EU Referendum

Yesterday, according to the great Sunday Times, Israel has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran's uranium enrichment facilities with tactical nuclear weapons. Under the by-line of Uzi Mahnaimi in New York and Sarah Baxter in Washington, the newspaper further asserts that two Israeli air force squadrons are training to blow up an Iranian facility using low-yield nuclear "bunker-busters".

Nothing of this is new however. We have been reading reports of IAF practising a strike for some considerable time and, ten days short of a year ago, posted a picture of the IAF Squadron that would lead the raid. The IAF has also published a picture of one of what might be a back-up squadron (above left). And the idea of a nuclear strike on Iran goes back to at least October 2003 when the LA Times "revealed" planning for such an attack.

However, the Sunday Times, in that infuriatingly self-important way that so typifies the MSM, seems to think such plans are new. It is thus able to announce, "Revealed: Israel plans nuclear strike on Iran", telling us that they were prompted "in part" by the Israeli intelligence service Mossad's assessment that Iran is on the verge of producing enough enriched uranium to make nuclear weapons within two years.

Actually, this is also not new. Iran has been "on the verge" for some considerable time. But, as we pointed out in February last, it is producing a uranium bomb, which means it will be too heavy for its current or any known means of delivery in the foreseeable future.

This minor piece of information seems to have escaped the Sunday Times and nor have I seen it in any other MSM outlet. But it has an enormous significance in assessing the threat from Iran. Even if it could get a bomb together in two years, it would take several more before it could get anywhere close to developing a means of delivery that could carry the weight.

Another highly significant issue is the delivery to Iran by the Russians, which started last November, of the Tor-M1 air-defence missile systems. Time and time we have argued, not least here, that the presence of these highly capable missiles would tilt the balance of advantage against an Israeli airstrike, to the extent that, once deliveries are complete, it would no longer be an option.

This is something which the Sunday Times itself, when it was forecasting a raid by March 2006, thought important in December 2005 - but now seems to have forgotten about. It also seems to have forgotten about its earlier report in March 2005 that an Israeli strike had been given "initial authorisation", that too being announced in the same, breathless, self-important tones, the headline proclaiming: "Revealed: Israel plans strike on Iranian nuclear plant".

Once again, we have the same pair of journalists in the by-line, Uzi Mahnaimi - in Tel Aviv, not having yet moved to New York - and Sarah Baxter, in Washington. And, as for Mahnaimi, he is a very odd cove indeed.

Nevertheless, if an Israeli strike was likely then, as Mahnaimi then asserted, it is now - over a year later - highly unlikely, whether nuclear or otherwise. In the first instance, this is because it is evident that there is no immediate threat and, secondly, because the window of opportunity for a quick, pre-emptive strike is now closing, if not actually closed.

A grown-up newspaper might actually mention these issues, in the absence of which, you just know the story is a crock – one of these excitable, lightweight fillers that the Sunday Times uses when it wants to look important but actually does not have any hard news. The funny thing is that if this blog "revealed" such garbage stories in such a consistently breathless manner, we'd be laughed off the blogsophere.

COMMENT THREAD

"The West is losing patience with Putin" says The Daily Telegraph leader, railing against the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, even though the paper admits that there is, as yet, no evidence linking the poisoning of to the Kremlin. Nevertheless, that does not stop it declaring:

Until now, the West has tended to overlook Mr Putin's authoritarianism, largely for the sake of a quiet life. But there must come a point when our patience runs out. It is one thing to tyrannise your people; quite another to presume to do so on British territory.

The first of 29 Tor-M1 systems in the $700m deal have been delivered to Iran by Moscow despite US opposition to their sale of a weapon widely regarded as the most advanced of its kind in the world. Some Iranian and Russian air defense experts say its full deployment at Iran's nuclear installations will make them virtually invulnerable to American or Israeli attack in the foreseeable future. Therefore, no more than six months remain, until the Russian Tor-M1 systems are in place, for any attempt to knock out Iran's nuclear weapons industry.

"While the world remains understandably transfixed on Lebanon and Israel, one fact bears keeping in mind: more people were killed in Iraq in the past two weeks than in Israel and Lebanon combined," writes Andrew Sullivan in The Sunday Times.

The numbers tell the story: 2,669 Iraqis lost their lives to violence in May. In June the number jumped to 3,149. Almost all the deaths were deliberate targeting of civilians. The attempt after the death of insurgent Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to assert the Maliki government's control of Baghdad — a police and military offensive in the capital — has been revealed as a failure within a few weeks.

In many ways, says Sulivan, the biggest story of the past fortnight may, in other words, have been missed. It was not the moment that Israel used "disproportionate” force; it was the moment when the West's inadequate force in Iraq was revealed as finally, irredeemably, insufficient to the task."

It is rather apposite, therefore, that in the Booker column today is a picture (above) which illustrates precisely one aspect of that "inadequate force… insufficient to the task". This is a burning Snatch Land Rover, which has been hit by a roadside bomb.

Booker recalls that I have been pointing out on this blog why these hopelessly inadequate patrol vehicles, which provide no protection against mines or roadside bombs, have been responsible for the deaths of more than a quarter of the 84 British soldiers who have been killed in action in Iraq. He also reminds us that in June, when this was first raised in the Lords, the defence procurement minister, Lord Drayson, insisted that these unarmoured Land Rovers provided "the level of protection we need".

Now that the MoD is to buy 100 Cougars (rather longer and wider than the RG 31s which it had earlier claimed were too large), Fraser Nelson, in his column in The Business tells us that "it quickly became apparent that the Snatch Land Rover was easily torn apart by roadside bombs." So, he writes:

Mr Browne negotiated an extra £40m from the Treasury for 100 US-made Cougar vehicles, which can survive such attacks, for delivery in November. As defence procurement goes, it represents lightening speed and an encouraging ability to change the mission depending on what is learned.

Combined with the developments in Iraq, it presages a real and new shift in power. If Tehran gains a Shi'ite mini-state with vast oil reserves in Iraq, if its nuclear programme continues unchecked, if its proxy fighters in Lebanon continue to show the tenacity and barbaric targeting of civilians that they have demonstrated so far, we have the makings of a war in the Middle East with Iran as the central player, vowing to rival Al-Qaeda as the spearhead of the new caliphate.

The Israelis are aware of this because their survival depends on it. Their elimination as a people and a nation is a central tenet of Hezbollah’s and Tehran’s ideology. That is why their response in Lebanon, however awful the collateral civilian deaths and injuries, and however unsettling to the region, is rational from their point of view. It is disproportionate only if you ignore the existential threat that they increasingly face.

Bush's bungled, unserious Iraq occupation has given the Shi'ite Islamists an opportunity. In southern Lebanon they have opened a polarising second front. In southern Iraq they are gaining a new and potentially deadly base of operations. From that base, their true intentions will shortly become clearer. And the future darker.

It is hard to decide which part of the British media that is more nauseating: the likes of the BBC, which puts out what is effectively Hezbollah propaganda (the website is, in fact, better) or the ignorant snootiness of the likes of Simon Heffer, known affectionately as the Hefferlump.

Let us set aside the BBC (as well as the Independent, fond though I am of Robert Fisk’s lunacies). In fact, given the choice examples of British coverage that Stephen Pollard supplies on his blog, it might be a good idea to ignore much of it. It is not a question of them taking an anti-Israeli line and supporting terrorism – they are entitled to that. They are not, however, entitled to equate the two. And they are not really entitled to write and pronounce with quite so much ignorance. On the other hand, several of their European brethren are equally bad and ignorant.

Let us concentrate on the Hefferlump who does not, as it happens, take the side of the terrorists. He is simply not interested enough in what goes on in the big bad world. The piece, entitled “A third world war looms - but Britain has no foreign policy” can best be described as a sort of curate’s egg. It is good in parts. Very few parts. Then again, judging by the largely inane comments posted by his readers, the bad parts have their fan club.

Let’s get the good bits out of the way first. It is undoubtedly true that Margaret Beckett is an embarrassment as a Foreign Secretary but so was Robin Cook with Jack Straw coming up close behind. And don’t get me on the subject of Douglas Hurd or Malcolm Rifkind.

In fact, the only half-way decent post-war Foreign Secretary we have had (actually the ones before the war were not that much better but it was a different world and you could get away with a lot more) was Ernie Bevin, who, as Mr Heffer reminds us, “spent his life as a trade union leader before, at a late age, entering government”.

In a way Beckett does not matter as Blair has been his own Foreign Secretary since soon after 1997 (probably since Cook’s ethical foreign policy collapsed around the government’s ears). Nothing particularly unusual in that. This country has had a number of prime ministers who, either formally or informally, conducted their own foreign policy. Margaret Thatcher did so periodically, others all the time.

Heffer is also correct in delivering a glancing blow to the Conservative Party, who appear to have no collective views on what is going on in the Middle East. As Tim Montgomerie pointed out on the Toryboy blog, Cameron did not raise the subject during the last PMQ before the summer recess. Judging by some of the comments, large parts of the Conservative Party think there is nothing wrong with that, one little lad (well, I have no idea of his size) even pointing out that this is all happening a long way away and has nothing to do with us.

The Conservative Party has, I believe, has a Shadow Foreign Secretary. He is believed to be the brightest of the bunch around the Boy-King. Have we heard any pronouncements from him on matters international, apart from the benighted EPP?

Anyway, back to the Hefferlump. I very much fear that he is one of those blessed baa-lambs that I have referred to in a previous posting. He seems not to have read or listened to that exchange between Bush and Blair, unexpectedly caught on the mike, in any detail. Yet it is very short and even Mr Heffer could have found time for that, though he seems to have been put off by that jocular “Yo!” used by the President.

Instead we get the usual stuff about the “master-servant relationship”, Bush’s poodle, yadda-yadda-yadda. Instead of which Blair must take “a more critical line with America” as the latter’s policies have been a disaster and we have been branded by it all, yadda-yadda-yadda.

It seems Mr Heffer has not noticed that, as we pointed out and as Fraser Nelson has written in this week’s Spectator (in case Mr Heffer is too grand to read blogs) Mr Blair does have ideas for a policy and he is always trying to foist it on President Bush. These ideas are all to do with multilateral activity and transnational organizations. They have failed in the Middle East and President Bush has, rightly, rejected them.

There are already UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon. They have been there ever since Israeli troops moved out. They have not prevented Hezbollah from arming itself, stockpiling more arms from Iran or from lobbing thousands of rockets into north Israel (described as the northern part of occupied Palestine by the Speaker in the Iranian Parliament).

Another thing about Mr Heffer is that he has really important friends:

“As a former Foreign Office minister put it to me this week, American diplomacy is now a contradiction in terms.”

“Instead, when Ms. Rice ventures to the region as early as this week-end, administration officials say that her mission will be to build support for the effective crippling of Hezbollah, which has popular backing across southern Lebanon and has two ministers in the country’s government. The U.S. officials also hope the crisis could end up limiting the influence of Hezbollah’s chief sponsors, Syria and Iran.”

“No longer subject to Syrian occupation, Lebanese officials spoke freely. The Middle East Media Research Institute translated many reactions. "Lebanon ... is not willing to be the spearhead of the Arab-Israeli conflict," former President Amin Gemayel said. "Hezbollah will have to explain itself to the Lebanese," Druze leader Walid Jumblatt told Le Figaro.

The independent Beirut daily Al-Mustaqbal quoted Lebanese Communications Minister Marwan Hamada saying, "Syrian Vice President Faruq al-Shara gives the commands, Hezbollah carries them out, and Lebanon is the hostage."

Nor did the wider Arab world rally in unanimity toward Hezbollah. "A distinction must be made between legitimate resistance and uncalculated adventures undertaken by elements [without] ... consulting and coordinating with Arab nations," the official Saudi Press Agency opined. Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit included Hezbollah rocket attacks in his condemnation of terrorism.

Even the Arab League, which seldom misses an opportunity to denounce Israel, offered only muted criticism. True, League Secretary General Amr Moussa condemned Israel's "disproportionate attack," after the July 15 meeting, but rather than just slam the Jewish state, Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, chided Hezbollah's "unexpected, inappropriate and irresponsible acts."

