Well, that was awkward. The world's leading economic authorities just gathered in Washington for a weekend session of policy glowering. Heading into the regular fall meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, there was some hope that some constructive, multilateral dialogue could defuse tensions and calm talk of currency wars. It was not to be.

What happened? The United States went into the meetings pushing for multilateral solutions, in particular an enhanced role for the IMF. In a speech at the Brookings Institution last week, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner addressed the issue of global misalignments:

This problem exposes once again the need for an effective multilateral mechanism to encourage economies running current account surpluses to abandon export-oriented policies, let their currencies appreciate, and strengthen domestic demand.

He noted that this was part of the long-standing mission of the IMF, then went on to argue that the world's powers had already agreed to address these issues:

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My Shadow Government co-conspirator Peter Feaver's post below on the similarities between the Eisenhower administration and the Obama administration probably elicited some smiles over at the White House. After almost two years of trying to fend off persistent-but-unwelcome comparisons with the Carter and Johnson administrations, the Obama team no doubt would find the Eisenhower analogy a welcome change. Eisenhower is, after all, regarded as a near-great president for his prudent Cold War posture and careful stewardship of the American economy during a decade of postwar growth and innovation.

The Eisenhower-Obama similarities that Peter identifies in his first few paragraphs are intriguing. However, the parallels are not unique; for example, Peter's first two paragraphs could easily have described the Nixon administration's early years in office following LBJ. The more important question in testing the analogy is how it does as a net assessment -- that is, while there may be similarities between the Eisenhower and Obama administrations, are they outweighed by the differences? This was one of the cardinal tenets developed by the late Harvard historian Ernest May for how scholars and policymakers should approach historical analogies. Identify the similarities, yes, but be sure to list the differences as well. [Insert obligatory academic joke here about political scientists playing in historians' sandboxes].

Taking the examples cited by Peter, a number of substantial differences emerge between the Eisenhower and Obama administrations:

• While both Eisenhower and Obama took office promising to end unpopular wars (Korea and Iraq, respectively), Eisenhower brought the Korean War to an end on terms consistent with America's original strategic goals: preserving South Korea as a secure, independent state and sending a signal of deterrent resolve against further communist aggression. Eisenhower was helped in accomplishing this by Stalin's death and an explicit American threat of a nuclear strike against China; these game-changers for North Korea's two superpower patrons enabled Eisenhower to secure a truce within six months of taking office. On Iraq, the Obama campaign emphasized ending the U.S. troop presence rather than securing America's original strategic goals. Once in office the administration modified its drawdown schedule, but almost two years later still remains ambivalent between contrived declarations of the "end" of the combat mission and maintaining an adequate American security presence. Left uncertain is the administration's commitment to the strategic goals of preserving a stable and free Iraq, while Iraq remains in the crucible of political and security vulnerability. As Jackson Diehl points out today, if the timetable-obsessed Obama administration sticks to its rigid December 2011 date for complete withdrawal from Iraq, it "will put the nascent U.S. ‘strategic partnership' with Iraq's new regime at risk -- and hand an advantage to Iran." In short, Eisenhower used timetables in the service of strategic goals, whereas the Obama administration too often seems to subsume strategic goals to timetables.
• While both presidents commissioned major strategic reviews upon taking office, Eisenhower's "Project Solarium" assessed the U.S. grand strategy for the entire global Cold War, in contrast to Obama's strategic review(s) of just one theater: Afghanistan-Pakistan. An accurate analogy would be if the Obama White House had done such a strategic review of the entire Global War on Terror (other than just giving it a new acronym). The Obama administration instead largely adopted wholesale the Bush administration's strategic framework for the war on jihadist terrorism: pre-emptive attacks, holding states accountable for terrorist actions, renditions, law-of-war detainees, support for reformist and peaceful Muslim leaders, and promoting governance and development as long-term antidotes to Islamist ideology.
• Yes, both Eisenhower and Obama (along with every other president since FDR) noted the connection between America's domestic economy and international strength. But here the comparison ends. During his two terms, Eisenhower oversaw a remarkable 40 percent expansion of the U.S. economy, encouraged private-sector growth and job-creation, and balanced the federal budget by his fourth year in office, all the while maintaining a vigorous national defense and a robust strategic posture abroad. President Obama, in contrast, has indulged in a deluge of deficit-spending such as the stimulus and health care bills, adding unprecedented trillions to the federal debt while stifling economic recovery and squeezing America's defense and diplomacy budgets. In short, it is not a program out of the Eisenhower playbook.

There are other interesting differences. For example, the Eisenhower administration engineered a dubious regime change in Iran in 1953 against the popular will, whereas (perhaps partly in overreaction to the Eisenhower legacy) the Obama administration has been too reluctant to support the popular will of Iranians themselves calling for a change in their regime. Or on nuclear weapons; Eisenhower's "New Look" expanded the nation's nuclear arsenal and made the option of their use (asymmetric response) central to U.S. strategy, whereas President Obama seeks to further minimize, if not abolish outright, the role of nukes in the United States' force posture. To be fair, there are other similarities between the two presidents as well, whether difficulties with Israel, or efforts to improve U.S.-Russian relations based on the perceived appeal of a new Russian leader, or even the time that both spent at Columbia University trying to ascertain their future calling.

