Are you going to campaign about that, too, or not so much?

Still, it was nice to see people like Tim Worstall, Brian Micklethwait, Charles Crawford and others of that ilk.

COMMENT THREAD

Not good

Ralph Peters in the New York Post lists the major mistakes the Obama Administration has committed since January 21, when he became President (and stepped down from his position as Messiah).

It makes disconcerting reading. Some of it is less serious than the rest. What the Castro brothers (assuming they are both alive) say is not really all that important except for the fact that "maltreatment" of Cuba has been a left-wing cry for many years. Though, oddly enough, not much is said about the maltreatment of Cuban dissidents by the Cuban government and police.

Russia is, indeed, preening again, but it is not clear how much of that is talk. Medvedev has, indeed, announced massive expenditure on rearmament but this is supposed to have been going on for years and not a whole lot has been achieved - the Russian military does not seem to be any better armed than it was before President Prime Minister Putin's time.

On the other hand, effectively telling the Russians that they can do anything they like in the old Soviet sphere is not particularly intelligent. With Georgia once again in turmoil, President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton may well find themselves with a serious problem in the Caucasus. With Russia's economy deteriorating and protests in the country mounting, a little war that could ignite nationalist feelings could appear to be just the ticket to the Russian leadership. Of course, little wars have a habit of turning into big ones and recent Russian history ought to be a warning. Let's face it, the Obama Administration is not going to be.

As for our allies, Obama apparently needs them less than Bush did. O treated Britain's prime minister like the deputy Paraguayan veterinary inspector, and he blindsided the leaders of the Czech Republic, Poland, Mexico and Canada on issues ranging from missile defense to trade. But he'd like them to take the Gitmo terrorists off our hands, please.

Well, that's OK. They won't take the Gitmo terrorists, being readier to scream abuse at the Americans than do anything themselves.

Interestingly, that list does not even mention Secretary of State Clinton's appalling speech in the European Parliament that ought to have warned our own eurosceptic Obama supporters but apparently did not.

The Western alliance is in the very best of hands.

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Whither NATO?

Undoubtedly we shall be writing a great deal about NATO as it celebrates (if that is quite the right word) its 60th anniversary. Here is a small taster: a discussion on RFE/RL of the French Defence Minister's assertions that the organization should abandon its global role and return to its roots with one significant difference - it should not antagonize Russia.

The original aims of NATO, as some of our readers will recall, were to keep America in, Germany down and Russia out. France and Germany seem to have a very selective memory when it comes to those original ideas. One could argue that this rather incoherent attitude led almost directly from last year's summit in April in Brussels (here and here) led directly to the Russian invasion of Georgia in August.

While the discussion with comments from Washington experts is very interesting, we should like to hear from those people exactly what the new policy towards Russia should be. Specifically, it would be nice if Ted Galen Carpenter explained why he thinks that it was the Bush Administration that caused the rise of Putin and what the Obama Administration can do to counteract that, without, we hope, simply rolling over and letting Russia play the big bully in the playground?

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You play, we pay …

The EU is at it again, prancing on the world stage, trying to be important. Its latest pronouncement being that it has a "crucial strategic interest" in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Therefore, "we" should dosh out €350 million to help tide them over their little local difficulties.

Now, there can be no dispute that the fate of these countries is of immediate importance to the likes of Germany and some of the eastern states, not least because of the gas supply and diverse other matters. And, in the general run of things, what happens in these countries is important. But it's not that important … not to the UK, anyway.

Nevertheless, that does not stop EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner declaring that the EU's so-called "Eastern Partnership" has "gained urgency" and we must drop everything and rush to its aid. Problems in Eastern Europe, she says, "affect us directly".

Therein lies our problem. They don't "affect us directly". Our prime minister has – or should have – far more important things to concern himself about, and we have far more important things on which to expend our dwindling pile of cash.

But there it is in a nutshell. If the EU says it's important, then it's important, whether we think so or not. And when it plays, we pay, all to help the little old lady in Kiev cross the road, between the high-priced SUVs (pictured) – AP's way of illustrating that there is a crisis in Ukraine.

The trouble is, we really cannot afford these diversions. We need to be able to address our own priorities, and deal with what is important to us - not wasting our efforts and resources dancing to the EU's tune.

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Sweden rethinking?

This winter's problems in the gas supply from Russia (and it is still not entirely clear why it took so long to sort out the now customary beginning of the year row) has turned some Europeans' attention to alternative sources of energy. By alternative I mean political as well as technological.

There is the Nabucco pipeline, still in abeyance, though at least one potential source country, Azerbaijan is beginning to get a little impatient. There are various problems but as Vladimir Socor points out, matters are not being helped by Chancellor Merkel's determination to keep the EU's attention and financing firmly on such Gazprom-led projects as Nord Stream.

Strategically, Merkel's demarche seems designed to elevate at least the Russo-German project, Nord Stream, to top-priority level in EU policy and elicit EU funding for this pipeline on the Baltic seabed. Thus far, only Nabucco enjoys top-level political attention and the prospect of funding by the EU. This development is of recent date, following long neglect. Russia's invasion of Georgia and then its suspension of gas deliveries via Ukraine to Europe mobilized the EU into onsolidating the South Caucasus transit corridor for non-Russian gas through the Nabucco project. eanwhile, Russia is unable to finance its part of the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, leaving Germany with the dilemma of covering Russia's investment in Nord Stream through credits or shelving the project altogether.

