close
The Wayback Machine - https://web.archive.org/web/20101020063404/http://volokh.com/

“People Raised By Delaware”

I recently learned that a book has been published about me. Ok, more like a book has a chapter on me. Ok, it’s not really a book, it’s probably more of a booklet. And the part about me is around one page. 

But you’d probably never know that if you saw the Amazon.com page for People Raised by Delaware: Cedella Booker, Orin Kerr, Tom Gallagher, William L. Nelson, George David Cummins, Robert B. Brandeberry, Chris Watson. Here’s the cover:peopleraised

Now before you rush out and buy your copy — only $14.14, and eligible for free shipping with Amazon Prime — my understanding is that the “book” is really just a collection of Wikipedia entries. Apparently there used to be a Wikipedia entry, “People Raised By Delaware” , which had links to people raised in Delaware. The entry no longer exists because of the obvious error of using “by” instead of “in.” Anyway, the “book” by that title is just a collection of the biographies that happened to be linked to that page when it still existed, all sold by a company “Books LLC” that lists itself as the “author.” (You can see a more current example with the current Wikipedia category “People Raised as Children in the Children of God.” The book version by “Books LLC” is available here.)

Some random guy on the Internet says this is legal because Wikipedia is published with a Creative Commons license that allows it. Normally I wouldn’t rely on some random guy on the Internet for a legal conclusion like that. But for this particular post, it’s actually kind of fitting, isn’t it?

Categories: Wikipedia     4 Comments


    Murder Is Excusable, But Being Gay....

    From a BBC story about a Saudi Prince, now living in London, who murdered his servant after having a sexual affair with him:

    If he ever returns to his home country he faces the possibility of execution — not because of the murder, but because being gay is a capital offence in Saudi Arabia.

    Categories: Uncategorized     55 Comments

      The stimulus bill included $5 billion for weatherization projects.  The idea was not just to create jobs, but also invest in energy efficiency.  The money didn’t get spent quite as quickly as some had hoped, but it was still worthwhile , right?  Maybe not.  The stimulus funds ramped up weatherization programs so much that quality control and oversight may have suffered.

      Exhibit A is Illinois’ Weatherization Assisatance Program, which received $242 million in stimulus money.  As the NYT’s Green blog reports, a new Department of Energy Inspector General audit of Illinois’ program finds serious problems.

      An audit by the inspector general focused on some work done by the Community and Economic Development Association of Cook County, one of 35 agencies in Illinois that are expected to share $91 million over three years. The audit looked at 15 homes and found that 12 failed final inspection “because of substandard workmanship.” In some cases, technicians who tuned up gas-fired heating systems did so improperly, so that they emitted carbon monoxide “at higher than acceptable levels.”

      In eight cases, initial assessments of the houses and apartments called for “inappropriate weatherization measures.” In one case an inspector called for more attic insulation but ignored leaks in the roof, which would have ruined the insulation, the audit said. And for 10 homes, “contractors billed for labor charges that had not been incurred and for materials that had not been installed.’’ . . .

      The federal audit said that Illinois had found a 62 percent error rate when it re-inspected homes weatherized by CEDA. And sometimes CEDA was spending more for materials than an individual homeowner would spend, the audit found. Some of the work created fire hazards, the audit said.

      These results may not be representative of programs in other states, but there is good reason to be concerned.  Thanks to the stimulus, state agencies got lots more money to spend.  In Illinois’ case, the stimulus increased weatherization funds ten-fold.  Agencies received the funds even if they lacked the administrative capability to spend it wisely — particularly if they were expected to spend it quickly.    As a consequence, high levels of waste were to be expected, and results like those found in the IG’s Illinois audit should not be a surprise.

      Categories: Energy, Public Choice     25 Comments

        Categories: Uncategorized     10 Comments

          Curtis Reed Jr., the Chair of the Vermont State Advisory Committee On Civil Rights (I’m not sure whether that’s current or past chair), has this argument against the Brian Dubie for Governor “Pure Vermont” advertising campaign:

          Brian Dubie’s “Pure Vermont” brand is [an] example of cross-cultural blundering. Presumably, the slogan refers to Vermont’s agricultural products and environmental legacy. But for many Vermonters, these words denote racial, religious and cultural oppression. They imply that Vermont is a place reserved for white Christians....

          Vermont’s population is becoming increasingly diverse. Over the past decade, nearly 95 percent of the state’s new residents were racial and ethnic minorities. The “pure” brand perpetuates the “native” verses “flatlander” divisive wedge for the 60 percent of us who were born someplace other than this great state. Tens of thousands of Vermonters today come from non-Christian religious traditions whose recent histories recount public humiliation, persecution and genocide under the rule of oppressive regimes.

          Dubie’s brand resurrects the horror of the Eugenics Survey and the 1931 passage of An Act for Human Betterment by Voluntary Sterilization. This measure codified the practice of racism, harassment, and the sterilization of the Abenaki people. “Pure Vermont” raises the specter of Hilter’s Aryan Nation and the Khmer Rouge where the purifying agent was genocide.

          And the slogan is a bitter reminder of the bigotry and racial segregation experienced by blacks under slavery and Jim Crow. The precipitous drop of Vermont’s black population in the early 20th century was no doubt partially due to the Klan’s efforts to keep Vermont pure.... 

          The brand [also] turns a deaf ear to the sensitivities of students of color and LGBT students....

          The “Pure Vermont” brand is pure invalidation of the fastest growing segment of our population. And the brand’s handlers have been dishing out a healthy dose of avoidant behavior or, optimistically, benign neglect. The inherent challenges and opportunities of a more multicultural Vermont should not be ignored or buried in the polite discourse of denial. Failure to authentically affirm our presence today will prove, in years to come, to be the Achilles heel of Vermont’s economic recovery, prosperity, and a sense of community free of prejudice and discrimination of all kinds.

          “Pure Vermont” does nothing to bring Vermonters together. Vermont deserves inclusive, decisive, self-aware leadership with the 21st century skills to negotiate the oncoming changes within and beyond our borders.

          That’s right — “‘Pure Vermont’ raises the specter of Hilter’s Aryan Nation and the Khmer Rouge where the purifying agent was genocide.” Unintentional self-parody at its finest.

          Categories: Uncategorized     64 Comments

            From Kuensel Online (“Bhutan’s daily news site”):

            Gelephu dungkhag court sentenced last week a 40-year old man to three years in prison for attempting to promote civil unrest.

            Prem Singh Gurung from Tarithang was arrested on May 21, after villagers in Gonggaon and Simkharkha of Jigmecholing gewog complained that he was screening movies on Christianity in the two villages....

            Kuensel sources said that Prem Singh Gurung invited the villagers, saying that he would be screening Nepali movies, but in between he would show movies on Christianity....

            Gelephu police filed the case on July 23 and charged him for the promotion of civil unrest, and violation of sections 105(1) and 110 of Bhutan information, communication and media act, which says that a producer or owner or importer of any film, which is intended for public exhibition by any mode of information and communication technology or media within Bhutan, shall submit the film for examination; and failure to comply with the requirement shall be an offence....

            Continue reading ‘Christian in South Asian Country Sentenced to Prison for “Attempting to Promote Civil Unrest” by Screening Pro-Christianity Movies’ »

            Justices’ Trial Experience

            Reader Tim Hudson writes:

            Other than Justices Sotomayor and Alito (who were both prosecutors) and maybe Ginsburg (with the ACLU), have any other Supreme Court Justices ever tried a case? In addition, has any active Supreme Court Justice ever tried a civil case to a jury?

            The federal appellate trend is to draw from biglaw appellate groups, academia, and the S.G.‘s office. I think we lose something (especially on procedural and evidence issues) when the members of the appellate courts (including SCOTUS) never have put a file together.

            I’m inclined to suspect that the Justices have more trial experience than one might at first think, because we don’t pay much attention to their early careers. Justice Kennedy was a lawyer in California from 1961 to 1975, and I believe was generally in a small practice, so I’m sure he had plenty of civil cases, likely including jury trial cases. Justice Scalia was a lawyer at a big Cleveland firm from 1961 to 1967, so I suspect he had some civil jury trials as well. (My sense is that junior lawyers at big firms had more civil jury trials back then than they do now.)

            Moreover, I don’t think that trial experience is necessary for a Justice: Chief Justice Roberts was of course one of the leading appellate lawyers in the nation, which is pretty significant experience even if he had never tried a case (I’m not sure whether he had tried any cases). Likewise, Justices Breyer and Kagan were significant scholars, and Justice Breyer was a very well respected appellate judge; Justice Thomas had significant administrative agency experience, which is pretty relevant to many Supreme Court cases. Nonetheless, I think the reader’s question is interesting, so if readers have any specific data on which Justices have tried criminal cases, civil cases, or in particular civil cases before a jury, I’d love to see it.

            Categories: Uncategorized     26 Comments

              A newly filed case, Bluman v. FEC, challenges 2 U.S.C. § 441e, which provides:

              It shall be unlawful for—
              (1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make—
              (A) a contribution ... in connection with a Federal, State, or local election;
              (B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or
              (C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication ....

              (b) ... As used in this section, the term “foreign national” means ... an individual who is not a citizen of the United States ... and who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence ....

              Plaintiffs say they live in the U.S. and have visas that let them work at a particular place, though they aren’t permanent residents (a status that would let them work anywhere). People with such visas (or with student visas) may often live legally in the U.S. for many years without becoming permanent residents or citizens. Generally speaking, they have the same First Amendment rights as citizens (at least when it comes to criminal or civil liability for speech); the question whether that also extends to (1) the right to contribute to candidates or parties, and (2) the right to make independent expenditures in support of or opposition to candidates. Prof. Rick Hasen (Election Law Blog) has more.

              Today Justice Sotomayor authored what strikes me as a rather remarkable dissent from denial of certiorari in Pitre v. Cain, a pro se Eighth Amendment case brought by a prison inmate whose case was dismissed as “patently frivolous” by the trial court and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in a short one-paragraph order. What is it about this pro se prisoner case that grabbed Justice Sotomayor’s attention, and led her not only to say that she would have granted the case, but to announce that she would have voted in the inmate’s favor? 

              Let’s take a look.