Delegates from Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and the UAE backed Mr. al-Faisal. Ahmed al-Jarallah, editor of Kuwait's Arab Times, condemned both Hezbollah and Hamas in an editorial that same day, writing, "Unfortunately we must admit that in such a war the only way to get rid of 'these irregular phenomena' is what Israel is doing."”

“There is anger at Hezbollah among many Lebanese who believe that its operation to capture soldiers on Wednesday invited Israel's military response, and some believe that Hezbollah is not acting in the interests of Lebanon.

Said Goksel: "If this carries on like this Hezbollah will turn up as the villain in this. This is not going to be healthy for this country. Forget national dialogue. Hezbollah has made it clear that it is not interested in internal politics."

But besides being a militia, Hezbollah is a political party popular with Lebanon's Shia community, and while much of Hezbollah's infrastructure can be destroyed, support for Hezbollah is likely to remain among the Lebanese Shia - the country's largest group.”

“Even as Arab states routinely condemn U.S. foreign policy, they embrace the American umbrella. John Mearsheimer and Steven Walt, respectively of the University of Chicago and Harvard, may argue that "the Israel Lobby" perverts U.S. interests; but Arab leaders understand that the only countries the U.S. military has fought to protect in the Middle East were Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

The tiny Gulf emirates are defenseless without U.S. protection. There is hardly a state on the Arabian Peninsula that does not train with the U.S. military or welcome a small U.S. presence. But with U.S. congressmen proclaiming the defeat and vulnerability of U.S. troops in Iraq, and the Islamic Republic drawing closer to its nuclear goals, Tehran's stock is rising at U.S. expense.

The signs of Arab unease have been growing over the last 18 months. Jordan's King Abdullah II first raised alarm. In a Dec. 12, 2004 interview with Chris Matthews, he warned that the rise of Iranian-backed Shiite parties in Iraq could give rise to a Shiite "crescent" stretching from Iran to Lebanon. Abdulaziz Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, called Abdullah's comments "ridiculous," but the remarks resonated in Arab countries.

True, the Shiites might account for only 10% of the world's Muslims, but in the volatile region stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Iran, the Sunnis and Shiites are near parity. That Shiites predominate in the oil-producing regions not only of Iran and Iraq but also in Saudi Arabia accelerates the fears.

Satellite stations throw fuel on the fire. A July 12 political cartoon in the Iraqi daily al-Mutamar depicted a man pouring gasoline labeled sectarianism into a satellite dish.”

“The EU is based on consensus and has a hard time responding during crises. And it is now floundering because all the previous givens and consensus on the Middle East have become obsolete.”

For an update on this post, see here.

And so it came to pass that their Noble Lords had their debate on defence yesterday and, in the nature of things, widely ignored it was by the media and the great unwashed.

It was in many senses a messy affair, covering too wide a range of subjects – from the nuclear deterrent to housing for the armed forces and all points in between.

One contribution which did stand out though was from the Viscount Brookeborough which, especially in the context of my earlier post, seems to make enormous sense. In the interests of fuelling our own debate, therefore, I am publishing the full text here:

While in Basra recently, I was struck by the similarity of certain operations to those that we carried out in Northern Ireland. But what really made an impression was the obviously low numbers of helicopters—less than half the maximum of 72 that we had in Northern Ireland. I have been involved in anti-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland for the past 30 years or so, and I saw some interesting parallels.

In Basra, in the multinational force area, insurgents are not normally suicidal. However, they have taken IRA technology—which is what it was—directly off the shelf. Suffice it to say, it is a device that noble Lords may have seen in the newspapers last week. It is called a PIR RC IED—a passive infrared radio-controlled improvised explosive device. It is almost certainly manufactured in Iran. It is not improvised—the device has been made by machines in a factory. The system of initiation enables extreme accuracy. That is why soldiers are being killed in Snatch vehicles. It is also capable of disabling tracked vehicles.

I am aware that we are developing counter measures. However, like Northern Ireland terrorists, the insurgents are most certainly developing the next generation of weapons to get round our counter measures. By the nature of things, we will always be slightly behind, so the problem cannot just be shuffled away, with the hope that there is a counter measure.

We were told by the Minister in May in answer to a Written Question that our service helicopter fleet was only 59 percent operational. That is seriously bad news; it is a disgrace within a modern Army. We were also told that there were 28 helicopters in Iraq, of which an average of 22 percent were not serviceable. Therefore, there are, on average, 20 serviceable aircraft in Iraq. This does not differentiate between the various capabilities. We were told that we had two Chinooks, eight Sea Kings, seven Merlins, five Pumas and six Lynx. I read a report about more Sea Kings going to Iraq, but I am not sure whether they are the right aircraft and whether we are not plugging a hole with the wrong nail.

If these helicopters are defined, rather vaguely, into "support/heavier lift" and "tactical/patrol deployment" categories, that would result in the Chinooks, Sea Kings and Merlins being in the support and heavy lift category, the Pumas being dual purpose and the six Lynx being the patrolling aircraft. This does not take into account the fact that seven may be unserviceable, spread over all types, or in extremes, all from one category. That is a possibility, but we hope it does not occur.

My observations are as follows. The 17 aircraft in the larger category and the Pumas in the second category are almost entirely used moving personnel and equipment between bases in the multinational force area in southern Iraq. That also includes providing aircraft to go to Baghdad occasionally. These tasks include administrative resupply, changeover of units, servicemen travelling to and from R&R; and hospital visits. These tasks are important—in fact, they are essential. They have become a vital priority in maintaining our deployment, so they are not for giving up, day by day, in preference to something else.

That leaves the Lynx and sometimes some of the Pumas for all the other tasks, including operational patrolling, surveillance and general taxi work. Surveillance is important because our modern surveillance system—the successor to P3—fills up the back of a Puma. You cannot land it on the ground and pick up eight soldiers. That helicopter is operational for surveillance only.

At the very best, it would be difficult to ring-fence the use of more than eight choppers for eagle patrolling and tactical operations by troops on the ground throughout the whole of our area. Where the use of single aircraft is at high risk, it will have to be done in pairs, thereby reducing separate operations that may be supported by choppers at any one time.

In practical terms, regardless of the theory, if anyone suffers a reduction in heli hours due to serviceability, it is the soldiers deploying on routine operations—they may be routine, but they are highly dangerous in Iraq—and not the vital admin resupply and support. It is therefore true that an overall increase in helis, and therefore heli hours, by, for example, 25 per cent, would be seven aircraft. That could result in a 100 per cent increase in availability of choppers for supporting patrolling on the ground. That is not great and I do not understand why we are not doing it.

We have lost personnel increasingly while on mobile patrol. We had a very similar problem in Northern Ireland, and we had to put large areas completely out of bounds to mobile patrols. Where I live, across the main road, it did not matter what happened—you were not allowed to take a mobile patrol. We used covert patrol vehicles, but I accept that that is not an option for Iraq. We also used helis, but we had 72 before taking serviceability into account. They often had to operate in pairs. We must ask ourselves questions about the patrols, especially mobile patrols. Is a given patrol really necessary? What is the threat and why is the IED beside the road? Could the patrol be done on foot? If we have the heli hours, could we use helis to patrol at virtually no risk? Are the helis at risk?

There was a range of conclusions, which included the following. Obviously many mobile patrols are vital to achieve the mission, but occasionally, if you ask the questions carefully, it is found that the answer is that they are "not really vital". So why are we doing it? If the threat to a mobile patrol is an IED, then why did the opposition set it up? To protect something, or purely because the patrol would pass it? If the latter is correct, then there is no need to be there, and that is why the IED is there. That is a very simple but important argument.

If the patrol is on foot, it is easier, through tactics developed in Northern Ireland and now in Iraq, to protect themselves and control the environment around them. I shall not go into detail, but that is what occurs. If there are heli hours, eagle patrolling reduces the risk immediately. If helis are at risk, the use of helis in pairs enhances safety yet again. One helicopter operates while the other one watches. Two helis in the air can virtually freeze terrorist movement in a 2 kilometre-square area. The second one can react to any unusual activity. There are more ARFs—air reaction forces—in the air, day by day, which can react to other things occurring in the area.

In Northern Ireland, the threat to helis virtually disappeared when there was more than one of them in the air. There were occasions in County Fermanagh, where I live, when a patrol or OP was hit and there was not vital necessity for it to be there. There would have been no attack if it had not been on the ground at the time. If it was not in an ambush position, what was it doing providing a target? That is what some mobiles are doing.

While in Iraq, I asked a very senior person how the Iraqis will patrol when we leave and remove our technology, which is going to happen. I was told that the Iraqi mobile patrols did not seem to be targeted in the same way. We seem to be providing ourselves as a target, especially if an Iraqi patrol can do it. That is fact—it is what I was told.

If you ask a senior officer, "Are you coping with accomplishing your mission?", the answer will be yes. If he gave the wrong answer, you would probably remove him. However, if you were to ask, "If you were provided with substantially more helis, would it change your tactics and make it safer?", the answer would be a resounding yes and you would have a very happy officer. Incidentally, an increase in helicopters to Northern Ireland levels would increase those provided to soldiers by 600 per cent.

In a discussion on research for new vehicles in the other place on 26 June, the Secretary of State said:

"There are medium and long-term plans relating to vehicles, and I shall be considering what we can do to respond to the situation in the short term".

The review should already be under way. We are in an operational situation. How come we have just decided to do it today? The terrorists, or the insurgents, are already reviewing what we are trying to counter, and we are about to set up the review. I suppose that it is something. What are the Government doing when they say that they,
"shall be considering what we can do to respond ... in the short term"?

The "short term" is tomorrow. Something should already have been done. That debate was on 26 June. It is amazing.

Later, the Secretary of State said:

"Decisions on which vehicles to use on operations are for the commanders on the ground". [Official Report, Commons, 26/6/06; cols. 4-5.]

The commander can use only what he's got. It is a lovely turn of phrase, but if he had the helis, he wouldn't be in the wagon.

A number of those in another place and some commentators have asked about bigger or stronger vehicles, but I do not think that that is the right line to go down. We do, however, need a patrolling vehicle, because the type of IEDs being used will disable tracked armoured vehicles. What are you left with after such an incident? You are left with a marooned armoured vehicle. How do you get it out? If you cannot, you may have a riot situation. Or perhaps we do not need to worry about it because, after they have stopped killing people in the tracked vehicle, the crowd will ensure that the situation is sufficiently in hand to petrol-bomb the living daylights out of it. These vehicles are difficult to recover. All I will say is that these reviews are a bit late in the day, and we ought to get some of the 41 percent of choppers which are non-operational into the air pretty quickly.

You have to give it to little Gordie. Not even prime minister yet (if ever) and he is already making the "big decisions". And they don't get much bigger than deciding to renew Britain's "independent" nuclear deterrent.

That certainly has got the BBC nicely worked up, and the Guardian too, not least because the estimates of the cost vary from £10bn to £25bn, depending on what type of new missiles or submarines are chosen.

In fact, generally, Mr Brown was very robust about his future defence policy in his Mansion House speech last night, declaring that he would be, “Strong in defence in fighting terrorism, upholding Nato, supporting our armed forces at home and abroad, and retaining our independent nuclear deterrent." For all the world he sounded just like Liam Fox, complete with exactly the same commitment to Nato – thus, ostensibly kicking European defence integration into touch.

But, Brown's declaration will also renew the argument about whether the deterrent is truly independent, not least because the missiles will be made by the US – probably Lockheed Missiles and Systems - and we will be beholden to the US for the supply and then the ongoing maintenance.

As before though, we will be making the warheads – which gives us the notional indpendence, except for one very important difference. As we recorded in November last year, the last remaining military explosives factory in the UK is being closed down, and the production transferred to France.

Included in that transfer is the vital and very special technology for making the conventional explosives which are required to trigger a nuclear bomb, without which we will have no deterrent at all.

If Mr Brown wants his "independent" nuclear deterrent, therefore, he had better not be too robust about his support for Nato. Au contraire, he will need to be very, very nice to the French - or he won't get his bombs. I wonder if anyone has bothered to tell him this?

