Defence of the Realm

It is always unwise to take any official statement at face value – but the same might be said of any statement by the media. Healthy scepticism should be the default mode. So what does one believe when the media charges the government with misconduct, and the government flatly denies the charge?

That is the conundrum presented by a piece in The Sunday Times today. Written by a reputable journalist, Stephen Grey, under the headline: "No 10 asked army to delay Afghan attack until after Gordon Brown's visit", it makes a very serious charge.

Specifically, Grey alleges that during the recapture of the Musa Qala in December 2007, General Andrew Mackay – commanding the operation - "was furious to be asked by Downing Street if he could delay the operation and spare potential embarrassment to Brown." Mackay refused.

The scenario is plausible enough, and the background is set out in Grey's book, Operation Snakebite.

If the operation had been successful – as was anticipated – Brown could have been accused of "political opportunism", attempting to bask in reflected glory. If the operation failed, or there had been a high number of civilian casualties (the greater fear), this could have proved embarrassing for Brown when he met president Karzai.

As to the accusation that No 10 sought to interfere, this is indeed flatly denied. A Downing Street spokesman states: "The suggestion that Downing Street asked for a delay, or indeed any change, to military plans in Afghanistan before the Prime Minister visited at the end of 2007 is utterly untrue."

So, who do we believe? Well, in his book, Grey publishes details of a meeting of "generals and civil servants" at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall on 4 December 2007, when the attempt to interfere with the operation was supposedly made. With it due to start in three days time, he refers to an "official" (no more detail is given) asking: "Does it have to be so soon? Can't it all be delayed?"

There then appears to be a general discussion about the political implications of the coincidence of the operation with the prime minister's visit. Addressing the meeting via an intercom was General Nick Houghton, based at Joint Operations HQ in west London. He, according to Grey, was asked to "check back" with theatre and "see if there could be any slippage." But, Grey adds, "few expected anything to change".

From this narrative, several points emerge. Firstly, the "official" initially asking whether there could be a delay was not identified. Secondly, there was no mention of No 10 – in this or any other context. Third, there seems to have been a general discussion on the proposition, from which it can be inferred that a consensus was reached. Fourth, this "consensus" was translated into a request that Houghton "check back", couched in terms of "see if". This implies that this was an exploratory question – a query - and by no means a demand.

Finally, and crucially, Houghton was not at the meeting. He was communicating via the intercom from another location. He then – or perhaps even someone delegated by him - communicated with "theatre", although Grey does not specifically assert that anyone talked to or communicated directly with MacKay.

MacKay, of course, was in Afghanistan (as indeed was Grey at the time). If he was contacted directly or indirectly by Houghton or someone deputed to do so, how did MacKay know that the query came from No 10? This is not specified, all in the context of Grey himself making no mention of No 10.

Herein lies perhaps the crux. Most people are familiar with the joke of First World War vintage, recalling a message saying: "send reinforcements, we're going to advance." Garbled in transmission, it comes out as: "send three and fourpence (old money), we're going to a dance". A similar dynamic might be at play.

Deconstructing the key parts of the narrative, we have in London an unidentified official, a general discussion and a somewhat ambiguous "request" which could be construed as asking for information on options. What precisely was conveyed to MacKay in Afghanistan, by whom and in what circumstances, is not specified.

At the receiving end, however, it is quite possible – perhaps aided by ambiguous wording or even some embellishments – that MacKay believed he was being asked to delay the operation and the source of the request was No 10. But a belief does not make it so. MacKay could have been misled, or simply misunderstood what was being asked of him.

As to the meeting in Whitehall, it is quite possible that the issues discussed reflected concerns that political fall-out would reflect badly on the officials, and they would be blamed for not taking measures to mitigate potential problems.

Rather than being directed by No 10, therefore – and Grey makes no accusation as to Gordon Brown being aware of what went on - the officials could simply have been covering their own backs. What we know of the narrative is entirely compatible with officials seeking to establish that options had been considered, and for good reasons had been discarded.

In the event, Grey in his book does not record MacKay's (or anyone else's) response to any query. That the operation went ahead as planned is testament to the fact that the response to the Whitehall query was "no". In fact, Houghton need not have referred it to MacKay - he had the authority to say "no" then and there.

If he did refer what amounted to a "request for information" back to theatre, it would have been as a matter of "form", in full expectation that the answer would be "no". If MacKay, against all expectations, had said "yes", most likely Houghton would have told him to stop being a bloody fool and get on with it.

On that basis, although Grey asserts that MacKay was "furious to be asked by Downing Street if he could delay the operation", we have no context. And whatever message MacKay did receive, Grey relies on his recall, some time after the operation had finished.

Interestingly, nothing Grey asserts in relation to MacKay's actions and reaction is in quotes. The narrative is unsupported by direct (or any) evidence. Rather, it is based on hearsay and ex post facto recollections, relying heavily on a particular interpretation of what could be an ambiguous request, delivered via a fragmented communication system.

Yet there can be no disputing the seriousness of the charge made by The Sunday Times - that attempts were made to interfere with a military operation for political purposes. That is serious, a breach of the long-standing constitutional principle that politicians do not interfere with the conduct of military operations.

On the other hand, the newspaper seems to offer very slender grounds on which such a serious accusation is made. For one of such gravity, more would be expected. Without more evidence, healthy scepticism should apply.

COMMENT THREAD

With yet another three soldiers reported killed in Sangin, bringing the total up to 204, the Scottish Daily Herald is reporting on a UK opinion poll on our involvement in Afghanistan.

From this we learn that some 57 percent believe British forces should not be in Afghanistan at all, only 13 percent think it is "very clear" why the UK military is there and 82 percent say the UK Government is not doing enough to support our troops. Undoubtedly, sentiment has been heavily influenced by the rush of casualties over the last two months and, as public opinion hardens, the opposition to our continued presence is only likely to increase.

