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Friday, September 10, 2010

Links 9/11/10



Freshwater turtles ‘in decline‘ BBC

Klingon opera makes debut in Netherlands Christian Science Monitor

There Already Was A Ground-Zero Mosque — On The 17th Floor Of The World Trade Center Clusterstock

Feds probe Arizona for violating rights of non-native English speakers Raw Story

“There Is No Economic Justification for Deficit Reduction” Galbraith to Deficit Commission The Economic Populist

The War on Bank Profits? Adam Levitin, Credit Slips

Moody’s continues to downgrade RMBS Housing Wire

Tax Cuts May Prove Better for Politicians Than for Economy New York Times

Spectre of deflation kills the mood at Jackson Hole Financial Times

Media Misses the Point on Elizabeth Warren Nomination Firedoglake

SEC Says Prince, Rubin Knew of Losses on Assets at Suit’s Focus Bloomberg. I’ve long suspected that Rubin’s ignorance of the SIV liquidity puts was feigned too (or perhaps he knew of the contractual provision, but didn’t know the jargon)

The Secret Dealer for Farmville Addicts Gawker (hat tip reader Lambert Strether)

$250k isn’t a lot of money if you want to shit gold dust Adam Ozimek

Antidote du jour:

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Summer Rerun: Bear/JP Morgan: The Rashomon Defense



This post first appeared on April 8, 2008

While there have been dark mutterings about how Bear shareholders were cheated in the sale of the firm to JP Morgan, I don’t have much sympathy for that view. Plenty of businesses fail every day; equity investors usually lose their entire stake and employees are fired. While it is sad on a human level to see people take such a reversal, it happens all the time in Darwinist America. The only difference between Bear’s share owners and those of most other companies facing liquidation is that in going though the five stages of grief over their loss, they took the bargaining phase literally.

What does have me agitated (and this blogger prefers to stay detached) is the Fed’s $29 billion subsidy to JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear and the utter lack of candor and accountability about it. Paulson came up with an excuse to run away to China to avoid testifying at the Congressional hearings on the Bear bailout this week (perhaps, having been a staffer to John Erlichman, he is acutely aware of the danger of committing perjury before Congress). In the end, Paulson’s absence probably made no difference, because the key actors executed a brilliant strategem, the Rashomon defense.

As in Kurosowa’s masterwork, certain basic elements are not in dispute: in the movie, a rape; in the financial world, a rape an unprecedented commitment on the Fed’s part that appears to be well beyond its authority. (While the Fed can lend against all sorts of collateral in exigent and unusual circumstances, I have been advised those loans are for a maximum of 28 days. It might have been possible to arrange overlapping loans that would have achieved the same end, but the Fed couldn’t be bothered to observe the niceties.)

In both performances, the witnesses tell stories that simply cannot be reconciled. The SEC insists Bear had sufficient capital. Bear CEO Schwartz maintains there was no action he could have taken to save the firm. Bernanke and Geithner claimed that the deal was necessary to preserve the financial system because Bear was going to have to file for bankruptcy (they indicated the big worry was the credit default swaps). Dimon said his firm is sound and the fact that he did the deal means he thought it was good for shareholders.

So we have at least three possible scenarios, with no way to sort them out:

1. Bear really was solvent but did not manage the crisis or its cash levels defensively enough

2. Bear was worth either not much or nothing dead, but JPM used the panic and the possibility of a Lehman-on-the-ropes further ratchet down to extract big concessions from the Fed. Put more simply, JPM played what were real risks to the max and exploited the Fed and Treasury’s desperation to get a deal done

3. There was a black hole in Bear’s balance sheet (I mean this in sense of either serious negative equity in liquidation or an information void). The possibility of losses to JPM was real (although Dimon still could have overplayed it)

What makes me even more keen for disclosure is that the de facto subsidies to JPM were even greater than previously disclosed. From “Fed Loosens Capital Rules for JPM.” in Alea (boldface his):

Up to $220 billion of Bear Stearns assets can be excluded from J.P.Morgan’s risk-weighted assets.
Up to $400 billion of Bear Stearns assets can be excluded from the denominator of the tier 1 leverage capital ratio.

JPMC also has requested that the Board provide JPMC with relief from the Board’s risk-based and leverage capital guidelines for bank holding companies.

Specifically, JPMC has requested that the Board permit JPMC, for a period of 18 months, to exclude from its total risk-weighted assets (the denominator ofthe risk based capital ratios) any risk-weighted assets associated with the assets and other exposures of Bear Stearns, for purposes of applying the risk-based capital guidelines to the bank holding company. In addition, JPMC has asked the Board to permit JPMC, for a period of 18 months, to exclude from the denominator of its tier 1 leverage capital ratio any balance-sheet assets of Bear Stearns acquired by JPMC, for purposes of applying the leverage capital guidelines to the bank holding company.

The Board has authority to provide exemptions from its risk-based and leverage capital guidelines for bank holding companies.

JPMC has agreed to several conditions that would limit the scope ofthe relief request.

First, JPMC proposes to exclude from its risk-weighted assets, for purposes of applying the Board’s risk-based capital guidelines for bank holding companies, the risk-weighted assets of Bear Steams existing on the date of acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMC, up to a total amount not to exceed $220 billion.

