Defence of the Realm

Given the intensity of the strategic debate on Afghanistan being conducted in Washington, the "Dannatt affair" over here is actually something of an unwelcome distraction, occupying more space in the media than it actually deserves.

However, The Guardian adds to the sum of human knowledge by pointing out a discrepancy between Cameron's speech text and his actual delivery, when he referred to Gen Dannatt's position in the House of Lords.

In the text, Cameron suggests that Dannatt "will join our benches" but the words spoken were merely that he would "sit in the House of Lords". He still goes on to say, though, if we win the election Dannatt "can" serve in a future Conservative government, so there is not an enormous practical difference.

Nevertheless, The Guardian takes this as a reflection of the growing unease being expressed in the senior ranks of the military, said to include the current CGS, Gen Sir David Richards, and General Lord Guthrie, a former CDS, who advised him not to take the Tory whip. "If he's going to the House of Lords, it's best to be a crossbencher," he says. "I will give advice to anyone, Labour or Conservative but I wouldn't want to be associated with any one political party."

Guthrie's views are given some prominence in The Daily Telegraph, which also records that Dannatt's appointment "has raised concerns about the political neutrality of the Armed Forces."

One senior Conservative MP is also said to be alarmed. "It's a mistake. It breaks some of the fundamental rules about defence, and it may be politically dangerous as well." Added to that, the shadow cabinet also seems to have expressed concern after Cameron, apparently, failed to consult key members of the frontbench defence team. Gerald Howarth, the shadow defence minister, was said to be angry after he learned about the appointment from a journalist.

Liam Fox, the shadow defence secretary, who was consulted about the move, had private misgivings, not least because Dannatt had been expressing to friends a desire to become defence secretary. Cameron later quashed speculation that this might happen by confirming that Fox would take the post if the Tories win the election.

From the Labour benches, Lord Foulkes, a Labour peer with a less than shining reputation, accused Dannatt of working "hand in glove" with the Conservatives and of being a "political stooge", forcing an intervention from William Hague to defend him.

This had followed mistaken criticism from shadow home secretary Chris Grayling, the Tories' "attack dog". Also uniformed by Cameron and thinking that Dannatt had been appointed as a government advisor, he had said: "I hope this isn't a political gimmick." He was "always suspicious of the government’s motives when it does things like this."

The implied criticism, quickly corrected when Grayling claimed he had "misheard" a question put to him by a BBC interviewer, nevertheless prompted a response from shadow chancellor George Osborne who defended the appointment saying that, it "shows an opposition that is taking very, very responsibly its preparations for government."

By then, the Tories' surprise announcement was beginning to look a little tarnished so defence minister, Kevan Jones, could afford to be relatively relaxed, simply observing of Dannatt that, "I always thought he was above party politics." Lib-Dem Sir Menzies Campbell responded with "profound disappointment", adding that "by convention, our senior military are non-political".

Media reaction was also mixed. While the Daily Mail "bows to no one" in its admiration of Dannatt, it feels "very queasy about his decision, within weeks of retiring, to serve under Tory colours." The paper tells us: "Generals, quite rightly, are meant to be politically neutral."

The Financial Times noted defence experts saying it was rare for a former CGS to go on to advise a political party in this way. The appointment, the paper said, "will raise concerns about how a Cameron government would manage policy in Afghanistan. Sir Richard could be advising a Tory prime minister alongside serving military chiefs whom he once commanded."

James Kirkup, political correspondent for the Telegraph took this point a little further, asking if, say, Gen Sir David Richards, the current CGS, advises one course of action and Sir Richard another, whose counsel will carry more weight?

Hinting at the reason why Dannatt – despite his public popularity – is so disliked in certain quarters, Kirkup also notes that, as CGS, Dannatt was party to a lot of controversial military decisions, all carefully minuted and documented. Some MoD people, he writes, "are privately seething that he has publicly criticised things that, they say, he signed off."

There is, in fact, even more to this. Some of the decisions for which Dannatt subsequently took credit he actually opposed. The operational allowance for combat troops is one of those. Dannatt was strongly against the idea, arguing that it was "devisive", calling instead for an across-the-board pay increase for the whole Army. Kirkup asks what might happen if those decisions start to come to light. His record in office must now be reassessed in the light of his new position.

As that starts to happen, as and indeed it will – Dannatt has made too many enemies for it not to – Cameron will find that his new recruit is a declining asset. Dannatt is already on the back foot, having to deny that he has been "plotting" for some time with the Tories. His current decision to join the Conservatives, he claims, was triggered by a direct invitation from Mr Cameron.

He said he had taken a two week holiday after retiring in August and was fishing in the River Spey, "when my BlackBerry burbled. It was David Cameron," he claimed.

Actually, things do not work that way. They never work that way in politics. A leader of the opposition does not make "cold calls" to prominent personages with offers of preferment, just on the off-chance that they might accept. Apart from anything else, it is far too risky. The "target" might not only refuse, but could leak details of the offer to the media, giving rise to some embarrassment.

Before Cameron would have even thought of lifting a 'phone, Dannatt would have been discretely "sounded out" by an intermediary and his agreement in principle secured. A call from Cameron would have been made only to close the deal. Thus, even at this stage, Dannatt cannot be telling the whole truth. There is more yet to emerge.

With more leakage about his professional background, which will not be favourable, and doubts about his earlier relationship with the Tories, this, as one commentator in The Times suggests, "is the Conservatives' biggest mistake." Crucially, as we also suggested, it is "another sign of Cameron's lack of judgement."

And the scale of that lack is just beginning to become apparent. The Daily Mail is reporting that the "military top brass" are planning to tell Cameron they do not want Dannatt as a defence minister in a Tory government. A senior Army officer has contacted the paper to make clear the reservations about his new role.

This officer said: "The Army won't wear it if Dannatt is made a minister in the MoD. You can't have someone walking out of his office in a green uniform and then walking back in wearing a pinstripe suit to sit just down the corridor a few months later ... He has had his go. It would be quite wrong for him to come back and peer over the shoulders of his successor."

And, the "leakage" has already started. A "well-connected figure" is saying that, while frontline soldiers were fond of General Dannatt for speaking out publicly in their support - or so they think - senior officers were less appreciative. "Some of them sat in meetings with him and saw him outmanoeuvred repeatedly by the Navy and the RAF," the source said.

In one fell swoop, Cameron has upset some of his front bench and senior MPs, he has failed to consult the Army and is facing a "rebellion" from senior officers, and he has picked a loser. That, for a prime-minister in-waiting, could be a problem.

COMMENT THREAD

Said David Cameron today in his closing speech to the Conservative Party conference, "When the country is at war, when Whitehall is at war, we need people who understand war in Whitehall."