But, if The Daily Telegraph is any guide, the growing public wish for withdrawal might come sooner than expected. Defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, it appears, is telling us that the mission in Afghanistan could largely be concluded as soon as 2010.

That the mission was to undergo fundamental changes was in fact signalled by Gordon Brown in his announcement on the AF/PAK strategy at the end of April, where he intimated that, from the autumn, greater effort would be devoted to training and mentoring Afghan security forces, with a view to an accelerated hand-over of responsibilities to them.

Whether this is realistic in view of the known inadequacies of the Afghan forces is moot, but it provides a political figleaf to cover our progressive disengagement, much as we did in Iraq, enabling us to declare a "victory" and leave with the flags flying.

In fact, according to Mick Smith in The Sunday Times, there are other pressures in theatre which may lead us to disengage even faster. These are coming from the Americans who are expressing their concern about the inability of the British to hold and stabilise Musa Qala district, in addition to their current commitments in the so-called green zone.

Following Operation Panther's Claw, which had British troops "clearing" the Taleban from 150 square miles of the green zone north and northwest of Lashkar Gah, troops have been left exhausted and there are barely enough men to mount "framework patrols" to secure the area.

Thus, the US forces are taking a more and more active part in operations, even to the extent of sidelining the British command structures, centred on the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in Northwood, west London. In theory PJHQ controls all British military operations abroad, but is increasingly toothless. With the Americans taking control of most of Helmand, it has lost much of its role.

That much is evident to the west of Musa Qala where, this weekend US Marines and Afghan officials completed yet another operation in Now Zad, this time hoisting the Afghan flag over the deserted town (pictured). Through the week, 400 Marines, with 100 Afghan troops had been taking part in operation Eastern Resolve II and are mow claiming to have regained control of the district.

Until recently, the US Marines have had only a tenuous grip over the district, taking considerable casualties, with a lone company responsible for policing the area.

Now Zad was, of course, one of the four original British "platoon houses", which included Sangin, Kajaki and Musa Qala. Now the US has taken total responsibility for Now Zad, if Musa Qala is also taken over, then half of the "outstations" held by the British will have gone.

But, if the casualty rate at Sangin - with over 50 dead - continues, it will only be a matter of time before there are serious questions as to whether holding this district is tenable by British forces. Certainly, it cannot be long before the media focuses on this area and the toll it is extracting, creating a situation where US forces might feel impelled to move in and then, eventually, take over.

By slow progressive moves, therefore, British involvement – at least in terms of the areas occupied – could gradually be scaled down, leaving a situation where one can imagine that the force is concentrated on Lashkar Gah and then Bastion, before retreating entirely to barracks and thence onto the ramps for the final airlift which will take them back home - and military oblivion.

The likelihood is that Gordon Brown's administration is unlikely to see this end game but Brown's successor will almost certainly see it to fruition. There is no longer any appetite for this war, either in the British public or even in the military – and the current casualty rate is politically unsustainable. Despite the analysis from Michael Evans in The Times, given a figleaf by the Americans, we will be gone.

COMMENT THREAD

On the one hand, the current edition of the New Statesman gives space to current defence secretary Bob Ainsworth, who tells us that opposing war in Afghanistan is "defeatism" The war in Afghanistan is too important to be reduced to a political football. We are fighting there to protect our national security, he says.

On the other hand, in a long editorial, the same magazine opines that, "Our military presence in Afghanistan is part of the problem, not the solution." Britain should follow Canada's lead and set a date for withdrawal from Afghanistan. It is time we accepted that we are losing this war.

Ainsworth would have it that British troops know they are in Afghanistan to prevent the country becoming a haven for terrorists, as it was in 2001. But they are also motivated by the plight of the people they are fighting alongside. They understand clearly why they are there and the progress they are making.

He then observes that "this sense of purpose and momentum has not translated to the home front in the way that it might have," continuing with the lament:

Despite the huge influx of US and other Nato troops, despite the focus of the Obama administration and the recent success of operations in Helmand, some in the UK believe the fight is not worth it. This defeatism has been exacerbated by political arguments about British troop levels, vehicles and helicopters that often misunderstand the nature of coalition warfare.

It was to combat al-Qaeda that British forces first entered Afghanistan in 2001. That was a limited commitment. Five lives were lost in the first five years. Then, in 2006, when the troop numbers rose dramatically, the British headed south to Helmand with a mission described by the then defence secretary, John Reid, as being "to support reconstruction", but which has shifted constantly.

Others have spoken since of the need to support the Afghan government. Or to lift the war-torn country out of poverty. Or to fight the growth of the world opium trade that is centred in Helmand. Or, as is the official line now, to secure the country from a revival of al-Qaeda. "If we can't even get straight why we're there, how can we get straight our strategy to win?" one UK battalion commander said to me recently.

Originally posted at 19:30 hrs Friday. Updated and reposted.


Sooner than we feared, another British soldier was reported killed in Afghanistan, bringing the number to three on the day and the total to 179.

Then, early in the afternoon, we began to get very strong rumours of many more in what was said to be a "major incident". By early evening, five more were said to have been killed, three seriously injured and three more less badly injured.

Early, unconfirmed reports said soldiers had sought cover from direct fire in a compound which was booby-trapped with an IED. Later reports suggested that troops had been ambushed after they had dismounted from their vehicle to investigate an explosion, and were hit by another IED and took casualties. More were killed and injured when the medevac Chinook arrived to pick up the original casualties. The tactics were said to be "sophisticated".

A different report, in The Daily Mail tells a different version, suggesting that after the first hit, "amid the chaos and appalling scenes, the Taleban is said to have opened fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades on the injured soldiers and those going to their aid."

Apache attack helicopters are then said to have been called in to strike at Taleban positions and provide cover as a rescue operation was launched with helicopters ferrying the wounded back to the field hospital at the main British base at Camp Bastion throughout the night.