Second, JPMC proposes to exclude from the denominator of its tier 1 leverage capital ratio, for purposes of applying the Board’s tier 1 leverage capital guidelines for bank holding companies, the assets of Bear Stearns existing on the date of acquisition of Bear Stearns by JPMC, up to an amount not to exceed $400 billion.

These regulatory capital exemptions would assist JPMC in acquiring and stabilizing Bear Stearns and would facilitate the orderly integration of Bear Stearns with and into JPMC. The Board notes that (i) JPMC would be well capitalized upon consummation of the acquisition of Bear Stearns, even without the regulatory capital relief provided by the exemptions; and (ii) JPMC has committed to remain well capitalized during the term of the exemptions, even without the regulatory capital relief provided by the exemptions.

Note that the existence of this huge and ugly-looking concession says that someone thought there was risk here, but it still doesn’t indicate conclusively how much of this was needed to overcome JPM’s hesitation versus a sign of the depth of the Fed/Treasury’s panic.

Or did JPM need regulatory relief irrespective of the Bear transaction, and the deal provided a much-needed fig leaf? According to Institutional Risk Analytics:

To understand the grim outlook for JPM, start the analysis with derivatives. Because of its huge market share in all manner of OTC derivatives, JPM represents a “super sample” of overall OTC market risk. In terms of total size vs the bank’s balance sheet, JPM’s derivatives book is more than 7 standard deviations above the large bank peer group.

Because of this huge OTC derivatives book, the $1.6 trillion asset bank can tolerate just a 15bp realized loss across its aggregate derivatives position before losing the equivalent of its regulatory Risk Based Capital (RBC). And much like the GSEs, JPM’s positions are too big to hedge – despite what Mr. Dimon may say to the contrary about laying off his bank’s risk. And note that we have not even mentioned subprime assets yet.

Look at the balance sheet of JPM’s three main subsidiary banks and the mounting stress from loans losses is apparent. At the end of 2007, JPM aggregated 97bp of gross loan charge offs, 1.25 SDs above peer, and produced a Loss Given Default of 85%, likewise well above peer. The Exposure at Default calculated by the IRA Bank Monitor using data from the FDIC was 202%, more than 2 SDs above peer.

At the end of 2007, JPM’s Tier One Risk Based Capital held by its subsidiary banks was just $88.1 billion, a tiny foundation for the bank’s vast trading operations. The Economic Capital (”EC”) simulation in The IRA Bank Monitor generates an EC benchmark of $422 billion for JPM or a ratio of EC to Tier One RBC of 4.79:1, suggesting that JPM needs almost five times current capital levels to fully support its economic risks (boldface ours).

If that isn’t ugly enough, consider another element: while none of the principals was likely to have admitted it out loud, they may have recognized privately that the inmates are running the asylum at all of the major trading operations on Wall Street. No one in authority, including the firms’ own management, knows the score. As Michael Lewis noted last week in Bloomberg:

There is, of course, a reason that the market doesn’t understand Wall Street firms: The people who run Wall Street firms, and who convey news of their inner workings to the outside world, don’t understand them either…

Late last November, in a superb account of the demise of Citigroup CEO Charles Prince, Carol Loomis of Fortune magazine revealed that Prince resigned after he was informed of the consequences of liquidity puts…Liquidity puts were about to make Citigroup the new owner of $25 billion of crappy mortgage securities at par, cost Prince his job, and put the company into the hands of Robert Rubin….

Rubin said he had never heard of liquidity puts.

To both their investors and their bosses, Wall Street firms have become shockingly opaque. But the problem isn’t new. It dates back at least to the early 1980s when one firm, Salomon Brothers, suddenly began to make more money than all the other firms combined. (Go look at the numbers: They’re incredible.)

The profits came from financial innovation — mainly in mortgage securities and interest-rate arbitrage. But its CEO, John Gutfreund, had only a vague idea what the bright young things dreaming up clever new securities were doing. Some of it was very smart, some of it was not so smart, but all of it was beyond his capacity to understand.

Ever since then, when extremely smart people have found extremely complicated ways to make huge sums of money, the typical Wall Street boss has seldom bothered to fully understand the matter, to challenge and question and argue.

This isn’t because Wall Street CEOs are lazy, or stupid. It’s because they are trapped. The Wall Street CEO can’t interfere with the new new thing on Wall Street because the new new thing is the profit center, and the people who create it are mobile.

Anything he does to slow them down increases the risk that his most lucrative employees will quit and join another big firm, or start their own hedge fund. He isn’t a boss in the conventional sense. He’s a hostage of his cleverest employees.

At this point you have to at least wonder if Wall Street firms should be public companies. Their complexity renders them inherently opaque. Investors are right now waking up to this fact: They will demand to be paid for opacity, and also for volatility.

The firms have been revealed to be so treacherous in bad times that the only way they survive as public companies is to make outrageously huge sums in good times. That is, as public companies, to be economically viable they are likely to be socially problematic.

If they aren’t about to go under, they are making so much money that everyone else hates them

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Back to the premise. The witnesses in the Congressional hearings no doubt chose not to attempt to reconcile their organization’s version of events with other accounts, cleverly leaving the panel and the wider world the impossible task of trying to come up with a consistent, coherent picture.

But per Lewis, the main actors may also unwittingly be victims of their own incomplete understanding. While they may all be trying to script Rashomon, the real story may be the blind men and the elephant, each only able to discern a piece and unable to grasp the whole.