COMMENT THREAD

The response to the MEPs who are junketing in the Middle East and who were convinced that they can create some kind of diplomacy that would sort out the Palestinian question has been swift, as has the reaction to funds being offered to the Palestinian Authority by Iran and Russia. A suicide/homicide bomber killed himself and eight other people and injured 49 in Tel Aviv.

Responsibility is variously being claimed by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ brigade (the “militant wing” of Fatah, which is rather unhappy at the turn of political events in the Palestinian Authority) and by Islamic Jihad. Hamas, of course, keeps telling us and this is repeated by somewhat naïve Western commentators, that they have agreed to a cease-fire and are keeping to it.

That does not mean, in their opinion, that they should in any way constrict the activity of Islamic Jihad who has not agreed to anything like a cease-fire, has consistently fired rockets into Israel and has now, possibly, sent a suicide/homicide bomber into Tel Aviv.

Nor has Fatah ever bothered to control or disarm Al-Aqsa. Speaking of the bombing, Hamas representatives all repeated the same line: this was legitimate activity in the face of Israeli aggression, by which they seem to mean the withholding of tax money until Hamas agrees to recognize Israel’s right to existence and definitely eschews terrorist activity. Also, it was self-defence.

It is important to emphasise that the bomb went off in Tel Aviv, not in the supposedly disputed territory. But, as one has to keep repeating, all Israeli territory is disputed by Hamas and their latest, though somewhat inadequate, paymaster, Iranian President Ahmadinejad.

In the meantime, the American Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) has published a report, which says that

“Iran has expanded its uranium-conversion facilities in Isfahan and reinforced its Natanz underground uranium-enrichment plant”.

“U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also warned that U.S. military intervention in Iran was not the best solution to resolve the nuclear standoff”.

It is all very well for Ahmadinejad to announce that his scientists have been able to produce enriched uranium but, as the Americans point out, we have no means of knowing whether this is true, or merely bluff and bluster, calculated either to improve Iran’s international negotiating position, or for domestic consumption – or a bit of both.

As US state department spokesman Sean McCormack said, "At this point, I can't confirm any of the technical details. There is a lot that goes into a technical assessment of where the Iranians might be in their capability in operating a centrifuge cascade, whether it be a small one or a large one ... I couldn't offer an assessment for you as to where they stand in that process."

If indeed Iran has succeeded with the enrichment process, at 3.5 percent, this is a long way from producing weapons-grade material in sufficient quantities to make a nuclear bomb and, as we have pointed out before, there is a massive leap in technology required to turn this into a bomb. There is then yet another leap before a reliable delivery mechanism can be produced.

Either way, in his prancing and preening, Ahmadinejad is playing a dangerous game and, despite the BBC's attempt to turn this into an US versus Iran conflict, with the peace-loving EU member states mediating, the fact is that the US – short of Israel for the time being – is the only nation with the means to mount effective military action against Iran, should Ahmadinejad go completely off the rails. Therefore, we can be thankful that the US is clearly developing contingency plans – it would be irresponsible of it not to do so.

Needless to say, left-wing columnists – like the increasingly mad Simon Jenkins - blame "western provocation" for Iran's actions, while others point to the sinister role of Russia and Saudi.

Remarkably, no-one seems to be mentioning the role of Russia in arming Iran and the possibility of an independent Israeli response is not being discussed either, although it must still be on the cards.

Altogether though, it is fair to say that no-one really knows what is going on in this troubled region, and we take little comfort that our ignorance is matched by that of the state department. The one thing of which we can be sure, however, is that cannot serve the interests of stability and world peace for Ahmadinejad to be playing to the gallery.

COMMENT THREAD

The Business has managed a singular achievement today in recruiting an American writer, James Forsyth who, in writing about Jack Straw and his wholly malevolent role in the Iran crisis, seems to display some understanding of British politics.

The piece, entitled The Straw that won’t break Tehran’s back, argues that, to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons, the West must convince the authorities in Tehran that it is prepared to use force.

But, writes Forsyth, one politician keeps getting in the way of this strategy and making it seem that force would never be even an option: Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary, whose words keep reassuring the Iranians that they can do whatever they want.

The thesis, which suggests that Straw is playing to the anti-war elements in his own party, and his shrinking support in his own constituency, is well argued and convincing, and well worth a read.

In addition, it is also worth remembering that Straw is a man who, at best, can be described as having very poor judgement, viz his recent visit to Tehran. It was while there that he shook warmly by the hand Esfandiar Rahim Masha'ie (pictured), otherwise known as “the Butcher”, for the cruelty he exhibited in Tonekabon in the 1980s.

Forsyth suggests that Blair should reshuffle Straw at the earliest opportunity. Until he is removed from the foreign office, it will be impossible to persuade Iran president Ahmadinejad that the West is serious about him acquiring the bomb, thereby making armed intervention more likely.

That is too kind a fate for Straw, but at least it would be a start. He is truly a man we could do without.

COMMENT THREAD

A disturbing report was published in the Jerusalem Post yesterday, suggesting that Iran has already enriched enough uranium fissionable material to manufacture at least one or two atom bombs

Their source is Rafi Eitan, a former Israeli intelligence chief who believes that Ahmadinejad "would not have dared come out with his declaration that Israel should be wiped off the map," unless he already had the means to do so. Eitan was involved in the secret planning and implementation of the attack on the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981.

Although he is now eighty, Eitan is still active and still in touch with the intelligence community, so it would be unwise to ignore completely his views. Furthermore, other sources report rumours of an Iranian "experiment" in March. But one does wonder.

Putting various strands together, for Iran to pose a credible threat to Israel, it must not only have a functioning bomb, but also a reliable means of delivery. And here, not all the pieces are falling into place.

The most likely delivery vehicle is the Shahab 3 missile, a much modified version of a North Korean missile, developed with Russian and Chines technical assistance. There are later versions, running to the Shahab 6 series, but only this model seems to have the reliability to pose a credible threat.

Then, although the distance between Tehran and Tel Aviv is just under 1,000 miles, at the limit of the missile's range, firing from either the western provinces of Ilam or Khuzesatan, close to the Iraqi border, would shave 200 miles off that distance and bring the missile well within range.

However, what is interesting is that the Iranians have opted for a uranium rather than a plutonium bomb, which means that they can refine the material without recourse to a nuclear reactor (the latter being the only source of Plutonium). The down-side of this is that a uranium bomb is heavier (and also produced a lower explosive yield).

Using uranium would also simply the design, enabling the relatively crude "gun" arrangement of the type employed in the first atomic bomb dropped by the Americans on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. Bit what must be remembered about that bomb is that it weighted in at 9,700 lbs, with a length of 10 ft and a diameter of 28 in. It also contained 140 lb of uranium.

Clearly, such a crude weapon could not be delivered by an intermediate-range missile like the Shahab 3, which has a maximum payload of a ton and serious dimensional limitations.

To enable missile delivery, the Iranians would have to produce a much more compact implosion device, which could be engineered to fit the limited warhead space of their missile.

However, the first design of this type was the American "Fat Boy", used on Nagasaki, and that weighed in at 10,800 lbs, with a length of 10 ft 8 in and a diameter of 60 in.

With all their skills and experience, the resources of the nation and no outside restriction placed upon them, it than took the Americans until 1966 to produce a lightweight implosion bomb, the B61 (pictured left). At 700 lbs, a length of 10 ft and a diameter of 10.75 in - with the actual nuclear device considerably smaller, this is the sort of development needed before the Iranians could fit out their missile. And, bearing in mind that this is a plutonium weapon, a uranium weapon would be heavier.

The technology required to produce this bomb is fearsome, not least the highly complex array of conventional explosives needed to trigger it, and to produce it would stretch Iranian capabilities and resources to the limit. Furthermore, such is the complexity that the Iranians would at least on live test to prove the design.

Even then, there have been doubts expressed as to whether the warhead dimensions of the Shahab 3 are sufficient even to accommodate a lightweight bomb, which raises further questions about Iranian preparedness.

Despite Rafi Eitan's concerns, therefore, an Iranian nuclear strike – or the acquisition of deliverable bombs - may be less than imminent, which raises questions as to why Eitan has gone public with his fears.

This could, of course, be part of the war of words, aimed at speeding up the reference to the UN Security Council, but it could also be part of the process of preparing Israeli and world opinion for a strike shortly after the Israeli general election, which is to be held on 28 March.

Whatever the truth, it looks like the possibility of an early Israeli strike cannot be ruled out, making the world of much more dangerous place than it was even a few months ago.

COMMENT THREAD

What is it with right-wing commentators? Yesterday, we observed that neo-con supporter Douglas Murray was suggesting the right action on Iran, for entirely the wrong reason.

Now, in the Telegraph today, we have Simon Heffer arguing that "Doing nothing in Iran is not an option", a sentiment with which we could not but agree.

As for his prescription, though, Heffer rightly observes that any military action against Iran, "whatever it is and whoever takes it," is likely to be provocative to the wider Islamic community. He also quite correctly notes that "none is likely to be quite so internationally combustible as a unilateral decision by Israel to bomb - by conventional or possibly other means - Iran."

The, says the redoubtable Heffer, seems to leave only one feasible option – "a United Nations-endorsed series of air strikes on suspected nuclear installations in Iran, made after due and reasonable warning and only as a last resort." All that must be made clear - but it must also be made clear, by the united powers of the United Nations, that any insistence by Mr Ahmadinejad on pursuing his present policy will be met with such a response.

At least Heffer does go on to say it is unlikely that "this happy diplomatic state can be achieved", which has to qualify for the understatement of the year. Russia is on the UN Security Council and thus holds a blocking veto, a country that is flogging billions-worth of arms to Iran, selling it nuclear technology and demurring even at the prospect of trade sanctions, does Heffer really think that there is any possibility at all of the UN authorising air strikes?

And if, say, the UN – under the management of Kofi, father of Kojo - did managed to get permission to mount an airstrike, who would possibly offer its own aircraft for a strike when, authorisation procedures and the "due and reasonable warnings" will have thoroughly alerted the (Russian-supplied) Iranian air defences which will be ready and waiting? Perhaps the only willing supplier would be Mothercare (right), the aircraft from which would be about as much use as Mr Heffer's ideas.

However, at least Heffer's heart is in the right place. Not so Simon Jenkins who has temporarily departed from The Times to his true spiritual home, The Guardian. There, he proclaims: "The west has picked a fight with Iran that it cannot win".

He would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb "but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it." Iran is a proud country, he writes, "How can we say such a country has 'no right' to nuclear defence?" ... from Israel? And how dare Washington's kneejerk belligerence put the "strong diplomatic coalition of Europe, America, Russia and China" under strain? And America wants to do what?

Jenkins does not see "how all this confrontation will stop Iran doing whatever it likes with its nuclear enrichment". The bombing of carefully dispersed and buried sites might delay deployment, he adds, "but given the inaccuracy of American bombers, the death and destruction caused to Iran's cities would be a gift to anti-western extremists and have every world terrorist reporting for duty."

Therefore, for his recipe, Jenkins enjoins us to recognise that Iran "is the regional superstate." If ever there were a realpolitik demanding to be "hugged close" it is this one, he tells us. And, "if you cannot stop a man buying a gun, the next best bet is to make him your friend, not your enemy."

I can't even be bothered to deconstruct this garbage – has he tried talking to the Israelis on this? Has he not seen the video films of strikes in the Gulf, where they can decide through which window they put a bomb? Silly though his ideas may be, I think I prefer Heffer. For Jenkins, I have put a special picture up for him to remind him which planet he is on. He has obviously forgotten.

COMMENT THREAD

The Social Affairs Unit has put up a post on its blog from “bestselling author and freelance journalist” Douglas Murray, author of Neoconservatism: Why We Need It.

Headed: "Why Israel must bomb Iran in the next two months", Murray argues that Israel must bomb Iran - in order to destroy its nuclear facilities - within the next two months. After that, he writes, it will be too late to take action to prevent Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb.

Israel, he continues, is the only country with the capacity and political will to carry out this vital operation: the "international community" will not act decisively; the situation in Iraq makes it all but impossible for the USA, or the UK, to take military action against Iran. If Israel bombs Iran's nuclear facilities, this will have appalling repercussions - but the alternatives are much, much worse.