The men, from the 2nd Bn, The Rifles, were reported to have been in the Sangin area - near Musa Qala. This is not part of the current Operation Panchai Palang (Panther's Claw), which is being carried out north of Lashkar Gah.

The official total for casualties since 2001 now rises to 184, exceeding the number 179, which was the death toll in Iraq. Predictably, The Guardian - commenting on the level when it reached 179 - said that the death was likely to intensify the debate about whether the Afghanistan operation is worthwhile.

The 179th reported killed was a soldier from the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, said to have died in an explosion during an operation near Nad-e-Ali. He was from the same regiment as Trooper Joshua Hammond, who was killed last week in a Viking.

The AP report at that time was headed, "The Climbing toll raises British doubts on Afghanistan" and cited Conservative MP Adam Holloway, a defence committee member. He said, "The casualties should fix peoples' minds on the fact that we've let the soldiers down ... The death toll means we should do it properly or we shouldn't do it at all."

He added that Britain had never had the troop strength needed to hold ground there and had failed to provide the promised security or reconstruction, leading many Afghans to believe the Taleban militants will outlast Western forces. "We're in a mess," he said.

Guthrie, according to Channel 4 News blames Gordon Brown who, as chancellor when Britain went into Helmand, had given "as little money to defence" as the Treasury could get away with.

And, in The Daily Mail, Doug Beattie, retired recently after 27 years in the Army, said: "Whether it's the 179th or the 200th, the soldier will not think twice about that number. They're just numbers - but every number and every name has a story behind it."

He added: "No soldier serving in Afghanistan will say, 'that's 179', they will say, 'that's my friend, that's my roommate, that's my commanding officer'. Very soon we are going to hit the 200 mark. The likelihood is before we leave Afghanistan we are going to hit the 500 mark - maybe even the 1,000 mark. But they are all false landmarks."

"For the politicians and for the Ministry of Defence," he then said, "public perception of the loss is crucial. For the soldiers on the ground, it won't matter."

However, despite the growing list of British fatalities, troops are continuing to push the enemy back on operation Panthers Claw. This is seen as a "crucial" operation for the security of Helmand.

The fighting had been "exceptionally arduous" with the threat from the Taliban roadside bombs "enormous", Lt-Col Simon Banton tells The Daily Telegraph.

Gordon Brown, who was attending the G8 summit in L'Aquila in Italy, admitted that the troops faced "a very hard summer". He said that there was no question of Britain pulling out until the international community had finished its mission.

COMMENT THREAD

The Daily Mail has deployed its heavy weapon on the Afghan front today, rolling out Max Hastings to tell us, "Why Lance-Corporal Elson and our other 175 soldiers killed in an unwinnable war deserve better from this country."

L/Cpl Elson is the last but one, of seven, soldiers to be killed in Afghanistan within a week – killed by an IED. At least Hastings cuts though the cant, remarking that it is hard to find much heroic about being blown up by a mine, the fate of so many soldiers in Helmand.

IEDs, he writes, impact significantly upon morale. Most men cheerfully take their chances in firefights, where superior skills and equipment usually enable them to prevail. But it is a wretched business, to march or ride daily through the Afghan countryside, knowing that at any moment one might be blown to eternity without the smallest chance of averting fate.

Unfortunately, Hastings then repeats the corrosive manta which is so beloved of the MoD and much of the military, telling is that "No armoured vehicle is proof against mines containing up to 500lb of explosive, such as the Taliban now employ." He is actually wrong there, which is why we've put up that famous picture of the destroyed Cougar again. That is reputed to have taken a hit from a 300lb charge – and the crew walked away with very light injuries.

That is not, of course, 500lb, but the weight comparison is misleading, as the really big bombs the Taleban are using are made from agricultural fertiliser – helpfully provided by the Western aid agencies. As such, they have only about a third of the explosive force of TNT and other military explosives – of the type that hit the Cougar. Not always, but even the big bombs are survivable.

As much to the point, although some big bombs are used, they are still the exception – they are difficult to get to site, very difficult to bury and expose the emplacers to a much higher risk of detection. More typical is this example recounted by a "Gateshead soldier" Corporal Dan Henderson.

He was on a routine patrol in Helmand Province when he noticed a suspicious bump in a road frequently used by food and medical supply vehicles. And after inspecting the mound, a 20-kilo roadside bomb was discovered – "the kind which has claimed the lives of scores of our troops."

With no time to spare, Cpl Henderson and his unit sealed off the area, close to the town of Musa Qala, before calling in bomb disposal experts to destroy the device. "It was 20 kilos of homemade explosive – the sort of thing that could do some serious damage," said Henderson. "Even a heavily-armed vehicle could still be knocked a few feet in the air."

He then added: "An unarmed vehicle wouldn't stand a chance. A British convoy was due to move across the route that it happened to be on. The Taliban obviously had their own information."

Even at that level, a Viking would be ripped apart if the bomb was detonated in the right place, but a Mastiff, a Ridgeback – or any other vehicle designed on the same principles – would shrug it off. There may, nevertheless, be bombs that will defeat these protected vehicles, although none have killed anyone in a Mastiff yet.

But to argue that we should not use protected vehicles because "bigger bombs" can defeat them is akin to arguing that soldiers should not wear bullet-proof body armour because it will not defeat RPGs. Similarly, we can dispense with tanks and go to war on bicycles because even the heaviest tank can be knocked out by an anti-tank missile.

To my mind, these are the sort of issues we should be discussing – how to bring protected mobility into theatre so as to restore freedom of movement to the battlefield, not only for mounted operations but also for foot patrols.

Here, we see a link to a BBC TV report from Ian Pannell, describing how the Taleban use multiple IEDs to slow down the advance of British troops, who have to use hand-held nine detectors to clear the way before they can move into positions. This gives time for the Taleban to assemble their forces to mount an attack.


Yet, in their Bush War, the Rhodesians had the Pookie mine detection vehicle (illustrated above) – small enough and light enough to lead the way down tracks, to clear the way for advancing troops. Surely, thirty years on, it is not beyond the capability of our procurement geniuses in the MoD to come up with something similar?