To amalgamate Nabucco with Nord Stream and South Stream in terms of EU support, as Merkel proposes, would downgrade Nabucco's existing priority level, relegating it to a group of three while elevating those Gazprom-led projects at Nabucco's expense. This could set in motion a zero-sum game for EU funding and political support. The Nabucco project could be compromised in that case. A follow-up commentary in the German press captures the situation in its headline: "Merkel Offends East Europeans" (Financial Times Deutschland, January 30). Those "East Europeans" are, of course, EU member countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea. But the Caspian energy-producing countries would also be left in the lurch in that case.

Our readers will recall Nord Stream. We wrote about it here, referred to the then Polish Defence Minister, now Foreign Minister, Radek Sikorski's somewhat overwrought description of it as the new Molotov-Ribbentrop pact here and alluded to former Chancellor Schröder's questionable role in it here.

Once again, Chancellor Merkel is managing to disprove the otherwise extremely sensible Edward Lucas, who thinks (though not as much as he used to, having been rather disappointed by the EU) that if the 27 manage to create one energy policy they would be able to stand up to Russia's bullying. The trouble is, she sighs, that policy is likely to be Chancellor Merkel's which is all about rolling over rather than standing up.

However, the big news comes from Sweden and it may not turn out to be as big as one hope. (I am waiting for our Swedish correspondent to appear and put me right.) It seems that the Swedish government has agreed to scrap the ban on building new nuclear reactors.

Sweden is a leader on renewable energy but is struggling to develop alternative source like hydropower and wind to meet its growing energy demands. If parliament approves scrapping the ban, Sweden would join a growing list of countries rethinking nuclear power as a source of energy amid concerns over global warming and the reliability of energy suppliers such as Russia. Britain, France and Poland are planning new reactors and Finland is currently building Europe's first new atomic plant in over a decade.

The decision still has to be approved by parliament but there are signs that public opinion has changed since that referendum in 1980 that put an end to nuclear development in the country.

COMMENT THREAD

Russia, Georgia and the EU

There are few things more irritating than listening to instructions on what the EU should be doing from people who clearly do not know the first thing about that collection of institutions. For once I am not talking about Conservative politicians and wannabe politicians but about the former Gergian Foreign Minister, Salome Zourabichvili, who gave a talk to the Henry Jackson Society this lunchtime, entitled "Russia and Georgia: The problem Europe would rather forget".

Nothing wrong with the second part of that title except for the exclusivity. "Europe" would rather forget about most problems, internal or external.

As it happens, Ms Zourabichvili's biography does not inspire one with any sort of confidence in her solid judgement but, at the very least, as a former member of the French foreign service (even while Foreign Minister in the Georgian government, which must have raised questions of conflicting interests) she ought to know a little more about the European Union.

It is possibly her Francophile background that prompts to castigate the outgoing American Administration as having harmed Georgia more than most people realize and expressing some certainty in the incoming Administration (just as soon as it gets over the lengthy inauguration festivities).

According to Ms Zourabichvili the EU has certain responsibility towards Georgia, Ukraine and other "neighbourhood" countries, especially as the new American Administration is likely to concentrate on other matters, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Gaza, the economy and so on. How she knows this is a mystery but her point that the EU ought to make it clear that "European" countries are its responsibility and the US can rely on its allies is a good one.

At least, it would be a good one, if one did not immediately recall the last time the then EC announced just that. "This is Europe's hour," - said Jacques Poos ofLuxembourg, then holder of the rotating presidency. He was talking about the disintegrating Yugoslavia and a right mess the EC/EU made of it. Perhaps, Ms Zourabichvili does not recall those days, despite being a high ranking French diplomat at the time.

The EU, according to her, has various other responsibilities. There are those 300 observers, whom Russia appears to accept while getting rid of the OSCE ones and probably closing down the UN mission quite soon. One can't help wondering why Russia thinks it has no particular difficulty with the EU keeping its observers there while refuses to countenance the OSCE.

One or two things the former Foreign Minister did not mention. The word NATO did not cross her lips. Neither did she refer to the fact that the Russians have broken the agreed cease-fire several times, despite the EU resuming the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement talks early last December. Could there be a connection between that event and the benign attitude with which the Russian government views the EU observers? And might this benign attitude not change if the 300 temporary observers are turned into some kind of a permanent EU presence, as Ms Zourabichvili suggested several times in her talk?

Much of the talk was taken up, as I said at the beginning, with advice on how the EU could make its interests in the area clear to Russia, thus forcing the latter to make its interests clear. She does have a point - it is not entirely clear what Russia has gained from that incursion last summer and from acquiring two more South Caucasian autonomous republics. Unless, of course, the whole episode was directed at the domestic audience, whipping up its fears of the enemy that is all around them and, even, inside the country.

The point is, the former Foreign Minister repeated several times, that the EU must make its interests clear in order to make people understand what its foreign policy is. Well, dear former Foreign Minister and French diplomat, that is the basic problem. The EU has no single set of interests anywhere, has no real policy towards its neighbours or near-neighbours and that is why there can be no EU foreign policy, no matter what the French President may pretend. You see, dear fFM&Fd, however hard President Sarkozy (and his predecessor) may try, nobody apart from the French and members of the State Department believe that French and European foreign policies are identical.

The EU, according to Ms Zourabichvili, is in a good position to help develop democracy in the two authoritarian states, Russia and Georgia, though the latter is probably more susceptible to the idea (especially if Ms Zourabichvili finally acquires some political support in the country, one assumes). Apparently, she labours under the misapprehension that the EU is a democracy as well as an organization that has certain interests.

Sadly, as soon as the Georgian crisis was over the European consensus (by which, I think, she meant French policy) disintegrated and Russia once again finds herself dealing with individual countries separately. This must be overcome.