We do not disagree with this thesis but, unfortunately, the reason why Murray believes a strike is so urgent is horribly flawed. As early as March, he retails:

…Iran will have the capability and expertise to enrich uranium in the quantities required to make a device. This is the point after which our options are appallingly limited. Once it has its uranium, Iran can develop its bomb, and do so safe in the knowledge that no foreign power will risk attacking a reactor once it has gone "hot".

Reviewing this morning's press on Iran, the single thing that is most striking is not what is said, but what is not. The more I think about it, the more I am inclined to the view that the politicos and the media are misreading the situation, and are emphasising the wrong things.

As it is, the focus is on Iran and its recent decision to re-commence work on uranium enrichment, with various erudite – and less informed – comments on the application of sanctions through the UN.

But, as has been thoroughly rehearsed on this blog and on the forum, the immediacy of the crisis has not been brought about by the Iranian decision. At best, it would probably be late next year before Iran has enough material to construct even one bomb. Given the probabilities of launch or delivery failure of its relatively primitives missiles, the likelihood is that, to make a credible strike against Israel, the Iranians would want several bombs in their armoury before deploying them.

Thus, it is probably fair to say that there is no immediate threat from Iran, and any such threat may be several years away.

The other driver of the crisis is, of course, the political situation in Israel, with the prospect of a hard liner being elected in the wake of Sharon's departure from the political scene, with a mandate to take pre-emptive action against Iran. That put the date of a strike at the end of March, or shortly thereafter.

On reflection, though, that does not stack up. A strike at this time, when the Iranians have produced relatively little, if any, weapons-grade material, would cause relatively little delay, while a later strike, aimed at destroying or rendering inaccessible such material as had been produced, would have a more serious effect. Arguably, this suggests that the best option would be a watching brief rather than an early strike.

What has to be asked, therefore, is what makes the difference – what makes the likelihood of an Israeli strike imminent? The answer, of course, is makes the difference the forthcoming delivery by Russia of the SA-15 Gauntlet anti-aircraft missiles, the sales of which it has been negotiating since 2001, and right through the EU3 diplomatic initiative.

Fully to understand the significance of this, one must go back in history to 1970 and the "War of Attrition" between Israel and Egypt. With recently delivered US F-4 Phantoms, the IAF was able to command air superiority over Egyptian skies until June, when – with Soviet assistance – the Egyptians deployed SAM-3 missiles, the very latest in anti-aircraft weaponry.

On 30 June, the IAF launched a furious attack on Egyptian defences after it had been discovered that dozens of SAM-3 batteries and hundreds of AAA guns had been advanced the previous night. But, unlike previous occasions, two Phantoms were downed, both falling prey to Egyptian SAMs. Another Phantom was downed on 5 June, once again by a SAM. By August five Phantoms had been shot down and the IAF was forced to suspend operations over Egypt.

I was in Israel during this period and remember the profound sense of shock amongst ordinary people. Travelling on the busses, the radio was piped continuously to passengers and, when the news bulletins came on, there was absolute silence. Everyone listened and, following the news of the first downing, instead of the animated chatter that you so often get, there was tangible gloom. Unlike our ignorant, pampered population, the ordinary Israeli-in-the street was fully aware of the implications.

That has left the IAF with a profound respect for Russian-built SAMs (a respect that USAF pilots acquired when they met SAM-3s in Viet Nam) and they will be under no illusions that, with the deployment of SA-15s, the chances of a successful air strike against Iran will have been reduced to as close to zero as makes no difference.

The new Israeli prime minister, therefore, is faced with a wholly new and uncomfortable decision. He will know that he has a very narrow window, when an strike could be effective. Following that, the only air force in the world which could deploy effectively in Iranian airspace would be the USAF, any strike spearheaded by its B-2 "stealth" bombers which would engage and suppress air defences.

For an Israeli prime minister – any prime minister - that is an uncomfortable position in which to be. He must either decide to act or give up any chance of future retaliation and trust that the United States, at some time in the unspecified future, will take the necessary action in the defence of Israel, should the need arise.

With what I know of Israeli psychology, my guess is that, at the moment, the "hawks" will be making the running. Whether they get their way depends very much on who is elected prime minister. In the case of Netanyahu, he has already said he would follow the example of former prime minister Menachem Begin who ordered the IAF bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant in 1981.

But the central point is that this current crisis has effectively been triggered not so much by the Iranian action, but by the Russian decision, in December last year, to sell the Iranians advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Thus, while the Western powers line up to condemn Iran, and look to Russian as an ally, perhaps they should be focusing their attentions on Russia, demanding that it delay deliveries of weapons to Iran.

Of course, with the EU cosying up to Putin, and reliant on Russian gas, it is unlikely to take this course, which leaves the Israelis exposed and the situation ever-more dangerous.

COMMENT THREAD

This is not meant to be a defence blog and neither is it. Discerning readers will have noted, however, that there has been a certain emphasis on this issue, but the emphasis is for good reasons.

Firstly, despite the EU constitution ratification process being temporarily stalled, defence integration is continuing apace, and has become the vanguard issue in the continuing process of European political integration. Secondly, at the current rate of integration, we are at risk of losing entirely any independent defence capability, with all that means for our status as a sovereign nation.

Thirdly, for reasons which remain mysterious, the mainstream media seem to have given up even a pretence of serious reporting on defence issues, which leaves to the blogs to pick up the slack.

That said, in today's Guardian, we have interview with John Reid, secretary of state for defence (left), in which he is said to be seeking a "debate on ageing Trident" – i.e., the replacement of our nuclear deterrent. Within the piece, though, there is a statement which, evidently, is not open to debate. Regardless of any decision (on the nuclear deterrent) says Reid, "spending would have to be tightened, with greater European co-ordination on procurement."

It is that latter statement that chills the blood, an acknowledgement – albeit elliptical – that the government is indeed adopting a "Europe first" policy on defence procurement.

Despite this, when Reid's minister for defence procurement, Lord Drayson, addressed the Royal United Services Institute yesterday, on "Military Capabilities in the 21st Century", he was guarded in his speech.

He was sure, he said that his audience would be "trying to parse my remarks for whether I am advocating wholescale protection for UK industry, 'Fortress Europe', or 'Buy America'", saying that he did not meant to convey any of those things. "There will be areas where appropriate sovereignty requires on-shore supply," he said. "There will be some we can procure from the global market. And there will be a third category which can be procured in co-operation with partners – continental European, or American."

"European and transatlantic purchases each have their own characteristics, and it is no secret that either situation can be frustrating at worst," he pointed out, adding, "We tend to forget they can also be extremely successful. For example, the Storm Shadow cruise missile within Europe…" (pictured left).

Unfortunately, no reaction is recorded to this claim, but one really wonders what was going through the mind of the minister as he made it. The Storm Shadow is, of course, the "million pound bomb" that we featured in an earlier posting. It is a French designed weapon, built by Matra Défense for the French Air Force under the name SCALP EG and has been built for the RAF by Matra BAe Dynamics.

In the sense, that it actually works, I suppose it can be considered a success, but it is heavier, with a shorter range than the equivalent US missile, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) - see right, which has a significantly lower price tag of $300,000 (£167,000). We have bought 900 Storm Shadow missiles at a cost of £981 million, whereas the same number of JASSM could have been purchased for £150 million, saving the taxpayer over £830 million.

That, it seems, is Drayson's definition of "extremely successful", and John Reid wants more of it. One is reminded of another the catchphrase of another John – John McEnroe: "You can't be serious!"

COMMENT THREAD

The Wall Street Journal has today had a look at the Iran situation in an opinion piece entitled Carrots for the Mullahs, expressing the view that giving them incentives is a surefire path to a nuclear Iran.

It concludes that the US, with its stake in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, its opposition to terrorist groups that Iran sponsors, and its commitment to spreading democracy in the Mideast, cannot be indifferent to a nuclear Iran.

The problem, the paper says, is not that we have yet to hit on the right mix of carrots and sticks to cajole Iran into responsibility - it is that Iran's theocratic regime is by its nature inimical to American interests; any move that extends its life also prolongs the hazard it poses to the US.

But that does not mean the US should drop diplomacy and take up arms against Iran tomorrow, the paper says. It does mean that if any headway is to be made, the Administration needs to be absolutely clear about Iran's intentions and Europe's motives. Signing on to Europe's strategy offers one certain outcome: a nuclear Iran.

Coincidentally, Reuel Marc Gerecht, fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, also writes on the same subject for The Financial Times, under the heading: "Watch what you wish for in Iran".

He is betting that Iran's nuclear programme is likely to derail any serious rapprochement between the US and western Europe, possibly to the same extent that the Iraq war did.

This is because the EU's approach to a nuclear Islamic republic could become more morally repellent to Bush than was the Franco-German campaign against the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.

Gerecht suggests that a "convergence" of American and European views is unlikely. Instead Bush will recoil from most of the compromises envisioned by the Europeans yet, as both tough economic sanctions and preventive military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities are distasteful if not unthinkable to leaders of the EU, "carrots" are, for the Europeans, the only diplomatic tools left.

Gerecht then cites Robert Kagan, the foreign policy historian, who has noted that, when soft power becomes the only option in foreign affairs, appeasement - the preferred European word is "engagement" - becomes a morally and strategically compelling choice.

What the EU really wants from Washington, says Gerecht is "Libya Plus": in exchange for good nuclear comportment, the Bush administration should forgive the Islamic republic its terrorism - the clerics ruling Iran are the same ones who orchestrated the bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 - without the clerics admitting guilt.

The US should be prepared to promise non-interference in Iran's internal affairs and stop condemning clerical tyranny and publicly ssupporting the country's democratic movement. In other words, the Bush administration should refrain from any action that might resemble Ronald Reagan's strategy toward the Soviet bloc.

If the EU could convince the Bush administration to "engage" Iran in this manner it would, of course, achieve perhaps the most highly-desired Franco-German foreign policy goal: effectively gutting the Bush administration's post-9/11 energy and mission. The Middle Eastern government with the longest terrorist track record could be rewarded with Boeing contracts.

This may be attractive to some in the Bush administration, who want to pass the Iran problem to the Europeans, hoping that EU-Iran negotiations would allow Washington to continue ignoring the conundrum.

Some still hope the Europeans can be converted to a big-stick approach; others, uncomfortable with the grand rhetoric about transforming the Middle East, hope the president will adopt the EU3's Libyan scenario.

But the European proclivity towards rapid concessions - and the near-total absence of will to even allude to big sticks - has disappointed the administration and Iran's ruling mullahs have now brought the EU talks to an impasse.

As a result, the odds are that Bush is not going to do Libya again and the two-decade old strategy of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the influential former president and the driving force behind Iran's nuclear weapons programme, is soon likely to come to fruition.

Says Gerecht, the Islamic republic will have successfully played divide and conquer against the west. But if this leads to a clerical A-bomb, or to a pre-emptive US strike amid a chorus of European outrage, the odds are good that the bonds holding the US and Europe together will further fray. One day, perhaps after the EU lifts its arms embargo on China and France supplies sophisticated radar and torpedo technology to Beijing, they will snap.

Altogether, from two different sources, the prognosis is poor. And the Europeans, it seems, are to be the losers. But that, appeasement did not work in the 30s. Why should it work now?

Well, two troublesome threesomes, really. On the one hand we have the United States, Iran and the European Union, with whom according to Secretary of State Rice, the US is now going to be best buddies except for intending to keep good bilateral relations with all the members as well.

On the other hand, there is the equally troublesome threesome of Britain, France and Germany, locked in an ever more hopeless pursuit of that elusive Holy Grail, objective guarantees that Iran will not acquire or construct a nuclear bomb.

In the wide-ranging press conference Secretary Rice gave in Luxembourg yesterday, where she shimmied skilfully round some difficult questions (even managing to catch out one hack, who seemed not to know the difference between Iraq and Iran), she was, naturally enough, asked about Iran.