Tom Ferguson: The Invisible Hand Is Waving Goodbye



This is a great interview of Tom Ferguson on Real News Network on the consequences of the “head’s I win, tails you lose” the financial sector has constructed with the rest of us, with Baltimore as object lesson. Enjy!

Links 9/10/10



Sorry for thin links. Big car accident on drive from airport, greatly increased transit time.

‘Five-minute brain scan’ for kids BBC

Health Insurer PacifiCare Faces Up To $9.9 Billion In Fines For Nearly A Million Alleged Health Care Violations Huffington Post (hat tip reader Francois T)

Obama mired in surreal US politics Edward Luce, Financial Times

What Can Goolsbee’s Early Academic Work Tell Us About the R&D Tax Credit? Mike Konczal (hat tip reader EGA)

China Posts $20 Billion Trade Surplus as U.S. Seeks Yuan Gains Bloomberg

The authority to justify fiscal austerity is lapsing billy blog

America’s public servants are now its masters Mort Zuckerman, Financial Times. More politics of hate your neighbor to shift the focus from the fact that the real rent extraction is taking place by those in the top 1% in incomes and rents. Also engages in apples and oranges comparisons. You’d expect Federal civilian workers to be better paid; the educational requirements are higher than for American workers as a whole. But he fligs what ought to be the real interpretation of the data: government workers are not making out like bandits; it’s that the private sector has gotten better and better at putting the screws on its workers.

Antidote du jour (hat tip reader Tlee):
A family living in Colorado Springs wondered why their water barrel was almost empty some days. They set up a camera and caught a bear bathing. Here is their email:

“Well, he’s back.

“Big Al came for his weekly bath again this week. He really looks like he enjoys the experience. He needs a bigger tub, we’ll think about that for next year:

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Auerback: China is Still a Renegade Nation



By Marshall Auerback, a portfolio strategist and Roosevelt Institute fellow

A few years ago, Chris Dialynas and I wrote a piece which introduced the concept of “renegade economics”. It was derived from a Frank D. Graham’s 1943 essay titled,
“Fundamentals of International Monetary Policy.” Graham, a Princeton University economist, wrote: “In international affairs we must therefore strive to reconcile the liberty of the individual, the sovereignty of states, and the welfare of the international community.” He understood that poorly crafted economic policies and rules in a global economy would lead to great imbalances that threaten stability and freedom. His analysis and insights applied to the two world wars of the last century as well as to the Great Depression.

But Graham’s insights, we noted in the article, were still relevant, notably in regard to China. Graham maintained that a poorly regulated fixed-exchange rate regime is inherently unstable. He argued that countries would cheat by setting their currency at rates that promote national agendas, ignoring the instability imposed upon the global economy. They become “renegade nations” in effect practicing “renegade economics.”

The nation which best reflects this description today is China. In response to Beijing’s mind boggling increase in real credit in the first half of 2009,\Chinese fixed investment in industrial tradables rose dramatically . In the first phase of such an investment boom China’s imports had to rise, as the country needed capital goods and inputs for planned new industrial capacity. It takes many quarters to go from credit disbursements to the completion of new capacity and the initiation of new production. By the second quarter of this year some – but only some – of this new capacity began to come on stream. Further production responses to this new round of Chinese overinvestment lie ahead. When such capacity comes on stream there is a lesser need for imported capital goods and for the import and stock piling of inputs for planned future production. Instead, there is an onslaught of new production which targets export markets and which substitutes for prior imports.

The build-up of new production is undoubtedly a key factor behind China’s prominent rise to the world’s number 2 economic power. But because of the potential protectionist threat and the underlying fragility at the heart of China’s capex boom (along with the corruption of its political class), the change in status might prove to be ephemeral, much as Japan’s vaunted rise to number 2 ultimately gave way to a post-bubble morass which exists to this day in “The Land of the Setting Sun”.

Why the caution on China? For one thing, the recent surge in Chinese exports and even the reduction in Chinese imports reflect the first stage of the production onslaught from the industrial overinvestment triggered by the 2009 credit boom. There has been more of this in 2010, masked by a brief, but cosmetic change in China’s trade balance with the US last March. More recently, China has reported some disappointing economic numbers. They have been more negative than they look. China reports its statistics on a year over year basis, not on a sequential month to month or quarter to quarter basis. Year over year growth rates for many Chinese economic statistics have slowed somewhat, but remain very high. These are the growth rates that everyone focuses on. From this year over year data one can interpolate with some difficulty sequential month to month and quarter to quarter growth rates for these same economic variables. Based on calculations done by Lombard Street Research it appears that in July Chinese domestic demand may have gone negative in real terms. It was only a huge improvement in net trade that kept production growth significantly positive on a sequential basis.

Frank Veneroso, in particular, noted that the Asian PMIs have all started to turn down. The consensus has been that Asia would remain the strong part of the world economy. PMIs falling to 50 in several Asian economies may suggest otherwise. Obviously, much depends upon the Chinese economy. There have been signs that credit tightening in the first half of this year has led to something of a slowdown. Because of the endless flaws in the Chinese data it is hard to monitor sequential change in the Chinese economy. Both the government and HSBC PMIs from China have shown a significant industrial deceleration.
What leaps out are the declines in many Asian region PMIs all the way back down to the 50 level. Here is the most recent PMI from Japan.