Interestingly, Ms Zourabichvili proudly proclaimed that the supposed weaknesses of the EU are, in reality its strengths. These are a more pragmatic attitude to international affairs, diversity of opinion and lack of military prowess. In other words, complete lack of integrity, no common ground and no real ability to back up its demands or requests, should these materialize.

I think it is time Ms Zourabichvili came back to where she belongs: the French diplomatic service.

A bit of light relief

If there was any justice in this world, all you would have to do in the modern equivalent of a music hall is utter two words (or three): "The European Union". You could add, "foreign policy" and that should guarantee to bring the house down.

To illustrate the point you could do no better than refer to the latest development in the long-running farce of the EU Chad peace mission which, as we recorded earlier has been dogged by a shortage of helicopters.

One can never repeat often enough the details of this farce, where 27 member states, collectively setting themselves up to rival the United States as a "superpower" found it impossible to provide a mere six helicopters to support their humanitarian mission in Chad.

And still it goes on. Still unable to resolve the problem, they have hit on what they hope is the ultimate solution, one laden in irony. Despite its dispute with Moscow over Georgia, the EU has – according to Reuters - gone cap in hand to the Russians and asked to borrow four of its helicopters.

This would boost the number of helicopters available to the EU force by a third – which does not say much for the number already available, to help police an area of operations the size of France.

However, Cristina Gallach, a spokeswoman for EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana, is trying to put a brave face on it. She says the Chad mission was "not dependent on the Russian helicopters." Rather, they would "increase its range". She did concede, though, that the issue "showed the need for the EU to boost its own resources." Perceptive is this one. She should go far.

Meanwhile, ministers of the EU member states are planning to do what they do best - talk. They are meeting in Deauville, France to discuss a "longer-term Anglo-French plan" to upgrade Europe's helicopter fleet.

And yes, I know Winston Churchill said, "jaw-jaw is better than war-war," but the "colleagues" are turning this into an art form.

COMMENT THREAD

Ukraine, Russia and the EU

A few thoughts on the subject over on BrugesGroupBlog. The EU is ready to resume negotiations with Russia about that partnership in October if troops move out of Georgia proper (something that still has not happened). Judging by Prime Minister Fillon's comments, the French Presidency will want to resume negotiations even if those troops stay as they have done so far.

The view from Montenegro

OK, I am back, though it is entirely possible that my temporary absence, caused by other work, has not been much noticed. The other reason for my absence has been a certain inner difficulty: it is hard to summon up interest in the doings of the EU when far bigger and more exciting things are going on in the world.

On the whole, I am happy to write about bigger issues, partly because we are examining Britain's role in the world, which means that the world has to make an appearance in our examination; and partly because our self-defined remit involves a discussion of various countries and organizations. Some of our readers prefer it that we (and they) remain big fish in a very small pond. The problem is that at 5ft 1in it is very difficult to be anything but a herring (though not a sprat) and, in any case, I easily succumb to intellectual claustrophobia.

Still, every now and then, one must turn to the EU and its shenanigans. Therefore, I was pleased to see in Wednesday's Wall Street Journal Europe (there she goes again, unable to stick to solid British newspapers) an article by Borut Grgic, entitled "Europe’s Lack of Strategic Ambition".

Mr Grgic (the one that is smiling in the picture) is, I assume, of Slovenian background, and a graduate of Stanford University. He is the Founder and Director of this particular Institute for Strategic Studies, based in Ljubljana, Brussels and New York. For a small institute it seems to have a lot of addresses but to quote Lady Bracknell in "The Importance of Being Earnest":

Three addresses always inspire confidence, even in tradesmen.

My pleasure lessened as I read the article. Instead of tackling the basic problem of a potential EU common foreign policy, Mr Grgic seems to have accepted its main plank. In fact, I had to take issues with his first paragraph, though I approved of the crisp style:

Russia's invasion of Georgia has once again revealed the European Union's central foreign policy flaw: While the EU is good at managing crises, it has hardly ever solved one.

Um, well, half-right, Mr Grgic. It is true that the EU has never (not hardly ever but never, to reverse the Gilbertian line) solved a crisis but neither has it shown itself able to manage one, whether inside or outside itself. Just look at the mess it is making of the problem of Ireland and the Constitutional Reform Lisbon Treaty.

In any case, a foreign policy, common or not is more than just managing crises, let alone solving them. In some ways, it is about preventing crises, though, clearly, that is not always possible. But, in order to have a foreign policy, there has to be some understanding of aim, purpose and interest. Clearly, the EU has none of these and that is why it cannot have a common foreign policy beyond the structures that can be created by agreement.

There is one exception to that – the EU's aim has been, so far, to expand. Like certain very simple animal organisms, such as an amoeba, the great European project can survive only by growing and changing shape. Mr Grgic seems to accept this, as the rest of his article is a discussion as to the harm done by the EU not talking seriously about making Georgia a member – an issue that has not really come up as Georgia wants to be a member of NATO, knowing full well that the EU is not going to be much use against its large neighbour to the north.

Even worse, according to Mr Grgic, the EU seems to have lost its appetite for expansion to the point of not wanting even small and well-run Montenegro.

Rather than embracing this as a strategic opportunity -- since both countries have been advancing fast in their reform and transition efforts, outpacing the regional averages - the EU seems to be embarrassed by their progress. Brussels is looking for ways to shut its doors and keep the ambitious would-be members at a distance, perhaps just long enough so they lose their zealous drive.