The question was not a particularly difficult one, though it may have seemed that to the particular journo:

"Could I ask you about another topic on which there seems to be some difference,Madam Secretary? You have been asked at almost every stop of your trip about the nuclear issue and Iran. As far as I understood, you supported and support the initiative of the EU-3 and advised Iran to take the deal. My question is if there would be a deal between the Europeans and Iran, and there would be a strong guarantee that Iran cannot go the path to develop nuclear weapons, would the United States be prepared to support that deal? Would you be prepared to engage, as well, with Iran? Do you see the necessity to offer incentives, as well, as the Europeans are trying to do, because I think you have been a little bit unclear on that?"

"Well, let’s do first things first: let’s get the Iranians to accept that they have an obligation to the international community not to develop nuclear weapons under cover of civilian nuclear power. The United States was the first state really to raise the alarm on this several years ago. And after some suspicious Iranian activities were uncovered, I think everybody began to realize that this actually was a very big problem.

The EU-3 are trying, in this way, to get the Iranians to live up to these obligations; as I said, the Iranians ought to do it. What we shouldn’t do is it allow the Iranians to start introducing new conditions, like what the United States might or might not do, in order to avoid the answer to the
question that is being asked of Iran, which is: are you prepared to live up to your international obligations? Let’s see if the Iranians can convince the international community that they are, in fact, able and willing to live up to their international obligations in a verifiable way.

The nuclear issue is urgent. It has to be seen in the context and Iran that is in other ways out of step with important trends in the Middle East - in terms of its support for terrorism, in terms of its treatment of its own people. When we’ve just talked about the need for reform in the Middle East, and we’ve just talked about the need for the Israelis and Palestinians to be able to move
forward and to resolve their conflict. The Iranians are on the wrong side of the divide on a number of issues."

We will guard this technology. You will see in the future that Iran will have all the achievements of nuclear science at its disposal. Iran has not hesitated for a moment about its decisions to continue enrichment.

This confidence must be obtained within a few months. Two to three months have already passed. We have given an opportunity, we expect the Europeans to use this opportunity. After the time limit is over we will continue the nuclear technology work using all our power and riches.

It is interesting to see that Iran is moving up the news agenda, although the coverage today seems to be concentrated in what might be called the "right wing" press – the Sunday Telegraph and The Sunday Times. As far as I can see, neither the Observer nor the Independent are looking in detail at the issue today.

Centre-stage is The Sunday Times, which runs a front page story, running over into page, with the headline "Straw snubs US hawks on Iran".

Written by Bavid Cracknell, and Tony Allen-Mills in Washington, these two reporters reveal that Jack Straw has "drawn up a dossier putting the case against a military attack on Iran amid fears that President George W Bush’s administration may seek Britain’s backing for a new conflict."

Straw and his officials, we are told, fear that hawks in Washington will talk the American president into a strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, just as they persuaded him to go to war in Iraq.

The foreign secretary has thus produced a 200-page dossier that rules out military action and makes the case for a "negotiated solution" to curbing the ayatollahs’ nuclear ambitions amid increasingly bellicose noises from Washington.

Apparently pursuing the line consistently taken by the UK, the document says a peaceful solution led by Britain, France and Germany is "in the best interests of Iran and the international community". It refers to "safeguarding Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology".

Yet, in his preface to the dossier, Straw admits that Iran’s compliance with international inspectors is "mixed and incomplete". He writes, in what must be one of the understatements of the century: "There are a number of issues which have still to be fully resolved. The dossier continues:

A negotiated solution, in which both sides have a feeling of ownership, is in the best interests of Iran and of the international community. It gives stronger guarantees of future behaviour than an imposed solution and is more likely to build the long-term confidence and trust which can enable the broader relationship to develop positively.

We have worked hard to achieve agreement with Iran on the way in which this issue is handled, to give the international community the reassurance we seek while safeguarding Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear technology."

The French, the Germans and the British have been trying to use diplomacy to persuade the Iranians to stop their nuclear programme. They have offered Iran technological help (building non-nuclear power plants, for example) if only it will abandon its project to build a bomb and agree to unannounced, on-site inspections from the IAEA. Khameini's men have indignantly responded that it would be "against our principles" to acquire a nuclear bomb – but refuse to agree to unannounced inspections or to allow the IAEA to enter their "research reactor" at Parchim near Teheran.

In fact, the Iranians already have a plant which will produce weapons-grade uranium under construction at Natanz. They have a heavy water facility, a large "nuclear technology centre" at Isfahan, and another at Parchim. The mullahs are still negotiating a deal with the Europeans to end their nuclear programme, but the bellicose rhetoric from America is probably all that keeps them talking.

If Iran is to be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons, effective diplomatic or military action will have to come soon. Production facilities can be bombed but once actual weapons are assembled, locating and destroying them will become next to impossible. And Iran will then be in a position to threaten not just Israel, but all of our oil-producing Arab allies.

When the Israelis bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear research centre at Osirak in 1981, they were universally condemned. The Americans showed their displeasure by cancelling arms sales. But the raid on Osirak prevented Saddam from acquiring a nuclear arsenal, a fact that the Americans and the world fully recognised when weapons inspectors went into Iraq after the 1991 Gulf war. If Saddam had had nuclear weapons in 1991, it would have been impossible to dislodge him from Kuwait. Able to intimidate Saudi Arabia, he would have had decisive power over Middle East oil. That propsect persuaded America, and most of the world, that Israel had done the right thing in bombing Osirak in 1981.

The Iranian situation is beginning to get seriously scary, with some commentators suggesting that it is only a matter of time – unless the situation can be resolved – before there is another war, precipitated by a US invasion.

The immediate causus belli remains Iran’s nuclear ambitions, on top of Tehran's support of violence in Israel and insurgents in Iraq. And, in what some think is an eerie repetition of the prelude to the Iraq war, hawks in the administration and Congress are trumpeting ominous disclosures about Iran's nuclear capacities to make the case that Iran is a threat that must be confronted, either by economic sanctions, military action, or "regime change."

However, intelligence reports, highlighted in our previous posting on this subject, now seem to be firming up, with the Washington Post reporting that the intelligence on Iranian bomb-making capabilities was provided by a "walk-in" source in the form of 1,000 pages of apparent Iranian drawings and technical documents including a nuclear warhead design and modifications to enable Iranian ballistic missiles to deliver an atomic strike.

It seems that the warhead design is based on implosion and adjusted for outfitting on existing Iranian missiles. If confirmed, this would mean Iran’s nuclear-cum-missile programs more advanced than previously known.

Despite this, the EU-orientated team of Britain, France and Germany are still urging diplomacy, placing their hopes in a deal they brokered last week in which Iran agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment program in return for discussions about future economic benefits.

US administration officials less than impressed, saying that there was "a steady tightening of outlook between hawks and doves" that Iran would use the negotiations as a pretext to continue its nuclear programme in secret.

Nevertheless, those same officials say that a military option like the one employed by Israel in 1981 against Iraq, when it bombed a reactor near Baghdad, is unrealistic because the Iranians have buried their most important nuclear facilities and can rebuild anything that is destroyed.

But one said that a military strike or sabotage was not out of the question - "you never take the military option off the table," he said - and that in any case it was "money in the bank" for Iran to be concerned about such an option, because it might be goaded into a more conciliatory approach to the United States.

Perversely, the US position, up to press, had not been to threaten war but to force the issue to the UN Security Council, where sanctions - including a ban on oil imports and technology transfers - could be considered. But the European initiative has brought such talk to a halt.

Now, the thinking is that, if the European deal falls apart – which is believed likely - administration hawks will surely enlist others in a campaign to confront Iran with threats.

Interestingly, that decision will be made by Mr. Bush with his new secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice. She is said to be willing to try diplomacy but is not sure that it will work and is ready to look at other possibilities if it does not.

Having listened to Christopher Huhne yesterday pontificating about how much more influential the UK was when it cast its lot in with the EU, it is singularly ironic that the Telegraph today should run a leader on the Iran situation with these opening words:

There has always been something suspect about European mediation over Iran's nuclear programme. This is not to deny that the EU trio (Britain, France and Germany) is sincere in wishing to prevent Teheran from acquiring nuclear arms. It lies, rather, in its ineffectiveness.

This analysis has been compiled by the National Platform EU Research andInformation Centre, 24 Crawford Avenue, Dublin 9, Ireland.

It draws from many sources and has been checked for legal accuracy by authorities on European law; its political judgements are those of its compilers. The National Platform is affiliated to The European Alliance of EU-critical Movements (TEAM), which links together some 60 organisations in 20 different European countries that are concerned on democratic and internationalist grounds at EU developments, excluding racist or fascist bodies ).

The National Platform's secretary is Anthony Coughlan, who is an economist and Senior Lecturer Emeritus in Social Policy at Trinity College Dublin, and who may be contacted at 00-353-1-8305792

THE TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE

An analysis of the Constitution that makes the EU into a State

"The Constitution is the capstone of a European Federal State."

Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian Prime Minister, Financial Times, 21-6-2004

"For the first time, Europe has a shared Constitution. This pact is the point of no return. Europe is becoming an irreversible project, irrevocable after the ratification of this treaty. It is a new era for Europe, a new geography, a new history."

French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin, Le Metro, 7-10-2004

We know that nine out of 10 people will not have read the Constitution and will vote on the basis of what politicians and journalists say. More than that, if the answer is No, the vote will probably have to be done again, because it absolutely has to be Yes."

Jean-Luc Dehaene, Former Belgian Prime Minister and Vice-President of the EU Convention, Irish Times, 2 June 2004


AN EU STATE CONSTITUTION THAT IS SUPERIOR TO NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, to call it by its proper official name, is not just another EU treaty. This Treaty (Art.IV-437) repeals all the existing EC/EU treaties from the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Nice and then founds or establishes quite a new EU, based on its own Constitution. Legally, constitutionally and politically this new European Union would be quite different from the existing EU.

The new EU, founded on its own State Constitution, in fact becomes a new European State in the world community of States. A young State and a new one, a weak State perhaps, but a State nonetheless, with virtually all the essential features of a State, in which the existing Member States are reduced to the constitutional status of regions or provinces. Simultaneously the EU Constitution becomes the fundamental source of legal authority within Europe, supplanting the Constitutions of the Member States as the ultimate source of legal power.

The EU Constitution becomes part of our Constitution and will not be amendable except with the consent of other countries. This is therefore the most decisive step ever in the near-60-year-old project of European integration, aimed at turning the EEC/EC/EU into a fully-fledged State, a superpower in the world.

To call it a "constitutional treaty" is to downplay its significance. "Constitutional treaty" implies that this is comparable to previous EU treaties like Nice, Amsterdam, Maastricht, and the Single European Act, whereas the most important thing about it is that it is a Constitution as well as a treaty. In international law a Treaty is a contract or agreement between independent States, the High Contracting Parties, as equal sovereign partners.

A Constitution is the fundamental law of a State, setting out its institutions of government, how it makes its laws, determines its policies and actions and relates to other States. This treaty will only be a treaty until the Constitution comes into effect. From then on it is the Constitution we will be bound by and will have to obey.

Article 1.1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe states: "This Constitution establishes the European Union." As the European Union already exists as an intergovernmental cooperation between its Member States established by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, what this Treaty-cum-Constitution proposes is an EU that would constitutionally, legally and politically be a fundamentally different thing from the EU we are at present members of.

Article I-7 gives this new European Union, established now on the basis of its own Constitution, legal personality and a distinct corporate existence for the first time. Hitherto the EU has had no legal existence apart from its Members. At present the Member States, not the EU, are superior. This is shown by the fact that the Member States if they wished could agree at any time to dissolve both the EU and EC, and interact with one another like the rest of the world community of States, and as they did themselves before the 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC).

The Constitution changes this. Legally and constitutionally it makes the new EU separate from any of its individual Member States, just as Germany is a separate state from Bavaria or Brandenburg, the USA from Virginia or California, and Canada from Ontario. This is the most essential constitutional step for those who seek to turn the EU into a State, an international actor in its own right for the first time.

Article I-6 then provides that "The Constitution and law adopted by the Institution of the Union in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States." Thus the proposed Constitution of this new EU overrides and is superior to the Member States' national Constitutions, potentially in all areas of public policy; for the EU Constitution does not seek to reserve any governmental area permanently from EU control. The central issue concerning the EU Constitution is this:

Which Constitution takes precedence, the European one or the national? That after all is the central question of politics: Where do power and legitimate authority lie? The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe is clear. The new EU State and its Constitution will be paramount.