Picture 19

The Korean industrial data still shows significant positive growth, albeit down from the spectacular growth several quarters ago. However, its PMI is also down to the 50 level.

Picture 20

Korean exports also appear to validate this caution over Asia.

They are released at the beginning each month and are the first to report in Asia (indeed the world, as far as we know) and the data quality is good.

The debate over a global slowdown will continue, but Korean exports suggest that the slide has already begun. September’s release showed Korean exports fell -13%m/m SAAR in August. This is the second m/m contraction, which does not happen that often for Korea; i.e., this could be statistically significant.

Some have argued that Korean exporters would be spared a slowdown due to a sharply weaker currency, especially against the JPY. Recall Japan is Korea’s main competitor. But this drop in exports appears to be happening despite a significant currency advantage, which again points to China as the potential culprit.

The same can be said of Australia and Taiwan where their manufacturing PMIs have fallen to 51.7 from 54.4 and 49.2 from 50.5 respectively.

It is difficult to gauge the significance of this purchasing data from Asia. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that this PMI data may be suggesting more economic weakness is Asia than the consensus has anticipated. This might be due to a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ currency policy embraced by China, much as it did in the early 1990s, as well as the relentlessly weak U.S. economic data over the last several months, or a combination of both.

In such a context of seriously slowing domestic demand, largely in response to various kinds of credit restrictions imposed earlier this year, the new increment to Chinese industrial capacity and production must find a home in foreign markets. It is this process that has probably been in large part responsible for the surge in Chinese exports over the last two months. If so, as more and more of the new capacity comes on stream, short of a violent reversal in Chinese demand management policies, Chinese exports should continue to surge. A further increase in inbound container volumes into U. S. West Coast ports in July supports this expectation.

At the same time, the notion that China has responded to this favorable shift in trade balances by “revaluing” the currency is a classic smoke and mirrors game. For Beijing, it turns out that” increased flexibility” just meant “we’ll do a quick half-percent move so it looks like we’re doing something and we’ll just make it more volatile so we can screw the speculators”. This is something they must have learned that one from the French. In terms of cumulative appreciation since the announcement, we have pretty much flat-lined around 0.6%. In other words, the RMB is not looking not too different from the Hong Kong Dollar – a currency that is still officially pegged.

It therefore appears that all China did was to make a political gesture ahead of the G-20 meeting held last June They did not revalue. They did not widen the currency band. They were not specific about reforms. They have said the ratio of their current account surplus to GDP has been declining since the beginning of 2010, “with the BOP account moving closing to equilibrium, the basis for large scale appreciation of the RMB exchange rate does not exist.” That basically suggests they think little Yuan appreciation is needed. Hence, any Chinese revaluation going forward is likely to be similarly marginal and therefore a non event for the markets.

In one sense, that doesn’t give the whole story, given that wage and price pressures have already increased in China, thereby in effect “revaluing” the RMB via internal inflation.. The recent rash of strikes in China and loud complaints from Chinese exporters over rising costs are testimony to a significant increase in the level of prices of inputs for manufacturers in China. If Chinese exporters of manufactured tradables experience a cost squeeze that cannot be good for Chinese corporate profits or the profits of its competitors in international markets for industrial goods, Chinese equities and equities elsewhere should suffer.

Of greatest importance, it is assumed by today’s market place that if the Chinese real trade weighted exchange rate revalues significantly, this would be a positive for the global economy. There is an idea out there that global imbalances in the form of excessive Chinese savings and excessive U.S. consumption has caused the disaster of the last several years. What have, in fact, caused these disasters are unprecedented global financial disequilibria resulting from myriad market bubbles, in part stemming from government policies in the U.S. and elsewhere that have fostered such bubble behavior. If China were to revalue significantly now they would increase the risks of more financial disequilibria largely because of the impact likely to be experienced in China itself, which could dwarf the situation that occurred in Japan, during its post bubble collapse.

The risk of consequent bursting bubbles lies in China itself. Today’s market participants have a belief that higher Chinese exchange rates will facilitate the transition from excessive fixed investment in China to more Chinese consumption. They seem to believe this will happen smoothly and that it will be a step towards stable global growth.

But as Veneroso has argued, throughout history, when fixed investment excesses have been reversed, there have been recessions. Fixed investment has never smoothly passed the baton to rising consumption. Whenever a fixed investment ratio has fallen from a high level there has always been an adverse multiplier into income and, therefore, into consumption. Check the historical record. There is little to support such optimism. The chances that China can smoothly transfer the growth baton from fixed investment to consumption should be less than in other historical instances. China’s current fixed investment ratio is higher than anything the world has ever seen.

In all economies and in all markets the greater the excess, the more severe the unwind. After all
the bubbles and their bursting over the last fifteen years this should be obvious to everyone.
Throughout history the greater the fixed investment excess the more severe has been the
subsequent recession when that excess was unwound. The fact that China has the greatest fixed investment excess ever suggests that, when it unwinds, there will be a nasty economic
adjustment in China.

The more China experiences a revaluation of its real trade weighted exchange rate the greater the chances of a fixed investment downturn. A large part of China’s overall fixed investment and its excesses are in tradable goods industries. It is no secret that these industries are already being squeezed by rising domestic costs and China’s peg to a rising dollar. A further double-barreled push to a higher real trade weighted exchange rate from domestic inflation plus revaluation will seriously squeeze the self financing of industrial fixed investment. This will turn this part of overall Chinese fixed investment downward.