              Pitre is an HIV-positive inmate in the Louisiana state prison system who has been prescribed medication to treat his HIV. In 2008, he was transferred to a particular corrections facility, the Phelps Correctional Center, where inmates apparently have to do hard labor. Pitre decided to protest the transfer by refusing to take his HIV medication. Pitre was then made to do hard labor like the other inmates in the facility, and he has been really struggling to do the work given his illness and his failure to take his medication. Pitre complained that the state was making him do harder labor than he could do given his illness, in violation of his constitutional rights. The state responded that Pitre was bringing it on himself because he was refusing to take his medication that would enable him to do the work. In effect, each side blamed the other: Pitre blamed the state for making him work when he was in such bad shape, and the state blamed Pitre for refusing to take his medication so that he was in such bad shape in the first place. 

              The magistrate judge agreed with the state’s view, and recommended that the case be dismissed as “patently frivolous”:

              A claim of deliberate indifference based on an inmate’s work assignment is actionable only when a prison official assigns an inmate to a job that the official knows would “significantly aggravate” the inmate’s serious medical needs. Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1246 (5th Cir.1989)(citing Black v. Ciccone, 324 F.Supp. 129, 133 (W.D.Mo.1970). From the outset, plaintiff was aware of the results that were certain to follow should he discontinue his medication. Nevertheless, with full knowledge of those effects, he chose to discontinue an admittedly successful course of treatment. All of the deleterious symptoms experienced by plaintiff, and complained of herein, were caused by his refusal to participate in the therapeutic plan offered by the defendants; his current symptoms were neither caused nor even exacerbated by the defendants. Plaintiff, has been, as the saying goes, “hoist by his own petard” FN3 and this attempt to blame his current predicament on the defendants is absurd. A ruling in plaintiff’s favor herein would encourage him to continue on this self destructive path.

              FN3. Hamlet, Act III, Scene 4, lines 206–07, “For ‘tis the sport to have the engineer/Hoist with his own petard” In common usage the phrase means to fall into one’s own trap.

              The district court agreed, adopting the magistrate’s report and recommendation in a one-page order. The Fifth Circuit then affirmed in a one paragraph order that read as follows:

              Before REAVLEY, DAVIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.
              PER CURIAM:
              The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Mr. Pitre has been given medical care, but he refuses to take medication which results at times in physical problems. Evidence of conscious indifference is not presented. The report of the magistrate judge dated April 29, 2009, 2009 WL 1491042, explains the reasons for dismissal. AFFIRMED.

              Pitre then filed his own cert petition, which the Court denied over Justice Sotomayor’s dissent. Justice Sotomayor would have construed the pro se petition liberally as making claim that Pitre had been punished for his refusal to take his medication:

              His pro se complaint and attachments thereto, “liberally construed,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 106 (1976), allege . . . that respondents . . . punished him for refusing to take medication, or attempted to coerce him to take medication, by subjecting him to hard labor that they knew exceeded his medical limitations.

              Specifically, Sotomayor would have liberally construed the complaint as stating a Due Process claim that making Pitre do hard labor was an attempt to improperly punish him to force him to take his HIV medication despite his liberty interest in refusing medication. This was an open question, Justice Sotomayor contended:

              We have . . . held that prison officials may forcibly treat a mentally ill inmate with antipsychotic drugs “if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Harper, 494 U. S., at 227. We have not considered, however, whether prison officials may require inmates with HIV to take medication, such that the refusal to do so might justify the imposition of sanctions by such officials.

              Second, Justice Sotomayor would have held that the liberally construed complaint stated an Eighth Amendment violation:

              Pitre’s decision to refuse medication may have been foolish and likely caused a significant part of his pain. But that decision does not give prison officials license to exacerbate Pitre’s condition further as a means of punishing or coercing him—just as a prisoner’s disruptive conduct does not permit prison officials to punish the prisoner by handcuffing him to a hitching post, see Hope, 536 U. S., at 738. Pitre’s allegations, if true, describe “punitive treatment [that] amounts to gratuitous infliction of ‘wanton and unnecessary’ pain that our precedent clearly prohibits.” Ibid. I cannot comprehend how a court could deem such allegations “frivolous.” Because I believe that Pitre’s complaint states an Eighth Amendment violation, I would grant the petition for a writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment below.

              I find Justice Sotomayor’s opinion a bit puzzling. I haven’t seen a copy of the complaint, so it’s unclear if it really could be liberally construed in the way Sotomayor does. But even so construed, I’m not sure I get the argument. First off, I’m not sure what Sotomayor is doing with the Due Process argument: Is she suggesting the Court take the case to decide that issue, even though it was not discussed below? It’s not entirely clear. 

              On the more substantive Eighth Amendment claim, Sotomayor suggests that if we construe the complaint as saying that Pitre was punished for his refusal to take medication, then it’s an Eighth Amendment violation. But that seems to artificially remove Pitre’s own role in creating his condition out of the picture, which doesn’t seem plausible to me. Sotomayor relies on Hope v. Pelzer, where the inmate was shackled after his misconduct was completed: The inmate had some role in triggering the punishment, as is the case here, and the Court still found an Eighth Amendment. But Hope didn’t have any control over whether he was shackled after he engaged in misconduct: He was left to suffer. That’s not true with Pitre, who has made the voluntary and continuing choice not to take his medication that appears to be the cause of his work being so hard for him. It’s hard to imagine that there would have been an Eighth Amendment violation in Hope if Hope had been shackled, given the key, and told that he could let himself out if he wanted. Or so it seems to me: I suppose this depends on part on what we take to be the likely ameliorative effect of taking the HIV medication, which doesn’t get discussed in any of the opinions. 

              Anyway, whatever the substantive merits of Pitre, it’s particularly interesting that Sotomayor chose to write on it. As far as I can tell, there was nothing special about this case that made it high-profile or would normally get a lot of attention. It was just a pro se prisoner petition in a big stack of IFPs that normally would be short-formed with a quick “Splitless, factbound, I recommend DENY.” That alone makes this opinion quite interesting.

              Categories: Eighth Amendment     138 Comments

                The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education has the details. The university admits that it is excluding the group from generally available student group registration benefits, because the university disapproves of the group’s message:

                Considerable research indicates the use of cannabis does not contribute to healthy decision-making, particularly in college-age populations. Given the above, the University determined that recognizing the “Students for Cannabis Policy Reform Group” as a DePaul student organization would not be congruent with our institutional goals regarding the health and well-being of our students.

                I rather doubt that recognizing such a group would materially affect the level of marijuana use by DePaul students. But denying recognition would affect the amount of debate about marijuana policy that takes place. Sounds like unhealthy decision-making on the university’s part to me. 

                DePaul is a private university, so it’s free to engage in unhealthy decision-making. But excluding the expression of some views from the very broadly open student group recognition program, it seems to me, is the gateway drug to broader restrictions as well, restrictions that are even more dangerous to the culture of debate and discussion that universities, private and public, ought to be promoting. DePaul itself has officially stated, in its Guiding Principles on Speech and Expression that it is “committed to fostering a community that welcomes open discourse.” And while that document seems to suggest that DePaul’s Catholic mission may support some restrictions aimed at protecting “dignity,” “respect,” and “civility,” I don’t see anything in that statement that justifies discrimination against student speech that promotes legalization of marijuana. So I’m glad that FIRE is taking DePaul to task for its position. 

                Finally, DePaul’s letter suggests that denying recognition to the student group would still leave open “myriad opportunities for students to gather together and express their views to the larger community regarding the use of and/or legalization of cannabis.” But if indeed the group will be able to speak as effectively without the benefits of recognition, then I don’t see how the university’s action will further its stated goals. And if the university’s action will somehow diminish the amount of speech that might promote “[un]healthy decision-making,” then that must mean that the university hopes the group will not speak as effectively without the benefits of recognition.

                UPDATE: I originally characterized DePaul’s actions, in the second sentence of the paragraph that starts with “DePaul is a private university,” as “banning the expression of some views.” This was intended as shorthand for the exclusion of the views from the benefit program; but, as commenter neurodoc pointed out, that is not accurate, as the last paragraph of this post makes clear. I’ve therefore corrected the post.

                A few weeks ago, I returned to my beloved University of Michigan, for a law school class reunion. This time, I stayed an extra day, in order to speak to law students at a lunchtime event on Monday, organized by the U of M Federalist Society. Michigan Prof. Richard Primus provided some thoughtful commentary on my presentation, and the FedSoc organization was outstanding. Anyway, the extra 36 hours on campus was a great opportunity to walk many miles revisiting the immense Michigan campus, the U of M’s beautiful Arboretum, and Ann Arbor.

                The campus visit reminded me of how much of the education I received at the University of Michigan took place outside the Law Quad–even though the quantity and quality of education received inside the Quad were excellent. My start as a journalist during law school was writing theater reviews, and then op-eds for the Michigan Daily.  Unlike some Daily alumni, I’ve never won a Pulitzer Prize, but like all Daily writers, I benefited from the opportunity to work for a solid daily newspaper with a circulation of 18,000.

                Other law school friends who got outside the Law Quad also had great experiences. One friend played interscholastic rugby. My 1L roommate found a small church in Ann Arbor, which at the time was holding services in a room at the YMCA. My roommate was a very studious fellow, even by law school standards, but the church drew him towards something more important. After serving as a JAG officer in the Air Force, he became an ordained minister.

                Even if the university beyond the law school doesn’t help you discern a vocation or avocation, you’ll still find lots of theater, music, museums (including mini-exhibits in classroom buildings), guest lectures on topics other than law, and so on. Not to mention intramural and spectator sports.

                Not every law school enjoys the good fortune of being located on a flagship research university campus with 41,000 students. But if your law school does share a campus with a university, it’s almost certain that there’s something there for you to enjoy. The law school experience can be all-consuming, especially during the first year. If you take the time to explore your university, you’ll give yourself a helpful mental change of pace, and have some fun. And as the Grateful Dead put it in Box of Rain, “Maybe you’ll find direction around some corner where it’s been waiting to meet you.”

                I appreciate Jonathan Adler’s response on the nature of Randy Barnett’s proposed act/omission distinction on the scope of federal power. Given that this is a proposed distinction, not one presently recognized in the caselaw, my real interest at this stage is just getting a sense of how such a distinction is supposed to work — not, as Jonathan has focused on, the degree to which the general category of distinction would be “precedented” or “unprecedented.” 

                In particular, I’m just trying to understand if the proposed test is that Congress can regulate it so long as there is some affirmative act included in the prohibition, or rather if the proposed test is some kind of more complicated test that either includes some nexus requirement between the act or omission or else has some other requirement beyond an act. In the comment thread, Jonathan says that he assumes there is some sort of nexus requirement. But I don’t know if that is what Randy has in mind. 