If the Constitution is ratified, the EU Member States would constitutionally and legally become provinces within a European Federal State, with their national democracy, sovereignty and political independence abandoned as they agree formally to subordinate themselves to the superior entity, as in any State Federation.

The Constitution's continental champions are quite honest about this, like the Belgian and French Premiers quoted above. In fact an earlier draft of Article 1 stated explicitly that the Union would exercise its competences "on a federal basis." The word "federal" was dropped because of concern that it would hinder ratification in some countries.

The Article now provides that the Union will exercise its competences "in the Community way." That is a Federal Statist way, even if the words "Federal" and "State" are not used. In a Federal State there are two levels of law-making, with the Federal level superior to the provincial or regional level.

Having repealed all the existing EC/EU treaties, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe then reapplies the existing body of EU law, some 100,000 pages of it, as if it were made under the constitutional primacy of the Constitution established by the new Treaty.

Simultaneously it transfers some 40 further areas of government policy or national decision from the Member States to the new Union, centralising them in the Brussels Institutions.

NO LONGER "POOLING SOVEREIGNTY", BUT ACCEPTING AND GIVING ALLEGIANCE TO A NEW SOVEREIGN

It is an historical moment of some importance - this attempt to turn much of the continent of Europe into a State and world power, in which 25 previously sovereign Nation States are reduced constitutionally to provincial status in a European Federation. Their hitherto sovereign peoples and national Parliaments must thereafter obey the laws made by the 25 politicians on the Council of Ministers in Brussels, backed by the EU's supranational bureaucracy.

This is no longer a question of States "pooling sovereignty" in some limited areas of government, the better to attain certain agreed purposes. "Pooling sovereignty" was always a misleading term anyway, aimed at disguising from the public the reality of what was happening. The legal concept of sovereignty has nothing to do with international power or economic weight. It refers to the exclusive right of a State to make its own laws, and consequently of its people consequently to govern themselves.

It is therefore no more possible to "pool" sovereignty than it is to be half-pregnant! But in so far as people believed that EU membership involved some such pooling, the Constitution's provisions now show the unreality of that. Under the Constitution the sovereign powers of the European Union would be vested in European Institutions, the EU Council, Court, Commission and Parliament, which are given legal supremacy over the laws and sovereignty of the Member States.

The EU and its Institutions would become our new sovereign. We would all, for the first time, become legally bound as direct citizens of this new legal entity. One can only be a citizen of a State. Under the Constitution we would legally become citizens of the new European Union, not just as an honorary title, an adjunct to national citizenship, as under the Treaty of Maastricht, but with rights and obligations direct to the European institutions rather than through our national institutions.

Article 1-10 provides: "Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Constitution."The once-in-a-lifetime decision of adopting the EU Constitution would directly concede power and sovereignty to the EU over the legal and constitutional framework that guards our civil liberties and democratic rights. It would do this for our children and future generations. It would change the international status of our country from being an independent democratic State to being a subordinate state within a greater European power.

Those pushing the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe are effectively asking us to be abandon our right to determine the laws we agree to obey and to decide our own government, which is our most fundamental democratic right.

IDENTICALLY WORDED PROVISIONS HAVE DIFFERENT LEGAL IMPLICATIONS IN AN EU CONSTITUTION AS COMPARED TO A TREATY

Parts 1 and 2 of the four-part Constitution are its core constitutional parts. Part 3 transposes most of the existing EU policies into the Constitution, while adding some new ones. This doubtless is what has led some politicians to refer to it as a "tidying-up exercise". That is to play down the significance of what it proposes.

A fundamentally important point here is that the EU Court of Justice (ECJ) which interprets EU treaties and will interpret the Constitution if it is ratified, does so in relation to their "objects and purposes", as shown by their preambles or other evidence of the intentions of their drafters.

That is the continental legal tradition, in contrast to the emphasis in English-speaking countries on the meaning of the wording of treaty provisions in the present tense.

The ECJ has laid down in the 1992 EEA Agreement Case that identically worded provisions in two separate treaties can be interpreted to have very different effects. Clearly changing the legal basis of the European Union from a series of treaties to a self-contained Constitution would fundamentally alter the Court's view of the objects and purposes of the legal texts it is applying.

In practice, there would be a presumption that the Member States are only permitted to exercise powers in the residual areas left to them under the Constitution, and even in those areas they would be regarded as constitutionally obliged to fit in with any over-arching EU policies or foreign policy imperatives in accordance with their general duty to "facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives"(Art.I-5).

Shifting the EU from a treaty basis to a constitutional basis would radically affect the Court's interpretation and application of treaty provisions as well as of the scope of EU directives and regulations. Henceforth all EU laws would be interpreted by the Court as having the force of constitutional law. It would be quite proper of the Court of Justice to see all areas of national government as either actually or potentially subordinate to the EU Constitution.

If the proposed Constitution is ratified, the only significant power of Statehood the EU would not possess would be the power to impose taxes. The EU State-builders aspire to that in time and the Constitution opens a legal path towards it. One can only be a citizen of a State, so the Constitution makes us legally real European Union citizens for the first time, for up to now the EU did not have legal personality or a corporate existence on its own account.

Only the European Community, covering the supranational areas of the EC treaties, had that under the Treaty of Maastricht. Now the new EU State will be founded on its own Constitution just like other States.

It will possess its own population and citizenship, a territory, an external frontier, a currency(the euro), an armed force(the EU Rapid Reaction Force), an embryonic police-force in Europol and judiciary in Eurojust, a legislature in the Council of Ministers and EU Parliament, an Executive (the EU Commission), a Supreme Court (the ECJ), a political President (the proposed President of the European Council), a Public Prosecutor's Office, a human rights code (the EU Charter), a foreign and security policy, a Foreign Minister and diplomatic corps, a body of federal law that covers ever-expanding areas of life and that is accepted as superior to national domestic law in any case of conflict, and power to conclude international treaties with other States in the ever-growing areas of its exclusive competence.

A State needs its State symbols. Unsurprisingly therefore Article I-8 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe provides that the EU State is symbolically capped with its own flag, anthem, motto and annual public holiday - Europe Day - which are given a legal treaty-cum-constitutional basis for the first time.

The new EU State will have control, or potential control, according to the terms of its Constitution, over all areas of public policy, even though in a new and young State it can take time for that to become clear. A European Union founded on its own Constitution may seem a weak State by comparison with other States and to have some peculiar institutional features.

But it would be no weaker than the early USA after it first adopted its Constitution and before it became strong and centralised enough to prevent some of the Member States that founded it breaking away in the 1860s American civil war. The EU State may strengthen, break-up or remain weak in the years to come - only time will tell - but a State it undoubtedly will be if the Treaty is ratified and the Constitution comes into force.

IS THERE ANYTHING GOOD IN THE EU CONSTITUTION?

There are some positive proposals in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. It provides that part of the meetings of the Council of Ministers when they are formally adopting new EU laws would be held in public, although most of their discussions would still be in private. It provides that one million or more EU citizens coming from "a significant number of Member States" may petition the Commission to propose a new EU law to the Council of Ministers, although neither the Commission nor the Council need accede to such a request.

A Protocol on Subsidiarity lays down that the Commission must give National Parliaments prior notice of any law it intends to propose, and if one-third of these contend that the proposal violates the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission must review its proposal, after which it may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw it. The Constitution also provides for a Member State that wishes to leave the EU, although the procedure it lays down for this could significantly disadvantage a State that sought to negotiate a fair withdrawal agreement.

The EU Member States can introduce all these changes anyway, in so far as they are desirable, without establishing the EU itself as a State on the basis of its own Constitution.

BACKGROUND TO THE CONSTITUTION

The most revealing account in English of the history of European Iintegration to date is C. Booker and R. North's "The Great Deception, The Secret History of the European Union" (Continuum, London and New York, ISBN0-8264-71056-6) A revised paperback edition of this book, bringing the story down to the signing of the Constitution, will be published in spring 2005.

Why do these authors speak of "deception"? Because the process of building a Europe-wide State has taken place in gradual steps, by governments using stealthy salami-tactics, a series of five treaties between 1986 and now, each of which has been represented to the public in the Member countries as necessary and desirable for economic growth and jobs.

But the real political State-building aim has been subscribed to only by the key political, economic and bureaucratic elites that are pushing the project. It has not been agreed to by the citizens of the different countries of Europe, although the Constitution confronts them with that choice clearly for the first time.

There have been five gradual steps to the EU State Constitution:

1957 Rome Treaty: free trade; a protected agriculture; supranationalinstitutions in the EU Commission, Council of Ministers and EU Court ofJustice;1987 Single European Act Treaty: the internal market; wide use of majorityCouncil voting to make EC laws;

1992 Maastricht Treaty: the euro as a single currency for the eurozone, but excluding Britain and Denmark, with Sweden opting out de facto in its 2003referendum; beginnings of a common foreign and security policy;

1998 Amsterdam Treaty: "the progressive framing of a common defence policy";2003 Nice Treaty: "enhanced cooperation"; sub-groups of EU States may usethe EU institutions for closer integration among themselves even if othersdisagree, opening the way to an unequal EU with an inner core dominated bythe Big States.

The historical origins of the EU project are in the 1920s and 1930s, withJean Monnet and others who conceived and pushed it for decades. Threefactors gave it impetus after World War 2:

* State Power Motivation:

Well-known Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung sums that up as follows:"One basic formula for understanding the Community is this: 'Take fivebroken empires, add the sixth one later, and make one big neo-colonialempire out of it all" (The European Community, a Superpower in the Making,1973.)

It is not the whole story, but it is perhaps the most essential partof the story. The "foundation myth" of the EU is that it has its origins asa peace project to prevent wars between France and Germany. In fact war wasimpossible between individual members of either of the two blocs during theCold War. Washington and Moscow would just not have permitted it. The atomic bomb makes inter-State wars in Europe impractical anyway. Most wars are civil wars.

The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought war back to Europe after 45 years of armed peace - in Yugoslavia and Chechnya. The real historical model for the EU is the unification of Germany in the 19th century, which began with a customs union and common market, then became a confederation of formally equal states, and then a unified Federal State with one Constitution, currency, army and government to represent it internationally vis-a-vis other States.

* Economic Motivation:

The aspiration of European-based transnational firms to be as free as possible of national State control and interference and to obtain maximum freedom of operations for their profit-maximizing activities. Constitutions do not normally enshrine an economic ideology, which is the stuff of debate between political right and left, but set general rules for working out such differences.

By contrast the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe erects extreme neo-liberalism, laissez-faire, a competitive market economy on the basis of cross-national free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, and a monetarist economic policy into constitutional principles.

These are especially congenial to the EU-based transnational firms organised in the EU Employers Federation, UNICE, and the European Round-Table of Industrialists, who have been the principal advocates of successive EU treaties prior to their negotiation, and major backers of the international European movement.

* Personal Power Motivation:

The process of EU integration transfers power from elected national parliaments and governments to a small number of politicians and bureaucrats, who obtain a huge accretion of personal power thereby.

At national level Ministers are part of the executive arm of government, responsible to their elected national parliaments and citizens. But transfer a particular policy area to Brussels and the relevant national Ministers become supranational EU legislators, members of what is literally an oligarchy, a legislative committee, of 25 persons on the EU Council of Ministers who make laws for 450 million people.

They are irremoveable as a body. They become ever more distanced from their national electorates. Their willingly accepted personal task vis-à-vis their fellow Ministers, with whom they interact on first-name terms, becomes to deliver their peoples in support of further EU integration National parliamentarians who aspire to become Ministers, whether they are in government or opposition, go along with this. Someone has described this process as "a slow coup against political democracy". It means that at national level those running the State itself become party to depriving their fellow citizens of the power to make their own laws and decide their own government.

Simultaneously at civil service level senior members of national bureaucracies are substantially freed from public scrutiny as powers are transferred to the bureaucracy in Brussels with whom they regularly interact. There they prepare EU laws for enactment by the Council of Ministers outside the ken of national parliaments or even the European Parliament, which can propose amendments to EU laws but cannot have those amendments adopted without the agreement of Council and Commission. Democracy, public accountability, wilt or disappear. This process, which would accelerate under the EU Constitution, is clearly building inevitably to a major crisis of democracy across our continent.