True, the recent accession of Romania and Bulgaria has given enlargement a bad name. Brussels sharply criticized Sofia and Bucharest in July for not doing enough to fight corruption and suspended hundreds of millions of euros in aid money. This experience has given enlargement skeptics the upper hand. But punishing Montenegro and the Balkans for the failings of Sofia and Bucharest is unfair and strategically shortsighted.

The EU is missing a huge opportunity to stabilize the broader Balkans and Caucasus regions if it fails to reward Montenegro and Georgia for their efforts. In the first case, it's the EU Balkan agenda that hangs in the balance. Montenegro is a living example of regional success. It never went through a war or ethnic cleansing. Because of its democratic outreach to all of its citizens, it has managed to keep its Albanian minority excited about a future in an independent Montenegro.

The country is making rapid economic progress and moving at a fast-forward pace through the reforms agenda outlined by the EU in its Stabilization and Association Agreement.

Certainly, European countries should make some kind of decision about the Balkans and the Caucasus, the latter, in particular, being a tinder box ready to blow. There is, furthermore, the question of energy supplies. The need to diversify includes the need to get gas and oil without any Russian interference, as the country has shown herself to be less than reliable in every way.

To assume, though, that the only way to achieve these objectives is by expanding and, necessarily, strengthening and centralizing the European Union indicates that Mr Grgic has not really studied the situation and all its possibilities. One wonders what his Institute really does for research.

Russia wins another victory

On Friday morning I bought three newspapers at my local newsagent (no, I don't keep them in business, the various lottery and other ticket buyers do): the Daily Telegraph, the International Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal Europe. (Yes, I do recycle those newspapers when I have finished reading them – I have two cats.)

Then I looked at the headlines of one of the most important stories. Our own Daily Telegraph said in the Business section, which is the only part that is worth reading: "BP buries hatchet with Russians". Hmm, I thought, I wonder if the Russians have also buried the hatchet and in whose skull.

The Trib was a little more cautious: "BP reaches a truce in its Russian oil battle". [This article seems to have vanished into cyberspace but there are others out there.] Slim hope of hatchets being buried or peace pipes being smoked.

The Wall Street Journal Europe was the most sceptical and most informative of all: "BP keeps TNK-BP stakes but Russians gain clout". [The article is available to subscribers only.] There is a trick to being able to sum up your story in a headline and there is also a trick to understanding what happens in the world. I think it may be called journalism but I am no longer certain.

Well, now the story about TNK-BP, which we have written about before, has taken another turn and not for the better as far as BP is concerned. Although they have managed to keep 50 per cent of the joint venture, the WSJE maintains that the "deal clearly gives the Russian shareholder more clout". According to Deputy Prime Minister, Igor Sechin, this is "a positive signal for the Russian market".

In the deal, BP agreed to many of the terms set by its partners, a group of Soviet-born billionaires [an unfair comment since all Russian adults are Soviet-born but the hit is palpable] led by Mikhail Fridman of Alfa Group, Lev Blavatnik of Access Industries and Vikotr Vekselber of Renova, collectively known as AAR.

Their main demands, the removal of BP-nominated Chief Executive Robert Dudley, who is to leave by Dec. 1 under the deal, and consideration of an initial public offering of TNK-BP shares, now expected around 2010. BP won few, if any, concession in return, according to people close to the company. BP gave up its demand for the removal from top management jobs of Mr Vekselberg and another Russian shareholder, German Khan, both of whom BP and Mr Dudley accused of insubordination and acting against the interests of TNK-BP. AAR denied those accusations.

The Trib points out that BP has been allowed to retain "access to the large oil fields in Siberia that are one of the company’s most valuable assets". Of course, nobody quite knows how long that situation will last but, at present, the deal is presented as being very helpful to Western investors, as Mr Sechin pointed out. After all, BP's assets were not nationalized through a forced sale to a state company. Again, nobody can predict whether that will not happen some time in the near future.

At present, the Kremlin and its various proxies have had to deal with "slide in the Russian stock market and in investor confidence", consequent on the invasion of Georgia.

Past experience suggests that some investors will swallow any amount of punishment and will ignore all warnings in the hopes of at least some small profits to be made in the Russian energy sector (there not being a great deal else, since the arms manufacturing is not going to be opened up to Western investors).

The Telegraph said:

Meanwhile, fears about Russia’s conflict with Georgia have taken their toll, forcing the Russian central bank yesterday [Thursday] to support the rouble. Currency dealers said the central bank had sold up to $4bn (£2.3bn) in reserves in an attempt to halt the fall of the rouble, after foreign investors pulled capital from the country. The chairman of the central bank, Sergei Ignatyev, was reported as saying about $5bn left Russia last month. Analysts believe the real figure is much higher.

Also on Friday Kommersant was reporting that the Russian stock index was starting to move upwards but the road will be difficult. Other accounts were painting a much gloomier picture. The TNK-BP deal was needed by the Kremlin but whether its effect will be all that they hope for remains to be seen.

In the Comments session the Telegraph was sanguine though admonitory:

But for all AAR's hard-nosed manoeuvring, Hayward has managed to keep a large amount of influence over selection of a new chief executive. But even more crucially, in the face of a Russian state whose president's attitude to diplomacy is "Cold War? Bring it on", Hayward has retained ownership of its asset. No mean feat.

But it's also been a warning. BP can never again be so naive in dealing with Russia. It's had to make concessions and been pushed on to the back foot. It should have acted sooner to protect its interests while its counterparts were weaker.

Other western companies should learn from its mistakes. You need to be as much of a street fighter as a statesman to succeed in the former Soviet Union. It's all very well having had lawyers and injunctions at the ready to freeze assets of its Russian partners but it should never have come to that.

