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Fear, Honour, and Interest: the fragility of European stability (Part II)

By Dr Robert Crowcroft

Two decades ago, analysts expected the reunified Germany to adopt a more assertive role in international politics. Yet since 1991 Germany has been only a small and generally unimpressive presence on the world stage. In footballing terms, a Premiership club, certainly; but more West Ham than Arsenal. While Berlin is insistent on playing the role of a ‘good’ neighbour – so as not to reawaken memories of German aggression – for the most part this is down to routine diplomatic incompetence and policy misjudgement. A brief historical detour underlines this. In the early 1990s, German ambition was obvious. The country hoped for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, and made a major financial contribution to the costs of the 1991 Gulf War. But the focus of German policy was directed at Europe, and here German assertiveness and influence was clear. The Maastricht Treaty transformed the EC into an EU on German lines; agreement was reached for a single currency, again on German lines; and a form of federalism was adopted, fully compatible with German understandings of that concept. Germany also led the way in recognising the collapse of Yugoslavia, and facilitated the entry into the EU of pro-German nations like Austria, Sweden, and Finland. In essence, there was every sign that the old German ‘customs union’, Mitteleuropa – the dream of the Kaiser – was at last about to emerge.

But these schemes led nowhere. A seat on the Security Council failed to transpire, the Exchange Rate Mechanism collapsed, and, by 1997, Germany had even abandoned strict criteria for entry to the single currency. The domestic economy was stagnant as reunification stimulated weakness and discontent. More recently, in the current financial crisis it has become clear that Germany does not know how to restore European prosperity. And the EU has proved simply too convoluted to be an effective vehicle German leadership. The result of all this is that Berlin has singularly failed to become the great power that its wealth, geographical location, and significance imply that it should be.

And yet, this isn’t the big story. What we should take note of is that despite this failure, Germany has become increasingly assertive in its international relationships, especially since the accession of Gerhard Schroeder in 1998. Schroeder’s policy was continued and indeed expanded by Angela Merkel, an unapologetic nationalist and advocate of distinctly German interests. Since 2005 Merkel has conceded little to other nations, explored a ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia, threatened to reconstruct the whole EU to force the ‘Club Med’ nations to fix their economies (despite lacking any legal means of doing so), and facilitated true German military expeditionary forces. This constitutes a marked departure for Germany. Berlin is cautiously and quietly exploring new possibilities. But even if German diplomatic clumsiness persists – and history suggests that it might – the country has still decided to take on a much larger role and flex its muscles. Its appetite increases by the year. And there will be no returning this particular genie to the bottle.

As suggested in Part I, it is far from clear that this will stimulate harmony and co-operation in Europe. And if America withdrew, Germany – currently no less dependent on Washington for security than other European states – would be compelled to look out for itself by increasing its military capacity, being more willing to assert German national interests, and probably seeking nuclear weapons. In response the rest of Europe would need to build up their own military forces. Both Germany and Russia would fear the other’s control over central Europe; the region is a crucial buffer zone. Again, this anxiety would result in a security competition. Far more likely than European harmony is a return to conventional balancing behaviour. Hopefully, of course, Britain will have sufficient nous to refuse to get drawn in to a problem that is none of London’s business. But German assertiveness is not going to make for a more co-operative continent.

By way of another example of fragile co-operation on the continent, consider the EU itself. The resilience of the EU to collapse lies principally in the fact that states find it convenient. That may change if security tensions ever return. Another factor is the complexity of its truly Byzantine bureaucracy, making it difficult to dislodge. But that bureaucracy is woefully inefficient. For instance, the European Commission has significant powers, but national governments are disinclined to let it off the leash, while other centres of influence within the EU (observe the obvious resemblance to the diverse points of authority in a medieval Asiatic empire) dispute its right to wield its powers. The European Court of Justice and European Parliament, for instance, have their own powers and act accordingly, hence the incoherence of policy and the impossibility of understanding the ‘European’ view on anything. Meanwhile, much EU expenditure consists of regional and agricultural subsidy; without this, it is doubtful how far states would deem it worth their while to bother. And as the EU expands, the previous beneficiaries of these subsidies become net contributors. The larger the Union becomes, the less likely is unity. No one can agree on what is proposed, hence the endless rounds of negotiation and revision. Now, it must be acknowledged that to some extent this is probably deliberate, a wrecking ball tactic; British support of Turkish accession is one example of this approach.  Throwing a spanner in the works is a standard tool in bureaucratic politics. But the problem persists. Meanwhile the mechanism by which a common or united Europe is actually to emerge has never been defined, even by its advocates. The plan is purely one of aspiration – i.e. hot air – rather than anything of substance. Language of a ‘natural progression’, or ‘inevitability’, is a means of ducking the issue, and an unconvincing one at that. So, as the EU is not sovereign, states will simply bypass and ignore it when necessary, rendering it irrelevant. Rather than a vehicle for ‘community’, it is a tool for the interests of states.