THE EU'S FUNDAMENTAL DEMOCRATIC PROBLEM

It is possible to turn the EU into a State, but it is not possible for that State to have a democratic basis. The reason is that democracy means rule by the demos, the people, through the representatives they elect and on whom they confer legitimacy and authority.

A European people does not exist except in the statistical sense, and one cannot be artificially created from above in the way the EU is attempting. The 450 million inhabitants of the EU are divided into many peoples, real national communities speaking their own languages, who desire to make their own laws, decide their own government and self-determine themselves as they have done for generations through representatives they elect and who are responsible to them.

The EU cannot be democratised by giving the European Parliament power to make laws instead of the 25-person Council of Ministers, as some suggest. The democracy that is needed to underpin a stable State is not just majorityrule, but majority rule on the basis of a community, a demos, normally a national community, where there is sufficient mutual identification and solidarity among its members as to induce minorities willingly to obey the majority, so giving majority rule its legitimacy and authority.

The existence of such a real, self-aware community is crucial for underpinningthe legitimacy and stability of a State with its own tax and public service system, from which some citizens are net gainers and others are net losers - if that State is to be stable and endure. It is the absence of such a community at European level, and the impossibility of artificially creating it, that is the root cause of the EU's crisis of authority and acceptability.

The EU's "democratic deficit" problem is inherently insoluble without repatriating major powers back from the supranational to the national level. The Constitution does the opposite of this. If it is ratified it can only worsen the crisis of democracy at both EU and Member State level. Just as people often only appreciate the value of health when they become ill, they appreciate the value of their democracy only when they have lost it, and they must begin the struggle to win it back again.

So it is and will be with the EU.

WHERE THE CONSTITUTION CAME FROM: THE LAEKEN DECLARATION AND THE CONVENTION THAT FAILED TO DO ITS JOB

The 105-person body, the Convention, that drew up the Draft Constitutionwas set up by the Laeken Declaration of EU Presidents and Prime Ministersin December 2001. This Declaration acknowledged the lack of democracy and transparency in the EU, said that the Union needed to be brought closer to its peoples, referred to the possibility of "restoring tasks to the Member States" and the possibility "in the long run" of adopting "a constitutional text."

Instead the Convention, which was dominated by Federalist EU-State-builders, rushed headlong into drafting a Constitution that for the first time makes the EU separate from and superior to its constituent Member States, transfers more powers from Member States to the EU, reduces the power of national parliaments and citizens further, and contains not a single proposal to repatriate powers from Brussels to Member State parliaments.

Over 1000 amendments were proposed, but the Convention chairman, former French President V.Giscard d'Estaing, ruled out any votes. Giscard decided when there was a "consensus" and that was that. The Draft Constitution was amended by the June 2004 EU summit of Presidents and Prime Ministers in relation to the population-based voting figures, the reduction in the number of Commissioners to two-thirds of the Member States after five years etc.

There has been no popular demand that the EU should be turned into a European State on the basis of its own Constitution. It is Europe's powerful political and bureaucratic elites, especially in the Big Countries, that are pressing that. Small Country elites are happy to go along, in particular if they face big problems at home, as the East Europeans do, for which they can henceforth seek to put the blame on Brussels.

What fundamentally inspires most of them is the old European dream of Big Powerdom, the intoxication of empire-building, of taking part in however small a way in running a Superpower, while simultaneously freeing themselves from democratic control and political accountability to national parliaments and electorates domestically. The pressure for EU integration that culminates in this Constitution comes wholly from the top down, not the bottom up.

STRUCTURE OF THE EU CONSTITUTION

The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe has 448 Articles dividedinto four parts. With its Protocols and Declarations it is some 800 pageslong. Following its signing in Rome in October 2004 it will go around forratification by all 25 EU Member States by November 2006. Some 10 countries will hold referendums on it. It cannot legally come into force if any one of them says No.

One of the Declarations states that if all 25 States do not ratify it they will meet to discuss what to do, but there is no legal mechanism for imposing the Constitution on a country that does not want it, or forcing such a country to leave the EU. In theory if 23 States said Yes and two said No, the 23 could set up a new Union based on the proposed Constitution, while the existing 25 would retain the existing EU with its resources, structures, euro-currency and institutions. But two EUs of this kind side by side is quite unrealistic.

The edited text of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe may be consulted here. The Reader-Friendly Edition of the EU Constitution by Danish MEP Jens-Peter Bonde is the most useful text to enable citizens to understand theConstitution, because of its invaluable Index and Glossary. This is available on the internet here.

Part 1, with 60 Articles, is the core constitutional part. It lays down the Union's general principles, sets out its objectives and values, its Institutions and the respective powers and competences of the EU on the one hand and its Member States on the other. It is clear and readable, even if much longer than the US Constitution. People should take care to read it. Its provisions are short, if deadly for national Constitutions.

Thus Article I-1: "This Constitution establishes the European Union"; Article I-6: "The Constitution shall have primacy over the laws of the Member States."; Article I-7: "The Union shall have legal personality"; Article I-12: "The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competence."

Part 2 (54 Articles) is the Charter of Fundamental Rights. For the first time ever this gives the EU Court of Justice power to decide our human rights in all areas covered by EU law. The ECJ in Luxembourg should not be confused with the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which is not connected to the EU and has over 40 European States as members.

Part 2 is important in that the Constitution could create new rights or take away existing ones. It would supersede our national Constitution, which is clear about rights, as well as the European Court of Human Rights, in areas affected by EU law, whereas the meaning of some of the rights in the Charter is anything but clear - the right to "human dignity" for example, or the right to "good administration".

The inclusion of a human rights code with full legal effect is further evidence that this is a truly Federal Constitution for a new EU. Unless adequately restrained, the doctrine of the legal supremacy of the EU Court of Justice would allow the new EU rights law to displace national provisions in highly sensitive areas of social policy, unrestrained by democratic accountability or control.

Part 3 (322 Articles) is the largest part. It sets out the detailed policies and functioning of the EU - free movement of goods, services, capital and labour; agricultural and fisheries policy; economic and monetary policy; foreign and security policy; crime and justice policy; social policy; EU financing etc. Much of this is already EU law, apart from the new powers the Constitution gives the EU, but the Court of Justice will interpret these provisions as having the force of a constitutional imperative if the Constitution is ratified. That is why the provisions of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe are more significant than those of a conventional EU treaty.

Part 4 (12 Articles) gives general and final provisions dealing with ratification and amendment of the Constitution, the admission of new Members and provision for a State to leave the EU. It provides for succession by the new European Union to the rights, responsibilities and assets of the existing Union. It carries over the 100,000 pages of the acquis communautaire from the old EU and entrenches the case-law of the ECJ as the source of interpretation for this and for the Constitution.

Protocols: The 36 Protocols or agreements on particular topics attached to the Treaty now become part of the EU Constitution and are as legally binding as its substantive text. They include Ireland's Abortion Protocol (No.31), which generated controversy at the time of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. They also include the Eurotom Protocol (No.36). The Euratom Treaty, which supports nuclear power, was due to end in 2007 after being in existence 50 years. It is now given an indefinite lease of new life by being made part of the EU Constitution. In addition there are 48 Declarations, which are not legally binding but are statements of political intention by the States making them.

ELEVEN KEY FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW EU

1. PROVIDING THE NECESSARY CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR AN EU STATE

A Treaty is an agreement between legally equal sovereign States, the High Contracting Parties. A Constitution is the fundamental law of a State setting out the relations between its subordinate parts. Up to now the European Union has been a descriptive term referring to various forms of cooperation between the EU Member States, some supranational – the so-called Community "pillar" - some intergovernmental, the foreign policy and security "pillar" or the justice and home affairs "pillar".

Up to now the European Union has been legally indistinguishable from its Member States. The Constitution changes this. Article I-1 states "this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common."

These objectives are set out in Article I-3 and are very wide. They include promoting the EU's values - also very wide - a single market based on free competition, establishing an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, sustainable development, economic growth, full employment, price stability, social justice, upholding the EU's values and interests vis-a-vis the wider world etc.

Article I-7 provides: "The Union shall have legal personality." Article I-6 lays down: "The Constitution and law adopted by the Institutions of the Unions in exercising competences conferred on it shall have primacy over the law of the Member States" That includes their constitutional law of course. This has never been stated in an EU Treaty before.

The doctrine of EU legal supremacy was developed by the EU Court of Justice in the 1960s in relation to the mainly economic areas of the EU, in which EU law was accepted as superior to national law in any case of conflict. This was the relatively narrow, supranational, area of the European Community, or EC.

Non-economic areas such as foreign and security policy, or civil and criminal law, were "intergovernmental", based on treaties between equal State partners and outside the domain of supranational Community law. The EU Commission, the non-elected body that proposes all EU laws, had no function in these intergovernmental areas.

The Constitution abolishes this distinction between the supranational "Community" area where EU law operated, and the "intergovernmental" areas where it did not apply. It thus brings all government policy either actually or potentially within the scope of the EU. It is one thing for Member States to go along with a principle of EU legal superiority established by the EU Court of Justice and applied to a restricted range of matters like customs duties or tariffs. It is quite another to concede national sovereignty to an EU Constitution whose writ covers everything from economic policy to criminal law to foreign policy and fundamental human rights.

2.EU POWERS AND COMPETENCES ... THE EU COURT DECIDES THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN EU AND NATIONAL POWERS

The Constitution gives the EU exclusive competence - i.e. powers – in certain areas of government(Art.I-13). This means the Member States lose all power to decide such matters. "The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: Customs union; competition rules for the internal market; monetary policy (for eurozone members); common fisheriespolicy; common commercial policy."

Exclusive competence means that it is the EU, not Member States, that will conclude international treaties with other States for these areas. The existing legal obligation on Member States is not to enter into an international agreement which conflicts with an EU obligation.

The Constitution now greatly extends the areas in which the EU is entitled to conclude treaties in its own name: "The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or insofar as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.". This would cover for example international crime conventions and extradition and asylum agreements. Together with the provisions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Constitution would deprive Member States of much of their present treaty-making powers.

Then there are areas of shared competence, where power is divided between the EU Institutions and the Member States. This is a peculiar kind of sharing, for EU power is stated to be constitutionally superior or primary, so that Member State powers are essentially residual and on sufferance.

Article I-12 provides: "The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competences." Areas of shared power with Member States include the internal market, elements of social policy, economic and social cohesion, environment, transport, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, aspects of public health etc. In jurisdictional disputes as to the boundary between EU powers and Member State powers, it is the EU, through the Court of Justice, that would decide which is which.

A gesture towards placating concerned democrats and "sovereignists" is Article I-11(2), which provides: "Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States." This is like the 10th Amendment to the US Constitution, adopted in 1791, which states that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

However, the 10th Amendment has not prevented the USA from becoming a fully-fledged and highly centralised Federal State over time, with provincial states like New York, Virginia and Kansas quite subordinate to the Federal Government in Washington. The similar Article in the EU Constitution can offer no such reassurance either.

In addition the Constitution gives the EU the right to coordinate theeconomic and employment policies of its Member States, to conduct a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign policy including "the progressive framing of a common defence policy", and "to take supporting, coordinating or complementary action" at European level vis-a-vis its Member States in relation to industry, health protection, education, vocational training, youth, sport, culture and civil protection.

3. EU LAWS TO BE BASED MAINLY ON POPULATION SIZE, WHICH ADVANTAGES THE BIG STATES

Apart from the establishment of the European Union as a State in its own right, the most important provision of the Constitution in power-political terms is the shift to a primarily population-based voting system for making EU laws by the Council of Ministers. The Constitution abolishes the weighted voting system that was agreed in the Treaty of Nice to provide for EU enlargement. It lays down instead that EU laws will in future be made by a "double majority" of States and population: 55 percent of the Member States, at least 15, as long as they include 65 percent of the EU's population.