The Russians, however, have had to swallow another hard lesson, which is that the West's open capital markets and the institutions that populate them will turn their backs if certain rules of engagement are ignored. A big investment bank will probably value a long-term relationship with a BP over what could be a short, risky and potentially dangerous liaison with a belligerent Russia. Oh, and never, ever sign a 50:50 joint venture.

We suspect that BP will continue to behave with exemplary naiveté right up to the moment they are marched out of Russia completely. For the moment, it is a Russian victory but, as ever, with heavier losses for the country than is necessary. Not that the leadership cares.

Two articles from over the Pond

Though the American media and blogosphere on the left seems to be taken up with dishing dirt - some relevant, most not so - about Sarah Barracuda, with the occasional irruption of fingernail-gnawing comments of what an utterly bad choice she was and how this will give the Dems the election, other matters do turn up as well, though mostly on the other side of the spectrum.

Oh, before I leave the subject of Governor Palin, here is an interesting reading of the situation by the highly regarded "maverick" blogger Spengler.

On to what really matters and that is what to do about Russia (and if there is one politician who knows about that country, it is the Governor of Alaska). John O'Sullivan produces a jeu d'esprit in the New York Post in which he envisages that famous 3 a.m. phone call for President Obama but as he says the situation would be much the same for President McCain, though he is unlikely to be quite so wimpish. Also, I don't think President Obama will make Hillary Clinton his Secretary of State. But as to what the Europeans might do if there is another crisis, the description is fairly accurate.

"Maybe the Germans can lean on them," mused the president, remembering his warm reception in Berlin.

"Germany won't agree to using force without a UN resolution. It's a constitutional thing with them," chimed in the secretary of state.

"I'm not talking force, Hillary," replied the president. "That's Bush-think. No, we have to respond with diplomacy and, as a last resort, sanctions."

"Maybe the Germans can impose oil and gas sanctions on Russia," said Mrs. Clinton sweetly. "Sit in the dark and warm themselves by burning the money they've saved until the Kremlin crumbles."

"Well, there's a united Europe today," replied the president, brightening. "Sanctions by the whole European Union would worry the Russians. Aren't they a possibility?"

"We'll know for sure in two weeks, sir, when the European Summit meets to discuss the crisis. But the signs aren't good. Poland and the Baltic states want a strong response, but they lack the clout of Germany and France. I'd say a moderately worded rebuke to Moscow is the best we can hope for."

Mr O'Sullivan's conclusion is entirely predictable and is obviously correct, since it is completely in line with what this blog has been saying for some time.

Multilateral forces can work only if there is a clear agreement of what the purpose is and who provides those forces. The European Union, on the other hand, without managing to provide an alternative by way of power, soft or hard, has an entirely negative effect on Western ability to deal with crises:

If the next US president wants effective multilateralism, he must re-establish NATO as the sole supplier of European security. Otherwise, when the phone rings, he'll have one rival to call instead of 25 allies.

There is, presumably, the possibility of re-creating NATO in a completely different form, which would leave out a number of West European countries.

One of the editorials in today's Wall Street Journal is also on the EU's inability to deal with the situation created by President Medvedev's refusal to live up to any of the agreements, supposedly sealed, signed and delviered by President Sarkozy, whose country holds the rotating presidency.

"Stop! Or we'll say stop again!" just about sums up the outcome of Monday's grand summit, whether it is the comedian Robin Williams's line or not.

We are glad to see that the newspaper is not falling for Sarkozy's bully tactics with which he tries to masquerade his own incompetence:

Mr. Sarkozy also insisted that his efforts to reach a cease-fire had borne fruit. The Georgians might disagree. Russia has used the agreement's vague language to justify a continued presence in Georgia far beyond the original conflict zone. The cease-fire called for international talks about the separatist regions, but that didn't stop Mr. Medvedev from recognizing their independence.

The most cynical comment of the day was Mr. Sarkozy's attempt to use the conflict to bully the Irish over their rejection of the EU's Lisbon Treaty in June. "This crisis has shown that Europe needs to have strong and stable institutions" like those it would have gotten under Lisbon, Mr. Sarkozy said.

No, what Europe needs is political will. Rather than scolding Irish voters, Mr. Sarkozy would do better to name and shame those member states whose desire to curry favor with Moscow keeps the EU from taking a firmer stand.

The one problem is that the Wall Street Journal still considers that Europe and the European Union are one and the same, thus assuming that "Europe" can have such a thing as political will.

The wise and all-seeing leader

The late unlamented (by most people) Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin was during his lifetime often describedthe world's greatest leader as well as being completely omniscient. Every now and then he would leave the cares of state and his never-ceasing watch over the people behind and would unbend his mind to put scientists or linguists or agricultural experts right about whatever it was they were wrong about. Woe betide anyone who ignored the great sage's guidance.

Even Stalin was not quite as hands-on as the former President, now Prime Minister, Putin appears to be. They do seem to have one thing in common – an ability to get the western media all excited by their activity. The Russian media has little choice.

The story that has convulsed the MSM a couple of days ago was that of Vladimir Putin and the Siberian tiger. I need not spend too much time on the actual story as it was written up everywhere but the pictures are worth looking at and one or two questions do arise.

The account in the Sydney Morning Herald is as good as any other.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has tried to boost his macho image by shooting tranquilisers at a Siberian tiger.

Putin, dressed in combat fatigues, was with a team of wildlife researchers in the Ussuri reserve in Russia's far east when the tiger escaped its harness and headed towards a television crew.

Armed with a tranquiliser gun, Putin shot at the tiger, which soon slumped to the ground.