Yet in the net assessment, while I share the hope that the Obama administration will follow the best of the lessons from Eisenhower, thus far the disparities between the two presidencies are more substantial. And if the Obama administration does change course and start following more of an Eisenhower model, perhaps as Peter suggests the parallels between Truman and Bush will further sharpen as well.

Over the past decade, Washington's Taiwan policy has created unnecessary dilemmas for Taiwan's political leadership. On the one hand, if a president of Taiwan is considered too provocative toward China, Washington, rightfully irritated over undue tensions, will freeze relations with the democratic island. On the other hand, if a president of Taiwan reconciles with China, Washington's impulse is to neglect relations, confident that the cross Strait "problem" is resolving itself. It's a small wonder why many Taiwanese believe that Washington is unreliable.

President Chen Shui-bian faced the former from Washington. While no one in Taiwan doubted that he would protect Taiwan's de facto independent status and its hard won democracy, or fight for its international dignity, he lost the confidence of Washington and then his own people when relations with both China and the United States soured.

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Awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo should remind the world of two things about China: one pessimistic, one optimistic. The former: The Chinese Communist Party is accustomed to controlling all politics at home and has not loosened its grip on political debate one iota. The latter: Liu is one Chinese of many who are fighting for, indeed risking their lives for, democratic change in China.

Consider the party's behavior. First it tried to bully the Nobel committee into abandoning its consideration of Liu. Then, it engaged in its familiar threatening and bullying rhetoric even after the deed was done. The party's propaganda and internal control apparatus removed any mention of Liu's victory in China's media. Then it announced that Sino-Norwegian ties would be damaged, notwithstanding the fact that the government in Oslo has nothing to do with the Nobel committee's decisions. This is a ruling party that seems not to understand that the rest of the world does not work in accordance with the party's precepts. Note to observers of China: In China there is no such thing as an independent civil body. So Beijing assumes that other governments can, with a wave of a hand (or the shake of an iron fist), stop political activity considered objectionable by a ruling government.

All the nongovernmental organizations we hear about operating in China, while doing great work, can be shut down at the whim of a Communist Party leader. China assumes the same about other countries. It wants to conduct its relations with others through official government channels and get others to pretend that the Communist Party is China. Liu's case is proof positive that nothing can be further from the truth. There are many Chinese who want nothing to do with the party, in fact, who are working toward its demise. The mistake we often make is to limit our engagement with China to the party and therefore ignore the many Chinese who desperately disagree with their government and want another direction for their country. Unfortunately, the party still dominates. This leads to the type of behavior we have seen recently from China in the South China Sea and with Japan, where it expects others to bend to the party's will. Accustomed to getting its way at home, the party is left befuddled when it cannot do so abroad, hence the empty threats aimed at the Norwegian government. Ironically for China, these histrionics amplify the case of Liu and attract more attention. Now the world can read not only about Liu's accomplishments, but also witness China's very bizarre reaction.

That leads to the good news. While the party remains dominant, there are many Liu's within China working for change. If they do not like China's authoritarian ways at home, chances are they do not like China's authoritarian ways abroad (ignoring international law in the South China Sea, forcing Japan to abandon its own legal procedures in the case of captain Zhan Qixiong). They are the hope for a truly peaceful rise for China. While most governments ignore them -- it is obviously easier to deal with the party and avoid the tension that engagement with China's democrats would bring -- the Nobel committee has not. Perhaps other democracies, like our own, will begin to take the Liu's of China and what they stand for more seriously and conduct an engagement policy that engages all of China.

Nouri al-Maliki appears close to a deal that will put Iraq's Shi'ia parties in power. After seven months of political wrangling, it would be tempting to believe that any government formed by Iraq's squabbling political leaders is progress. It is not.

The political slate that garnered the most seats in the parliamentary elections, Ayad Allawi's non-sectarian bloc, ought to have had the first shot at forming a government. Prime Minister Maliki's manipulations of electoral commission findings and superseding of judicial decisions accrued that advantage instead to his second-place finish.

Even with the advantages of incumbency in a system newly empowered and without strong legal constraints, Maliki has been unable to cobble together a coalition. Other parties fear a "soft coup" of Maliki consolidating power and have been unwilling to join a government with him as prime minister.

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Generalismo Franco is still dead. That SNL bit popped into my mind when I heard that General Jim Jones has resigned to be replaced by his deputy, Tom Donilon.