The claim that the European project is responsible for keeping the peace on the continent is even more ridiculous. There is no evidence to support the argument. It overlooks the threat posed by the USSR, and, even more so, the role played by the United States. NATO was successful due to the existence of an obvious danger to western Europe; but the historical record indicates that in the conditions where contemporary real-world crises will arise – Russian pressure, German self-assertion, terrorism, energy crises – ‘solidarity’ gives way to calculations of individual advantage and interest. One or two sizeable demonstrations of the iron law of international relations will torpedo the whole façade of European harmony and its attendant, hyperbolic language.

For instance, when crises do occur, how likely is that European nations will even be able to agree on what to do? There has been one example of this post-Cold War – the Balkans – and the record is not encouraging. There will be others, probably involving the Balkans again, Russia, Germany, or the Middle East if Turkey should join the EU. If the European nations couldn’t agree among themselves to bomb Serbia, then there is little chance that unity will prevail in future. The players are separate nations, with distinct interests, resources, relationships, domestic arrangements, strategic visions, and geographies. The probable scenario at a time of crisis is EU paralysis and a lack of collective action.

Organisations, by their very nature, are defined by rules that stipulate how members will behave. However there is no mechanism in Europe for forcing sovereign states to obey these rules. If they judge it in their interests to defy them, they will do so. European states routinely do this over relatively minor trade quarrels; they will certainly flout the rules even more vigorously over something of real importance. Whatever the advocates of international institutions may claim, there is no evidence that they can compel states to act in ways contrary to the dictates of traditional behaviour.

What we have in Europe therefore is neither a genuine ‘community’ nor even a ‘concert’; instead, states have been able to avoid engaging in overt security competition because of the presence of an overwhelming external power, the United States. That’s it; there is no revolutionary force at work. The nature of the international system, as it has functioned since time immemorial, indicates that the fiction of European co-operation will change when, and if, the US decides it no longer wants to guarantee European security. That could happen for several reasons, from focusing on the Pacific, to doing a deal whereby the Americans concede pre-eminence on Russia’s borders in return for assistance balancing the Chinese. Who needs to be afraid when the US behemoth can be trusted to squash malfeasants? But remove the American giant, and watch states began to compete, and maybe fight again. Thankfully, we can be reasonably optimistic that this won’t happen for the foreseeable future. States desire, and indeed rely on US activism. Washington may adopt the view that maintaining the status quo is easier than riding to the rescue later on, and while the White House has minimal interest in ‘Europe’ it does have an interest in maintaining good relations with key players like Britain, Germany, and Poland. So while the rationale for state co-operation in Europe is actually fairly weak, the architecture of the American security guarantee probably is not. The Europhiles can probably rejoice for a good while longer. But, one day, the scales will surely fall from their eyes.

The lesson here can be summarised thus: all of this is remarkably fragile. The structures of European harmony are not deep, and in fact lie remarkably close to the surface. A stiff breeze, let alone an earthquake, might collapse them. The whole illusion of European harmony stems from two transient phenomena: Germany’s hesitation about asserting her natural pre-eminence, and the willingness of the US to underwrite European security in the post-Cold War era. When those things change, so will the manner in which European politics is discussed.

Robert Crowcroft is a specialist on British politics and defence.

Fear, Honour, and Interest: the fragility of European stability (Part I)

By Dr Robert Crowcroft

Today the spectre of conflict in Europe has receded to the point that a general war is virtually unthinkable. Since the termination of the Balkan wars, smaller conflicts are also unlikely. A view has arisen that the structures of stability and co-operation are now so deep that Europe is perhaps in a state of ‘perpetual peace’. This is usually attributed to post-war Franco-German reconciliation, the rise of the European Union, economic interconnectedness, and the Euro. And it is true that no region has such a range of well-developed institutions as Europe from the EU to NATO, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Western European Union, and more. Indeed analysts now often find Europe – the arena that inspired International Relations theory – so dull that they look elsewhere for the required fix of tension, competition, and violence. But the current state of affairs is not as resilient as some maintain. It might be that the whole rationale for co-operation between the states of Europe is, actually, remarkably thin.

The ancient Greek scholar Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, offered one of the first – and still probably the best – insights into the motivating forces behind the behaviour of states. His hypothesis was simple: in their external policy, states are driven by [1] fear [2] honour and [3] interest. That framework provides a useful series of tests when analysing modern Europe.

Fear sat at the heart of the European project at its inception. And contrary to what some think, this remains the case today. Since 1991, European states have been worried about American withdrawal; renewed conflict on the continent emanating outwards from the Balkans; and, more recently, Russian bullying on matters like NATO expansion, energy security, and missile defence. But, crucially, what must be grasped is that there is no distinctly ‘European’ perspective on international politics; merely the priorities of defiantly individual states. Each nation has its own fears, stemming from history, geography, and resources.