Amazing. There was nobody better qualified there to deal with the escaped tiger either before or after it had been shot with a tranquilizer gun? I mean, do they all need careful instructions on how to deal with the problem? That is certainly the impression one gets from the second photograph where the omniscient one appears to be instructing someone else on the best way to deal with the stunned tigress.

Apparently, the tranquilizer worked immediately. Sheesh! That's superior Russian technology for you. How long does something like that take normally? About 20 minutes, I have been told.

The Aussies seem a little sceptical as one reads the story.

It seems that not a summer goes by without some macho image of the former President, now Prime Minister appearing in the media. In this he has long outstripped Stalin and his henchmen as well as his successors who usually preferred to appear in jolly poses, perhaps post-hunting but with children and happy friends and family members. Our Vlad does not seem to like that. When did we last see him with his family, just enjoying himself, not throwing judo opponents over his shoulder or riding bare-chested with a knife stuck in his belt or brandishing a tranquilizer gun?

Why on earth was he wearing combat fatigues anyway? Is this all part of the message he is trying to convey to the Russian people: the country is constantly at war with its neighbours, all of whom are her enemies and are merely thinking of invading as soon as possible?

Meanwhile, there is trouble in Ingushetiya. (That's next door to Chechnya in north Caucasus.)

The owner of the embattled opposition web site Ingushetiya.ru was killed Sunday after being detained by police, and his supporters promised massive protests that could lead to a sharp escalation in violence in the restive region.

Magomed Yevloyev, a prominent opposition member and staunch critic of Ingush President Murat Zyazikov, was detained in Ingushetia's main city of Nazran as he stepped off a plane from Moscow, his lawyer and friend Kaloi Akhilgov said by telephone.

The police maintain it was an accident that happened while Yevloyev tried to wrestle an assault rifle away from a police officer in the police car. In the process he was accidentally shot in the head. I am a little surprised they did not go for the suicide explanation.

Other people give different accounts:

Ingush opposition activist Magomed Khazbiyev said Yevloyev was found lying near a Nazran hospital with a bullet in his temple, Interfax reported.

He died during an operation at the hospital, said Vladimir Markin, a spokesman for the Investigative Committee in the Prosecutor General's Office. The Investigative Committee has opened an investigation into the death that might lead to charges being filed against the local police, Markin said, Interfax reported.

As they say, you pays your money and you takes your choice.

The protest that had started during Mr Yevloyev's funeral was broken up by baton-wielding police though the police are denying that as well.

President Medvedev, meanwhile, possibly to show that he is as tough as his predecessor, now Prime Minister, has announced that President Saakashvili is a "political corpse" and should, presumably, be given a decent burial. Whatever one may think of President Saakashvili and his ability to withstand Russian provocation, the fact remains that he was elected by the people of Georgia. Therefore, despite the many Western comments about him being the wrong person in that position because the Kremlin does not like it, the fact remains that Georgia is no longer a Russian colony.

Needless to say, the whole mess is America's fault (but President Prime Minister Putin will solve it all with his tranquilizer gun) and there was praise for the European Union, which refused to impose sanctions, though did suspend talks on a strategic pact until Russia withdraws her troops from Georgia. Apparently there have been suggestions that those troops will be withdrawn. We have, I believe, been here before.

The BBC Russian Service reports that Georgia has broken off diplomatic relations with Russia and employees of the Russian embassy will be leaving Tbilisi. There is also a brief report that Vice-President Cheney is about to visit Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.

Turkey has been complaining that there are delays for its goods at Russian border crossings, a move that is seen as a "punishment" because the country has dared to allow "US warships carrying aid to Georgia to pass through the Turkish straits, which connect the Mediterranean to the Black Sea" and is thinking about retaliatory gestures.

Not so, said Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is visiting Istanbul.

This is not an action directed against Turkey; Turkey is not being singled out. There can be no politics involved in trade.

Of course not. And the best person to subdue an escaped tigress is a country's President Prime Minister.

Got it in one … almost

"What is the point of the EU summit and a Georgian fudge?" asks Bruno Waterfield.

"What is the point of an EU foreign policy that can reconcile British and east European calls for tough "sanctions" against Russia (even it is all just talk) with the conciliatory approach of France, Germany and Italy?" his text then runs.

If he had deleted all after "EU…" he would have had a better title. But, after dismissing the EU as "mouth and no trousers", his piece would effectively say the same thing. What is the point of an EU?

COMMENT THREAD

United in [in]action

Deutsche Welle is telling us that an emergency EU meeting Monday in Brussels on how to respond to Russia's recognition of the Georgian breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "could be instrumental in confirming the EU as a force for peace."

If this is supposed to be an example of serious journalism, one can only stand back and wonder. On the one hand, the EU has no military forces at its disposal and cannot intervene physically in the region. It is thus totally reliant on its "soft power".

On the other hand, though the good offices of France's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, we learn that the EU has ruled out sanctions against Russia.

We also know why the EU will not take any firm action in this respect. Whether an inspired leak or not, the threat of Russia withholding gas or oil supplies to Europe (or even both) has the euros paralysed. They cannot risk even the briefest of interruptions.

Thus, one has to ask, what is the purpose of this fabulous "emergency summit"? Well, the clue also comes from Angela Merkel who is saying that she believes it is important for Monday's summit to send "a clear political signal of the European Union's unity" on the crisis.

If that then is the game, Deutsche Welle notes that the "opportunity" is mined with potential pitfalls and risks. The potential for disagreement, it says, is enormous. In one corner are Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the countries most dependent on Russian gas supplies – who will, we are told, be demanding "radical" action.

In the checkerboard of influence and interests, Polish prime minister Donald Tusk can be relied on to toe the EU line, but president Lech Kaczynski has said that the Polish and Baltic stance at the summit "won't be completely radical, but radical enough."