Can China pick up the slack with increases in fixed investment in housing and in infrastructure?
That is unlikely. There has been so much over building of real estate in China that the government has taken numerous measures this year to curb real estate speculation and over building. A reversal of this policy would simply shift the locus of unstable overinvestment from the industrial sector to the real estate sector which is unwanted by the Chinese policy makers and would probably prove to be unsustainable in any case.

What about infrastructure? It is always possible that China could decide to build even more infrastructure projects than it has already started. But there are impediments to this. Most of these projects are directed by state and local governments. According to many the state and local governments have borrowed to fund these projects through unorthodox channels and are now saddled with debts they may not be able to service. We have to remember that many of these infrastructure projects do not generate revenues that make them “self-financing”. It is possible that, over the long run, the central government of China may assume responsibility for the financing of these projects and use their control over money issue to assure their finance,

But so radical a step is likely to occur only after some unwind of China’s fixed investment excesses in the infrastructure sector have already created some damage.

As for the consumer quickly picking up the economic growth baton, there is no historical precedent for this. The fact that China’s consumption is such a small share of GDP makes it even more unlikely it could happen in a meaningful way in China. The fact that high income households who account for much of Chinese consumption have a huge exposure to Chinese real estate, which is a bubble, makes it even less likely that the Chinese consumer can pick up the baton amidst a downdraft in fixed investment.

The U.S. Congress was supposed to vote on China as a currency manipulator on April 15 of this year. As the date approached China’s trade account went suddenly, almost miraculously, and very transitorily into a deficit. This, plus efforts by the Geithner Treasury to avert “frictions” over the trade issue led to a deferral of that vote and an ultimate decision that China was not a currency manipulator.

Since then China’s trade account has gone back into a huge surplus and the U.S. trade deficit has widened dramatically, to some considerable degree as a result of trade deterioration with China. Obviously, the lawmakers and politicians who wanted to brand China as a currency manipulator and backed off because of the change in the Chinese trade balance this past March are likely to now want to bring the Chinese trade and currency issues back to the table. Additionally, since April the U.S. economic data has deteriorated in a relentless fashion. We are probably not yet in a double dip recession, but at a minimum the odds favor slow enough economic growth which, if not increasing unemployment, will certainly fail to reduce it. U.S. trade deterioration has contributed to this growth slowdown. The odds are great that, if the unemployment rate rises, there will be greater political pressure to do something about the adverse impact of China’s “mercantilism” on the U.S. economy and unemployment

Obviously, if the U.S. goes into a double dip recession and unemployment soars, the China trade issue is likely to become a politically very pressing one, especially during the heat of mid-term elections.

The Chinese at home face a dual bubble in real estate. There is a price bubble. According to the NBER, the real inflation adjusted price of land in Beijing has increased eight fold since 2003 – most of it in recent years. There have been similar though lesser land price bubbles in other cities. There is a quantity bubble as well. There are estimates that many tens of millions of apartments and other dwellings in China are vacant, suggesting a supply glut and vacancy rate beyond those experienced in other notorious quantity property bubbles elsewhere in Asia. These property price and quantity bubbles have gotten much worse over the last year and a half as a result of the unprecedented real credit expansion launched by the credit authorities in early 2009.

In addition, to these two bubbles in property in China there is clearly overinvestment in many industrial sectors in China. There is also an infrastructure bubble in the sense that many local authorities have embarked on massive projects which they are unable to finance through traditional channels.

Faced with these multiple “bubbles”, the Chinese authorities have been trying to reign in price and quantity bubbles in the real estate sector, have been trying to curtail capacity in some heavy industries, and have been trying to limit unconventional and often illegal financings by local authorities. All of these point to some degree of restraint on domestic demand. Given such restraint and the now programmed surge in the capacity to produce industrial tradables the odds are that China cannot afford a reversal in its widening trade surplus, since that would leave large swaths of industrial capacity idle and threaten employment as well as the absorption of migration from rural areas to urban centers. In other words, given the fact that the credit boom of 2009 has lead to serious overheating, China will try to restrain “pockets” of excess demand and is therefore going to be loath to take measures that would stop its export juggernaut and its substitution of imports.

This combination of growing U.S. political discontent over the U.S./China trade deficit and China’s need to put its latest round of fixed investment in industrial tradables to use in the context of domestic demand constraint puts U.S. and Chinese politics as regards trade on a collision course.

Economists and policy makers in the United States regard protectionism that might arise out of such a political impasse as a grave threat and danger to the world economy. But is this really true as regards the U.S.? That is not borne out by history, according to Peter Temin’s “Lessons from the Great Depression”.

Many blame a good part of the Great Depression on the Smoot Hawley legislation passed in 1930. But
Temin notes that during the 1930s, the Smoot Hawley legislation hurt countries like the U.S. which had large export surpluses and were large net creditor countries. It did not hurt countries that were on the other side of those trade surpluses and external credits, such as the UK.