                While we’re on the topic, I’d also be interested to know more on the meaning of “mandate” in the proposed distinction between regulating acts and regulating omissions by “mandating” conduct. What exactly does it mean to “mandate” action? For example, does the government “mandate” an act if a person has the choice of paying a fine instead of acting? What if the fine is very low, like, say, $400? $100? $1? Does it depend on the mechanism for collecting the fine? It seems to me that the difficulty is that the law often encourages people to take a certain act through economic incentives. For example, Congress might pass a tax break for people who do something that Congress wants people to do. Where exactly is the line between a (presumably) permitted incentive to act and an illegitimate mandating of conduct?

                Categories: Individual Mandate     93 Comments

                  Orin is concerned about the ability of the Supreme court to draw a line between the federal government’s authority to regulate or prohibit conduct, on the one hand, and its ability to mandate conduct on the other.  Drawing a line of this sort may be difficult, but it is hardly unprecedented.

                  Consider some of the Court’s decisions regarding state sovereignty which adopt a limitation on federal power that is similar to (though not completely analogous to) the act/omission limitation Orin and Randy have been discussing.  The federal government may prohibit states from engaging in certain conduct, regulate particular conduct, and even place conditions on certain types of conduct, but the federal government may not mandate that states regulate private conduct.  This sort of “commandeering” is prohibited under New York and Printz.  The federal government may push against this line, such as by attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds or regulating states in other ways so as to induce their cooperation, but the underlying limitation remains.

                  The rule against commandeering can be viewed as a limitation very similar to that which Randy has been defending, as the federal government can regulate state conduct (and prohibit it), but  not mandate that states engage in conduct in the first instance.  So, for instance, the federal government can say to states that if they hire employees, they must follow all sorts of rules (e.g. wage, hour and nondiscrimination rules), but the federal government cannot mandate that states hire individuals in the first place.  The federal government may require state governments to undertake steps to mitigate environmental impacts when building roads or other infrastructure, but it cannot neither require a state to construct infrastructure nor take affirmative conservation measures independently of some other activity subject to federal regulatory authority.  The federal government may also condition the receipt of federal monies on compliance with all sorts of conditions on how the money will be spent, and even require recipient states to adopt various programs, but it could not simply mandate that states create the programs in isolation.  This may not perfectly track the act/omission distinction Randy and Orin have been debating, but I think it’s close enough to demonstrate that the Court has engaged in the sort of line-drawing Randy is seeking to encourage here.

                  Again, my point in raising this is not to say that line-drawing of this sort is easy.  I concede that it is not.  Even lines that appear clear from a distance can be difficult to apply in particular cases.  My point here is simply that the line-drawing the Court would be asked to undertake in the context of the individual mandate does not strike me as any more difficult than the line-drawing the Court has readily undertaken elsewhere, including in the context of the proper balance between federal and state power.

                  C-Span’s archives are truly amazing, and its online library has filled out over time. The site now allows embedding of video, too. So here’s a fascinating video of President Reagan speaking at the Federalist Society’s Lawyer’s Convention in 1988, with Reagan starting at around the 9 minute mark:

                  The President won’t be speaking at this year’s Federalist Society Lawyer’s Convention, but you can find the list of speakers, including several of my fellow Conspirators, here.

                  Categories: Federalist Society     10 Comments

                    The Supreme Court may answer that question in Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, a case the Court announced this morning that it will hear later in the Term. If they answer it, my guess is that they’ll use the standard that lower courts have unanimously approved in the civil commitment setting. In civil commitment cases, the question is what standard the Fourth Amendment requires to detain someone because he is dangerous to others or himself. Lower courts have held that probable cause to believe the person poses a danger to himself or others satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Here’s how one circuit court analyzed the issue in Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461 (10th Cir. 1996):

                    The Fourth Amendment is not limited to criminal cases, but applies whenever the government takes a person into custody against her will. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370, 1373–74 (D.C.Cir.). A seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment, however, unless it is also unreasonable.

                    In the criminal arrest context, a Fourth Amendment seizure is reasonable if it is based on “probable cause.” Because similar underlying interests arise in the context of a detention for an emergency health evaluation, several courts have applied an analogous “probable cause” doctrine in determining the validity of the government’s seizure of a person for mental health reasons. See, e.g., Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 795 (7th Cir.); Gooden v. Howard County, 954 F.2d 960, 968 (4th Cir.) (en banc); Harris v. Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 686 (8th Cir.); Baltz v. Shelley, 661 F.Supp. 169, 178–79 (N.D.Ill.).

                    The state has a legitimate interest in protecting the community from the mentally ill and in protecting a mentally ill person from self-harm. A person suspected of mental illness possesses a right to liberty and a right to freedom from unfounded charges of mental infirmity. Because a seizure of a person for an emergency mental health evaluation raises concerns that are closely analogous to those implicated by a criminal arrest, and both are equally intrusive, we conclude that the “probable cause” standard applies here . . . .

                    In effect, the difference between the criminal arrest and the civil commitment detention becomes what kind of probable cause is required: While the criminal arrest requires probable cause that the person committed a crime, civil detention requires probable cause that the person poses a danger to himself or others. 

                    The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, but I wouldn’t be surprised if the Justices adopted the civil commitment standard in the case of national security detention. After all, the point of national security detention is quite similar to the point of civil commitment: The goal is to stop and monitor someone who is believed to be a threat of engaging in violent acts. If probable cause to believe the person is dangerous permits a detention for civil commitment purposes in the mental health setting, I would not be surprised if the Justices applied the same reasoning to say that the same standard allows allows detention in national security cases.

                    UPDATE: I should make clear that the probable cause standard permits detention but not indefinite detention; similarly, I am referring to temporary detention for national security purposes rather than some indefinite detention for such purposes. My point was simply to note that the civil commitment cases present a body of lower-court caselaw that circuit courts have followed for a long time that a majority of the Justices might find a helpful starting point for thinking about national security detention. 

                    Categories: Uncategorized     64 Comments

                      Today the Supreme Court granted cert in Ashcroft v. Al Kidd, the case holding then-Attorney General John Ashcroft personally liable for his role in the detention of terrorist suspects under the material witness statute. 

                      I had a long post on the Ninth Circuit panel decision here: al-Kidd v. Ashcroft: Is Pretextual Use of the Material Witness Statute Unconstitutional?. As I noted then, the qualified immunity analysis in the Ninth Circuit was pretty clearly wrong:

                      This case raises a novel question of law. I am a Fourth Amendment specialist who teaches and writes in this area and has spent a lot of time pondering how the Fourth Amendment applies in the war on terror specifically, and I myself am not sure whether pretextual use of the material witness warrant statute violates the Fourth Amendment. It’s a really hard question, and there is no caselaw on it all. Given that, I would be hard pressed to understand how this legal question could have been “clearly established” back in 2003, as the majority says.

                      Part of the problem is that the majority’s qualified immunity analysis is just unpersuasive: It looks to things like the general purpose of the Fourth Amendment, dicta in a footnote in a district court opinion, and the like, all of which is pretty hard to square with how the Supreme Court applied qualified immunity in the most obviously relevant case, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), which like this case was a civil suit filed against the Attorney General alleging a Fourth Amendment violation in the national security context. 

                      I also noted:

                      Fortunately, this case is perfect for Supreme Court review: If the en banc Ninth Circuit passes on it, this case will give the Supreme Court an ideal opportunity to evaluate the very important question of how the Fourth Amendment applies to preventive detention.

                      Depending on how the case is briefed and how broadly the Justices want to decide it, it looks like they may take advantage of the opportunity. Either way, I would think that a reversal of the Ninth Circuit is highly likely on the qualified immunity issue.

                      Incidentally, I have a short article on how the Supreme Court has approached Fourth Amendment standards in the national security context here: The Modest Role of the Warrant Clause in National Security Investigations, 88 Texas L. Rev. 1669 (2010).

                      Categories: War on Terror     23 Comments

                        I’m confident that this is only a partial list of cases the Court has relisted.  If you know of others, I’m all ears. 

                        Three cases on their first relist:

                        Wong v. Smith, 09–1031, CA9. The Court called for the record on 9/28. The case involves whether 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and the Supreme Court’s “clearly established law” permit federal habeas corpus relief on a claim that a state judge unconstitutionally “coerces” jurors to return a guilty verdict by identifying specific evidence in the case as important and instructing them to consider it.

                        Alderman v. United States, 09–1555, CA9, involves the constitutionality of 18 USC § 931. (Disclosure: This petition was filed by the UVA School of Law Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, with which I’m affiliated.)

                        Stroud v. Blount, 09–1572, Ill. App., involves the validity of a punitive damages award under BMW v. Gore, and whether the lower court erred in rejecting the applicability of Noerr-Pennington doctrine (which, as an aside, is a great thing to cite when you need to induce puzzled looks). 

                        Then we have four cases that appear to be on their third relist. As a statistical matter, these seem likely to produce dissents from denial or possibly a summary reversal. 

                        Beer v. United States, 09–1395, CAFed. Relisted 9/27, 10/8, apparently 10/15. Whether the Compensation Clause of Article III prevents Congress from withholding the future judicial salary adjustments established by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. 

                        Williams v. Hobbs, 09–10382, CA8, relisted 9/27, 10/8, 10/15. Looks like an ineffective-assistance claim in a capital case. (Thanks to commenter Scott Braden for contributing this one.) 

                        Allen v. Lawhorn, 10–24, CA11, Relisted 9/27, 10/8, apparently 10/15. Whether, under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), a state court’s determination that trial counsel’s waiver of a penalty-phase closing argument did not prejudice the defendant was “contrary to” clearly established precedent of this Court.

                        Wilson v. Corcoran, 10–91, CA7, relisted 9/27, 10/8, apparently 10/15; the court called for the record on 10/1. 1. Does a state capital defendant have a constitutional right to a sentencing decision informed in no way by facts that are neither elements of a crime of which he stands convicted or aggravating circumstances authorized by statute? 2. If so, may a federal court grant habeas relief based on its own finding that a state trial court improperly considered non-statutory aggravators when imposing a sentence of death, contrary to the determination of the state supreme court on that issue? 

                        Categories: Supreme Court     12 Comments

                          A Film Version of the The Silmarillion?

                          Various commenters on my recent post about Peter Jackson’s upcoming movie version of The Hobbit lament the fact that it is impossible to make a movie based Tolkien’s Silmarillion, the book that describes the history leading up to The Hobbit and The Lord of the Rings. The idea that the Silmarillion is impossible to film has become conventional wisdom. But I’m not sure it’s true.