The countries of eastern Europe remain petrified of domination by either Russia or Germany, the two major powers of the region. These smaller states also worry about each other. Thus, their chosen foreign policy is a classic hedging strategy motivated by fear. For those nations, membership of NATO and the EU represent a thoroughly old-fashioned, realist strategy for survival; a mechanism for linking themselves to Uncle Sam and connecting with other European states. In the west, recent Anglo-French military co-operation, and even hushed talk of a new, unofficial military entente, is certainly not aimed at Portugal or Iceland; Germany and Russia are the only conceivable targets for such hedging behaviour. There is painfully little evidence of new, harmonious, ‘globalised’ thinking here. For its part, Berlin worries about being encircled by other states keen to tie Germany down like Gulliver at Lilleput. The German strategy is therefore to construct an image of being a ‘good’ European, not the militaristic menace of old. The hope is that Germany will be perceived not as a traditional state, but something different – something better. In Part II we will return to this theme and see how Germany in fact is as self-interested as any other nation.

But fear and traditional calculative behaviour are evident elsewhere. The lack of interest among European states in crafting a common security policy underlines the absence of genuine trust. If Europe really is the beacon of hope that we are told, surely this wouldn’t be a problem? Yet there is no significant willingness to pool critical security resources; no desire to be anchored to other countries where it matters most – defence; and no desire to sacrifice advantage for the gesture of unity. It proved exceptionally difficult to craft common policies even during the Cold War – often due to French pretensions to significance – and in the period since the collapse of the USSR this has proven even more problematic over the Balkans, energy security, and missile defence. The blunt truth is that states do not stick together.

This leads us to another point. Despite the political rhetoric of anti-Americanism circulated by the usual intellectuals, swallowed whole by gullible publics, and exploited by politicians – most famously Gerhard Schroeder – the reality is that European nations all remain desperate for the United States to remain politically involved in Europe, as the security underwriter of choice; truly the ‘indispensable nation.’ Being located across the Atlantic, Washington harbours no territorial ambitions in Europe and is thus the only nation who can be just about ‘trusted’; and trust is a rare commodity indeed in international relations. The reality is not that European nations no longer need the USA; it is that the USA doesn’t give a hoot about Europe. The desire for the USA to retain its security architecture in Europe – most obviously NATO – stems from a fear of other regional actors. While American supervision has facilitated cautious co-operation, this does not equate to a transformation of international politics and is inseparable from the fact of Washington’s military might.

Honour is probably less of a force in Europe than fear, and what little ‘honour’ is at stake, is largely for show. European states enjoy being seen as a ‘player’ in world affairs, and like to bask in the glow of being invited to summit meetings and consulted. France, particularly, is obsessed with this, and likely to spit the dummy when others do not indulge Gallic pretensions. But we can detect the pattern across the continent. On either side of the English Channel, London and Paris jealously guard their membership of the United Nations Security Council and are, to say the least, unlikely to endorse any reforms that will see them thrown off. European nations turn up in Afghanistan to show solidarity with NATO, but conviction is patently lacking. But European egotism can be identified most readily in the incessant interference as ‘brokers’ in the Middle East and Africa: diplomatically intervening in conflicts, holding talks, trying to put together packages of aid or sanctions to encourage peace. The record is hardly a successful one, given that Europe has limited influence and less power. But that doesn’t stop Europeans from basking in symbolism. Nor does the fact that in many cases – like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – European states have no national interests. Yet they enthusiastically become involved in any available crisis, baffling the participants as to what precisely they are doing, and then heading off to the next trouble spot, wholly undeterred by failure.

In contemporary Europe, ‘honour’ tends to mostly be about values. For western European politicians this tends to equate to the rather empty language of democracy and human rights; and for eastern Europeans (and the publics of western Europe), nationalism and identity. The fact that the rhetoric of human rights and democracy (particularly when set against the anti-democratic excesses of the EU) is empty is obvious; so is the weakness of this as a basis for long-term political co-operation. Additionally, by their very nature the more substantive issues of nationalism and identity entail not harmony, but division.