This was a prelude to the opposition leader formally announcing that General Sir Richard Dannatt was to become a Conservative defence advisor and would join the Tory benches in the House of Lords. If the Conservatives won the election he could then serve in a future Conservative government.

Of Cameron's prelude, it is difficult to say whether his bald statement that "Whitehall is at war" was simply sloppy phrasing and therefore accidentally ambiguous, or deliberately so. Did he mean that "Whitehall" was at war with itself, or with – presumably – the Taleban?

And when the leader referred to needing people "who understand war in Whitehall", was he referring to the war in Whitehall, or that we need people in Whitehall who understand war?

The distinctions are by no means spurious – witness a piece by Michael Evans on the subject of Dannatt in The Times, headed "Fight this war in Afghanistan, not Whitehall".

In his text, Evans freely refers to the "battle" between military and politicians, which is also raging on the other side of the Atlantic. This side of the water, it is generally acknowledged that there is not only a "battle" between military and civilians, but also between the different branches of the Services, and even within the Army, as it tries to get to grips with the conflict in Afghanistan.

Whatever expectations Mr Cameron might have of Gen Dannatt, however, they are likely to be unfulfilled. Had Dannatt been more skilled at fighting the "war" in Whitehall, perhaps he would not have felt it necessary to appeal to the media in an attempt to win his battles. As it is, he lost the confidence of ministers and, according to some of his military peers, set back the cause of the Army.

As to the "war" in Afghanistan, therein perhaps lies a bigger story, resting not so much on phrasing as precise terminology. Specifically, there is no "war" in Afghanistan. It is an insurgency and our people out there are (or should be) engaged in a counterinsurgency.

For the "Tom" engaged in a "contact" with a group of fighters awarded the generic name “Taleban", the distinction might seem academic. But it is far from so being. That much Gen McChrystal got right. In a war, the focus is on the destroying the enemy and capturing territory. In a counter-insurgency, it is on the people, with the objective of convincing them that they should support the government of their country.

The fundamental difference here is that the prosecution of war is primarily the function of the military. The civil power takes the back seat. The counter-insurgency is a politico-military endeavour, which works best when there is a political lead and the military acts in support of the overall political plan. The military should take a secondary and subordinate role.

Relying on a man such as Dannatt, on advice on how to fight a "war", therefore, is not exactly a winning formula. There is a fundamental error of perception here – and one which, if it continues to dominate our thinking, will ensure our eventual failure.

This is an error, incidentally, to which I have been prey. And I freely admit that I have been in error, treating and discussing the counter-insurgency there as if it was a war, reporting and analysing it as if it was a military campaign. We are not at war. This cannot be over-emphasised. There is no "war".

In making this error, I am far from alone. We see daily in the reportage, the heavy emphasis on the military action and it is the view of the generals on the conduct of the "war" that predominate.

Of the civilians on the ground in the theatre, we scarcely know one, and in media terms they are invisible. Yet this should not be so. The civilians should be up-font, making the key decisions, with the Army clearly seen as supporting the civil authority. Where, as is currently the case, the public face of the campaign wears uniforms and carries guns, it is unsurprising that the Afghans think we are at war – with them.

Interestingly, in one of the many articles discussing Afghanistan in the Washington Post, reference is made to "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy."

The order of words is all-important - "civilian" comes before "military". And then, of course, there is that word "integrated". As it stands, the order is reversed and the two activities are very far from integrated. Therein lies our problem. To make a difference, as we noted recently, the politicians need to re-assert their primacy and put the generals back in their box.

Mr Cameron today did no such thing. He simply perpetuated the error which has dogged the campaign, and backed the wrong horse. Despite his slogan, it seems that he is not ready for change.

COMMENT THREAD

"General Sir Richard Dannatt, the former head of the British Army, is to become a Tory peer and adviser to the Conservative Party on defence, David Cameron is to announce," reports The Daily Telegraph.

This, of course, puts Dannat's interview with The Sun in perspective. He was talking not as a former head of the Army but as a Tory advisor. And how long he has been assuming that role, we shall never know. But since his message yesterday has not changed from his previous pronouncements, we can only assume that this has been the case for some time.

According to Sky News, however, this need not be an assumption. Jon Craig reports a senior Tory MP telling him: "Between you and me, he has been advising us for years." This MP "wasn't at all surprised" when he heard of Dannatt's new role. "There has been talk at Westminster for some time that he might become a defence minister in the House of Lords if the Tories win the election next year."

For a man who has displayed lamentable judgement in his post as CGS, however, this is but a continuation of that same poor judgement. By tradition, ex-service chiefs, on ascending to the Lords, become cross-benchers, staying above party politics. If indeed, while in the post of CGS, Dannatt has been advising the Tories, it is more than bad judgement. It is a betrayal of his office.

Furthermore, by entering the cockpit of narrow, party politics, Dannatt has diminished himself, his former post, and whatever advice he has given and will give. It will be forever tainted.

How interesting it is that, when Dannatt made his debute on the public stage, the Daily Mail called him "a very honest general". It now turns out that he has been a very dishonest general.

For the Conservative Party also – and Mr Cameron in particular – this is appalling judgement. It plays into the hands of those who would have it that Dannat's advice was tainted by party poltics, as opposed to merely being ill-considered. It diminishes substantially the authority of the post of Chief of the General Staff, the holders now being regarded as potential recruits for the political party machines.

Whatever the intentions of General Dannatt might have been, Mr Cameron should never have even considered, much less allowed, a former CGS to take the Conservative whip. This is a major error on his part, and one he will have cause to regret.

UPDATE: Alan Massie is uneasy.

COMMENT THREAD

Just as US defence secretary Robert Gates is calling for "calm and privacy" as Obama considers his next move on Afghanistan, across the Atlantic The Sun has chosen to ramp up the temperature, publishing yesterday an interview with General Sir Richard Dannatt, his first since retiring as Chief of the General Staff.

"We are fighting with one arm tied behind our back," says Sir Richard, who goes on to complain that prime minister Gordon Brown had refused "a plea" for 2,000 extra troops earlier this year.

With weary constancy, a Downing Street spokesman has denied Dannatt's charge, claiming that as a matter of "fact" that the 2,000 figure is false. Far from a direct "plea" as The Sun so graphically puts it, "ministers were presented with options" but none was ever for 2,000. The most we were asked for, says Downing Street, was 1,500 (from 8300 to 9800) of which the Army got 700.

On the face of it, there is nothing new in the Sun's story, the paper effectively reducing a retired General to a political pawn (although it is not clear who is using whom - probably a bit of both). The Dannatt view is: "If you're going to conduct an operation, you're doing it for one reason – to succeed." He thus claims that his aim has always been "to make sure we've got the right number of people with the right equipment, conducting successfully the mission the government has asked us to do."