The trouble is – as with the Clegg – we do not get that sort of debate. Clegg, for instance, talks about wanting more troops for the "take and hold" (aka "shake 'n' bake") strategy, without any discussion of the possibility that this might be fundamentally flawed, and can never work.

So it is with Hastings. There is a long whinge in which – in passing – he refers to Major Patrick Little, and cites his comment that, "All is not well in the British Army." But he does not develop the theme. Instead, he withdraws to his comfort zone by declaring that, "There is still supreme professionalism in the British Army, together with a cheerful willingness to accept the risks of a soldier's calling."

There is a growing climate of unrest and anger that they [the troops] are called upon to fight a costly war with inadequate resources, no Afghan gratitude and cynical indifference from the British Government, then declares the Hasting, deciding that "this Labour Government sent the British Army to fight and die in Afghanistan, and bears an absolute responsibility."

For all that, Hasting is "not one of those who favours quitting immediately." Afghanistan's collapse into anarchy could have a grave effect on Pakistan, he says. But, he avers, "the security situation is deteriorating, and those in charge are muddling. We must do Afghanistan differently or admit defeat and come home."

Yea ... alright Mr Hasting. We must do it differently. But how would you do it? Come to think of it Mr Clegg, how would you do it - apart from more European co-operation?

COMMENT THREAD

Currently running in Exeter is the inquest on the death of Pte Jack Sadler, which we covered last year, with the inquest proceedings attracting an interim report from The Daily Telegraph.

Jack, a TA volunteer in Honourable Artillery Company, was a Wimik gunner, attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Force (BRF) serving 52 Brigade in Afghanistan during Operation Herrick 7.

On 4 December 2007, the BRF, comprising a group of Wimiks, was scouting a route for an artillery convoy of made up of two Pinzgauers each pulling a 105mm light gun, plus DROPS trucks carrying the ammunition. They were on their way to a firing point close to Musa Qala to take part in the operation to recover the town.

Making pitifully slow progress over the rough ground, they had been observed by what they feared might have been Taleban "dickers" as they had skirted a village en route before then reaching a "problematic" steep-sided wadi which they had to cross, following a route they had taken the day before – the only one which the trucks could negotiate.

Because of the heavy trucks the Force was escorting, there were only a very limited number of points at which the wadi could be crossed. While scouting the route across, Jack's Wimik hit a mine, with him sustaining fatal injuries.

No mine clearance had been carried out as the convoy was static while the reconnaissance was carried out. It was a "sitting target" and an attack was feared if it remained in one place too long, so the pressure was on to get the convoy moving again. But, on the rocky ground, the Group commander did not suspect any danger. There were no "Combat Indicators" suggesting trouble and no one in the group "sensed" any danger.

Had there been enough helicopters, the two guns and their supplies of ammunition could easily have been transported by air – as underslung loads. This would be an easy job for a Chinook. But, with a major operation in the offing, there was no spare capacity and, therefore, the battery had to travel by road, with fatal results.

That then puts the focus on the Wimik, deployed in an area where the threat of mines and IEDs was ever-present. And, it emerges from the inquest that a report submitted to the coroner described it as "not designed to be used in a combat situation because of its lack of ballistic and munitions protection".

Needless to say, the Ministry of Defeat is represented at the inquest, with Col Charles Clee holding the line. He was quick to stress that Wimik has since been replaced with newer models fitted with better protection against mines and roadside bombs.

Clee, who is deputy head of urgent operational requirements at the MoD also stated that Wimiks were "valuable to commanders because of their flexibility." Their light weight meant they could operate on local roads. He also trotted out the familiar line that, it was up to commanders on the ground to choose which types of military vehicles to use for different tasks.

Indeed there was a choice ... Wimik, Wimik or Wimik. As for it being able to operate on local roads, as a convoy escort, the BRF was being tied to a predictable route which could only be negotiated by heavy trucks. It, not the convoy, was the "sitting target".

With the Viking in the news, and the past publicity on the Snatch Land Rover, the vulnerability of the Wimik has, by and large, passed under the media radar. Yet more have been killed in Wimiks in Afghanistan than any other vehicle, at least 15 as opposed to ten in the Snatch and Jackal and eight in the Viking.

The hearing continues tomorrow so it remains to be seen what the coroner will make of this, but there is not any great confidence that local coroners can see through the dissemination poured out by the MoD. The precedents are not good.

COMMENT THREAD

It was never the case that the MoD was going to take the charge of lying without attempting a comeback and, sure enough, after Stephen Grey's piece in The Guardian that we looked at last week, Nick Gurr, the MoD's Director of Media and Communications, has tried his hand at a rebuttal on the MoD website.

Addressing the issues that the "MOD is restricting access to conflict zones" and that journalists have been "lied to and censored", Gurr deals with each in turn.

The points he makes on the access issue look eminently reasonable, stating the obvious – that air transport to theatre is limited and that there is an increasing demand for media access, which cannot be met. Gurr would have it that the MoD is doing its best, the number of media visits to operational theatres (Iraq and Afghanistan) having increased from 152 in the year to Oct 2007 to 246 in the year to May 2009. For Afghanistan during the same period they rose from 90 to 116 - an increase of more than 25 percent.

What Gurr does not say though is that much of the increase is through a programme of encouraging reporters from regional and local papers to follow their home regiments – ranks of very often inexperienced and compliant journalists, many of whom (not all) who lack specialist knowledge and thus are easy prey for the military propaganda machine.

An example of this comes with a recent piece from Harry Miller of the Surrey Comet, writing about a re-supply mission to a patrol base 2km west of the Musa Qala District Centre.