Then there is Czech president Vaclav Klaus will be accompanying Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek to Brussels. Both men have widely diverging opinions on the issue and it is not clear which of these leaders will speak for his country.

Where the UK stands is anyone's guess, Italy is expected to side with France and Germany, along with Spain, which does not want to go further than sending a firm message to Russia. With Greece also relying on Russia for 82 percent of its natural gas and 29 percent of its oil, it too does not want to rock the boat

Thus, with no real unity on offer, according to Voice of America, analysts expect that, "for the sake of [a show of] EU unity, summit members will use strong language, but will forego tough measures."

One thing they might do is appoint a special envoy to Georgia to ensure that a cease-fire is observed and, if Moscow does not fully implement the six-point agreement brokered by Sarkozy, a French official has said that European relations with Russia will be "under observation."

If it is action you want, then look to Turkey. Without much fanfare, it is preparing to host the foreign ministers of Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan for separate talks on the ongoing crisis in the Caucasus, all with a view to setting up what it describes as "Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Platform".

By contrast, what we are seeing from the EU is the usual display of institutional impotence, dressed up in fine language but devoid of action. Very soon we will have seriously to consider revising the EU's motto. From "united in diversity", it should become "united in inaction" – the only thing the "colleagues" can agree on.

COMMENT THREAD

What do they hope to achieve?

In Wednesday's Wall Street Journal Bret Stephens's column argued something we have been saying on this blog for a long time: Russia’s flaying about and bullying neighbouring smaller and weaker countries are not a sign of strength, no matter what most of the media repeats ad nauseam; it is a sign of weakness.

Putin, supposedly the strong man of Russia and of the whole Eurasian sphere, has demonstrated his and his government's weakness on a number of occasions, in the international and, more importantly, the domestic arena.

Continued on EU Referendum 2.

It takes a crisis

About ten years ago I was privileged (if that is the right expression) to lead a discussion at the Centre for Policy Studies on the subject of British foreign policy – do we have one in the light of the developing EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and can we actually define what it ought to be. I have an odd suspicion that it was before the watershed of 1997, that is, under the last Conservative government. Otherwise, the CPS would not have been thinking about developing policies. So, let us say, 1996.

The crisis that the EU could not cope with was the disintegration of Yugoslavia that had been going on since 1989 and had been made worse by the posturing of various West European politicians. (I wasn’t going to mention Douglas Hurd and his letter about level killing fields but find that I cannot resist the temptation.)

Since then both my colleague and I have written many tens of thousands of words on the subject of the EU's common foreign policy as weary readers of this blog know. To sum up, the structures and institutions of the CFSP have been developing, treaty by treaty, Council by Council with cheerleaders like the Centre for European Reform's director Charles Grant telling us that Europe must play a stronger role in the world and can do so only by speaking with one voice. I have never had an answer to the question "what will the Single European Voice say".

This has been the problem all along as we, on this blog, have grown tired of pointing out: there is no common interest among the 27 member states so there can be no common foreign policy. But if the EU is to turn itself into a more or less functioning state, it has to have a foreign policy. Each time we go round this argument we reach an impasse that becomes particularly obvious whenever there is a crisis.

Well, here we are in another crisis that involves Russia, Georgia, other former Soviet colonies and a spectacularly inept performance by the EU. The old structures, NATO, G7 and individual countries are beginning to reassert themselves and Britain has, amazingly enough, made it clear that it is siding against Russia's aggressive intent to reconstruct the Soviet geopolitical sphere. Well, the Foreign Secretary has made it clear as has the Leader of the Opposition. There has been little from the Prime Minister and the Shadow Foreign Secretary but one cannot have everything.

Mirabile dictu, at least one journalist, Iain Martin in The Daily Telegraph, to be precise, has noticed an interesting thing. Britain, he has discovered, has no foreign policy beyond becoming more involved with the EU's CFSP and, as a consequence, farming out what is left of that policy. Well, well, well. How long did it take Mr Martin to discover this? And why does he need to dilute his discussion of a very important topic with the inevitable speculation about David Miliband's plans to become Leader of the Labour Party either before or after the next election?

In fact, what is the point of spending quite so much time on lambasting Gordon Brown (a sport that is akin to shooting fish in a barrel) instead of analyzing how the country has reached this particular stage?

Of course, Mr Martin might have to acknowledge that this is not a problem created by the Labour government but one that has been in the background since the beginning of the European project and has been definitely developing since the Maastricht Treaty whose Title J first spoke of a common foreign and security policy, though in very general terms, and an intention would be to formulate a common defence policy.

Since then the idea has been gaining ground steadily and as steadily has the notion of an independent British foreign policy been disappearing from the public debate. Tony Blair would not have had as many problems with the war in Iraq if he had argued the need for it on the basis of British interests and British foreign policy but being a true supporter of European integration and of transnational thinking he could not bring himself to do that.

The world, Iain Martin thinks, is a scary place and the response to that should be a development of where Britain's interests lie, this being an alliance with the United States though not a close subservience to it, rather than a drowning in the European project and an acceptance of Franco-German ideas as being the right ones to follow. Mr Martin has noticed, apparently, that neither France nor Germany have been particularly alert on the subject of Russia and her aggressiveness. But then, neither has our own Foreign Office. Come to think of it, our media has been remarkably quiescent on the subject of British foreign policy and what it should be.

Still, we must cease worrying. Iain Martin is not alone in noting this peculiar development. Daniel Hannan has also written about it on his blog. As I said, it takes a crisis …

A high water mark?