                          I don’t doubt that it’s impossible to make a movie version that incorporates the entire Silmarillion. It covers several thousand years of history with numerous stories that are only loosely connected. But it is surely feasible to make movie versions of some of the individual stories, several of which are self-contained and have well-developed characters. The Tale of Beren and Luthien is an obvious choice. It’s a great tale of love and adventure, one of Tolkien’s own favorites among his works. The story of Turin Turambar is a great heroic tragedy, and could also work as a standalone movie (though Hollywood might not like the absence of a happy ending). Turin’s story has now been published in an expanded version based on Tolkien’s previously unpublished notes: The Children of Hurin. I blogged about it here and here. There is easily enough good material there to make a movie version.

                          These stories are almost as compelling as The Hobbit and the Lord of the Rings. Moreover, there is a built-in audience for movies based on them, since there are so many Tolkien fans out there (including many new ones attracted by the earlier LOTR movies). Once you drop the assumption that a Silmarillion movie must cover the entire book, it becomes a much more feasible project.

                          I doubt that either Peter Jackson or any other Hollywood bigwig reads the Volokh Conspiracy. Even if they do, they are probably (rightly) skeptical of film-making advice from legal scholars. Still, I hope they would consider the idea of a Silmarillion movie, on the off-chance that they do hear about it. 

                          UPDATE: As at least one commenter points out, a TV series based on the Silmarillion or one of its component parts might also work. Indeed, it might be even more appropriate than a movie, since it would not have to be limited to just 2–3 hours and could tell a longer story.

                          Categories: Science Fiction/Fantasy     49 Comments

                            I very much appreciate Randy’s response to my latest post; It’s really terrific to have this discussion with him. While I have him on the line, I wanted to push Randy a bit on the act/omission distinction.

                            If the constitutional line is between acts and omissions, as Randy suggests, then I gather Randy would agree that Congress could circumvent this restriction by prohibiting an affirmative act together with failure to buy health insurance. That’s what Congress did when it wanted to require sex offenders to register, for example. Under that recent law, a person who is supposed to register as a sex offender is guilty of a federal crime if he crosses a state line and has failed to register. The “act” is the crossing of state lines, even though the real goal is to require sex offenders to register. The circuit courts have so far unanimously upheld this prohibition as being within Congress’s power. 

                            Given that, I’d be interested in Randy’s view of what “acts” Congress could legitimately use to overcome the proposed act/omission distinction in the case of the individual mandate. Here are four possibilities:

                            a) Congress prohibits the affirmative act of crossing state lines after having failed to purchase health insurance.
                            b) Congress prohibits the affirmative act of using a means of interstate commerce, such as the Internet or the telephone system, after having failed to purchase health insurance.
                            c) Congress prohibits the affirmative act of using the postal service after having failed to purchase health insurance.
                            d) Congress prohibits the affirmative act of purchasing of any item in interstate commerce after having failed to purchase health insurance.

                            If the Supreme Court were to adopt the proposed act/omission distinction, which ones of these law would be constitutional because they are punishing “acts” rather than “omissions”? All of them? None of them? 

                            Categories: Individual Mandate     110 Comments

                              I thank Orin for his thoughtful response and believe I understand much better our areas of disagreement. I am happy to discuss the “line drawing” problem instead of “slippery slopes.” In McDonald, there was always a serious line drawing problem with reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause. But there is no comparable line drawing problem with striking down economic mandates. Congress has gotten along quite well for 220 years without the power to mandate economic activity when regulating interstate commerce. Barring Congress from imposing economic mandates will affect no other laws now on the books, though it will cut short a potential slippery slope into all sorts of economic mandates Congress might dream up to avoid taking political responsibility for enacting taxing and spending schemes.

                              I also think I see better now what Orin is driving at when he claims that: “The challenge to the constitutionality of the individual mandate tries to engage in just the kind of line-drawing that the Justices have concluded they can’t do. It tries to carve out a zone of economic regulation that Congress is forbidden to enact. But exactly what is the zone? Where exactly is the line?” Yet, it is easy to distinguish regulating and prohibiting voluntary economic activity, on the one hand, from requiring such activity on the other. The Justices never had to make this distinction before, because Congress never before attempted to impose an economic mandate on the citizenry at large. And only one law will be in jeopardy if the Supreme Court declines to extend its current doctrine from activity to inactivity. 

                              As to why the line should be drawn here, there are many powerful reasons, some of which I identify in my paper. But the ability to draw a principled line is easy: it is the difference between acts and omissions. Of course, Orin (like Justice Breyer) may think that the rationale for regulating economic activity may extend to inactivity, and he is entirely free to argue why the Supreme Court ought to recognize such a power in Congress. Indeed, that issue will be debated seriously from now until the end of this litigation. But that is not a “line drawing problem.” That is a substantive legal debate requiring a substantive analysis. 

                              I did not have Orin in mind when I wrote the following in my paper (which you can download here), but I think it may well describe how he is approaching this issue:

                              Until 1995, law professors believed that, beginning in 1937 with cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, United States v. Darby, and Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court had so expanded the scope of the commerce power of Congress that Congress could do anything it wanted provided it was not violating some other constitutional constraint, like say the First Amendment.

                              So law professors were shocked when the Supreme Court in 1995 held in United States v. Lopez that the Gun Free School Zone Act unconstitutionally exceeded the commerce power of Congress. They interpreted this case as an aberration. By 1995, Congress had become so complacent about the scope of its powers that it did not even bother to make findings about why the act was within its commerce power. Most law professors were confident that, in the future, the Court would uphold any law if Congress made adequate findings that the activity it sought to regulate had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 

                              So law professors were, once again, surprised when the Supreme Court in 2000 held in United States v. Morrison that the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional-notwithstanding extensive hearings and findings about the substantial effects of violence against women on interstate commerce. In the wake of Morrison, law professors started to believe that the Court just might be serious about drawing a line between what is national and what is local, and lower courts started to be more receptive to Commerce Clause challenges. 

                              In one such case I helped bring on behalf of Angel Raich and Diane Monson, the Ninth Circuit held that the Controlled Substances Act was unconstitutional as applied to marijuana grown at home for medical use as authorized by state law. When the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich turned away this challenge, however, law professors breathed a sigh of relief that they had been right all along. They reverted to their pre–Lopez understanding that Congress can do pretty much whatever it wants under its commerce power.

                              Indeed, the new conventional wisdom is that, so long as Congress establishes a sweeping and ambitious regulatory scheme, it can reach any activity-whether economic or not-that it deems to be essential to that scheme. In other words, the more grandiose the claim of power by Congress, the stronger is its claim of constitutionality. 

                              Hence some law professors have breezily asserted that Congress may, for the first time in American history, use its commerce power to mandate that all individuals in the United States engage in economic activity. After all, this mandate is essential to Congress’s grandiose new scheme regulating private insurance companies. So under Raich, it must be constitutional.

                              The rest of my paper explains why I believe this conventional wisdom is an inaccurate understanding of existing doctrine governing “necessity” in the context of the commerce power, and also why the Court should not expand beyond existing doctrine. 

                              Given that Orin quotes from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Lopez, we ought also to note Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Comstock where he insisted that:

                              The operative constitutional provision in this case is the Necessary and Proper Clause. This Court has not held that the Lee Optical test, asking if “it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct” an evil, is the proper test in this context. Rather, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, application of a “rational basis” test should be at least as exacting as it has been in the Commerce Clause cases, if not more so. . . .

                              I had thought it a basic principle that the powers reserved to the States consist of the whole, undefined residuum of power remaining after taking account of powers granted to the National Government. The Constitution delegates limited powers to the National Government and then reserves the remainder for the States (or the people), not the other way around, as the Court’s analysis suggests. And the powers reserved to the States are so broad that they remain undefined. Residual power, sometimes referred to (perhaps imperfectly) as the police power, belongs to the States and the States alone.

                              It is correct in one sense to say that if the National Government has the power to act under the Necessary and Proper Clause then that power is not one reserved to the States. But the precepts of federalism embodied in the Constitution inform which powers are properly exercised by the National Government in the first place. See Lopez, 514 U. S., at 580–581 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also McCulloch, supra, at 421 (powers “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional”). It is of fundamental importance to consider whether essential attributes of state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, that is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the reach of federal power.

                              The opinion of the Court should not be interpreted to hold that the only, or even the principal, constraints on the exercise of congressional power are the Constitution’s express prohibitions. The Court’s discussion of the Tenth Amendment invites the inference that restrictions flowing from the federal system are of no import when defining the limits of the National Government’s power, as it proceeds by first asking whether the power is within the National Government’s reach, and if so it discards federalism concerns entirely.

                              These remarks explain why the Court ignores important limitations stemming from federalism principles. Those principles are essential to an understanding of the function and province of the States in our constitutional structure.

                              True, Justice Kennedy expresses his concern here with compromising state sovereignty, rather than categorical distinctions like the difference between “economic” and “noneconomic” activity, or activity and inactivity. (Recall that Justice Kennedy did join the majority opinion in Lopez that drew the line between “economic” and “noneconomic” activity, while also concurring.) But the issue of Congress’s power to impose economic mandates was not before him in Comstock. And this passage does not sound to me like a justice willing to overthrow the traditional effort to draw a line between the enumerated power of Congress and powers “reserved to the states respectively or to the people.”

                              Of course, if Orin is right that a majority of the justices have indeed given up on all efforts to draw a “line” around Congress’s power to each any activity — or inactivity — it deems convenient to its regulation of interstate commerce, then the challenge to the mandate will surely fail–as will the scheme of limited and enumerated powers. That would be breaking new ground indeed. I wonder if the time is ripe for that sort of judicial declaration? 

                              Categories: Uncategorized     Comments Off

                                Libertarianism and Blame for Misfortune

                                In a post commenting on the controversy generated by our earlier exchange (see here and here), Sandy Levinson writes:

                                It is obvious that contemporary libertarians are prone to blame individuals for most (even if .... not all) things that befall them; political liberals are far more likely to offer structuralist explanations that have the consequence of exempting individuals from “responsibility” for much of their fate. 

                                I don’t think this is correct. One of the central tenets of libertarianism is that many bad things that befall individuals are caused by excessive government intervention. I gave several examples of such in my last two posts, and of course libertarian scholars have catalogued many more.

                                Once government has caused harm or injustice, it is natural to want government to compensate the victims. However, libertarians are more wary than liberals of large-scale government programs rationalized by the need to compensate for government’s own injustices. Unfortunately, using “government” to compensate the victims almost always actually requires forcing taxpayers to do so. And most of them are also innocent of inflicting the original injustice. Thus, using government to correct its “own” injustices usually involves creating new and sometimes even greater injustices. 