Perhaps we can find more of a basis for optimism in Interest. Unfortunately, this turns out to be an equally difficult crusade. Interests will in all likelihood diverge, consensus shattering, if put to the test. Take the EU project. The rationale for the EU is economic advantage, but it is simply not the case that prosperity is dependent on the structures of the EU. This is not to deny that good neighbourly relations help to improve trade links. But, as the last few years – especially the Greek crisis – have shown, the economic advantages to be gained from co-operating in the EU are deeply debatable; and there is even talk of the Euro collapsing. Sticking to the same monetary policies for radically different kinds of economies was never a good idea, and the consequences of this are clear to see. In turn, this means that the advantages to be won from co-operating with the EU are rapidly reducing. Moreover, as is obvious to every honest observer, sovereignty is not diminishing. Why would states permit themselves less flexibility in making choices by giving more powers over to foreign bureaucrats? Interests are aligned to a point – usually to the point of convenience and no further – but, rhetoric aside, is there any substance to back this up? The reality of the EU is that some states benefit more than others. Thus, nations judge it in their interests to co-operate to only a very limited extent; little of substance is conceded. France, for instance, has repeatedly defied EU financial rules when domestic pressure increases. Britain is famously an awkward European, and has at times played a cunning game in that respect. But, crucially, every other European state has been more concerned with its own interests than with those of their neighbours or a nebulous ‘community’.

It could plausibly be argued that there are important interests in the security realm served by European co-operation in the economic and political realms. But this is only true to a point, as would be painfully obvious if the United States withdrew from the region, or a crisis arose that generated disagreement (say Russian or German pressure in the east). The key to the current peace is a stable balance of power in Europe – most importantly, the United States acts as a pacifier in both eastern and western Europe; Russia sits on the periphery, ambitious but as yet without the strength or incentives to be a genuinely destabilising presence; Germany has been both diplomatically inept and cautious so as not to generate alarm; Britain aligns itself with the US while hedging among the European states; and France attempts to sit close enough to everyone to defend her interests effectively. No state is more anti-American than France, but yet Paris rejoined NATO in order to underpin its federal experiment with US security. This system, then, is very precarious; the most stable element is the role of the US, but this might not persist beyond the medium term. If the balance was upset, the picture would change rapidly. The reality is that the security architecture of European geopolitics is not self-perpetuating or natural. It is unsustainable without American acquiescence. Only the presence of the United States raises the stakes for Germany and Russia to the point that they do not throw their weight around in the east.

Certainly nuclear weapons enhance stability and make war among the major powers exceedingly unlikely. However, miscalculation is still plausible; the potential for being predatory against the weaker, non-nuclear states is high; and in an environment of tension, states will still have to form balancing alliances whether they are armed with nuclear weaponry or not. It should thus be clear that the traditional dynamics of state behaviour remain dominant in European geopolitics. The international system consists of independent states with no entity exercising sovereign power over them. These states are all inherently dangerous, because they have some capacity to inflict damage. Moreover, states can never be certain about the intentions of others. No matter how pacific their rhetoric, there is always the possibility that states will take decisions which menace others. This means that states seek to maximise their options and relative power position. In this environment of uncertainty, they have no choice but to take precautions and hedge. And, flowery rhetoric aside, what is the whole superstructure of modern European politics but one giant hedge?

Economic interdependence might be thought of as another area of mutual ‘interest’ that changes the calculation to compete. It certainly raises the costs of security competition by damaging trade. However, considering that a state’s commerce is divided between many nations this is very unlikely to encourage a government to compromise on security. Surprisingly, the levels of international economic interconnectedness today, when set aside domestic economic transactions, are probably no higher than they were a hundred years ago – and certainly not markedly so. And democratic peace theory – the idea that democratic states do not fight each other and generally have compatible interests – is based on a dreadful reading of the historical evidence. The reality is that national interests diverge – often widely. It is difficult to see how this will change.

Finally, if we step outside the realm of politics, public opinion is even less harmonious. There are forty-four countries in Europe. Most private citizens are unapologetically nationalist; anti-immigrant sentiment is a powerful force; there is great concern about the dilution of national cultures; and support for federalism lags far behind Brussels. Although western European politicians are usually too frightened of their indigenous liberal intelligentsias to exploit these sentiments, there are few such qualms among the politicians of eastern Europe. Certainly, the contrasting tone of political language in eastern and western Europe shatters many of the more cosmopolitan assumptions aired in the seminars and newspapers of London or Paris. Nationalism glorifies the people and their country; it is the strongest political ideology in the world, and certainly the strongest in eastern Europe. The ethnic groups in the region are densely intermingled and usually fairly hostile. There are also powerful historical legacies at play in the east, of virtually every group having been menaced at some point by the rest. The record is definitely not a multicultural love-in, a pattern that, worryingly, we now see being replicated in western Europe as well. Without harmony in even the domestic sphere, there is precious little chance of it arising in international relations.

Robert Crowcroft is a specialist on British politics and defence.

The U.S. withdrawal and limited options in Iraq

By George Friedman

It is August 2010, and as the last U.S. combat troops leave Iraq, it is time to take stock of the situation in Iraq, which has changed places with Afghanistan as the forgotten war. This is all the more important since 50,000 troops will remain in Iraq, and while they may not be considered combat troops, a great deal of combat power remains embedded with them. So we are far from the end of the war in Iraq. The question is whether the departure of the last combat units is a significant milestone and, if it is, what it signifies.