For the moment, that "mission" is to develop a self-sustaining, stable and democratic Afghanistan. Within that, the Army's specific task is to "create a stable environment to enable the Afghan government extend its authority across the country and reconstruction and development to take place" – an extensive brief which is recognisably impossible to achieve within any defined timetable. It may well take generations to achieve.

In arguing that he wishes to "succeed", therefore, Dannatt is being more than a little disingenuous. As best, all the British Army can do – in concert with the 36 other nations that comprise ISAF – is achieve a degree of progress that brings the "mission" closer to completion.

To that end, the Army has considerable freedom to decide on what steps it will take. Senior officers – and especially the chiefs of staff - insist on maintaining the distinction between strategy and implementation, jealously guarding their right to initiate military operations without political interference. They are thus able to define what constitutes "success" by reference to objectives they, themselves, have set.

However – and especially in such a long-term and complex venture such as this – the distinction between grand strategy and the stages of implementation, including the definition of military strategy, is never precise. Dannatt, however, has insisted on a rigid division, not permitting the flexibility that the fluidity and uncertainties of the campaign demand. This has led to tension at the heart of government – and is at the heart of Dannatt's complaints of lack of support.

Shining a little light on this tension is Col Richard Kemp, commander of British forces in Afghanistan in 2003, who spoke at a fringe meeting at the Conservative party conference yesterday.

At the meeting, Kemp argued that Dannatt's public attacks were ultimately harming the military's cause in Whitehall, pointing out that: "It was incredibly dangerous for him to speak out when he was in office. He was a member of the Government team."

His action, said Kemp, "undermined the relationship between the military and the politicians," adding: "It's very easy for generals to point the finger at politicians and blame them, but decisions on defence taken at the highest levels are joint decisions. I don't think the military advice to ministers has always been the very best."

Putting that in the context of Afghanistan, what we have been seeing is the military, with Dannatt as it champion, unilaterally deciding on a level of operations which have required resources far beyond those available, leaving the Army dangerously exposed.

The point – and it is one that has not properly been identified – is that the Army has been dictating the pace of operations, resisting political constraints on their conduct, arguing that any such constitute interference in military operations. Having then created the situations in which the Army is struggling to maintain its momentum, Dannatt has been demanding more resources to complete what amount to self-appointed tasks.

Additional resources, however, have then been used to increase the pace of operations still further, leading to calls for still more resources. This has presented government with the dilemma of either committing to an open-ended cycle of reinforcement or seeking to restrain the exuberance of the military by denying it the resources it demands.

In fact, what the government is now attempting to do – and has been attempting for some time – is institute a bargaining process which it calls "conditionality".

Before permitting additional troops to be sent, it is thus demanding a clearer idea from the Army of its plans, and is seeking to force the Army to match manpower commitments with the flow of other resources – especially protected vehicles and helicopters. By this means, it is trying to restrain the Army's tendency to "crack on". It also wants to see a new Afghan government in place, ready to seize the initiative on corruption, and ready to send more Afghan troops to be trained and partnered by British troops.

What is happening therefore – in effect – is that the Army is being asked to cut its cloth according to the resources available, rather than devise in isolation an operational tempo that outstrips them, creating a need for more.

Refusing to accept this discipline, Dannatt has effectively taken the view that the role of the government is to support him unconditionally in implementing what he and his senior officers consider to be necessary to complete the "mission".

And, having not been goven what he wnats, he has broken ranks and been appealing directly to the media, a process he is continuing even after he has left office. And, having put the Army out on a limb, it is very easy to make what appears to be a powerful case for more resources.

The incoming CGS, General Sir David Richards – although imbued with much the same exuberance as his predecessor – is less inclined to break ranks and more disposed, as a team player, to accept the "conditionality" constraints.

Of course, there is another "player" in this convoluted game – the "enemy". Inconveniently, the disparate groups which have acquired the generic label of the "Taleban" have shown an unwillingness to conform with the strategic role set out for them, with their increased activity and tenacity driving the Army agenda.

But this is where the crucial issue of strategy comes in. Imbued with a conventional fighting ethos, instead of addressing the different and altogether more subtle dynamics of a counter-insurgency – the instinct of the Army has been identify an enemy and then hunt it down and engage it in battle. The presence and scale of the "enemy" has thus dictated the operational tempo and determined the level of resources required.

Enter another "uppity" general, Stanley McChrystal. His "take, hold, build" ideas are by no means new, but he offers the prospect of scaling back the objectives of the campaign by proposing only to take and hold the most populous areas. For that, though, he still feels an extra 40,000 troops are needed.

However, Henry Kissinger, architect of the US withdrawal from Vietnam, perhaps offers another pointer - in the current edition of Newsweek. He notes that military strategy is traditionally defined by control of the maximum amount of territory. That has indeed been the driver of the campaign to date.

But, he observes, the strategy of the guerrilla is to draw the adversary into a morass of popular resistance in which, after a while, extrication becomes his principal objective. In Vietnam, Kissinger recalls, the guerrillas often ceded control of the territory during the day and returned at night to prevent political stabilisation.

Therefore, he concludes, in guerrilla war, control of 75 percent of the territory 100 percent of the time is more important than controlling 100 percent of the territory 75 percent of the time. A key strategic issue, therefore, "will be which part of Afghan territory can be effectively controlled in terms of these criteria."

Gen McChrystal certainly would certainly agree with the premise that the territory held should be under complete control, but he is perhaps being too ambitious. We need to take a lead from Stephen Grey's precept of doing fewer things better.

One way of doing this was suggested by Major Mehar Omar Khan, who argued that the actual areas controlled only need to be modest. Just a few districts should be held. That is enough to achieve a long-term strategic effect, while also providing bases for the "counter-terrorism" component of the grand strategy.

This is the essence of a "third way" that is being considered in the halls of power, and could well resolve the tension between the militaries and their governments on both sides of the Atlantic. It would relieve the pressure on resources, while giving the military clear and achievable objectives.

First, of all, though, the generals must be put back in their boxes. The politicians must reclaim their lost ground and take charge of the military. Counter-insurgencies are not "wars" and their direction shouild not be militarily-led. They are essentially an exercise in practical politics. The political lead must be re-asserted.

COMMENT THREAD

It was in December 2006 that we published our own "shopping list" for new equipment to fight the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of which addressed the urgent need for better surveillance capabilities.

To give him his due, on 27 February 2007 Chris Bryant, who had then recently been to Basra Air Station, asked in Parliament what was to be done to ensure that we have better ISTAR — intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance.

On 21 March 2007, we offered "cheap and cheerful" options for achieving improved surveillance. Like Bryant, our comments went unreported.

Then, on 22 April 2008, we were writing about Robert Gates, the US defence secretary, observing how difficult it is to get the USAF "old guard" to change its ways, and address the realities of fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

He was addressing officers at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, telling them that the US military needed more UAVs and equipment to collect intelligence and conduct surveillance in Iraq despite a big boost in those capabilities since 2001.