He travels with the 3 Scots in "some of the newly delivered Jackal armoured vehicles, used for reconnaissance, rapid assault, fire support and convoy protection." These, presumably, are the Jackal 2s, the virtues of which Miller extols, telling us that, "The new design of the vehicles has meant that Improvised Explosive Devices are having less of the desired effect and crews are much more likely to survive the impact with only minimal injuries."

Following on from Harding's piece on 1 June, expressing "safety concerns" about the Jackals, no self-respecting specialist defence correspondent would have written such an uncritical piece.

For the MoD to have got Miller to have written such a glowing testament – which could only have been repeating what he had been told – was, therefore, something of a coup, representing hard core propaganda from an unwitting journalist.

Yet, four days after the piece was published, Major Sean Burchall was killed – the most senior British Army officer to date in Afghanistan – in a Jackal. It may well have been a Jackal 2. Yet, while the MoD is happy to see "puffs" for the Jackal, when it comes to bad publicity for the machine, the MoD website is curiously silent.

Throughout the piece on Burchall's death, there is no mention of the Jackal, reference being made only to "armoured vehicles", a description which would not normally be applied to this equipment.

To favour relatively impressionable reporters, which then justifies restricting more frequent access by experienced journalists, and then to omit details of the Jackal in the press release, cannot be called lying or anything so obvious. But these are nonetheless classic examples of how the MoD seeks to manipulate the message to the public.

Gurr, however, claims that the MoD "wants the media to see first hand the efforts of our forces in Afghanistan", to which effect he argues that "our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are our best advocates," on which basis it is "in our interests to get the media there to see it for themselves." We owe it to our forces to ensure their story is told, adds Gurr.

In fact, though, the MoD's prime concern is to get the media to report the "story" it wants them to report. Those journalists who are compliant find that the MoD cannot be too helpful. Those who question the official line find that all sorts of difficulties arise when they want access to theatre or want to talk to people on the ground.

If this is the subtle – and deniable – end of media control, the plain lie is also a tool of the trade. But, to be credible, the lie must be denied. Thus does Gurr aver, "We don't tell lies. We are not allowed to." Of course, this is a lie.

We have far too many examples of outright lies from the MoD to believe otherwise – from the denial that there was major fighting in al Amarah during the height on the Mahdi uprising in 2005, to the false expectations raised on the conduct of Operation Sinbad in late 2007 to the falsehoods perpetrated over the recovery of Musa Qala, pretending that it was an Afghan-led operation.

The strict definition of the lie, however, encompasses more than just the telling of an untruth. It takes in not only the act, but default or sufferance – the processes of allowing untruths to be perpetuated for want of interventions that would correct them.

These are the common fare of the MoD but its tenuous grasp of the meaning of truth leads it further down the path of deception than can be imagined. One classic – and frequently employed stratagem – is to keep quiet about operations which would be of interest to specialists, using its own staff or journalists to cover the events and then only to publish the details if they go to plan – whatever the plan was.

That was the strategy adopted with Operation Sond Chara (Operation Red Dagger), over Christmas last. No embeds were present through the whole operation and only a very carefully sanitised version was released to the public.

The same goes, of course, for the deaths of individual soldiers. Stephen Grey complained that there was less coverage of British deaths than they deserve because the MOD was not getting journalists to the front line. Gurr disagrees, declaring that his organisation produces detailed eulogies "for all our people who are killed in action." That might be the case but, as we have seen with Major Burchall, the releases published by the MoD rarely include any significant operational detail.

For all Gurr's protests, though, he himself is most revealing about the real agenda. "There is a good story to be told in Afghanistan about all the things our forces are achieving in the toughest part of the theatre," he writes. "We want this story told and we want journalists there to help tell it." The journalists are there to tell the "good" story, and it is Gurr's job to make that happen.

COMMENT THREAD

Given the professed concern for "Our Boys" and the outpourings of regrets when soldiers are killed, it is rather remarkable that so little attention is being given to their equipment, particularly the growing list of vehicles failures which have accounted for more than 40 deaths in Afghanistan.

Even then, it is quite remarkable that the only journal to notice the comments on the Vector last Monday by Quentin Davies at Defence Questions was Defence Management.

It noted Davies saying that, "When purchasing a number of armoured vehicles, failure was bound to occur in some areas," this (rightly) being interpreted as the defence minister attempting to justify the withdrawal of the Vector.

The journal then goes on to state: "Despite lessons learned from the Iraq insurgency, when the MoD bought a new fleet of 100 Vectors in 2006, it failed to ensure that they had v-shaped hulls or armour strong enough to withstand IEDs and landmines. At least five personnel have died in the vehicles since 2007". Despite spending £100m on the Vector, Davies did not appear willing to admit that the process was a failure, it added.

That failure has cost £100 million, the deaths of at least five soldiers and the serious injury of many more, and one would have thought that the very obvious refusal of Quentin Davies to admit error on the part of his ministry might warrant a mention in the MSM, not least because it indicates that the MoD has yet to learn any lessons from its failures.

At least on another egregious failure – the Jackal - The Daily Telegraph did publish a story on it. With only five pages for general news, however, while the paper concentrates on MPs' expenses, only a tiny amount of space was allocated to the story in the print edition. No other newspaper or media outlet seems to have touched the issue.

With two soldiers being killed in the Jackal, in the Musa Qala area, the story would have been even more powerful had a piece published yesterday in the Oxford Mail been available. This also dealt with a bomb attack on a vehicle in the Musa Qala area – this one on 17 May - but the headline tells of a different outcome. It reports: "Bicester troops survive Afghan bomb explosion."

Four soldiers were involved in this incident, from 23 Pioneer Regiment of the Royal Logistic Corps (pictured), but they were in a Mastiff and were unscathed after a Taleban bomb exploded under their vehicle.

Vehicle commander Capt Gordon Fletcher is cited as saying: "After the initial shock of the explosion and the dust cloud in the vehicle had subsided, our first reaction was one of disorientation, trying to take in the severity of the event that had just happened, followed by what felt like minutes, but most probably seconds, of almost silence."