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with three goals: The first was the destruction of the Iraqi army, the second was the destruction of the Baathist regime and the third was the replacement of that regime with a stable, pro-American government in Baghdad. The first two goals were achieved within weeks. Seven years later, however, Iraq still does not yet have a stable government, let alone a pro-American government. The lack of that government is what puts the current strategy in jeopardy.

The fundamental flaw of the invasion of Iraq was not in its execution but in the political expectations that were put in place. As the Americans knew, the Shiite community was anti-Baathist but heavily influenced by Iranian intelligence. The decision to destroy the Baathists put the Sunnis, who were the backbone of Saddam’s regime, in a desperate position. Facing a hostile American army and an equally hostile Shiite community backed by Iran, the Sunnis faced disaster. Taking support from where they could get it — from the foreign jihadists that were entering Iraq — they launched an insurgency against both the Americans and the Shia.

The Sunnis simply had nothing to lose. In their view, they faced permanent subjugation at best and annihilation at worst. The United States had the option of creating a Shiite-based government but realized that this government would ultimately be under Iranian control. The political miscalculation placed the United States simultaneously into a war with the Sunnis and a near-war situation with many of the Shia, while the Shia and Sunnis waged a civil war among themselves and the Sunnis occasionally fought the Kurds as well. From late 2003 until 2007, the United States was not so much in a state of war in Iraq as it was in a state of chaos.

The new strategy of Gen. David Petraeus emerged from the realization that the United States could not pacify Iraq and be at war with everyone. After a 2006 defeat in the midterm elections, it was expected that U.S. President George W. Bush would order the withdrawal of forces from Iraq. Instead, he announced the surge. The surge was really not much of a surge, but it created psychological surprise — not only were the Americans not leaving, but more were on the way. Anyone who was calculating a position based on the assumption of a U.S. withdrawal had to recalculate.

The Americans understood that the key was reversing the position of the Sunni insurgents. So long as they remained at war with the Americans and Shia, there was no possibility of controlling the situation. Moreover, only the Sunnis could cut the legs out from under the foreign jihadists operating in the Sunni community. These jihadists were challenging the traditional leadership of the Sunni community, so turning this community against the jihadists was not difficult. The Sunnis also were terrified that the United States would withdraw, leaving them at the mercy of the Shia. These considerations, along with substantial sums of money given to Sunni tribal elders, caused the Sunnis to do an about-face. This put the Shia on the defensive, since the Sunni alignment with the Americans enabled the Americans to strike at the Shiite militias.

Petraeus stabilized the situation, but he did not win the war. The war could only be considered won when there was a stable government in Baghdad that actually had the ability to govern Iraq. A government could be formed with people sitting in meetings and talking, but that did not mean that their decisions would have any significance. For that there had to be an Iraqi army to enforce the will of the government and protect the country from its neighbors, particularly Iran (from the American point of view). There also had to be a police force to enforce whatever laws might be made. And from the American perspective, this government did not have to be pro-American (that had long ago disappeared as a viable goal), but it could not be dominated by Iran.

Iraq is not ready to deal with the enforcement of the will of the government because it has no government. Once it has a government, it will be a long time before its military and police forces will be able to enforce its will throughout the country. And it will be much longer before it can block Iranian power by itself. As it stands now, there is no government, so the rest doesn’t much matter.

The geopolitical problem the Americans face is that, with the United States gone, Iran would be the most powerful conventional power in the Persian Gulf. The historical balance of power had been between Iraq and Iran. The American invasion destroyed the Iraqi army and government, and the United States was unable to recreate either. Part of this had to do with the fact that the Iranians did not want the Americans to succeed.

For Iran, a strong Iraq is the geopolitical nightmare. Iran once fought a war with Iraq that cost Iran a million casualties (imagine the United States having more than 4 million casualties), and the foundation of Iranian national strategy is to prevent a repeat of that war by making certain that Iraq becomes a puppet to Iran or, failing that, that it remains weak and divided. At this point, the Iranians do not have the ability to impose a government on Iraq. However, they do have the ability to prevent the formation of a government or to destabilize one that is formed. Iranian intelligence has sufficient allies and resources in Iraq to guarantee the failure of any stabilization attempt that doesn’t please Tehran.

There are many who are baffled by Iranian confidence and defiance in the face of American pressure on the nuclear issue. This is the reason for that confidence: Should the United States attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, or even if the United States does not attack, Iran holds the key to the success of the American strategy in Iraq. Everything done since 2006 fails if the United States must maintain tens of thousands of troops in Iraq in perpetuity. Should the United States leave, Iran has the capability of forcing a new order not only on Iraq but also on the rest of the Persian Gulf. Should the United States stay, Iran has the ability to prevent the stabilization of Iraq, or even to escalate violence to the point that the Americans are drawn back into combat. The Iranians understand the weakness of America’s position in Iraq, and they are confident that they can use that to influence American policy elsewhere.