On 5 August 2008, I was writing of complaints, voiced in The Daily Telegraph that the MoD has been "slow to appreciate' potential of drone aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan". To that, I ventured that we would say, in a voice laden with irony, "You don't say!" We might also add the question, "what took you so long to notice?"

However, it was on 4 December 2007 that I had written, in the specific context of securing adequate surveillance assets: "Until and unless we start getting grown-up discussions ... we are going to get nowhere."

There has been very little in the way of grown-up discussions since, certainly not in the British media, but now we get The Daily Telegraph picking up on Gen Dannatt's call for 24 hour surveillance in Afghanistan.

This follows his "shopping list" of more equipment he delivered last month, and we are now told that his demand for more surveillance systems is his most explicit yet. Sir Richard wants an increase in resources for Britain’s Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) programme, "a network of planes and unmanned drones that collect images and listen in on enemy forces."

As the same time, a document submitted to the Commons defence committee, has the MoD admitting that it does not have enough ISTAR specialists. "Manning shortfalls in these groups vary widely and may apply at different levels within a trade group. The ones of particular concern from the point of view of current operations are linguists, human intelligence operators, image analysts and Royal Engineer (geographic) and manning shortfalls in these areas range from 10 per cent up to around 40 per cent."

Then, in evidence to the committee, senior military officers expressed concern about the shortage of ISTAR specialists in Afghanistan. Brigadier Kevin Abraham, Director Joint Capability at the MoD described the staff shortages as "a serious challenge" to ISTAR operations.

With the scene thus set for him, Liam Fox makes a foray into what for him is virgin territory. Despite having had hundreds of opportunities to raise the issue, in Parliament and elsewhere, only now does he finally observe that: "Good ISTAR capability, in addition to more helicopters, earning the trust of the local population and increased armour, is the best way to counter the IED threat. If there is a shortage of this capability, the Government must do everything it can to fill that gap."

He, the media, the military and, in particular, Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, could have been saying these things three years ago. They weren't. But, in his own intervention, David Cameron accuses ministers – and only ministers - of paying inadequate attention to the Afghan operation, saying the government must show more "focus" on the mission there. His remarks could, however, equally be addressed to his own defence team and also to the MoD and military.

Speaking personally – we are allowed to do this occasionally – I am getting tired of all this posturing. I take a great deal of flak from all and sundry, about not "being there", about my lack of military experience, about being "ill-informed" – and all the rest of the crap.

Yet I was writing seriously about the role of surveillance in counter-insurgency as early as November 2004 - getting on for five years ago – and have made over 70 references to the need for surveillance on this blog alone, with a particularly strong piece about equipping for counter-insurgency warfare in August 2006 and one in November 2006 on surveillance.

Then, in that November, I was complaining that "all we hear is silence". Now, all we hear is complaints from the very people whose voices we should then have been hearing. I think that I'm more than a little justified in saying they're a bit bloody late.

COMMENT THREAD

It is easy to recall the squawks of media indignation when Gen Dannatt artfully explained that the reason for his travelling on a US Blackhawk helicopter during his tour of Helmand in July was that there was no British machine available.

Helicopters, of course, comprise only one aspect of the shortage of British equipment in theatre. There is equally a pressing need for specialist mine/IED detection and clearance vehicles, the first of which are not due to arrive until next year as part of project Talisman.

Given the carnage caused by IEDs, one might have thought that the media might show some interest in this vital deficiency, not least because this equipment – even more than helicopters – is needed to protect supply convoys and mounted troops as they go about their patrols.

However, despite US forces, the Canadians and now the French having acquired such equipment, the British media has been almost completely silent on this remarkable and dangerous lack of capability in the British Army.

Interestingly, we now see Kim Sengupta, of The Independent writing about Operation Tor Shadey, the last offensive by British and Nato forces to clear insurgent-held areas before this week's national elections.

Entirely with critical comment, though, he notes that the British convoy, moving through the night to the operational area was "a laborious affair", trailing behind "an American anti-explosive unit, Task Force Thor, with specialised vehicles, sweeping the road ahead for the ever-present threat of bombs."

This is the same Kim Sengupta who enthusiastically wrote up the debate on helicopters, but he (and his fellow hacks) is apparently completely unconcerned about the shortage of equally vital equipment.

Of course, Sengupta could have made this an issue, focusing his piece on a "shortage of IED clearance vehicles" which had forced the British to rely in US resources. But then, while helicopters are part of the "narrative", IED clearance equipment is not.

It is probably not unfair to assert that the media furore over helicopters has at least focused ministers' minds on the shortage of helicopter capacity, and perhaps ensured that machines will be brought to theatre a little earlier than they might have been.

If that is the case, then arguably, a similar furore over the criminal lack of specialised IED clearance vehicles could have had a similar effect. To that extent, it would not then be unfair to assert that the trivial, superficial and careless conduct of the media over such equipment is part of the problem.

Journalists do like to dish it out, and are ever so good at criticising all manner of people – especially defence ministers – who might offend them (or provide good copy). But one wonders whether they might also think about taking some responsibility for their own conduct.

COMMENT THREAD

Reflecting precisely a comment on our forum, we have Lt-Col William Pender (rtd) in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph today, making the essential point about the war in Afghanistan: either we fight it properly, or not at all. More specifically, he writes:

The fundamental question, both for the Government and for Nato (if it is to remain a meaningful alliance), is whether defeat of the Taleban and establishment of a stable, long-term democracy in Afghanistan really is a vital interest.

If it is vital, then since national security is the prime duty of any government, whatever it takes in manpower – but primarily willpower – from all Nato member nations, must be allocated to fulfilling this aim. If this means putting economies on a war footing – fine.

If, on the other hand, these aims are merely desirable rather than vital – and with governments led by politicians with no personal military experience, and more concerned with interest rates, credit crunches and unemployment – why, let them say so.

Then the nations that contribute combat troops can resign themselves to long-term attrition of their soldiers committed to an unwinnable war.

General Stanley McChrystal, the US military commander in Afghanistan is at least being candid, readily admitting that the Taleban have gained the upper hand in the fighting.

His widely reported statement came from an interview with the Wall Street Journal. Hours after it appeared, the Taleban launched a major attack on a provincial government and police headquarters near Kabul - 10 days before nationwide elections.

This episode rather confirmed McChrystal's view that the Taleban strength had grown as they had moved beyond traditional areas in southern Afghanistan to threaten formerly stable regions in the north and west.

Within the heartland areas of the south, however, the strength is matched by what commentators are beginning to acknowledge is an increased professionalism, with defence correspondent Robert Fox in today's London Evening Standard suggesting that the deadly ambush of the three members of the Parachute Regiment in Helmand indicated a great improvement in their tactical skills.