                                Moreover, a program intended to compensate the victims of a specific government-inflicted injustice often gets “captured” by interest groups and gets diverted away from its original purposes. For example, affirmative action was originally instituted to compensate African-Americans for the horrible government-inflicted injustices of slavery and segregation, a worthy objective that I have great sympathy for. Over time, however, various other groups have become beneficiaries of the system under the “diversity” rationale, often in ways that undercut the original objective. I don’t categorically rule out the option of using government programs to alleviate government-created injustices. But any such efforts must take due account of 1) the harm to innocent taxpayers, and 2) the possible perversion of the resulting program by interest group politics. For these reasons, I prefer compensatory measures that involve a one-time payment that is difficult to divert and does not establish an ongoing bureaucracy or class of interest group beneficiaries. The 1988 bill compensating Japanese-Americans unjustly interned during World War II is a good example (though I think the payments were probably too low).

                                There is also nothing unlibertarian in recognizing that many people suffer simply as a result of bad luck. A person who can’t get a well-paying job because his IQ is very low for genetic reasons surely can’t be blamed for that. Few libertarians would disagree. But the fact that a misfortune is not the fault of the victim does not necessarily mean that government should intervene to “fix” it. After all, the misfortune also is not the fault of the taxpayers who would be forced to pay for the fix. Moreover, giving government broad authority to correct misfortunes caused by bad luck leads to all the standard pathologies of big government that I summarized here. Over time, this harms a great many innocent people.

                                In sum, the big disagreement between libertarians and liberals is not over whether individuals often suffer misfortunes that aren’t their fault (though there is sometimes debate over the degree of individual fault in particular cases). It is rather over the justice, efficacy, and potential negative side-effects of government action.

                                Categories: Libertarianism     99 Comments

                                  It is always a pleasure when Randy responds to one of my posts that touches on his areas of expertise. Here are a few thoughts in reply to Randy:

                                  1) I fear there is a misunderstanding as to what comparison I made in my post to which Randy responds. In my post, I compared the blog debate here at the Volokh Conspiracy on the P or I arguments in McDonald with the blog debate on the individual mandate. That is, I was comparing VC posts then and the reactions of VC commenters then to VC posts now and the reactions of VC commenters now. Randy responds by arguing that the legal issues presented by the two cases are quite different. That’s true, but I don’t think I argued to the contrary. On the other hand, Randy’s post today does reaffirm my sense of deja vu on the blog debate: It seems to me that his post responding to me today has a passing similarity in tone and argument to this post responding to me on the road to McDonald. And come to think of it, the post you’re reading right now is kind of like this one replying to Randy. (Am I the only one who is thinking of this scene from Spaceballs right now?)

                                  2) Randy contends that one major difference between the challenge in McDonald and the challenge here is that the challenge in McDonald raised slippery slope problems but that it is the defenders of the mandate who have slippery slope problems. I think Randy has it backwards, however. Supreme Court Justices think in terms of line-drawing, not slippery slopes. A slippery slope may be a reason to draw or not draw a line in a particular place, but it’s the actual line-drawing — the decisionmaking — that they care about as judges. If they have to draw a line, they want it to be a coherent and clear line. And if they can’t draw a coherent and clear line, often they would rather not draw a line at all. 

                                  This was a big problem for the petitioners in McDonald because privileges or immunities argument raised an enormous line-drawing problem as to what rights were included or excluded. The petitioners refused to even say what rights were included or excluded. That made the P or I argument in McDonald very unlikely to be adopted, as was clear to many court-followers as soon as the brief was filed (and was clear to others after the oral argument).

                                  In the case of the individual mandate, it is once again the challengers to the law who have the line-drawing problem. To see why, you have to recall the long struggle in Supreme Court decisions with trying to draw lines in the scope of federal power in the area of economic affairs and commercial matters. Over time, the Supreme Court gave up on trying to distinguish between interstate and intrastate in this area — it was just too hard to distinguish the two persuasively, the Justices thought. Justice Kennedy highlighted this long history in his Lopez concurrence that I excerpted on Friday, and included his own view that stare decisis requires adhering to that approach.

                                  [Stare decisis] forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th century economy, dependent then upon production and trading practices that had changed but little over the preceding centuries; it also mandates against returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities was limited by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.

                                  The challenge to the constitutionality of the individual mandate tries to engage in just the kind of line-drawing that the Justices have concluded they can’t do. It tries to carve out a zone of economic regulation that Congress is forbidden to enact. But exactly what is the zone? Where exactly is the line? I asked that question in a blog post back in April, Drawing Lines in the Commerce Clause Debate on Health Care Reform, and I was interested that no one offered any answers. Perhaps Randy has an answer to that post, and if so, I would be interested to see where he would draw the line between constitutional and unconstitutional. But I think it’s the challengers to the mandate, not the defenders, that have the line-drawing problem. 

                                  3) Randy suggests that he is confused by what kind of claim I am making when I discuss the constitutionality of the mandate. As Randy has articulated elsewhere:

                                  When discussing the “constitutionality” of a governmental action, one must distinguish between three senses of ‘constitutionality’: (1) What the Constitution says and means; (2) what the Supreme Court has said and meant, and (3) whether there are five votes on the Supreme Court to uphold or invalidate the action.

                                  To make sure we’re on the same page, I have blogged about (2) and (3). I blogged about (2), what the Supreme Court has said and meant, starting with my post “Some Tentative Thoughts on the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate Under Current Supreme Court Doctrine.” I blogged about (3) in various places, both directly and indirectly, starting with my post “What Are the Chances that the Courts Will Strike Down the Individual Mandate?”. As for (1), I haven’t blogged on it at all because I am not a constitutional theorist and I’m quite skeptical of grand constitutional theory. So it’s not the kind of question that falls within my area of particular interest or expertise. I very much enjoy reading Randy’s fascinating work in this area, and I realize this is Randy’s approach. But it just happens that it’s not mine, so I haven’t blogged about that. 

                                  UPDATE: As a slight amendment to that last point, I should point out that I alluded to (1) briefly in this post, in which I wrote:

                                  I don’t like modern commerce clause doctrine, . . if I were magically made a Supreme Court Justice in the mid 20th century, I wouldn’t have supported the expansion of the commerce clause so that it covers, well, pretty much everything, [and] I agree that the individual mandate exceeds an originalist understanding of the Commerce Clause.

                                  I don’t know if that really counts as blogging about (1), but it might, so I wanted to make sure my post wasn’t misleading.

                                  Categories: Individual Mandate     89 Comments

                                    A small correction for Sandefur

                                    Timothy Sandefur  produces important research on economic liberty. I’m pleased that the Independence Institute, where I work, recently hosted an event for him to promote his book. I’m also happy that he has become part of the team of Cato Institute writers, which I have been part of since 1988. As a contributing editor of Liberty, I have followed his writing since he was a law student. And of course I commend Eugene for inviting him to guest-blog for VC. However, one item in his blogging appears to me to be erroneous:

                                    When talking about “substantive due process,” as I’ve been doing, one must address a number of myths about that theory that, sadly, are so common that many law students are never even taught what the theory even means.

                                    I.

                                    Here is a good example: “the Supreme Court has never in its entire history tried to derive [substantive due process] from the text of the Constitution.” Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson III, 25 J.L. & Pol’y 1, 3 (2009). Now, whether one accepts or rejects the idea of “substantive due process,” this claim is just false. The Supreme Court had repeatedly explained how substantive protections arise from the Constitution’s text.

                                    The quote is not precisely accurate, and here, the lack of precision leads to a serious error. In the article that Sandefur cites, Nelson Lund and I were discussing and criticizing Roe v. Wade. After a quote from Roe about “the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty,” we then wrote: “This was presumably a reference to the doctrine of substantive due process, which the Supreme Court has never in its entire history tried to derive from the text of the Constitution.”

                                    Our statement as actually written was accurate. Sandefur supplies no example to counter our statement that “the doctrine of substantive due process” (that is, of selective incorporation, unenumerated substantive rights such as those in Meyer v. Nebraska and Roe v. Wade, and so on) has never been the beneficiary of a Supreme Court attempt to derive it from the text of the Constitution.

                                    Instead of showing a case where the Supreme Court did what we had said it did not do (explicate a textual basis for “the doctrine of substantive due process”), Sandefur instead supplies two quotes from Supreme Court cases that did something else.

                                    The first quote, from Loan Ass’n v. Topeka (1874) is little more than an asserted conclusion, albeit one I happen to think is correct. The block quote from Hurtado v. California (1884) provides a litany of things that are not “due process of law”; such as bills of attainder, or special laws enacted to favor or harm a particular individual or group. The Hurtardo quote presents a common nineteenth century view of “due process of law,” with, at least arguably, hundreds of years of roots in American legal understandings. Some of the background of this thinking can be found in Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 Emory L.J. 585 (2009) and James W. Ely, The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 Const. Comment. 315 (1999). Both authors trace the “due process of law” concept from Magna Carta’s “law of the land” provision, through Dr. Bonham’s Case (voiding a local monopoly on the practice of medicine) and its explication by Edward Coke, and to its understanding by the American colonists. This understanding (which might have been incorrect as a matter of English law) was adopted by the American Framers, and carried forward by antebellum state courts.

                                    So yes, “due process of law,” in a textualist sense, can require judicial action against even laws which may have been enacted under proper procedures, such as special legislation (e.g., taking property from X to give it Y). And, quite obviously, this traditional view of “due process of law,” summarized in Hurtardo, has very little to do with “the doctrine of substantive due process.” The former, text-based view, condemns special legislation; yet you can’t use the modern Supreme Court’s “doctrine of substantive due process” to attack a congressional statute that was enacted for the obvious benefit of one corporation, whereas such a challenge might be plausible under the “due process of law” principle of Hurtardo.

                                    In short, Nelson and I did not voice any objection to the principle of “due process of law” as briefly explicated in Hurtardo. Instead, we claimed that the Supreme Court’s doctrine of substantive due process (which is much more wide-ranging and dubious) has not been derived by the Court from the text of the Constitution. Hypothetically, it might have been possible to so derive at least some of the modern SDP decisions, but I suggest that the absence of any Supreme Court citations from Sandefur rebutting what we actually said is further support for our point.

                                    In an earlier post, Orin compares the current challenges to the constitutionality of the individual insurance mandate to debates on this blog over the case of McDonald v. Chicago. But there are some marked differences between the two challenges, and I don’t believe he recollects accurately the nature of the debate we had over McDonald.