American and Iraqi officials have publicly said that the reason an Iraqi government has not been formed is Iranian interference. To put it more clearly, there are any number of Shiite politicians who are close to Tehran and, for a range of reasons, will take their orders from there. There are not enough of these politicians to create a government, but there are enough to block a government from being formed. Therefore, no government is being formed.

With 50,000 U.S. troops still in Iraq, the United States does not yet face a crisis. The current withdrawal milestone is not the measure of the success of the strategy. The threat of a crisis will arise if the United States continues its withdrawal to the point where the Shia feel free to launch a sustained and escalating attack on the Sunnis, possibly supported by Iranian forces, volunteers or covert advisers. At that point, the Iraqi government must be in place, be united and command sufficient forces to control the country and deter Iranian plans.

The problem is, as we have seen, that in order to achieve that government there must be Iranian concurrence, and Iran has no reason to want to allow that to happen. Iran has very little to lose by, and a great deal to gain from, continuing the stability the Petraeus strategy provided. The American problem is that a genuine withdrawal from Iraq requires a shift in Iranian policy, and the United States has little to offer Iran to change the policy.

From the Iranian point of view, they have the Americans in a difficult position. On the one hand, the Americans are trumpeting the success of the Petraeus plan in Iraq and trying to repeat the success in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the secret is that the Petraeus plan has not yet succeeded in Iraq. Certainly, it ended the major fighting involving the Americans and settled down Sunni-Shiite tensions. But it has not taken Iraq anywhere near the end state the original strategy envisioned. Iraq has neither a government nor a functional army — and what is blocking it is Tehran.

One impulse of the Americans is to settle with the Iranians militarily. However, Iran is a mountainous country of 70 million, and an invasion is simply not in the cards. Airstrikes are always possible, but as the United States learned over North Vietnam — or from the Battle of Britain or in the bombing of Germany and Japan before the use of nuclear weapons — air campaigns alone don’t usually force nations to capitulate or change their policies. Serbia did give up Kosovo after a three-month air campaign, but we suspect Iran would be a tougher case. In any event, the United States has no appetite for another war while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are still under way, let alone a war against Iran in order to extricate itself from Iraq. The impulse to use force against Iran was resisted by President Bush and is now being resisted by President Barack Obama. And even if the Israelis attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran could still wreak havoc in Iraq.

Two strategies follow from this. The first is that the United States will reduce U.S. forces in Iraq somewhat but will not complete the withdrawal until a more distant date (the current Status of Forces Agreement requires all American troops to be withdrawn by the end of 2011). The problems with this strategy are that Iran is not going anywhere, destabilizing Iraq is not costing it much and protecting itself from an Iraqi resurgence is Iran’s highest foreign policy priority. That means that the decision really isn’t whether the United States will delay its withdrawal but whether the United States will permanently base forces in Iraq — and how vulnerable those forces might be to an upsurge in violence, which is an option that Iran retains.

Another choice for the United States, as we have discussed previously, is to enter into negotiations with Iran. This is a distasteful choice from the American point of view, but surely not more distasteful than negotiating with Stalin or Mao. At the same time, the Iranians’ price would be high. At the very least, they would want the “Finlandization” of Iraq, similar to the situation where the Soviets had a degree of control over Finland’s government. And it is far from clear that such a situation in Iraq would be sufficient for the Iranians.

The United States cannot withdraw completely without some arrangement, because that would leave Iran in an extremely powerful position in the region. The Iranian strategy seems to be to make the United States sufficiently uncomfortable to see withdrawal as attractive but not to be so threatening as to deter the withdrawal. As clever as that strategy is, however, it does not hide the fact that Iran would dominate the Persian Gulf region after the withdrawal. Thus, the United States has nothing but unpleasant choices in Iraq. It can stay in perpetuity and remain vulnerable to violence. It can withdraw and hand the region over to Iran. It can go to war with yet another Islamic country. Or it can negotiate with a government that it despises — and which despises it right back.

Given all that has been said about the success of the Petraeus strategy, it must be observed that while it broke the cycle of violence and carved out a fragile stability in Iraq, it has not achieved, nor can it alone achieve, the political solution that would end the war. Nor has it precluded a return of violence at some point. The Petraeus strategy has not solved the fundamental reality that has always been the shadow over Iraq: Iran. But that was beyond Petraeus’ task and, for now, beyond American capabilities. That is why the Iranians can afford to be so confident.