This is particularly the case in the use of their basic weapon, the buried IED, which emplacers seem to be able to lay at will, using greater imagination and skill in how they lay their traps.

That much is evident in the account of the latest British death, where we are told that Private Jason Williams was caught by an IED as he and his unit returned to the site of a previous ambush in an attempt to recover the body of one of three Afghan soldiers who had been killed. In what appears to be becoming something of a pattern, the Taleban had got there first – unobserved – and had prepared the ground, with devastating results for Pte Williams.

What is also evident is that both the British (ploughing up the desert in their Jackals - pictured right) and the better-equipped US forces in Helmand have been caught out by the scale and inventiveness of the Taleban bombing tactics. Thus, while the British lost 22 soldiers last month, the Americans lost 45. This month, while we have lost five, the Americans have so far lost 18.

Interestingly though, the national responses, seen through the prisms of their respective media, seem to differ. In The Washington Post today, we see staff writer Ann Scott Tyson offering an informative account under the heading "Potent Bombs Slow Marine Offensive", describing the experiences of US Marines in dealing with the IED threat.

The bombs, we are told, have forced Marine commanders to put long stretches of road off-limits, requiring troops to walk instead of drive. Marines on foot patrol must keep a keen eye out for dug-up dirt and "ant trails" that could cover a wire.

All of that, Tyson reports, has made for delays in supplying the troops - and, she writes, as one Marine company discovered in late July when its mission went badly off track, it has also required a diversion of manpower to the mundane but vital task of watching the roads, hoping to ambush anyone who attempts to plant a bomb.

This a carbon copy of the situation vividly described by the anonymous Captain, whose report we analysed yesterday. It is instructive, therefore, to look outside the narrow national perspective of the British media to find that US forces are facing exactly the same difficulties.

On the one hand, though, the Tyson piece points up the utility of the MRAPs, recounting how a Humvee is ripped apart by an IED, despatched to help recover a mine-resistant vehicle that had become stuck in a canal.

The bomb went off under the Humvee as it was returning with chains to hitch to the MRAP, preparatory to towing it out. And in one of those tragic ironies of war, the crew were only riding a Humvee because their own MRAP had been disabled by an IED. Two died and two were seriously wounded.

Had been in an MRAP, they probably all would have survived, was the view of the unit commander, 2nd Lt. Brendan J. Murphy. The battalion's weapons company commander, Capt David Snipes, was shortly to test that thesis when he approached the shattered Humvee, riding an MRAP. It too struck the bomb. The impact was like "hitting a brick wall," Snipes recalled later. The vehicle reared up and crashed back down.

Tyson records that, as Snipes made his way through choking dust to open the rear hatch, he was amazed to see the vehicle's 50-calibre machine gun sitting in the sand. "The 50-cal somehow went from the mount, past [the gunner's] head, and landed behind us," said Snipes. Surprisingly, the gunner was not badly injured.

Even the US forces are struggling with this attrition rate and, it would appear, lack enough surveillance assets to enable them to keep watch over the stretches of road down which they must travel. They too must commit to the manpower-intensive work of keeping watch 24 hours a day.

Seemingly uncomplaining – at least to Ann Scott Tyson, although the Marines reflected with some bitterness over the loss of their friends, and questioned whether many Americans appreciate, or even know of, their daily grind in the windswept purgatory of Helmand – an entirely different "line" is taken by the London Evening Standard.

Here, the paper has John Geddes, a former SAS warrant officer complaining that "futile" vehicle patrols during daylight were leaving troops as sitting ducks for the Taleban and costing lives.

His antidote is to learn the lessons of earlier conflicts, such as Northern Ireland and he thus calls for better intelligence — including gathering crucial information from paid informers — so that targeted night-time operations could be mounted to "take out" the insurgents' leaders. In the interim, troops should be moved by helicopter or only at night in targeted raids.

Once again, therefore, we see a one-dimensional approach to a complex problem, but with an added sour twist. Geddes blames the military's failure to adopt such tactics on interference from "grubby politicians who think they are generals".

This theme is expanded as Geddes argues that the fundamental problem is poor tactics. He adds: "Don't waste fuel on high-visibility patrols that turn into Taleban bomb runs; better spend the money on paying informants, so we can target the Taliban in their beds."

"Get their identities, the location of their arms caches and the co-ordinates of their encampments then go after them, turning the terror tables the other way round," he advises. "Carefully planned, covert night-time raids on known targets should replace the endless patrols."

Geddes then claims that the failure to pursue a more effective approach is because military chiefs were being restricted by political meddling. "Untie the hands of the army and unleash them on the enemy," he demands.

It is this willingness to focus blame on the politicians, or the amorphous MoD which seems to mark out the British "debate". This latter target comes under fire in The Daily Telegraph, which has Col Richard Kemp, a former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, attacking the MoD for keeping hundreds of armoured vehicles "parked up doing nothing" in Ashchurch. "You have to ask why our troops are still running around in Vikings, when they could be using the types of vehicles parked up in Gloucestershire," he says.

This focus perpetuates the narrative which, in its most simplistic form, paints the black and white picture where "Our Boys" and their gallant commanders, are the good guys, much put upon by the heartless bureaucrats of the MoD and the uncaring, penny-pinching Labour politicians.

Not for one moment does the narrative deviate to allow that, under no circumstances, do politicians interfere with Army tactics – as Geddes alleges – or that, when it comes to the paucity of mine-protected vehicles in theatre, this as we have reported is most definitely the results of decisions made by the Army high command, in defiance of the politicians' wishes that the protected vehicles should be deployed early.

Such is the power of the narrative though that, for want of informed comment, The Daily Telegraph enlists the ever-willing renta-mouth, Patrick Mercer, to blame "cost concerns". "This is outrageous," he shrieks. "I have been talking to men who are out in Afghanistan. They are crying out for these armoured vehicles." Then we get the narrative: "The vehicles are not being sent where they are needed because of tight defence budgets – no more, no less than that."

In truth, both the US and the British military have been caught out, in what was an entirely predictable development. Once again, we have to recall that, in June 2006 – over three years ago – Ann Winterton asked the defence secretary:

As our forces appear to be winning the firefights in Afghanistan, does he expect those who oppose our troops there and in other theatres to revert to the use of improvised explosive devices? If so, what vehicles are our forces to be equipped with to counter the threat?

We have been very effective in Afghanistan. We have a potent force in the Apache attack helicopters. We are up against intelligent and capable enemies, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, and we know that they will continue to look for ways to attack land-based vehicles or air-based platforms. We have a lot of measures in place. The hon. Lady will understand that it is not appropriate to discuss all the detail, but where we identify a threat - be it a new or technological threat - we identify a quick way to deal with it. Sometimes that takes time as we come to understand the threat before developing the technical response. Our focus at all times is the protection of our personnel, whether it involves fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, land-based systems or maritime systems.