Fletcher then tells us: "Due to the size of the explosion we were unsure of the extent of the damage to the vehicle. On further examination, the vehicle was able to drive on its own out of the contact area."

The contrast between the fate of the crew in the Jackal, compared with this happy affair, tells its own story, but Fletcher goes on to say that "The Mastiff armoured vehicle affords us great mobility across the desert terrain of Afghanistan, despite its size and weight, giving us unrivalled protection." He adds, "In our opinion the Mastiff saved our lives and is an excellent asset."

The rationale for the Jackal, of course, is its superb off-road mobility and, although the Mastiff has actually performed better than expected, it cannot compete with the Jackal in that department.

However, even here one is struck by the inertia and lack of imagination of the MoD, which relies on its "mobility" and "agility" mantras to justify fielding a machine which has now accounted for nine deaths and many more injuries.

Yet, when it comes to off-road performance, there is one option which could dramatically improve the Mastiff's capability. That same option was adopted by the Wehrmacht on the eastern front, after the 1941 campaign when its supply trucks bogged down in the mud of the Russian steppes.

Taking the standard three-tonner, the Opel Blitz, the vehicles were adapted to take the Panzerkampfwagen I track assemblies, turning them into highly capable half-tracks known as the Maultier. The modifications were not complicated and could be undertaken by field workshops. And, when the trucks returned to better terrain, some were converted back to fully-wheeled standard.

Nor has technology stood still in this area. Recently, a Dutch company has pioneered half-track conversion kits which can be fitted to a range of commercial trucks – most notably the Iveco Hovertrack (pictured below).

The rig, which doubtless could be fitted to a Mastiff, confers stunning off-road performance and could considerably expand the performance envelope of this vehicle.

Furthermore, when it comes to the smaller 4x4 version, the Ridgeback, again the Opel Blitz provides a model. Some of these were converted to fully-tracked vehicles. Applying the same thinking, modified Ridgebacks could perhaps take the place of the failed Viking, which has also proved to be a killer of men.

That this is a Second World War solution reminds us that, during that period of hostilities, we saw a great deal of technical innovation, driven by the need to provide solutions to pressing problems. The half-track was one of those solutions, and it was also adopted by US forces as a way of providing enhanced off-road mobility.

Thus the White Scout Car was adapted to become the ubiquitous M3 Half Track, which was still in operational use thirty years after WWII ended. Some 41,000 were built.

Currently, the lack of innovation and the rigid thinking also tells a story, reflecting an Army and the MoD which still has not come to terms with being at war. That, more than anything, is what is handicapping our armed forces, constituting a major hidden scandal. The Army, it would seem, would rather stick to its mantras than provide solutions to problems, inviting the suspicion that it is not up to the job.

COMMENT THREAD

Penetrating the closed – and frequently inept – minds of the MoD publicity team is a task best not attempted by the faint-hearted. But, to judge from their output on Afghanistan, no lessons have been learned from Iraq and the same dire publicity model is still in place.

The latest example of this is seen on the MoD website, where we get classic tale of derring-do from "Our Boys" in a style that would put snake-oil salesmen to shame.

That is not in any way to denigrate our troops, or to question their dedication – merely the treatment of their activities by the MoD publicity machine. For, what the very stupid people in this department do not seem to be able to understand is the a constant diet of gushingly-phrased "good news", in the absence of context and without any reference to the things that did not go so well, is not information but propaganda.

And so you might say that it is not the job of the MoD website to put the whole picture. It's job – certainly in the view of the team – is to put out a positive message, countering the negativity of the media. What they seem to forget is that this site is financed by the taxpayer. PR is fine for private sector corporates, but the duty of a tax-funded site is to provide public information, not "spin".

In this case, the "positive message" covers the week-long Operation Zafar, conducted recently by the Mercian Regiment and elements of the Afghan National Army, to push the Taliban out of several villages in the area of Basharan, close to Lashkar Gah. This seems a logical extension of Operation Sond Chara which began in mid-December last year, aimed at cleaning the Nad-e Ali district.

That operation itself, planned at short notice after the attempted take-over of Lashkar Gah by the Taleban in the October (described by the MoD as "recent attacks") was publicised without any real explanation of the broader strategic context. That is again the case with Operation Zafar. It "plops" out as a stand-alone operation, with no indication that it is part of an overall plan – if indeed it is.

But then, this is not about informing the reader. The message we are supposed to take from this piece is immediately evident from the framing, which heavily emphasises the role of the ANA (and the ANP), complete with a glowing testimonial from Mercian CO, Lt-Col Simon Banton. He tells us that, " … the Warriors of the Afghan Army proved to be seasoned fighters and fought hard to provide security in this part of their own country."

Later from Lt-Col Banton, we also get: "This operation was another example of the progress being made by the Afghanistan National Army. They proved to be flexible, committed and brave. On more than one occasion it was touch and go as the enemy fought hard but the Afghan Warriors did not retreat."

All this may be true, but it also has the hallmarks of an I/O (Information Operation), the nature of which was revealed by author Stephen Grey, where the coalition PR machine sought to convey that the operation to recover Musa Qala had been ANA-led, even to the extent of hiding coalition men and vehicles for the photographs of Afghan forces raising the flag in the town after it had been stormed by US and British forces.



A very similar PR strategy was adopted during the Iraqi occupation, with the spin machine taking every opportunity to talk up the capabilities of the Iraqi Army, even when it was evident – and later proved – that the formations being hyped were seriously deficient and incapable of independent operations. The ulterior motive, of course, was to pave the way for the withdrawal of British troops, predicated on the legend that the insurgency there was an "Iraqi problem", which needed an Iraqi solution.

Such a view of this current operation may be overly cynical and even wholly distorted, but candid views are hard to find. However, we do occasionally get some clues, and the video (above) tells you a great deal more. The MoD has its reality, but it does not necessarily belong to this planet.