What would happen if there was a trade war between the U.S. and Asia today? U.S. consumers might find their goods slightly more expensive at Wal-Mart if U.S. companies did not manage to move the locus of their offshore production from China to other low cost countries fast enough. Would that really be so grave a loss to the U.S. economy? Asia has conducted mercantilist policies at the expense of Asian consumers for decades, and the investment world regards it as having been a successful strategy. Would it be a disaster for the U.S. if U.S. consumers had to pay a little more for their goods, but more of those goods might be produced once again back home, thereby reviving the U.S. industrial base?

If one simply looks at the numbers, in a trade war the U.S., with a low share of industry in its GDP, would be hurt far less than Asia with a very high share of industry in its GDP.

This sentiment has now been seconded by Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman who typically has the guts to challenge the orthodox consensus when it makes no sense. Krugman in effect backs the thesis set out by Peter Temin.

My colleagues believe that we should lecture the Chinese on what a bad thing they’re doing, but not actually threaten sanctions, lest we start a trade war. My belief is that this gets us nowhere. …
I say confront the issue head on – and if it leads to trade conflict, bear in mind that in a depressed world economy, surplus countries have a lot to lose from such a conflict, while deficit countries may well end up gaining.

Big Pharma: Even Worse Than Used Cars as a Market for Lemons?



Some readers have wondered why this blog from time to time runs posts on the US health care system. Aside from the fact that it’s a major public policy problem in America, it is also a prime example of bad incentives, information asymmetry, and corporate predatory behavior. It thus makes for an important object lesson.

Reader Francois T pointed to an example, a commentary on a paper presented by Donald Light at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, “Pharmaceuticals: A Two-Tiered Market for Producing ‘Lemons’ and Serious Harm.” It still appears to be embargoed, but Howard Brody provides an extensive summary on his blog.

Light uses George Akerlof “market for lemons” as a point of departure. For those not familiar with the famed Akerlof paper, a “market for lemons” can occur when consumers are unable to distinguish product quality. The used car market is the paradigm, since the dealer has a much better idea than the buyer of whether a particular car is any good. Unscrupulous operators can stick a lot of hapless chump customers with overpriced clunkers. However, as crooked vendors become more common, buyers wise up a tad and are not longer to pay as much for cars they cannot evaluate. So while the prices buyers are now willing to pay are probably still too high for rattletraps, they are too low for decent cars. People with good merchandise start to look for other channels. Akerlof posits that the market eventually falls apart.

Note that used cars dealers did not set out to create lemons; the cars were bad deals by being overpriced (presumably, if they had been presented, warts and all, they still would have found purchasers, presumably people who thought they could repair them and those who wanted them for parts and scrap). Light contends, by contrast, that major pharmaceutical companies create bad products:

[T]he pharmaceutical market for ‘lemons,’ differs from other markets for lemons in that companies develop and produce the lemons. Evidence in this paper indicates that the production of lemon-drugs with hidden dangers is widespread and results from the systematic exploitation of monopoly rights and the production of partial, biased information about the efficacy and safety of new drugs…Companies will design and run their clinical trials to minimize evidence that their drugs cause adverse reactions and maximize evidence that they are not inferior to or [are] better than a placebo for the target indication. And companies will also learn from the regulatory body how to game accelerated approvals and condition[al] approvals with post-market studies by cutting corners and submitting partial evidence in order to get drugs on the market faster and put the regulator under pressure to approve and not to later rescind.

Yves here. The reason we have an FDA was unsafe food, such as adulterated meat products and unsanitary slaughterhouses, and toxic medicines (such as radium drinks that produced some particularly horrid deaths). And the impetus for the FDA is being proven correct: producers, left to their own devices, value their own profits over their customers’ well being.

Pharma defender will contend this picture is distorted; the industry is highly innovative. Really? Its innovativeness of late is on par with Wall Street’s. The Financial Times reported that of the so-called “new drug applications” to the FDA, 88% were not in fact new drugs at all. They were either slightly different formulations (say, a time released version, so patients might need to take a pill only once a day rather than morning and evening), or were simply getting “off label”uses approved so that that the drug company could market that application (pharmaceuticals can be marketed only for uses approved by the FDA, but doctor are free to prescribe a drug as they see fit). Light has read a broad range of studies and has similar findings, that only 10% to 15% of the drugs approved by the FDA are new compounds. Thus, per Light, “[C]ompany R&D goes largely to a marketing strategy that does not meet societal needs or the needs of patients.”

Brody draws some implications from Light’s study:

Extrapolating from the best available figures, the US suffers about 111,000 deaths annually from adverse drug reactions (that is, drugs prescribed and administered correctly, and leaving aside deaths from medical errors), or more than twice as many fatalities as from auto accidents. This puts adverse drug reactions as the 4th leading cause of death, and besides, adverse reactions lead to about 1.5M hospitalizations per year (the total damage toll being underestimated because we lack good data for nonhospital settings).

If the industry produced drugs, many of which offer no real advantage over existing drugs, and then urged the maximum possible caution in their use, we could perhaps avoid some of this swath of death and destruction. But such, of course, would hardly suit the company bottom line; so instead we have what Light calls the “risk proliferation syndrome.” Company-sponsored research talks up the efficacy and the safety of the drug. Marketing then tries to get physicians to prescribe the drug to as many patients as possible, including those (such as the elderly) inherently at higher risk for adverse reactions, and those who have less and less chance of actually benefiting (because their disease is mild, or for whom nondrug therapy would work better, etc.) The industry does everything possible to speed up FDA approvals of new drugs and to slow down any threatened FDA action to remove an unsafe drug from the market or to restrict its use. The end result is that as many patients as possible are put at risk, while revenues go steadily up.