Of more than usual importance, given his high public profile and the state of flux in the Afghan campaign, the outgoing Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, gave his valedictory speech last week.

By tradition, the speech is actually written in close consultation with the successor, in this case General Sir David Richards, and his senior advisors, in order to maintain continuity and to avoid "poisoning the well" for the incomer. Thus, while Dannatt's offering has a personal component, it is also a reflection of the "Army view" of the current defence situation, of events past and of its aspirations.

It was, said Dannatt, a contribution to the defence debate and, as a shot across the bows to the media, he warns that "defence of the realm must be the stuff of considered debate and not just of catchy headlines." That debate, he adds, must be conducted in such a way that "prevents some comments being taken out of context, and becoming tomorrow's headline."

Since the main preoccupation of the media is precisely to look for the rounded "sound bite" in order to craft a catchy and preferably controversial headline – for want of which nothing gets reported – Dannatt is immediately on a loser here. And the likes of the Daily Mail do not disappoint, demonstrating that the MSM are not – and are not about to become – serious players in the defence debate.

That said, the speech is complex and full of detail and it would be impossible within the framework of the contemporary media to do it justice. In days gone by, the likes of The Times might have published the whole thing, following which there would have been weeks of discourse in the letter columns. As it is, the speech is already yesterday's news, the content largely ignored and unappreciated.

Nor indeed, by its very nature, can this blog do justice to the speech – a full review would be unreadable, and thus unread. Nevertheless, we hope it will invite an ongoing debate on the forum, and we will undoubtedly return to the issues raised.

What leaps out though is something about which we have been vaguely aware, but on which we have never really focused specifically, which explains a great deal about why we are in our present predicament.

This comes early in the speech when Dannatt takes a backwards look at the New World Order post the Cold War and Blair's concept of liberal intervention. There was, says Dannatt, a belief that this could be conducted on the basis of "Go Fast, Go First, Go Home". After all, he says, it seemed to work in Sierra Leone, East Timor, a small intervention in Macedonia, and even after 9/11 with our first experience in Kabul.

If there was anything which pre-conditioned the lack of preparedness in Iraq, perhaps it was that, where the idea was that, after the successful (from the military point of view) invasion, the troops could pack up and go home, leaving the grateful Iraqis to rebuild their country in the absence of dictator Saddam, with the assistance of civilian agencies and generous foreign aid. There was no military planning for the occupation because, under the doctrine of "Go Fast, Go First, Go Home", there was no need.

This also explains the Army obsession with FRES and the air-mobile rapid reaction forces which were very much in the vogue, these being the physical assets which were needed to implement the doctrine. The whole idea of the "long war" seems to have been discarded in favour of this new paradigm.

That Dannatt – and by no means him alone – then misread the signs is revealed by a later passage in his speech, when he declares that, "... with the Iraq campaign seeming to be progressing well in the early years, in the south at least ... Tony Blair announced in the middle of 2004 that we would return to Afghanistan in greater numbers in 2006 - a strategic move to assist our senior partner in the coalition."

"This," says Dannatt, "was a very reasonable decision at the time, but its strategic and operational consequences proved to be considerable." The "Go First, Go Fast, Go Home" as a mantra became history. The current decade has been characterised not by short, sharp interventions but by protracted campaigning in Iraq and Afghanistan.

That, effectively, is now what the current debate is about. Having been locked into a flawed "mantra" – as even Dannatt admits it was - the armed forces geared to be able to deliver on this basis, now to find that they are faced with "long wars” for which they are neither equipped nor trained – nor fully understand.

To all intents and purposes, that is the core what amounts to a confession. Dannatt, in a highly coded form, is admitting that the entire defence and political establishment got the post-Cold War paradigm wrong, and are now having to go through the process of a defence review in order to re-orientate the thinking to meet the realities of warfare, which actually have not changed that much since the Second World War. The "long war", then as now, is still the predominant mode of conflict.

To deal with that says Dannatt: "We should be under no illusion: we are at war and if we want to succeed, which we must, we must get onto a war-like footing - and as I said to the Officer Cadets being commissioned from Sandhurst last Christmas 'you enter an Army that is at war - even if not everyone in our nation realises that'".

It is certainly the case that we are a nation at war and, if any comfort can be drawn from what Dannatt says, it is perhaps that, at last, the Army seems to realise this, and may be beginning to gear up for it - the war that actually exists. Whether the MoD has quite caught up remains to be seen.

COMMENT THREAD

Colonel Blimp, you're still fighting the wrong war.

by Philip Jacobson

The Daily Mail, 24 July 2009

Although Richard North sets out to make the "case for the prosecution" of the British military and the political establishment for comprehensively bungling their conduct during the Iraq War, it is events in Afghanistan that make the book so timely and thought provoking.

The parallels between the two conflicts are inescapable, from the failure to learn from tactical mistakes to the desperate need for more helicopters.

Where North accuses the Ministry of Defence of an Orwellian attempt to spin an ultimately disastrous campaign in Iraq into a resounding triumph, an unspoken question hangs it the air: is history repeating itself in the wilds of Helmand Province?

The launch pad for North's withering assault on the MoD is the emblematic story of the Snatch Land Rovers, lightly armoured vehicles originally developed for riot control in Northern Ireland and pressed into service in the British zone of operations in Southern Iraq with the approval of General Sir Mike Jackson, then head of the army.

Under fierce attack by the well-armed militias, the snatches rapidly acquired the grim reputation as "four-wheeled coffins". North was one of the first military analysts to highlight their extreme vulnerability to the enemy's roadside bombs, known as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

In North's view, shared by other knowledgeable observers, the initial success of the allied invasion was squandered by the MoD's inability – some would say pig-headed refusal – to grasp the true nature of the Shi'a insurgency that followed and adapt tactics accordingly.

Equally damaging, he argues, was the failure of the procurement system – the unglamorous but crucial business of ensuring that British soldiers had the best weapons and equipment for the kind of war they were being asked to fight.

While the Snatch vehicles were going up in flames and commanders pleaded for more troop-carrying helicopters, billions of pounds were being lavished on high-profile projects designed, in North's words, to fight imaginary wars of the future". The admirals were determined to have their giant new aircraft carriers, the air marshals their Eurofighters; meanwhile the army "was getting palmed off with wholly unsuitable, second-hand equipment".

In stark contrast, when IEDs began killing large numbers of US soldiers in Iraq, the Americans rushed into service hundreds of lumbering armoured troop-carriers specifically designed to withstand roadside bombs.

The result was a swift and substantial reduction in the body count. A US Marine officer who survived a massive blast told me reverently: "We just love those big ugly mother f*****s."