                                    First, and most importantly, in McDonald, in addition to challenging the Chicago gun ban, which most observers (Orin included) believed would succeed, the challengers were also seeking the outright reversal of longstanding Supreme Court precedents on originalist grounds — in particular, the Slaughter-House Cases, Cruikshank, and Presser. In contrast, in the challenges to the mandate, the challengers are resting their case on their interpretation of existing Supreme Court precedents. In particular, they rely on the long line of cases that analyze the “class of (intrastate) activity” being regulated to see if it is either “economic” or “essential to a broader regulation of interstate commerce.” In no previous case, has the Court ever sanctioned the mandating of economic activity as a Necessary and Proper exercise of the commerce power. The difference between challenging century-old precedents and offering an interpretation of existing precedents can hardly be exaggerated. This difference is already being manifested in the rulings of lower court judges.

                                    Second, and of almost equal importance, in McDonald, the challengers’ theory of the Privilege or Immunities Clause faced several uncertainties including serious “slippery scope” issues. These included identifying what rights are included among the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, how such rights are to be identified, what differential treatment, if any, is warranted between citizens and persons, and what laws might be unconstitutional under a revived Privileges or Immunities Clause. Although these difficulties were known and debated in advance, they really came to the fore during a very contentious oral argument when they were raised by both the liberal and conservative sides of the Court. Because of these difficulties, no one who witnessed that argument was optimistic that the Court would revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In the challenges to the mandate, however, a judicial refusal to allow Congress to impose “economic mandates” on individuals to effectuate its commerce power would affect one and only one law: the Patients Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. This is because it is the only law in American history that ever sought to impose such economic mandates (or so the Court could easily reason, as did Judge Vinson). For example, these challenges would not reach such taxing and spending programs as Social Security or Medicare; nor would they reach a single-payer Medicare-for-everyone scheme, should Congress enact one. By contrast, the government’s “economic decisions” theory (such as it is) faces enormous slippery slope objections all coming to this: what principled limit is there to allowing Congress to mandate that person engage in economic activity–especially on the theory that the Government (and Orin) advance for why this mandate is necessary and proper? Any serious defender of the constitutionality of economic mandates needs to come to grips with these slippery slope concerns, unless one is prepared to argue that there are no judicially-enforced limits to the Commerce and Necessary & Proper Clause–a proposition that has always been rejected by the Supreme Court. When contemplating oral argument in this case, I know which side i would prefer to be arguing. 

                                    Third, and less importantly, if the PPACA remains as politically unpopular when the Court considers the challenge as it is today, and one or both houses of Congress have changed parties, and a repeal initiative in Congress is blocked by a counter-majoritarian Senate filibuster or Presidential veto, the Justices will feel more comfortable accepting valid constitutional objections to this law than they would if the law was perceived by them to be popular. All they need to do to strike down the mandate is stick with their previous decisions limiting the scope of “necessity,” all of which involved the regulation of “activity.” Alternatively or secondarily, they could find economic mandates to be an “improper” means for effectuating the commerce power. In contrast, in McDonald, they could strike down the Chicago Gun Ban by merely extending its existing Due Process Clause jurisprudence to the Second Amendment without opening “Pandora’s box.” Add to this the fact that the mandate does not go into effect until 2014, so they will not have the burden of striking down a system that is already up and running (as was the gun ban in Chicago). 

                                    Finally, I think Orin misremembers the nature of the debate he and I had about McDonald. My claim then was that “the Constitution” protected the right to keep and bear arms against state infringement as a privilege or immunity of citizenship–as ultimately contended by Justice Thomas in his McDonald dissent, and never denied by Justice Alito in his majority opinion in McDonald. Orin countered by characterizing my position as “the Constitution as it ought to be,” as opposed “the Constitution as it is.” I found this distinction baffling and we debated several rounds on what it means to claim that a statute is “unconstitutional.” To the extent I understood his position–and I never felt confident that I did–Orin seemed to be basing his view of “constitutionality” solely on his prediction of what the Court would do, rather than any substantive analysis of the Constitution or even of existing doctrine. My view of “constitutionality” did not rest on such predictions, so I did not need to offer any. Indeed, I did not see how you could argue Orin’s conception of constitutionality to a court: “Justices, may it please the Court. The Constitution protects the right to keep and bear arms as an aspect of the Due Process Clause because I predict this is what you will hold. I reserve the balance of my time for rebuttal.” In response, Orin said as an advocate he would employ the full range of constitutional analysis and argument, but I simply did not see how this connected up with his view of “constitutionality” which declined any reliance upon or even any mention of these modes of analysis. As I recall, THIS was what we were debating.

                                    Of course, because the challengers of the mandate are basing their challenge on their reading of existing doctrine, rather than any claim about the original meaning of the text, Orin can’t offer the same critique. Instead, he now seems to be basing his view of “constitutionality” on some combination of his predictive prowess (hence his fond recollection of McDonald) and an exceedingly confident interpretation of Supreme Court doctrine apparently based on his view of its underlying rationale. I must confess that I am again uncertain about the nature of his interpretive claims about how to read precedent, though I strongly suspect that his reading of doctrine is, once again, actually a product of his prediction of how the Court will rule. In essence, he seems to be predicting how the Justices will write the opinion upholding the mandate, but I could be wrong about this. Once again, neither Ilya, nor Jonathon, nor I are basing our claims about existing doctrine on our prediction of how the Supreme Court will actually rule. If the challenge was decided today, I think the best case scenario for upholding the law would be 6–3, and best case scenario for striking it down would be 5–4. But notice that, like Orin’s predictions, these are completely nonfalsifiable until the decision is handed down. Unlike McDonald, however, this time Orin IS also offering his own reading of existing doctrine, so the nature of this disagreement is different than before. And unlike McDonald, in which the Seventh Circuit denied the Privileges or Immunities Clause (and even the Due Process Clause) claim on the basis of precedent, this time, Orin is in the position of challenging an opinion of a sitting federal district court judge, rather than merely his cobloggers. Hence his complaint about the “missing argument.” So, at this point, he cannot resort to mere prediction of how the district court will rule and must move on to discuss his reading of the cases versus those of Judge Vinson. 

                                    Categories: Uncategorized     Comments Off

                                      The Roots of Lunacy

                                      From Andrew Ferguson’s review of Dinesh D’Souza’s The Roots Of Obama’s Rage in The Weekly Standard:

                                      The partisan mind—left-wing or right-wing, Republican or Democrat—is incapable of maintaining more than one oversized object of irrational contempt at a time. When Obama took his place in the Republican imagination, his titanic awfulness crowded out the horrors of Bad Old Bill; Clinton’s five days in Moscow were replaced by Obama’s three years in that mysterious Indonesian “madrassa.”

                                      We should probably be grateful for this psychological limitation. Without it the negativity of our politics would be relentless. Like Ronald Reagan before him, George W. Bush was reviled for eight years by Democrats driven mad by a sputtering rage—the “most right-wing president in history”!—but it’s only a matter of time until they rediscover him as a mild-mannered figure, the signer of campaign finance reform, funder of African AIDS relief, would-be grantor of amnesty to illegal aliens; an able if sometimes misguided man whose public service stands in stark contrast to whatever revolting Republicans have come after him. The Dubya renaissance will begin the moment President Christie takes his hand off the Bible and begins his Inaugural Address.

                                      It’s in this light that the anti-Obama hysteria of recent months should be seen. Among professionals, political loyalties and hates are as changeable as the weather, bearing no relation to the plain evidence that normal people try to rely on. Taking the long view means never taking them seriously. Lucky for us, the hysterics make it so easy not to take them seriously.

                                      The review is subtitled “How Not to Understand Obama.”  It’s fair to say Ferguson was not impressed by D’Souza’s book.

                                      Categories: Uncategorized     80 Comments

                                        The idea of robotic cars that drive themselves is a good one, I think, and one whose time is rapidly coming.  The New York Times reports on Google undertaking test drives of cars in the San Francisco area with robotically controlled cars, including a drive down Lombard Street, a famously hilly and difficult street.  The engineers are those who took honors at recent DARPA contests for creating vehicles able to self-navigate urban settings; these are the top people in the business:

                                        During a half-hour drive beginning on Google’s campus 35 miles south of San Francisco last Wednesday, a Prius equipped with a variety of sensors and following a route programmed into the GPS navigation system nimbly accelerated in the entrance lane and merged into fast-moving traffic on Highway 101, the freeway through Silicon Valley.  It drove at the speed limit, which it knew because the limit for every road is included in its database, and left the freeway several exits later. The device atop the car produced a detailed map of the environment.

                                        The car then drove in city traffic through Mountain View, stopping for lights and stop signs, as well as making announcements like “approaching a crosswalk” (to warn the human at the wheel) or “turn ahead” in a pleasant female voice. This same pleasant voice would, engineers said, alert the driver if a master control system detected anything amiss with the various sensors.

                                        The test drives have a human navigator in the car as well as an expert human driver at the wheel to take control if something went wrong; the Times article says that assuming human control is no more difficult than ending cruise control.  None of which I doubt at all.  The article added, however, that Google had carefully examined the California vehicle code to determine that the experimental cars were legal to drive on the road:

                                        But the advent of autonomous vehicles poses thorny legal issues, the Google researchers acknowledged. Under current law, a human must be in control of a car at all times, but what does that mean if the human is not really paying attention as the car crosses through, say, a school zone, figuring that the robot is driving more safely than he would?  And in the event of an accident, who would be liable — the person behind the wheel or the maker of the software?

                                        “The technology is ahead of the law in many areas,” said Bernard Lu, senior staff counsel for the California Department of Motor Vehicles. “If you look at the vehicle code, there are dozens of laws pertaining to the driver of a vehicle, and they all presume to have a human being operating the vehicle.”

                                        The Google researchers said they had carefully examined California’s motor vehicle regulations and determined that because a human driver can override any error, the experimental cars are legal. Mr. Lu agreed.

                                        I am particularly curious whether Google had, or perhaps ought to have in the future, an obligation to let appropriate California authorities know that it was test-driving experimental cars with at least some question as to whether the configuration of a human poised to take over is safe and effective.  In fact, I wonder if it did so in advance — the article gives a California Department of Motor Vehicles counsel’s view, but I wonder whether that came before or after the fact?  Is there some obligation to warn the local law enforcement before undertaking something like this?  And to be perfectly blunt, suppose that it were Toyota that had been doing this?  Would the reaction have been quite so agreeable?