The connection was driven not by General Jones diffident style, although some disgruntled staffers did complain about a certain autocratic air (it goes, I suspect, with a 4-star resume). Rather, the Franco connection was driven by how long this move has been anticipated by beltway insiders.  General Jones is leaving, still leaving. Only a few months into the administration's tenure, and General Jones seemed to be on the chopping block. He survived another 16 months, but they were exceptionally stormy months with some serious missteps by the  National Security Advisor. Moreover, the most important thing done on his watch - the Afghan Strategy Review 2.0 of the Fall 2009 -- has played to decidedly mixed reviews, especially with the revelations of the recent Woodward book.

Indeed, the Woodward book seems to confirm what many suspected and what today's announcement makes official: that President Obama had more confidence in Jones's deputy than in Jones himself. Jones is a great patriot who has served his country honorably in a number of important posts. But he never seemed to master the most important part of the NSA job: cultivating a close working relationship with the boss. National security advisors who have that (or who cultivate that) succeed in the job. If underlings on your staff are viewed as being in the inner circle while you are not, then the job becomes impossibly difficult. Ironically, the Woodward book also confirms that Jones struggled with the aspect of the job that he seemed best equipped to handle: relations with the military.  

Jones successor, Tom Donilon, starts with an advantage Jones never had: Everyone believes him to be a close intimate of the president and of other White House powerbrokers. He also is an unabashed partisan, thus strengthening the White House's ties with the constituency most disappointed in Obama's foreign policy: the Democratic base. He doesn't have the same apparent advantages on the civil-military front, and the strongest player in the administration on civil-military relations, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, reportedly has grave doubts about Donilon's suitability for the job. Whether Donilon can develop as strong a working relationship with Gates and with the senior brass as he has with President Obama and the political team will likely determine whether he is successful in his job.

For my part, I hope he is successful (full disclosure: Donilon and I have been members together of the Aspen Strategy Group, where he showed himself to be sharp-witted, tough, and a compelling critic of the Bush foreign policy). The Obama Team has a series of very daunting foreign policy challenges to handle, and some of them -- such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran - won't wait around for a leisurely transition in personnel.  

I worked in the Obama administration as director for Afghanistan and Pakistan through September 2009, covering much of the timeframe of Bob Woodward's new book Obama's Wars. I was one of several holdovers who helped provide continuity from the previous administration. This is the first in a series of posts responding to the book and to the administration's Afghanistan policy. I did not personally witness most of the discussions that Woodward describes, but I typically received detailed readouts from those who did. I also left just prior to the fall 2009 strategy review, and I do maintain relationships with some of the people mentioned herein. With those disclaimers, I think the book is quite accurate in tone and substance.

The most damning insight of the book is not the inter-office gossip -- e.g., who is a "waterbug" or who thinks Holbrooke is "arrogant." That stuff happens in every administration, every professional workplace, and, frankly, every gathering of human beings. More damning is the poor quality of discussion at the principals' level. The president himself said as much himself at one point, according to Woodward, expressing displeasure with the strategy review. The principals' discussion wandered back and forth, re-trod the same ground again and again without fresh insights, failed to resolve basic questions, and ultimately settled on a policy that reflected compromise, large assumptions, and the search for a least-common-denominator consensus.

I want to focus on just one example today. According to Woodward, Vice President Joe Biden and, separately, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg were concerned that Afghanistan was becoming "another Vietnam." Such concerns led them and others to argue against troop increases and in favor of limiting U.S. goals and commitments in the region.

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The presidential candidate campaigned on a variety of themes: change, a persona that rose above partisan politics, and a commitment to restore a country exhausted by crises at home and abroad. Even though the predecessor was not on the ballot, he was so unpopular by the time of the election that his shadow seemed to dominate the campaign. The winner won in part because he was seen as his predecessor's antithesis.

In foreign policy, the contrast was sharp. The country was mired in a bloody stalemate, the result, apparently, of initial intelligence errors compounded by gross mismanagement and toxic civil-military discord. Of greater concern, this war seemed a side-show from the larger conflict, which the challenger also claimed had been mismanaged so severely that the United States was now generally thought to be falling further behind, far less secure even than when the conflict began. The winning candidate promised to end the stalemate in the "side-show" quickly, and refocus on the larger conflict, putting the United States back on the offensive and rolling back the gains of the enemy with a bold new strategy that would restore American credibility throughout the world.

Once elected, the new president went about his business methodically. He commissioned a major review and devoted an extraordinary amount of his time and his senior staff's time to considering a range of apparently sharply drawn options. Prominent in the review was the budgetary concern: the United States simply could not afford to continue to spend money on national security at the rate it had been without piling up a crushing debt. However, as the review unfolded, the various clear-cut alternatives got blurred, and in the end the president chose a compromise option even though his staff argued, not unpersuasively, that the president was blending mutually exclusive alternatives in an incoherent strategy. There was also an embarrassing inconvenient truth: while there were enough new features to be able to spin it as a new look, in fact the new strategy resembled more the strategy of the predecessor than anything touted during the campaign.

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