Read more: The U.S. Withdrawal and Limited Options in Iraq | STRATFOR

This report is republished with the permission of STRATFOR

Power struggle among Russia's militants

By Ben West and Lauren Goodrich

On Aug. 12, four members of the militant group the Caucasus Emirate (CE) appeared in a video posted on a Russian militant website withdrawing their support from CE founder and leader Doku Umarov. The reason for the mutiny was Umarov’s Aug. 4 retraction of his Aug. 1 announcement that he was stepping down from the top leadership position. STRATFOR and many others noted at the time that the Aug. 1 resignation was unexpected and suggested that Umarov may have been killed. However, the Aug. 4 retraction revealed that Umarov was still alive and that there was considerable confusion over who was in control of the militant group.

The mutineers were all high-level members of the militant group: Hussein Gakayev, commander of the CE’s Chechen forces; Aslambek Vadalov, commander of Dagestani forces and to whom Umarov had briefly turned over control in his Aug. 1 resignation; an Arab commander named Muhannad; and a veteran field commander known as Tarkhan. The four CE commanders said Umarov’s renunciation showed disrespect for his subordinates and that, while the four leaders continued to pledge support to the CE, they no longer supported Umarov. Gakayev, Tarkhan and Muhannad had all appeared in a video that aired Aug. 1 in which they supported Umarov’s decision to appoint Vadalov CE emir.

To further confuse the issue, a video released Aug. 11 by Emir Adam, the CE leader in Ingushetia, pledged his and his followers’ loyalty to Umarov. The next day, another video appeared featuring the group’s new leader in Dagestan, Emir Seyfullakh Gubdensky (who succeeded Vadalov after he became deputy leader of the CE), similarly endorsing Umarov’s reclamation of the top CE post.

These disparate messages from top leaders paint a picture of confusion and dissension in the CE that appears to mark a serious crisis for a group, which, until recently, had been consolidating militant groups across the Caucasus under a single, more strategic leadership structure. STRATFOR has collected insight from sources familiar with the group and its leadership turmoil that explains what happened and the nature of the threat that the CE poses to Russian security in the Caucasus.

The Inside Story

According to a Russian source, the confusion caused by Umarov’s apparent indecision over the CE leadership position was a deliberate operation by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). According to that source, the operation that ultimately appears to have undermined Umarov’s position as leader of the CE began in early 2010. However, the FSB received intelligence only over the past two months that set the stage for executing the operation. That intelligence allegedly came from the CE’s former leader in Ingushetia, Emir Ali Taziyev, who was arrested by the FSB on June 9 in an Ingushetian village. Taziyev allegedly provided the FSB information on the CE’s training, ideology, weapons procurement and leadership structure. This information then allowed the FSB to activate a sleeper agent, Movladi Udugov, who served directly under Umarov as the CE’s head of media and publicity. According to our source, Udugov was responsible for the unauthorized release of the video in which Umarov announced that he was stepping down and named Vadalov as his successor.

The story goes that Umarov had recorded the video with the intent of saving it and releasing it only in the event of his demise. This would ensure that a crisis of succession wouldn’t erupt because of his death or disappearance. The fact that Vadalov was named as his successor on July 25 means that each of the regional leaders within the CE had likely agreed to the decision. It is important to note that the leadership crisis did not occur because Vadalov was assigned to the post, but because Umarov appeared to have stepped down and then reclaimed his title. Udugov provided the crucial blow to Umarov’s status as leader of the CE by releasing the resignation video prematurely, laying the foundation for dissension among Umarov’s followers.

The resulting flurry of approval and disapproval from the CE’s corps of commanders shows just how damaging the videos were. We have to be critical of the Russian source’s account of how all of this transpired, since the source is likely interested in promoting the FSB’s capabilities and its penetration of Russia’s most dangerous militant group. The account is logical, however, since it does explain the unusual sequence of videos, and the FSB is capable of infiltrating such a group. There are, of course, other explanations for what could have motivated Udugov to release the tape: Perhaps he was trying to trigger a power struggle within the group on his own, or perhaps someone else inside the CE obtained the tape and released it in hopes of weakening Umarov or promoting Vadalov. However, it is very unlikely that the release was a mistake, since Umarov and his commanders have proved very competent at running a successful militant movement.

Looking deeper, it becomes obvious that a video alone would not have caused dissension on the scale that we are seeing now within the CE. Had everything been perfect in the CE and had Umarov enjoyed unwavering support, he could have dismissed the video as an attempt to undermine his authority, promised to punish those responsible and gone on with business. It is very apparent that Umarov was not able to do this. The release of the videos exacerbated divisions among CE factions that Umarov and his deputies were trying to consolidate. By releasing the video of Umarov stepping down as commander, Udugov (allegedly under FSB guidance) forced the divisions into the public spotlight.