                                        I am delighted to see this kind of technology moving forward, and definitely agree that the technology is ahead of the law in some of these areas.  As a lawyer interested in robotics and the law, I do have some questions as to the appropriate protocols in place for testing new technologies, and whether there are obligations to let the public know in advance, or authorities know in advance, what one is doing.  I have no doubt that Google carefully checked its legal position beforehand.  Query whether this is exactly the right set of legal rules for testing new technologies that, in order to see whether they can function as they are intended, require that they be tested in, among, and with the public.  I do not have a settled view on how these rules should work.

                                        Update:  Alert commenter points to an article at Jalopnik on the question of whether Google’s cars are legal on California roads; the article says that Google alerted local authorities.  But my question is still, what should be the rules for deciding whether the car is safe to take in traffic among people like you and me?  Who should be able to decide that?

                                        In a certain sense, after all, what Google is doing is a form of human subject experimentation, of the kind that were it a university, would likely at a minimum require discussion with a human subjects committee, informing the subjects, etc.  Of course, one can say that this is not the proper analogy — and I would agree as a lawyer looking at California’s codes — but I would still ask the question, without having at this point a fixed answer, should it be?  The nature of Google’s testing requires that it be done among the driving public, by assumption among people who don’t know there is a robot among them; should this be regarded as ethical and should the legal rules allow for it in dealing with robots?

                                        From a technology and society standpoint, the long term gains from this kind of technology will presumably be once we mandate that all cars be driven by robots.  Among other things, if things work as hoped, it will allow for much, much smaller spacings between the cars and higher road speeds that will extract greater efficiencies from roads and highways, and help manage congestion problems.  Being able to read the Volokh Conspiracy on your way to work is vitally important, of course, but not the only potential gain of the new technologies.

                                        Update 2:  Several of the comments suggest that the issue isn’t really a big one, since the “driver” that Google has placed behind the wheel is ultimately legal responsible for the operation of the vehicle under the law, as it currently stands.  I’m sure that Google has researched this question as a matter of current law thoroughly and I don’t doubt the conclusion.  Query once again, however, whether that would be a stable legal rule of liability in the case of ordinary people for whom the vehicle has come equipped with this technology; if something goes wrong, you are responsible and then you turn and sue the manufacturer?

                                        But we’ve been down these paths before; it seems to me it would be hard in some future where the technology is widespread and beyond the ability of a human operator to have much sense of whether the machine is properly operational, to have any very direct form of liability, either as a matter of tort or a matter of the criminal law of the vehicle code.  People simply will conclude, with good reason, that it would be unfair and inefficient to hold them responsible for the operation of technology without any clear way of knowing whether it works or not.  The responsibility then moves backwards to the manufacturer, and other points of expert contact, but it is hard not to conclude that in terms of the actual operation of the vehicle, that point of accountability is lost.  It might well — I am pretty certain that it would — be made up by safety and other gains from the widesrpead use of the technology, but I would not at all believe that the current liability rules in either tort or the criminal aspects of the vehicle code would remain legally stable.

                                        And the idea of the “system” acting as a “driver” when everyone is mandated to use the system — well, I assume at that point, we shift entirely to a different arrangement for liability.  The idea of the “system” as “driver” as “liable” is interesting, but I would assume that at that point, it morphs into some insurance system of liability and compensation.

                                        (No more updates for me — I’m allowing myself to be distracted from writing about the operational and strategic uses of UAVs.  Can I get a robotic system to write that for me?)

                                        Categories: Robotics     39 Comments

                                          “Alito may skip State of Union”

                                          Or so reports the Associated Press (available in the Washington Post).

                                          The justice said the annual speech to Congress has become very political and awkward for the justices, who he says are expected to sit “like the proverbial potted plant.”
                                          * * * * *
                                          The better course, Alito said, is to follow the example of more experienced justices like Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and the recently retired John Paul Stevens. None has attended in several years.

                                          “So I doubt that I will be there in January,” Alito said.

                                          File under “surprising to absolutely no one.”

                                          Categories: Supreme Court     50 Comments

                                            Sandy Levinson’s Challenge

                                            In a recent post at Balkinization, Sandy Levinson argues that the recent mostly government-funded rescue of the trapped Chilean miners proves the need for a large welfare state. He also issues a challenge to the Volokh Conspiracy:

                                            PBS reports that the cost of rescuing the 33 trapped Chilean miners was $10–20 million. A third apparently came from private donations, with the rest from a mix of the state-owned copper company in charge of the effort and the government of Chile itself. Every American law student is told that there is, in the United States, no “duty to rescue.” It is, of course, just such a notion of “good Samaritanism” that is the foundation of the welfare state, in which haves see their funds redistributed to have-nots lest the latter end up starving or freezing on the streets or watching their houses burn down because they can’t afford to pay the user fee to the local fire department....

                                            I’ve done a quick check of recent entries to the Volokh Conspiracy, which I take it is the leading collection of libertarians in the legal academy, and I notice that none of them saw the rescue as worthy of comment. Might it be too threatening for, say, David Bernstein, who announced his forthcoming talk to the Federalist Society (with a comment to follow by Jack Balkin) on his new book that attempts to rehabilitate Lochner, to admit that at least sometimes there is a role for the “rescuing state,” which, almost by definition, must take from those who have in order to provide for those who don’t?

                                            First, I very much appreciate Sandy’s calling us “the leading collection of libertarians in the legal academy.”

                                            Second, I can’t speak for David Bernstein. But my own view is not that the mine rescue is unworthy of comment, but that I’m not a good person to comment on it. Why? Because I am not an expert on either industrial accidents generally or mining specifically. For reasons I recently explained here, I try to limit my blogging on public policy issues to areas where I have real expertise or at least follow closely. Sandy Levinson is a leading constitutional law scholar, and his work on the issues where he is an expert is almost always insightful and interesting. On this issue, however, I suspect that Sandy’s expertise isn’t much greater than mine. At the very least, such expertise isn’t evident in his post. For example, Sandy doesn’t actually cite any evidence showing that a government-led system for dealing with industrial and mining accidents is superior to private sector alternatives. 

                                            Given my own lack of expertise on industrial accidents, I’m not going to try to offer an argument to the contrary. I will say, however, that the mining accident adds little to the case for the modern welfare state even if Sandy’s interpretation of what happened there is completely correct.

                                            As I pointed out in a recent response to one of Sandy’s co-bloggers, it is perfectly consistent to believe on the one hand that government should provide some degree of assistance to those of the poor who genuinely can’t care for themselves, while also arguing for a massive reduction in government intervention in the economy. That was the view of libertarian thinkers such as Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek. Much government intervention benefits not the poor, but the wealthy and well-organized interest groups, who generally have vastly greater political power than the poor do. It is ironic that Sandy brings up David Bernstein’s work on Lochner in this context. A central element of David’s analysis of Lochner and other early 20th century labor regulations is that those policies in fact benefited organized interest groups at the expense of poor, immigrant, minority, and female workers. In many cases, David points out,this was actually their intended purpose, not merely an accidental side effect.

                                            It is also somewhat strange that Sandy (in the same post) uses the issue of government aid to the poor to attack people like Paul Ryan and Eric Cantor. These politicians haven’t even come close to proposing the abolition of the welfare state. They are far less radical in that respect than I am (I too would not abolish the entire welfare state, but I would abolish a lot more than either Ryan or the GOP leadership would). Rather, Ryan’s famous “road map” proposes to scale back the welfare state primarily by introducing greater means testing. In other words, he seeks to cut benefits to the wealthy and middle class, not the poor “have-nots” who, in Sandy’s words, might “end up starving or freezing.” As Ryan himself puts it, he supports a “robust safety net” for the latter. 

                                            As I noted in my last post, there is actually a lot of historical evidence that private sector institutions often do a better job than the state in aiding the poor as well as the rich and middle class. But even if you believe, as I do, that some degree of government redistribution to the poor is needed, that doesn’t justify anything remotely resembling today’s overgrown government. Indeed, redistribution to the genuinely needy would be far easier to maintain if it weren’t for the looming fiscal crisis created in large part by enormous bailouts and entitlement programs that mostly benefit the nonpoor.

                                            Categories: Libertarianism     140 Comments

                                              A Light Springs from the Shadows

                                              There is plenty of bad news in the world today. But one recent piece of really great news is that Peter Jackson’s film version of The Hobbit, has finally been greenlighted and is scheduled to begin filming in February 2011 [HT: fellow legal academic Tolkien fan Steve Bainbridge]. Apparently, Jackson has managed to settle the labor union problems that threatened to further delay production.

                                              As Tolkien might have said, this is truly a sign that “A light from the shadows shall spring.” Not all those who wander are lost, including Peter Jackson.

                                              Perhaps it’s not too late to include a part for co-blogger Randy Barnett, who has previous experience in sci fi/fantasy roles. I myself would be happy to sign on as a consultant on Middle Earth property law.

                                              On a (slightly) more serious note, I can’t wait to see the movie. Jackson did an excellent job with the Lord of the Rings films, and I have high expectations for this project as well.

                                              Categories: Science Fiction/Fantasy     81 Comments

                                                BERJAYAThank you to The Volokh Conspiracy for allowing me to guest blog this week about economic liberty and the law. Economic freedom is one of the most crucial of human rights, and it is a shame that government violates this right in so many ways today, and with little serious opposition by the courts that are supposed to protect our rights.

                                                Check out the new Right to Earn A Living book page, and if you haven’t joined our Facebook page, please do so today!

                                                I hope readers will check out PLF Liberty Blog for more updates on the cases I and my Pacific Legal Foundation colleagues are litigating. Also, in the coming weeks I’ll be speaking at events across the country, and would love to meet any VC readers or PLF supporters. I’ll be speaking in Boston on Tuesday, Hartford on Wednesday, Portland and Brewer, Maine, on Thursday, and again in Boston on Friday. Check out the book page for a full schedule of future talks in those and other cities across the country.

                                                Please also drop by my personal blog, Freespace, and Panda’s Thumb, where I sometimes write about creationsim/evolution issues.

                                                Categories: Economic LIberties     No Comments

                                                  I recently was reminded of this quote about Commerce Clause doctrine and I thought I would put it out there for comment in light of the recent debates on the constitutionality of the individual mandate:

                                                  [T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature. That fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only an 18th century economy, dependent then upon production and trading practices that had changed but little over the preceding centuries; it also mandates against returning to the time when congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities was limited by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient connection to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on the assumption that we have a single market and a unified purpose to build a stable national economy.

                                                  Do you agree or disagree? The source of the quote, for those who are interested, is below the fold.