The financial power of the drug industry allows it to “colonize” medicine in the same way that it has effectively taken over the FDA. This means that more and more of medicine turns into a commercial enterprise placed at the service of industry profits. New diseases are “discovered” that require drugs to treat them. The medical literature becomes indistinguishable from the industry marketing juggernau

Yves here. In one sense, we do have evidence of a market for lemons: the rising popularity of alternative medicine. Some of its appeal is that certain treatments do work (for instance, acupuncture does reduce inflammation) and that alternative practitioners are interested in ailments often deemed as sub-clinical by MDs. one impetus is that some consumers are reluctant to take drugs. Light’s analysis says their concern is not unfounded.

Will We Finally See Some Prosecutions for Lehman’s Dubious Accounting?



I know some readers may think that Lehman is 2008’s news. That sort of learned attention deficit disorder works to the advantage of those who participated in or enabled the looting of the average person to the benefit of the banksters. And the degree of questionable behavior of Lehman was so pronounced that if regulators and prosecutors are unable to collect a scalp or two, it provides compelling evidence of deficiencies in our legal regime as far as white collar crime is concerned. And I use the word “crime” deliberately. What went on at Lehman and AIG, as well as the chicanery in the CDO business, by any sensible standard is criminal.

The Wall Street Journal reports that the SEC is ratcheting up its investigation into questionable accounting practices at Lehman. Lehman has long looked to be the poster child of likely accounting fraud. As we noted while the firm was on the ropes, it was engaging in visible dubious marks of major assets (the famed and widely discussed SunCal and Archstone developments). If you are so desperate as to mark assets up in a way that the outside world can see and question, what other questionable valuations lurk elsewhere? The Valkas report unearthed the now infamous Repo 105, a mechanism for moving assets off balance sheet at quarter end to make it appear to be less levered.

It appears the findings of the Valkas report were too damaging for the SEC not to take action, and the agency is in the midst of what appears to be a pretty serious investigation, and the US attorney is also taking a hard look. One metric: the Journal notes, “former Lehman executives have hired armies of lawyers.” The SEC is also looking into the rather notable lack of interest shown by Lehman’s accountant, Ernst & Young, in Repo 105.

While Lehman certainly looks to be a textbook case of excessively creative accounting (how could Lehman show positive net worth of $26 billion as of your last quarterly report and then produce an estimated $130 billion in losses in bankruptcy? The “disorderly collapse” argument is insufficient as an explanation), I would not hold my breath about obtaining criminal indictments. Look at the recent experience with Joe Cassano, of AIG, another obvious target for investigations. His “get out of jail free” card was that he told his accountants what he was up to. One of the huge FUBARs in our current legal regime is that it allows desperate or criminal managements to use compliant accountants and attorneys as cover.

In the sort of thefts that little people engage in, like holding up a store, the person who drives the car is an accessory and can be prosecuted. But white collar crooks can escape if they get their advisors to wink and nod (in both criminal and civil cases, most juries will be very reluctant to find an executive guilty for something his accountant signed off on). Now that would suggest that the logical route is to go after the crooked (or at best criminally incompetent) advisors. But as we wrote in ECONNED:

Legislators also need to restore secondary liability. Attentive readers may recall that a Supreme Court decision in 1994 disallowed suits against advisors like accountants and lawyers for aiding and abetting frauds. In other words, a plaintiff could only file a claim against the party that had fleeced him; he could not seek recourse against those who had made the fraud possible, say, accounting firms that prepared misleading financial statements. That 1994 decision flew in the face of sixty years of court decisions, practices in criminal law (the guy who drives the car for a bank robber is an accessory), and common sense. Reinstituting secondary liability would make it more difficult to engage in shoddy practices.

One factor that would seem to improve the odds of success in pursuing former Lehman executives is they were directly involved in the preparation of the dubious financial statements, while at AIG, the dubious behavior occurred at the operational level, and accounting and management controls appear to have been weak (which serves to give corporate level executives plausible deniability). But you have a thicket of other problems. The biggest is if any of these cases were to go to trial, complex financial fraud cases are very hard to win. As Frank Partnoy explains long form in his book Infectious Greed, defense attorneys can win simply by confusing the jury. And given some of the stunning decisions he recounts, that approach seems to work with some judges too.

An a further obstacle is that the SEC is just not practiced at this sort of case. For many years, they limited their focus to insider trading cases. Their botched suit against Ralph Cioffi, the manager of the Bear hedge funds that blew up in July 2007, has no doubt made them more cautious in their choice of targets.

Despite the obstacles to winning in court (which in turn weakens the government’s ability to extract a juicy settlement), Lehman is such a high profile case that the SEC may feel politically that it has not choice other than to file the best suit it can. If so, it will be revealing to see how they frame it and who they decide to pursue. The Goldman Abacus suit suggests that they will focus very narrowly. And that in turn means its potential to have broader impact is likely to be limited.

ECB Chief economist disses German banks (and Eurostresstests)



A little shock for the Germans while we’re at it, with resonances for the whole Eurozone. From FT Deutschland:

The chief economist of the European Central Bank (ECB), Juergen Stark, considers the German banks to be undercapitalized. Stark made this statement on Wednesday at a meeting with the head of Unions Parliamentary Group in Berlin, according to participants. He was referring largely to savings banks and regional banks (Sparkassen und Landesbanken). Accordingly, [Stark] called for privatization of the German savings banks, based on the successful Spanish model. The ECB declined to comment.