According to our Russian source, the resignation scandal has split the CE three ways. The first split concerns operational security. The CE knew that penetrating the group was a top priority for the FSB and that it had to remain vigilant against outsiders attempting to do just that. Simply the allegation that one of Umarov’s top advisers was working for the FSB undermines the sense of operational security throughout the entire group. Already, accusations of FSB involvement in the CE leadership crisis have emerged in the open-source network, on sites like globaljihad.net. In such an atmosphere, the level of trust among commanders decreases (as they begin to wonder who is reporting to the FSB) and the level of paranoia increases. Infighting at the top of any organization can quickly create operational gridlock and reduce the organization’s effectiveness. This is exactly why the Russians might try to claim credit for the tape’s release, even if they were not responsible.

The second split is generational and ideological. According to our source, a younger faction of the CE (led by Vadalov) has accused Umarov and his cadre of not protecting the ideological unity of the CE. It is no secret that Umarov is much more experienced in and knowledgeable of military strategy and tactics, while his background in Islamism is weak. He has bungled religious protocol and terminology a number of times, undermining his authority as emir of the group. Meanwhile, the older, more military-oriented faction accuses the younger faction of being willing to work with Moscow and sell out the movement.

The third and possibly most volatile fault line is the tension between regional groups within the Caucasus Emirate. The northern Caucasus republics of Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan each have their own, independent histories of militancy, with Chechen militants traditionally being Moscow’s highest-profile antagonists. Without the support of the Chechen commander of the CE (Khusein Gakayev, who withdrew his support for Umarov in the Aug. 12 video), Umarov has a serious deficit of support in controlling the Caucasus Emirate. The advantage of having the support of the current Ingushetian and Dagestani militant leaders is diluted by the fact that Chechnya geographically lies directly between them, rendering any trans-Caucasus network incomplete. Also, Chechens have been the more successful leaders of militant movements in the Caucasus. Umarov himself is Chechen, as was Shamil Basayev, a commander of Chechen separatist forces in two wars against Russia.

Threat and Inherent Weaknesses

It is exactly because of Doku Umarov’s ability to bring together militants of different motivations, generations and locations under the umbrella of the Caucasus Emirate that made his group so threatening to the Russian state. As a unified militant group, the CE proved capable of launching a suicide attack against Moscow’s subway system in March 2010 and carrying out relatively sophisticated attacks targeting security forces and infrastructure. The CE leadership structure provided strategic guidance to the individual militant groups operating in the separate republics that actually carried out the attacks. With the recent crisis in leadership, these capabilities will likely be severely weakened.

Umarov announced the formation of the CE only in 2007, which means the group was just three years old when the leadership turmoil broke out Aug. 1. This is precious little time to consolidate militant groups across a region with sharp geographic fragmentation that traditionally has caused groups to be isolated and independent. Moscow has had plenty of problems controlling the region and is faced with the same geographic challenges as the Caucasus Emirate. A different source familiar with the CE said that Umarov has most recently attempted to consolidate the CE by broadcasting his statements in different languages, such as Avar, which is widely spoken in Dagestan. But Avar is only one of 10 languages spoken across Dagestan alone, which makes communicating efficiently to an audience across the Caucasus a difficult task.

That same source has said that the CE has had trouble moving food, supplies, weapons and people across the Caucasus (this effort is complicated by Russian security forces as well as geography), which means that each group is responsible for providing for itself. This prevents standardization across the militant movement and complicates cooperation among groups. It also reduces the reliance of regional militant groups on the Caucasus Emirate leadership, decreasing Umarov’s control over the movement. If militant commanders in Chechnya are supplying and recruiting on their own, they are less likely to take orders on what to do with those resources from detached leaders. However, lack of unity among the groups does not necessarily make them less able to carry out the small-scale attacks that are common in the Caucasus. On Aug. 17, five days after a split in the CE leadership became apparent, a suicide bomber (most likely affiliated with a group linked to the CE) attacked a police checkpoint along the border of Ingushetia and North Ossetia.

Militant groups existed in the Caucasus long before the Caucasus Emirate was formed and will continue to exist long after it is gone. The strategic importance of the Caucasus and the fragmentation of its inhabitants due to ethnicity, culture and geography (which makes for ideal guerrilla-warfare terrain), ensure that whoever attempts to control the region will face serious challenges from local populations who want to govern themselves. With varying levels of success, these groups will continue to use violence to undermine their respective governments, especially those seen as Moscow’s lackeys.

Indeed, even though the Caucasus Emirate may be seriously disrupted by recent turmoil in its leadership structure, the regional militant groups that made up the CE will certainly continue to conduct attacks against security forces and even civilians as they try to loosen Moscow’s control over the region. But the turmoil will reduce the strategic threat the combined efforts of these disparate groups had posed to Moscow for the foreseeable future.

Read more: Power Struggle Among Russia's Militants | STRATFOR

This report is republished with the permission of STRATFOR