Thus 15 States, if they satisfy the 65 percent population criterion, would be able to outvote 10. On the number-of-States criterion a blocking minority must be at least 11 States, so that will be harder to assemble than before. This shift to a mainly population criterion for EU law-making makes it easier for the Big States with their big populations to get their way. It reduces the relative voting weight of middle-rank and smaller Member States. It would make EU laws easier to pass, which means there would be more of them.

The word EU law" replaces "directive" under the Constitution, as is normal in States.

4. MEMBER STATES TO HAVE NO EU COMMISSIONER FOR ONE-THIRD OF THE TIME

One-third of the Member States will lose their Commissioners five years after the Constitution comes into force. Thus each Member State will have no national representative for lengthy periods of time on the body that proposes all EU laws which those States and their citizens must obey.

5. A NEW POLITICAL PRESIDENT, AN EU FOREIGN MINISTER AND DIPLOMATIC CORPS, AND AN EU PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

The European Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers will elect a permanent Council President for up to five years, who will preside over their quarterly summit meetings. The present revolving six-monthly EU presidency system will disappear. The European Council President will be the EU's top job, the chief political representative of the EU, in effect its Head of State and chief spokesman to the world.

The EU Minister for Foreign Affairs will conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy, chair the Council of Foreign Ministers, manage the EU diplomatic service (The European External Action Service) and serve also as a Vice-President of the Commission. Only States have Foreign Ministers. For the rest of the world the EU Foreign Minister will be the foreign policy representative of the fledgling EU State. As the Foreign Minister will be appointed by majority vote this will make it possible for some Member States to be represented internationally at EU-level by someone who is unacceptable to them.

There will be a European Public Prosecutor's office to prosecute fraud against the EU, whose powers may be extended by unanimity to prosecute any serious crime with a cross-border dimension.

6. AMENDING THE EU CONSTITUTION WITHOUT NEED OF FURTHER TREATIES OR REFERENDUMS

The "Passerelle" or Bridge Clause:

Article IV-444 provides that the European Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers, acting unanimously, may authorise the Council of Ministers to act by qualified majority in areas where unanimity is currently required.

This cannot be done if a national Parliament objects, but the formal approval of national parliaments is not required. This means that policy areas where States still retain a national veto can henceforth be put under EU majority voting without the need for new treaties, formal parliamentary approval or ratification by popular referendums - as would at present be required for any such development - so long as the Heads of State and Heads of governments of the EU’s member states agree.

Convention Chairman Giscard d'Estaing dubbed this escalator article, the passerelle or bridge clause, "a central innovation" of the EU Constitution. It is not hard to see why. The existence of this and other "passerelle" clauses means in effect that the Constitution will not be a wholly accurate guide to its own provisions.The Flexibility Clause:

In addition there is the "flexibility clause"(Art. I-18) which provides that if the Constitution has not given the EU sufficient powers to attain one of its very wide objectives, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously "shall adopt the appropriate measures".

This enables the Council of Ministers to extend their own powers without need for new treaties, so long as they act unanimously. This has been widely used over the years for internal market matters. The Constitution replaces an existing treaty article, Number 308, which applies only to the internal market, and extends its scope to everything in the EU Constitution, including civil and criminal law, fundamental rights, social policy, culture etc. This is an extraordinary power to have in a supposedly democratic document.

Delegated Legislation by the Commission:

Article I-36 of the Constitution allows the Council of Ministers to delegate law-making powers, such as making regulations, to the non-elected Commission as regards "non-essential elements" of EU laws. The Council decides what is "non-essential" but it could be very wide.

This turns the EU Commission, a body of nominated, not popularly elected persons, which France's President De Gaulle once described as "a conclave of technocrats without a country responsible to nobody", into a subordinate legislature in its own right, which we all as EU citizens must obey.

7. "LOYAL" SUPPORT FOR EU FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY... EU DEFENCE MOVES FROM "MAY" TO "WILL"

The Constitution provides for a unified foreign and military policy for the new EU State. Art.1.40 lays down that "Before undertaking any action on the international sceneŠeach Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council." EU Members are thus constitutionally precluded from conducting a meaningful independent foreign policy.

The Constitution provides that the Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy "shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence."(Art.I-16).

It lays down as a constitutional imperative that "Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's actions in that area." The word "loyalty" here again shows which is superior.

Article I-40(3) of the Constitution requires all Member States, including the military neutral ones, to "make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy" and to "undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities."

The Constitution points to the end of the formal military neutrality of Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Austria by replacing the Nice Treaty provision that the progressive framing of a common defence policy "might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide" with the provision of the Constitution that it "will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides."

(Art.I-41).

"Enhanced cooperation", permitting sub-groups of States to use the EU institutions for closer integration amongst themselves may now be undertaken in the security and military area, as was not permitted by the Nice Treaty. Here it is to be called "structured cooperation".

This inner group of States is likely to be bound by a mutual defence pact, will work closely with NATO and will be served by the EU Foreign Minister. The Constitution does not require EU actions in the military field to be in accordance with the United Nations Charter, which is the foundation of modern international law. As a superpower-in-the-making the EU reserves theright to ignore the Charter if need be.

8. THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GIVES THE ECJ POWER TO DECIDE OUR RIGHTS

It is proper that the EU and its Institutions should respect and abide by human rights. But should they have the power to decide those rights? Part 2 of the Constitution makes the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was approved as a political document by the Nice summit in 2001, now legally binding in supranational EU law. This gives the Court of Justice power to decide our rights in all areas covered by European law, including Member States when implementing that law. The scope of EU law is now vast and most EU policies can be interpreted as having a human rights dimension.

In disputes as to the boundary between EU law and national law, it is he Court that would decide. This adds a further tier of lawyers and judges t EU level for people seeking redress in human rights cases. Justice delayed is justice denied. Big corporations will find it easier than private citizens to contest claims in the EU Court. This should make the vindication of human rights slower and more difficult in practice.

The Constitution states that the Charter "does not establish any new power or task for the Union." But the EU does not marry anybody, or provide health or education services, or concern itself with matters like reproductive cloning, academic freedom, the rights of children and the elderly, conscientious objection to military service etc.

Why then should it list these and many other things as rights in the Charter when they are wholly outside its powers and functions and up to now have been the exclusive responsibility of Member States with their national Constitutions and Supreme Courts? What is the point of listing them if they are not enforceable?

Neither is there any consensus across Europe on a wide range of human rights matters that could arise in an EU context - for example hard drugs, legal procedures such as trial by jury, displaying religious symbols in schools, marriage, succession law, abortion, euthanasia. How can the ECJ purport to lay down a common cross-EU standard of rights in such sensitive areas?

Article II-112 allows all the rights set out in the Charter to be overridden by providing that they may be limited by law "to meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union." So the fundamental rights are not so fundamental after all. The conflict between a right and a justification for derogating from it is a highly political matter, in deciding which the Court of Justice would be able to extend its powers further.

The preamble to the Charter states that the fundamental rights listed in it are to be interpreted by reference to the "Explanations" prepared by the Convention that originally drafted it. This means that the ostensible legal meaning of the rights in the Charter may be altered significantly by the Court of Justice in interpreting them, relying on a document drawn up by a different body from that which drafted the Constitution. Article II-62 provides that "no one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed."

Yet the associated article of the Explanations lifts this restriction and states that the death penalty may be imposed "in times of war or during the immediate threat of war", presumably for EU-led operations, for all the Member States have abolished the death penalty in such circumstances.

The Charter does not strengthen workers' rights to organise or act collectively, as some have claimed. Article II-88 states that workers have these rights "in accordance with national laws and practices". The associated Explanation, which is now part of the Constitution, emphasises this and points out that the right of collective action is one of the elements of trade union rights laid down in Article 11 the European Convention of Human Rights, which all Member States are already bound by.

In so far as Article II-112 allows fundamental rights to be limited in the interests of the Union, some future ECJ judgement might possibly threaten workers' rights that have been long fought for and established at national level. The Charter as it stands ostensibly protects an employer's right to lock out his employees quite as much as an employee's right to go on strike, depending on what their national labour law lays down.

In truth, making the EU Charter of Rights legally binding under the EU Constitution has more to do with power than rights. Giving a human rights jurisdiction to the EU Court of Justice has huge federalising potential, as the history of the USA has shown. It could potentially bring the Union's Supreme Court, the ECJ, into virtually every area of our lives.

9. THE EURO TO BE CONSTITUTIONALLY THE EU CURRENCY

Article I-8 states that "The currency of the Union shall be the euro." If the Constitution is adopted, all EU Members will in effect have voted for and be constitutionally committed to abolishing their national currencies and replacing them with the euro, even though 13 of the present 25 EU Members still retain their national currencies.

10. EXTENSIVE EXTRA POWERS FOR THE EU

The Constitution extends EU powers to make laws that override national law in over 40 new policy areas or matters, in addition to the 35 areas agreed in the 2003 Nice Treaty and the 19 areas in the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty.

Under the Constitution national vetoes disappear for most things. The new areas transferred to the EU include judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters; harmonisation of legislation on criminal proceedings, sanctions and the definition of offences; border controls; asylum and immigration; civil protection; Europol and Eurojust; energy; culture; services of general interest(i.e.public services); structural and cohesion funds etc. Article I-12 lays down that "Member States shall coordinate their economic and employment policies within arrangements as determined by Part 3, which the Union shall have competence to provide."

This opens the way to extensive economic supervision and coordination powers for the Unionover its Members. It goes well beyond what is possible under the existingEU treaties and could potentially cover such things as taxation policy,national public spending, pensions policy and industrial policy.

11. AN IDEOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION

The Constitution of any normal State lays down the rules and institutionalframework for political decision-making. It does not seek to pre-empt theideological content of those decisions. That is left to political debatebetween the parties of Left and Right, abiding by the Constitution'sdecision-making rules. The EU Constitution is different. It enshrines aparticular economic system based on an extreme neo-liberal ideology, which it seeks to clamp as a constitutional imperative on 450 million Europeans.

The Constitution turns the fundamental principles of classical laissez-faire, free competition across national and State boundaries on the basis of free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, into constitutional imperatives, implemented by the rules and Institutions it establishes and enforced by the EU Court of Justice. At the same time, the sanction it gives for supranational regulation transfers the corporatist governmental traditions of some countries, e.g. France, to the pan-European level.

The Constitution enshrines as constitutional principle the monetarist economic policy of the European Central Bank, whose sole brief in setting interest rates and controlling the money supply of the eurozone is to ensure stability of prices, not maximise economic growth, foster employment or advance social cohesion. It encourages the privatisation of public services and permits the imposition of such policies on countries outside the EU through the trade and investment agreements the EU concludes under its Common Commercial Policy.

It lays down as one of the objectives of the EU "a highly competitive social market economy", but there is no definition of the term "social market", which is taken from the German Constitution, or anything to indicate that something other than maximising competition is implied. These ideological objectives and values of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe seek to pre-empt society's fundamental political choices into the indefinite future, as no other modern Constitution seeks to do.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE EU CONSTITUTION

IF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION IS REJECTED BY ONE OR MORE COUNTRIES, THE EU WILL CONTINUE AS IT IS NOW ON THE BASIS OF THE 2003 TREATY OF NICE, WITH THE VOTING ARRANGEMENTS WHICH THAT TREATY LAID DOWN FOR A EUROPEAN UNION OF 27 STATES

It would be appropriate then to revisit the Laeken Declaration, reconvene the Convention on the Future of Europe on a more democratic basis than Giscard's Convention of EU State-builders which gave us the present undemocratic document, and have a genuine debate among Europe's peoples and parliaments on the kind of Europe people really want.

Almost certainly that is not a Europe which is a State or superpower in its own right, run by a narrow elite of top politicians and bureaucrats, within which the ancient countries of Europe are reduced to the constitutional status of subordinate regions.

It is more likely to be a Europe of cooperating independent democratic States, where powers are repatriated back to the EU Member States from Brussels, as the Laeken Declaration originally mooted but which Giscard's Convention totally ignored. It is likely to be a Europe where national parliaments and voters have their democratic rights restored and where democracy, political self-determination and representative government are re-established for the peoples and nations of our continent.

Democrats all over Europe should say in the coming period: EU ConstitutionNo thanks; No to the EU State Constitution; Yes to democracy.