COMMENT THREAD

It is now a matter of record that one of the reasons why the platoon house at Musa Qala in 2006 was effectively surrendered to the Taleban was that it had become too dependent on Chinooks for supply.

With a limited number of landing sites, and the Taleban closing in, it was felt that it would be only a matter of time before the insurgents "got lucky" and downed one of these helicopters. The effect on public opinion - with the loss of upwards of 40 personnel - would have been, it was felt at the time, so severe that it is unlikely that continued British participation in Afghanistan would have been politically possible.

At that time, possibly the main threat to helicopters was RPGs, ground fire from Kalashnikovs and even 12.7mm machine guns. But, as the campaign progressed, there was an even more serious threat – the possibility of hand-held guided missiles (MANPADS as they are called) bringing down a machine.

That this has not happened – despite several attempts – is one of the untold successes of the military, and British industry. Aircraft in theatre have been fitted with a complex of physical and electronic countermeasures, known collectively as the Defence Aids Suite (DAS) which, with a combination of good tactics, superbly skilled flying and an element of luck, have thwarted Taleban attacks.

However, in a sinister turn of events, it could be that the Taleban are reverting to old technology – the dedicated anti-aircraft gun - in an attempt to achieve a "spectacular", the shooting down of a fully-laden Chinook. This, they are fully aware, could still have a devastating effect on British sentiment towards the war.

Possibly, there was some intimation of this development on 15 November last year when US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt IIs were called in to fire cannon rounds and a B-1B Lancer dropped a GBU-38 onto Taleban hiding in a compound trying to shoot down an aircraft. A coalition aircraft also performed a show of force to deter enemy activities near the compound where the anti-aircraft fire was seen.

Nothing much was made of this at the time but, as we reported recently on 21 April there was another disturbing development.

In the space of 12 hours, the Taleban had fielded two heavy anti-aircraft weapons, each capable of taking out a Chinook or other British helicopter. Both were Soviet-made ZPU-1s, loaded and ready for use, mounted on the back of pick-up trucks. They were located in the Nad Ali district, close to Lashkar Gah, where British troops are stationed and from where Chinook helicopters frequently take off and land from the helipad.

Fortunately, as we reported at the time – in an encouraging testament to the ground work done by coalition forces - the villagers spotted the first gun and reported it to the authorities. Shortly thereafter, it was attacked by two US Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt Iis which destroyed the gun and the truck, using their 30mm Avenger cannons.

The next gun was also a ZPU-1, and again it was reported by villagers in the Nad Ali district, after it had been fired in the vicinity of the local bazaar. This one was taken out by US Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles. They first disabled the truck using strafes, preventing enemy personnel from driving the vehicle into a civilian area, and then bombed it using GBU-38s.

Although the ZPU-1 is 70s-era equipment and obsolete, with a 14.5mm calibre, it is a potent anti-aircraft weapon and could have made short work of any helicopter it hit. The rapid intervention of the US Air Force, said a coalition forces spokesman, "without a doubt saved the lives of Afghan and coalition forces".

However, the situation was to get potentially worse. We later reported, on 28 April, that another gun had been seen – this one on the 26th. This time is was a ZPU-2 - the twin-barrelled version of the guns previously reported – and very much more devastating. A Chinook would not have survived a sustained attack from this weapon.

Fortunately, as it was being towed by a farm tractor, again close to the British base at Lashkar Gah, it was taken out by a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper, which fired Hellfire missiles. Both the tractor and the gun were destroyed.

However, it now appears that there was a fourth gun, this one reported on 25 April when it was strafed by an A-10 and destroyed. Again it was – most probably – a ZPU-2, this one mounted on a truck. The vehicle and the anti-aircraft gun were destroyed.

Thus, it seems, in the space of less than a week, the Taleban have fielded no less than four potent heavy anti-aircraft machine guns, close to a British base, the obvious intention being to shoot down a British helicopter. This is the first time that so many of such weapons have been deployed against coalition forces and could represent a new level of threat.

If the Taleban have had four of these guns, the possibility is that they could have more, and are prepared to risk all to use them. So far, we have been fortunate in that the guns so far deployed have been spotted. But the Taleban only have to be "lucky" once. A fully-laden Chinook hit by one of these guns could lead to forty or more being killed.

What is doubly disturbing is that, while the US Air Force has reported these guns – in a low key way – no mention has been made of the threat by the MoD, which has been flooding the media with "feel-good" human interest stories, avoiding any hard-edged news of the war in Afghanistan.

This presents an entirely false picture of the risks our troops face and thus fails to prepare the public for the remote but nevertheless real possibility that we could some day be confronted with the news of a helicopter disaster involving significant loss of life.

Unprepared, media and public reaction is likely to be extreme and the fall-out could very well create overwhelming pressure for the removal of British troops from Afghanistan. In one fell swoop, the Taleban could achieve a major victory.

With luck, skill and vigilance, this may not happen by the MoD bears considerable responsibility, if it does, for leaving the public unprepared, to an extent that the whole campaign is threatened. As with the famous "Blackhawk down", one Chinook down and it could be game over.

COMMENT THREAD

One of the complexities of the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan is the variegated nature of the enemy. Although we are used to the portmanteau term "Taleban", military sources speak of "tier 1", "tier 2" and so on, to describe the various levels of commitment.

On top of that, there are the tribal factions, the drug lords, foreign fighters and the rest, all making for a bewildering kaleidoscope of opponents that confuses the strategic picture no end.

So it is with the real enemy in Whitehall – the MoD. Seen by outsiders as a monolithic entity, its warring tribes boast exactly the same kaleidoscopic variety as the armed insurgents on the plains and hills of Afghanistan, with their own agendas, loyalties and alliances.

Some clue as to where any particular faction stands at any one time can be gained from their ambassadors, the individual defence correspondents for the media. Most – but not all – of them have allied themselves with one or other factions, acting as unofficial spokesmen for their respective groups.