                                                  Continue reading ‘One Perspective on the Scope of Federal Power “In the Commercial Sphere”’ »

                                                  Categories: Individual Mandate     289 Comments

                                                    At Balkinization, prominent legal historian Brian Tamanaha has an interesting post on progressivism, racism, and libertarianism. He acknowledges that libertarians, including me, are right to point out that early 20th century progressivism was tarred by racism. But he also argues that libertarians have their own historical skeletons in the closet, ones he claims are more difficult to shed than racism is for progressives:

                                                    With the resurgence of the use of the term “progressive” by liberals, libertarians have taken to reminding liberals that their turn-of-the-century progressive forebears were virulent racists. According to libertarians, when the social reformist impulse of progressivism mixed with the personal racism of progressives, a toxic brew resulted that led to the legal oppression of blacks and other racial minorities. “The ideas of race and color were powerful, controlling elements in progressive social and political thinking,” [David Southern] argues. “And this fixation on race explains how democratic reform and racism went hand-in-hand.” Libertarians even blame progressives for Jim Crow laws.

                                                    There is much truth in this charge......

                                                    But classical liberals have their own embarrassing grandparents. Herbert Spencer, the most influential advocate of laissez faire in nineteenth century America, opposed all government aid to the poor and infirm because it thwarted the biological law that the weakest should die. (He coined the phrase “survival of the fittest.”)....

                                                    While racism can be severed without loss from progressivism (and indeed has been), the doctrine that government activities should be strictly limited to protecting property, enforcing contracts, and maintaining order is built into libertarianism. Ludwig von Mises, the leading classical liberal of the early twentieth century (not a social Darwinist), opposed public education as beyond the proper scope of government, and he was against any unemployment benefits (because it encourages indolence). Von Mises recognized that the unemployed would suffer, but he felt this was justified because it would increase overall material wealth. Clear echoes of this argument are still made in libertarian circles today. 

                                                    To the extent that Tamanaha merely wants to suggest that early libertarians such as Spencer made some very dubious arguments that modern libertarians should repudiate, he is surely right. I also welcome his acknowledgement, which echoes that of some other liberal scholars, of the close relationship between early 20th century progressivism and racism. But I take issue with some of his other points about both libertarianism and progressivism.

                                                    I. Progressivism and Racism.

                                                    I don’t believe that early 20th century Progressive racism is as easily sidestepped by modern liberals as Tamanaha suggests. As I explained in my earlier post on the subject, “The racist elements of Progressive ideology don’t prove that economic interventionism is racist by nature..... Still less do they prove that modern left-wingers are necessarily racist as well. But they do undercut claims that racism is primarily a product of the ‘right’ and that economic leftism and racial progress necessarily go together.” The point is not that modern liberals are racists (the vast majority are not), but that many of them are wrong to believe that racism is mostly or exclusively a product of “the right.” 

                                                    There is a second, even more important, lesson here as well. It is that concentrating economic power in the hands of government is unlikely to benefit unpopular minority groups and the politically weak more generally. Rather, government intervention is likely to benefit the politically influential at the expense of the weak, which usually includes the poor, as well as disliked racial, religious and other minorities. As co-blogger David Bernstein notes, “[a]s a matter of American history, activist government was often used to oppress minority groups. As a matter of world history, the record of “activist government” with regard to minorities is even worse. And as a matter of political theory, it’s not at all clear why one would expect public policy in a democracy to necessarily be helpful to minority groups.” Progressive-era economic regulations that victimized blacks and immigrants are just one of many historical examples. 

                                                    This is the really important lesson of early 20th century racism for modern progressives. And it’s one that few of them have fully assimilated. Indeed, it’s not clear that they can assimilate it without seriously questioning one of modern progressivism’s central commitments: the idea that there should be few or no constitutional constraints on government’s power to control “economic” activities.

                                                    II. Libertarianism and “Hard-Heartedness.”

                                                    Tamanaha is indeed correct to note Herbert Spencer’s social Darwinist “hard-heartedness,” which is not defensible. On the other hand, few if any modern libertarians either oppose all charity or rely on social Darwinist arguments about the “survival of the fittest” in any significant way. David’s work on the Lochner era shows that social Darwinism was a much less important element even in early 20th century libertarian legal thought than was traditionally believed. For example, contra Oliver Wendell Holmes, it is simply not true that the justices who decided Lochner did so under the influence of social Darwinist ideas.

                                                    Few modern libertarians even cite Spencer or other social Darwinists at all. By contrast, modern liberals do often cite early 20th century progressives as inspirations for their ideology. And until recently, few of them paid much attention to the more unsavory aspects of early 20th century Progressivism (though I should add that some far left radical scholars, such as Gabriel Kolko, were much more critical).

                                                    Tamanaha is also correct to note that many modern libertarians oppose welfare statism across the board for reasons unrelated to social Darwinism. He is wrong, however, to suggest that this position is an essential element of libertarian thought. Such prominent libertarian scholars as Milton Friedman (inventor of the negative income tax), and F.A. Hayek argued that libertarianism is compatible with a strictly limited welfare state. It is a coherent position to argue that property rights and economic liberties should get strong protection — far stronger than most liberals would permit — without concluding that they always outweigh all other considerations.

                                                    While my own views are close to the Hayek-Friedman position, I do not believe that more categorical versions of libertarianism are morally disreputable or something that modern libertarians should be embarrassed about. There is a serious case that the functions currently performed by the welfare state are likely to be better done by private organizations. Historian David Beito has shown how the rise of the welfare state destroyed many private mutual aid organizations that often did a better job of providing social services to the poor without creating perverse incentives. You don’t have to be either a social Darwinist or “hard-hearted” to endorse Beito’s position. Indeed, Arthur Brooks’ research shows that opponents of government welfare on average donate a far larger proportion of their income to charities that benefit the poor than supporters do.

                                                    As for public education, its extremely poor record over the last several decades and its repeated use for indoctrination suggests that libertarians have no reason to apologize for Mises’ views. To put it a different way, libertarians can support educating the public without supporting public schooling. As E.G. West describes in his classic Education and the State, education levels in Britain and the United States were rapidly rising before the introduction of public schooling, which was largely motivated by a desire to indoctrinate students in government-approved religious and political views. In the words of John Stuart Mill, an important intellectual forebear for both libertarians and progressives, “A general State education” promotes whatever view “pleases the predominant power in the government.... in proportion as it is efficient and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading by natural tendency to one over the body.”

                                                    UPDATE: I am having some difficulties eliminating certain technical problems in this post. I hope to get them resolved soon. 

                                                    UPDATE #2: The technical issue has been solved.

                                                    UPDATE #3: Various people, including my wife and David Bernstein, have pointed out that I was too quick to endorse Tamanaha’s critique of Herbert Spencer. As Damon Root explains here, Spencer was not actually opposed to private charity, and many of the other standard charges against him are also based on distortions of his work:

                                                    At the heart of [historian Richard] Hofstadter’s [famous] case [against Spencer] is the following passage from Spencer’s famous first book, Social Statics (1851): “If they are sufficiently complete to live, they do live, and it is well they should live. If they are not sufficiently complete to live, they die, and it is best they should die.” 

                                                    That certainly sounds rough, but as it turns out, Hofstadter failed to mention the first sentence of Spencer’s next paragraph, which reads, “Of course, in so far as the severity of this process is mitigated by the spontaneous sympathy of men for each other, it is proper that it should be mitigated.” As philosophy professor Roderick Long has remarked, “The upshot of the entire section, then, is that while the operation of natural selection is beneficial, its mitigation by human benevolence is even more beneficial.” This is a far cry from Hofstadter’s summary of the text, which has Spencer advocating that the “unfit...should be eliminated.”

                                                    Similarly, Hofstadter repeatedly points to Spencer’s famous phrase, “survival of the fittest,” a line that Charles Darwin added to the fifth edition of Origin of Species. But by fit, Spencer meant something very different from brute force. In his view, human society had evolved from a “militant” state, which was characterized by violence and force, to an “industrial” one, characterized by trade and voluntary cooperation. Thus Spencer the “extreme conservative” supported labor unions (so long as they were voluntary) as a way to mitigate and reform the “harsh and cruel conduct” of employers. 

                                                    Roderick Long has more information on Spencer’s views on charity here.

                                                    Categories: Libertarianism, Racism     201 Comments

                                                      A Foreclosure Moratorium?

                                                      Marty Robins has a nice column summing up the case against a foreclosure moratorium in light of the foreclosure documentation fiasco.

                                                      The bottom line is that these guys screwed up royally and need to take their lumps.  But equally, we should not forget that we are talking about homeowners who haven’t paid their bills.  This is a fight as to who has the right to foreclose, not whether foreclosure is valid.

                                                      Categories: Uncategorized     163 Comments

                                                        [With apologies to Orin.]

                                                        The more I participate in discussions on the constitutionality of the individual mandate, the more it feels to me like a replay of the debate over the limits of federal commerce clause power prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez.

                                                        In both cases, the issue is whether the Supreme Court will adopt limitations on the scope of government power that are greatly desired by libertarians and supported from an originalist perspective, but that Supreme Court doctrine hasn’t shown any particular sign of adopting as a a matter of constitutional law. In both cases, the commentary in favor of the limitation seems aimed at fostering a sense of the legitimacy of those limitations with the hope that this will make it more likely for the Supreme Court to adopt them. In both cases, most informed observers were skeptical (if not incredulous) at the idea that the Supreme Court  would take that step– only a handful of people saw the invalidation of the Gun Free School Zones Act as a realistic possibility; most saw it as extremely unlikely. In both cases, many commenters are extremely passionate about what they believe the correct constitutional answer must be — with commenters seemingly lining up in the same way on the two issues. And in both cases, most informed commentators would expect the Supreme Court to side affirm federal power.

                                                        There are differences, of course. The debate over the Commerce Clause pre–Lopez was more for law geeks than the public: It concerned the likelihood the Court would affirm the limitations of the federal commerce power for the first time in over fifty years  in a low-profile case few had heard of, let alone cared about, and it lacked the broad political movement that exists over the individual mandate.  Yet then, as now, the litigation occurred at a time when limited government political arguments were on the rise and now, unlike before, serious academics and court watchers believe that, as a predictive matter, the constitutionality of the individual mandate is  an “open question.”   Nonetheless, I can’t avoid the sense of deja vu — but maybe that’s wishful thinking.

                                                        Update On Stossel:

                                                        Turns out I was being filmed for an upcoming Stossel special, not for the weekly show on Fox Business.  So don’t look for me tonight because I won’t be there!  I’m sure that tonight’s show will be great anyway, even (especially?) without me.

                                                        Categories: Uncategorized     No Comments