The MoD's tactical fallibility was rooted in the fateful assumption that the undoubted expertise acquired by the Army in Northern Ireland could be applied more or less wholesale to the radically different circumstances of Iraq. North cites the toe-curling meeting at which the senior British officer in Basra was dispensing lofty advice to US commanders on how to defeat the militias at the very moment they were forcing his troops into a humiliating withdrawal from the city.

"It's insufferable, for Christ's sake," raged one of the Americans present. "He comes in and lectures everyone in the room about how to do counter-insurgency. The guys were just rolling their eyebrows [as] the notorious Northern Ireland came up again."

Littered with military acronyms with obscure technical data, North's prose rarely rises above the utilitarian, while the crop of footnotes on practically every page reflects his heavy reliance on published sources (it appears he did not interview any of the senior military and political players, British or American).

He might also have examined more closely whether the strategic, tactical and organisational failures he identifies in Iraq are being perpetrated in Afghanistan.

It is hardly reassuring when an acute shortage of helicopters obliges the head of the Army, General Sir Richard Dannatt, to borrow and American Black Hawk for a visit to his increasingly hard-pressed "grunts" on the ground.

For years, the default response of the MoD to criticism from civilians, however well-informed, has been to rubbish them as "armchair generals" pontificating from the comfort of the living room.

North will probably get the same treatment but, as he mischievously points out, only a couple of years ago some £2.3 billion was spent on upgrading the MoD headquarters in Whitehall – money that could have paid for two dozen of the troop-carrying Chinook helicopters so desperately needed in Afghanistan today.

And what that show up on the final bill but the purchase at £1,000 each, of more than 3,000 Herman Miller Aeron chairs, advertised as "the most comfortable in the world".

COMMENT THREAD

Twice we've called "time" on the controversy over equipment for our troops in Afghanistan, yet it continues almost unabated. It was with more than some interest, therefore, that we watched author and analyst Michael Griffin on BBC News 24 yesterday, expressing similar puzzlement over the intensity of the "debate".

Viewed wholly objectively, with the focus narrowed down to whether troops have enough helicopters, there is nothing to sustain it. As it stands, there is no shortage of helicopters in theatre to support current operations. The prime minister is right on this.

That most of the helicopters are American is neither here nor there. But there are Dutch, Canadian and British as well, all "pooled" in a vast coalition fleet which is being used not for British or American operations, but for coalition operations, of which the national contingents are an integral part.

In that sense, complaining about the shortfall of British helicopters is about as rational as anyone arguing against the use of B-17s of the US 8th Army Air Force to extend the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1943. Allies work together, and harness their collective assets to the common cause. That is what we did then and that is what we are doing now.

In seeking to explain the furore, however, Griffin linked the campaign in Afghanistan with Iraq, suggesting that in the latter, the British Army had not performed well, to the disappointment of the Americans. And in Helmand too, its grasp of counter-insurgency had been maladroit, again leading to a less than admiring response from the Americans.

To an extent, ventured Griffin, the military were seeking to transfer the blame for their own poor performance onto the politicians. Similarly, he felt, the military had some considerable control over the types of helicopters purchased and their deployment. Problems could not be laid entirely at the doors of the politicians.

If that is one element which is driving the controversy, the other is clearly the Conservative Party, anxious to find yet another stick with which to beat the government. The attitude is summed up in the recent comment from Liam Fox, who declares: "It is abundantly clear that we are asking our troops to fight a war for which Labour has not properly equipped them."

Notice there, the use not of the word "government" but of "Labour", revealing an overt partisanship which puts the alleged default wholly in a political context. There is no room in Fox's kitbag for any equivocation or shared responsibility.

Gordon Brown, nevertheless, is playing his own political games, relating helicopter requirements to current operations, but the distinction between these and the "general campaign" is becoming clear, with an acknowledgement that, while troops are able to fulfil their tasks at the moment, there is an overall shortfall of helicopters. This, we are told, is to be redressed by the Merlins which will at last be despatched by the end of the year, by the re-engined Lynxes and, next year, by additions to the Chinook fleet.

That things could have been done quicker, better and considerably more cheaply is indisputable, but the fact is that issues are being addressed, further confirming the "totemic status" of helicopters. In other words, this controversy isn't really about helicopters at all – or even about equipment.

Returning to Griffin, at the end of the interview – to the evident discomfort of his BBC interrogator – he broke away from the script to express his concern over the exaggerated level of publicity about an issue which lacked that substance. He warned that the Taleban would be monitoring programmes such as these, and the furore would improve their morale considerably.

Therein does lie a huge trap, created by the concern over casualties and the focus on helicopters. We have alluded to this before, in that if the Taleban were successfully to bring down a Chinook laden with troops, it is very hard to see how continuing the campaign could be politically sustainable.

The problem is that the Taleban know that, and they will do everything possible to make it so, while seeking generally to maximise the British casualty rate. This much is being recognised, with Dannatt at last taking the IED threat seriously.

As to the remarkable controversy that we have been witnessing for the best part of three weeks, this – if Griffin is right – is a dangerous self-indulgence which we simply cannot afford, motivating the Taleban to greater efforts on the basis that the home front can be so weakened that British troops will have to be withdrawn. We are, unwittingly, sending them a message that there is everything to gain from killing British troops.

This is not a happy message, and one that is difficult to change, as these media storms tend to have a life of their own. But the military, the politicians and the media – and indeed this blog – need to think very hard about the message they are sending, and to whom.

COMMENT THREAD

One feels very deeply sorry for Mrs Diane Bell, mother of Corporal Ivano Violino, killed when the Volvo FL-12 truck he was driving hit a mine. As she stood outside the Coroner's court in Tunbridge Wells, where today an inquest was held into her son's death (reported here and here), she struck out at "ministers", demanding that they do some "soul-searching" over whether enough was being done to protect British troops.

During the inquest, Mrs Bell had heard that the 44-vehicle convoy, moving equipment to a base nearly 12 miles north-east of Gereshk, had been promised air cover during its passage, but the helicopter designated had been re-tasked and had not appeared.

Focusing on that omission, she made the impassioned plea for more air cover for convoys, heedless of the view of the Coroner, Christopher Sutton-Mattocks. He was satisfied, he said, that it would not have made any difference whether air cover had been provided, as it would not have been able to detect the explosives that Cpl Violino's truck had driven over.

The convoy was in fact regarded as low-risk and an attack was not expected. Furthermore, the vehicles were not driving along a tarmac road but across desert. Some of the heavier vehicles were becoming stuck in the soft sand so, at the time of the strike, Violino's was driving his 10-20 yards to the right to avoid deep ruts made.

The chances are, therefore, that this could have been a legacy mine, rather than a deliberate ambush. Certainly, the Coroner declined to rule the death "unlawful killing" and instead elected to record that "Cpl Violino was killed in action on Her Majesty's Service".