Such a clue comes from The Times, with Michael Evans reporting under the headline, "Military loses battle over Afghanistan troop boost", retailing how: "Gordon Brown has rejected the advice of both his Defence Secretary and military chiefs by refusing to send 2,000 more troops to Afghanistan to boost the permanent British presence in Helmand province to more than 10,000."

The use of the word "battle" is highly revealing, as it indicates the reality of that invisible war being waged in Whitehall, and in the messes, clubs, offices and boardrooms of the defence contractors (many of them employing former defence chiefs), all of them pushing their own agendas, leaking to their particular media allies when they do not get their way.

Hence it is highly revealing that the piece does come from Michael Evans, a loyal supporter of one of the military wings of the MoD, who tells the story from the perspective of his "clients", in terms of pleas from commanders for more "boots on the ground" having been rejected by the prime minister, who has "sided with the Treasury and has ruled that the total force must remain at the present level of 8,300."

The inferences you are invited to make are transparently obvious – the brave, sturdy soldiers are once again being balked by a cash-strapped Gordon Brown who, conspiring with his the "bean counters" in the Treasury, are depriving "Our Boys" of the resources deemed essential to win the war against Johnny Taleban.

As we have already pointed out on the forum, however, things really are not as simple as that. Things never are that simple.

The military, as currently constituted, is a deeply dysfunctional organisation, not least evidenced by its state of denial over its performance in Iraq. It is also one which – as CDS Jock Stirrup admitted in January - was "smug and complacent" about prosecuting counter-insurgency warfare, relying too much on its experiences in Northern Ireland – the lessons of which it did not even apply properly.

It is also a military which, as Stirrup also admitted, has yet to complete a "fundamental reappraisal" of Britain's counter-insurgency training and structures and which, as we have seen recently, seems unable to foster a "spirit of informed debate" when it comes to reviewing its own performance.

Furthermore, despite some reputed high-fliers and intellectual heavyweights in the middle ranks, this is a military that has been unable to come up with a coherent strategy for the prosecution of the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, is (still) making a complete mess of its equipment procurement and is unable to mesh with US doctrines.

On top of that, it has shown itself to have been comprehensively caught out in its dealings with the Taleban, and despite its operational budget having increased from £1.5bn in 2007-08 to £2.6bn in 2008-09, it has been unable to demonstrate any proportionate increase in effectiveness.

Confronted with its own inadequacies, it has therefore - in the time-honoured fashion of bureaucracies since the dawn of time - raised a cry for "more resources" as the answer to all ills, not least because when they are not delivered the fault (and blame) can be transferred. It then "briefs" heavily to its friends in the media, to ensure its version of events lodges in the public consciousness, thus establishing its alibi for when things go "belly-up".

On the other side of the road from the MoD, however, the situation is seen somewhat differently. While Evans avers that Gordon Brown has had a "change of mind, under Treasury pressure" about sending more troops, as long as the military could not come up with a credible strategy, encompassing the effective use of additional troops, there was never going to be any permanent uplift in numbers.

We are told that John Hutton, the defence secretary, put his full weight behind the military chiefs' recommendation to send long-term reinforcements, but this is not surprising. There was always a fear that Hutton would "go native" and be captured by the MoD – and this has proved to be the case. Rather than a controller or director of the military caucus, he has become an apologist for it.

Evans also tries to imply that the US will be discommoded but his choice of phrasing is, once again, revealing. "The decision will also bitterly disappoint the Americans," he writes, "who had been led to believe that a mini-surge of British troops was due to be announced." In other words, this is a speculative assertion.

In fact, while no one disputes the undoubted bravery and elan of the British military, and their competence at executing rehearsed tactical drills, at political and higher military level in the US, there is indifference to their intentions. After the debacle in Iraq and the "deal" at Musa Qala (and elsewhere) there is no longer any trust in the strategic judgement of the British military – and nor are their ill-equipped and ponderous formations of any great value.

While the "Toms" churn up the desert in their "boy racer" Jackals, the US Command have long since decided that their own troops will do the "heavy lifting", while continuing to supply much of the heli-lift, close air support and intel assets. British help to fill in the gaps and deal with the natives is appreciated but no longer essential.

For General Sir Richard Dannatt, though, Evans has it that this "will be a bitter blow". But it is he that has presided over the diminished reputation of the Army of which he is so proud. He needs to look to his own lack of strategic leadership, and his failures to grasp the nettle of turning the Army into an effective counter-insurgency force.

As for the Army generally (and the military as a whole to a lesser extent), it needs to come to terms with quite how much its reputation has been diminished and how much goodwill it has lost – and is losing through the inept handing of the "information war" which is so much part of any counter-insurgency campaign.

The worst is, the longer and deeper the military remains in its current state of denial, blaming anyone and any thing but itself for its own shortcomings, the worse it will get. Already, the MoD publicity effort is a parody of itself. The way it is going, the rest of the military will follow, to become a tarnished asset and a shadow of its former glory.

COMMENT THREAD

In response to Booker's piece on Afghanistan yesterday, a number of commentators disagreed with his "take" on the situation. One, who called himself "Praetorian" even went so far as to argue that the situation in Helmand was largely under control.

According to this anonymous source, the US did not retake Now Zad. It was handed over peacefully by the Estonians to the US so that the Estonians could be redeployed to the Nad-e Ali district (this actually happened in Nov 08). Thus, does he claim that, while the situation that Christopher Booker describes was true two years ago:

Currently we have secured the five major population centres in Helmand and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have exploited this security to deliver tangible, effective and sustainable reconstruction and development. During our tour you could count the number of security incidents in these areas on the fingers of your hands. During Dec 08 we mounted a major operation (Op Sond Chara) that secured 270 km square of fertile land and 100,000 people. We established patrol bases and have delivered sufficient security to enable Voter Registration, Focused District Development for the Afghan National Police and Governor-led Poppy Eradication, all without major incident. In short, the columnist is out-of-date and ill-informed.