As Russia replaces its combat troops with "peacekeepers" in Georgia, thereby making a mockery of the international "community" and in particular M. Sarkozy who brokered what passes for the withdrawal deal, the commentators are picking over the bones of what is left of the EU's fabled common foreign policy.

Pre-eminent in this noble task is John O'Sullivan who notes how the conflict in Georgia has brought into focus the stark divisions in the political structure of the world, arguing that it "is really a three-way struggle between authoritarians, national democrats, and global legalists."

And, while one might expected the "global legalists" to have rushed to the barricades to defend the "international norms", the odd thing, writes O'Sullivan, is that when the crisis broke, it was the national democrats from whom the show of solidarity with the Georgians came.

Thus, he avers, the EU argument that pooling sovereignty leads to greater real power proved to be a sham - it led in practice to collective impotence and self-deception. This post-modern war has proved the limits of soft power and the emptiness of global legalism without roots in democratic support.

If the Georgian conflict has proved a blow to the self-esteem and ambitions of the "colleagues", however, already the camp followers are attempting to pick up the pieces.

In the Irish Times this weekend, John Palmer - founding political director of the European Policy Centre in Brussels and previously European editor of The Guardian - makes a case for a new post-conflict relationship between the EU and its eastern neighbours.

Amazingly, he argues for a "United Commonwealth of Europe", which would include Russia and the former Soviet satellites, within the framework of the Council of Europe. This, suggests, would replicate the EU's own arrangement for deciding issues of mutual interest "through both co-operation and a degree of sovereignty sharing."

Acknowledging that Russia under Putin's authoritarian rule "may neither qualify for nor be interested in membership" (how could he do otherwise - when did Russia ever "share" sovereignty?), Palmer still contends that this is a strategy which would attract Russian democrats who have always aspired to be part of "the European family".

But, at the heart of Palmer's piece is a lament that the European Union could play a more constructive role only "if it could overcome its own internal divisions," with that observation that "EU governments seem bereft of ideas for a long-term strategy to overcome a looming new division on the Eurasian continent."

Indeed, that is the reality. As my co-editor so often observes, there is no common interest between the 27 disparate states of the EU and without that, it is difficult to see how they can cobble together a coherent – or any – long-term strategy.

This, though, does not mean it will not continue trying to pull its mad edifice together and, come the autumn political season, we will see many pronouncements from the "colleagues" on the direction to take.

Nevertheless, more and more, it is becoming apparent that the EU is a wounded animal, stranded by its own unrealistic ambitions, compounded by its complete lack of ability to deliver. All the talk in the world will not fix this problem, which can only get worse as that inconvenient reality continues to intrude. In Georgia, therefore, we may just have seen the high-water mark of European ambitions.

COMMENT THREAD

An institutional breakdown

If we came away with nothing else out of the constitutional Lisbon treaty, it was an appreciation of how much the "colleagues" value their institutions, this being their preoccupation during this – and previous – treaty negotiations.

It is quite remarkable, therefore, that the rabidly Europhile Euractive can apparently view with equanimity what amounts to a complete breakdown of the established institutional order of the European Union, over relations with Russia.

In the natural order of things, EU external relations should be handled by the presidency, currently in the "safe" hands of M. Sarkozy, aided and abetted by the High Representative, Javier Solana, the baton handed on through successive presidencies until the matter is resolved (or not).

What Euractiv is embracing, however, is the growing view that German chancellor Angela Merkel should "step up and take the lead within the EU to resolve tensions over Georgia and reshape the West's relations with Moscow".

In one way, this is a completely logical view. By any account, Sarkozy has spectacularly failed to manage the Georgia crisis and, with clearly a better rapport existing between Merkel and president Medvedev (pictured) – to say nothing of shared geopolitical interests – it makes sense for the chancellor to front negotiations.

The point is, though, that Merkel is an interested party, with a very keen interest, not least, in maintaining the flow of gas, oil and coal from Russia. With Germany closing down its nuclear industry and its coal mines, without the active support of Russia, Germany no longer has an economy.

Yet, the whole ethos of the EU institutional system is that it should be "above politics", managed by disinterested "Platonic guardians" who are looking after the interests of the Union as a whole, without deference to the needs or ambitions of any one or group of member states. Whatever Merkel's merits, no one can accuse her of being disinterested.

On a more practical level, the very last person (or country) we want representing our interest is Germany. Having mismanaged our own energy policy, we too are reliant on Russian gas and are likely to become more so – and have also an unhealthy reliance on Russian coal. Merkel, therefore – in a very real sense – is hardly a "partner" but a serious competitor in the race to secure increasingly scarce and expensive energy resources.

Any idea that Merkel will, in representing the EU in its relations with Russia, will look after our interest lies strictly in the land of the fairies.

In this, history offers a very poor precedent when, in the post Yom Kippur oil crisis, individual member states broke away from the community interest and sought their own salvations. At the time, Jean Monnet and his integrationalist colleagues deplored this exhibition of national self-interest, calling for the rapid development of still more institutional structures to remove this undesirable trait.

Some 35 years later, the institutional structures are still not in place and, rather that pursue them with more vigour – not that they would be of any use – the "colleagues" seem quite content to abandon them altogether in their search for answers.

The significance of this cannot be overstated. Effectively, it represents a loss of faith in the drivers of European integration, with politics reverting to the classic model of Great Powers resolving issues between them, while the lesser powers pick the crumbs from the table after the pie has been shared out.

What is different now, though, is that the UK has absented itself from the game, yet we are still bound by the institutional ethos of the Union when it is clearly no longer functioning. This is the worst of all possible worlds.

COMMENT THREAD