As to whether this death could have been prevented, we explored this issue back in September 2007 when it happened. Then, oddly enough on the back of comments made by Lord Malloch Brown on the need for helicopters, we concluded that the convoy supplies could have been better and more economically delivered by helicopter.

As for Cpl Violino's truck – a loader-tipper – this was engineering equipment being delivered to a Forward Operating Base. It too could have been delivered by helicopter. At 10 tons unladen weight, it could easily have been carried by an Mi-26 and we even published a photograph demonstrating that this could be done (top left). It was not until February the following year, however, that a Mi-26 was leased by the MoD, too late for Cpl Violino.

Therein, however, lies a conundrum. Only last week, that same Mi-26 was shot down by the Taleban, killing six on board and a young girl on the ground, with a man injured. Moving the FL-12 by air would have been safer for Cpl Violino, but it would, effectively, have transferred the risk to the helicopter crew – and those under its path.

In turn, fully to protect the helicopter on its approaches to British bases, where it is at its most vulnerable, would need foot patrols out in the approach area transferring the risk to the soldiers, making them highly vulnerable to ambush, either from direct fire or IED.

Arguably, an escort of Apache gunships might have sufficed, but then there is the opportunity cost: how many soldiers would die, how would the overall mission be compromised by the allocation of this precious asset to escort duty, when it might be better employed on air support?

Collecting together these various strands, arguably, Cpl Violino's life could have been saved, had helicopter lift been available. Given that lift capacity is currently a major controversy, one might have thought that an astute journalist might have picked this up. This could even have been raised in the inquest, but it was not.

But the price of his safety could have been at the expense of the helicopter crew who transported his vehicle, as indeed it was the safety of those troops who did not have to make the land convoy into Sangin base to deliver supplies least week.

We would like to think that the Mi-26 which crashed last week could have been better protected, and need not have been shot down, or that the lives saved through convoys avoided were more than were lost. We can never know. Whether seven dead and one injured was a fair trade is also something we can never know, but it does point up an essential truth – war is a dangerous business and people get killed.

But there is another, more uncomfortable truth. To ensure one man's safety may, directly or indirectly, put others at greater risk. There is no such thing, they say, as a free lunch.

COMMENT THREAD

Now it is the Observer's turn to pick up on the details that we've been running on this blog and DOTR for months, most recently here, here and here. I suppose I shouldn't keep saying, "you read it here first," but you bloody well did.

Defence ministers, we are told spurned three separate deals to buy American Black Hawk helicopters which would have helped to plug the dangerous shortage facing British troops in Afghanistan. The most recent rejection came only days ago, "the Observer can reveal."

The ministers are, of course, acting under the advice of their officials and the military. And there is only one reason why the Blackhawks are not being bought. There is not enough money to buy this (cheaper and better) helicopter and that pile of over-priced garbage otherwise known as Future Lynx so if the Blackhawks were ordered, the Future Lynx was junked.

The Army – as we have already said – blocked the Blackhawk because it is too heavy for the Army to fly. Under current arrangements, the RAF would operate them. The Army loses is organic utility helicopter capability – bye, bye Army Air Corps. And the Colonel Commandant of the AAC? Mr Saintly Dannatt, who made keeping the AAC more important than getting capacity into theatre.

We must remind readers that he had a lot of support – the lobbying has been ferocious on this, from across the board. Had ministers ignored their officials and Mr Dannatt's orchestra, there would have been the mother of all political rows, and the media would have pitched in ... on the Saintly Mr Dannatt's side.

Instead, having already pulled a fast one with the Merlin, the officials told the ministers to go for the only other option on which the Army and the RAF would agree - refurbishing Pumas. They should, perhaps have rejected the advice but hey! The narrative is that ministers should take the advice of the military.

So it is the Observer tells us that "under the initial offer from Connecticut-based Sikorsky in 2007, 60 Black Hawks would already have been available for British forces in Helmand province, where they have sustained heavy casualties from roadside bombs in their renewed offensive against the Taleban."

Yea ... and where was the media then, while an unpaid blogger has been doing the running? Where was the Tory opposition? Er ... lobbying hard for Future Lynx.

And then we have bandwagon rider extraordinaire James Arbuthnot, chairman of the defence committee, whose report last week "condemned the Puma refit" and expressed concern over its "poor survivability" in combat. He says: "The Black Hawks are extremely good, they could be acquired in large numbers and the cost of running them would be low." So why didn't he recommend getting them in his report last week?

Answer, there will be none.

COMMENT THREAD

Such is the overwhelming fog of impenetrable distortion that, at times one is tempted to walk away from the Afghan War issue, perhaps to write an earnest piece about wind farms and energy policy – or a careful analysis of Booker's column, which indeed I must do later today, if only to express my horror at the events he reports today.

What impels one to continue – I suppose, because I don't really know why I invest so much time, energy and emotional capital into this, when I have more pressing things to do - is perhaps because of an overpowering sense of injustice, and an equally powerful sense of a story that must be told, for good or bad.

This is particularly provoked by a piece in The Sunday Telegraph today, headed: "Labour at war over Afghanistan." It makes the highly tendentious claim that, "Labour is bitterly divided over defence spending as the Government's Afghanistan policy suffers a series of fresh setbacks."

One point must be addressed immediately – the rest later in this post. Labour is not at "war" over Afghanistan, not in any sense that this mischievous headline implies. It is basing its assertion on a single strand, comments by former defence secretary John Hutton who, for reasons of his own, has chosen to write "exclusively" about Afghanistan for The Sunday Telegraph, calling for more troops and helicopters.

One should also note, that Hutton – whatever arrangement he might have had with The Sunday Telegraph - Hutton has also allowed himself to be interviewed by The Sunday Times where he "breaks silence to fight for the generals".

With this, there is clearly an element of calculation, which fits ill with Mr Hutton. If he cared so deeply, then he might perhaps have stayed in his post instead of quitting after a mere nine months, and fought from the inside. Instead, he walked out at a critical juncture, a decision he had made well before the current controversy reared its head.

Mr Hutton's current pitch, though, is that, "When it comes to the numbers and the equipment it is absolutely essential politicians listen to advice from the military. Politicians must not become armchair generals. They must make decisions based on clear military advice."

Matthew Parris put this in context yesterday, warning us that the politicians should not defer automatically to the generals. Furthermore, Charles Moore reinforced this theme, writing in his column:

And do remember that our top brass, patriotic though they undoubtedly are, are also engaged in inter-service rivalry. It does not hurt the Army, losing money to the Navy's carriers, to protest that it does not have enough for Afghanistan. Just because you don't believe a minister, don't automatically believe a general. Ministers have to adjudicate between competing claims: it is not easy.