Jürgen Stark’s comments feed doubts about the local banking system.This is even more surprising given the positive results for the regional banks in the stress test of the EU in July, in which the ECB were heavily involved.

Well, whether any of that is a big novelty is debatable: not if you read Hubert in the comments, or read Yves’s posts passim, for the last couple of years at least, or anything at all about the recent stress tests, apart from the official puffs. Very tasteless remarks, these. Good for Stark, though there is some serious politics going on, no doubt, when the ECB’s Chief Economist contradicts the ECB.

Apart from the nationalized Hypo Real Estate, which took part hors concors, as it were, all the banks, even in the worst scenario, reached the required minimum capital ratio. According to statements at the time by the Bundesbank and BaFin, which share regulatory responsibility, the banking system was “robust” and “resistant”. Admittedly, the German savings banks, unlike the Spanish Cajas, did not take the test.

So he’s administering a glancing blow to BuBA and BaFin as well. Hmm. Takeaway: some breaking of ranks in Europe on the quality of the stress tests.

Meantime, irrespective of all that, Stark  agrees that the German banks are going to need rather a lot of new capital because of the Basel III changes to their very arcane capital calculations.

The Irish mess (II)



One of the striking features of a really slap-up financial disaster is the immense scale on which those hackneyed old stages of grief (Shock, Denial, Bargaining, Guilt, Anger, Depression, Acceptance and Hope) are worked out.

With an eye to illustrating this progression one more time, my last post on Ireland was just a snapshot of the dubious official story about the state of Irish banks. I had a little feeling that the snapshot would soon be out of date; in the most important respect, the likely Irish loan losses (initially touted as 30% of EUR 70Bn, though the first set of loans were transferred in at 50% haircuts), it was already bordering on stale. When one observes that those loans were ~50% “investment property” and ~28% land, 50% haircuts look pretty darned optimistic, too. Any guesses on appetite for investment property and development land in Ireland, for the foreseeable future? Those loans look like zeroes, on any reasonable timescale.

Based on the latest news, for the Irish government, the stages of Grief seem more likely to be Denial, Bargaining and Oblivion. Two years into the Irish crisis (for the Irish banks, the music stopped, dead, in September 2008) we may be glimpsing the end of the Bargaining phase.

First of all, the second set of transfers into NAMA, at haircuts around 60%, pretty much extinguishes any hope that the average losses will be anything like 30%, even bearing in mind that after the second transfer, only one third of the loans (23Bn of EUR 70Bn) have been transferred.

Also, since NAMA has changed its mind about what to disclose (the first summary report included a breakdown by categories, the second doesn’t), we don’t really know what’s backing the loans in that second tranche; it was supposed to be yet more development land. One hopes they will catch up with a separate disclosure and confirm that.

But the real killer is the scale of new losses coming out of Anglo-Irish Bank. It just keeps getting worse, justifying the gloomiest suspicions. Perhaps the most alarming thing is this glimpse of Anglo-Irish Bank’s balance sheet. Why is the cost of immediately closing Anglo-Irish calculated to be EUR70Bn? That must be based on firesale valuations of its assets. Why would the EU commission suggest such a course of action: is a firesale valuation the best that can be hoped for? Unfortunately, that sounds very possible, looking at the NAMA valuations, and with so many other recent precedents (Lehman, and Iceland’s banks, for instance).

The Irish government opted to press on with its good bank/bad bank split and a slow (hah, 15-year) wind-down, instead.

That won’t be the last time Lenihan has to reassure the markets, and it will get harder each time.

In the mean time, sleuths are discovering new ways to portray just how tiny the pool of Irish business talent is, and by implication, how well-connected with the Government. The more of this mess is dropped in the laps of tax payers, via ‘austerity’, by the very politicians who corruptly facilitated its creation, the angrier those taxpayers will get; a sampler in the article and comments here.

Oblivion for the Irish Government, in due course. Not much Hope for Irish taxpayers for the foreseeable future. And continuing Shocks for the Eurozone, whether triggered by political instability in Ireland, or some final admission that the Irish economy simply can’t guarantee the Irish bank losses.

More on this topic (What's this?)
Ireland - First PIIG to Break Down
THE AUSTERITY TRAP
Read more on Investing in Ireland at Wikinvest

Links 9/9/10



Apologies for thin links, still traveling….

Keeping up appearances Ben Goldacre, Guardian (hat tip reader John M)

Humpback dinosaur – theropod of the north Guardian (hat tip reader John M)

Labor Day 2010 II Joe Costello

Pat Choate: Our “Innovation Crisis” & Patent Backlog The Big Picture (hat tip reader Francois T)

Retailers – Reality Check Time Jim Quinn

Food Stamp Participation Climbs 10% Mark Thoma CBS MoneyWatch (hat tip reader Francois T)

Japan Plans to Seek Discussions With China on Bond Purchases Bloomberg. Tim Duy, who pointed out this story, notes, “I see the evolving conflict between China and Japan as a very significant story. It is absolutely classic – Japanese policymakers never realized the tide could turn against them.”

Geithner Says China Needs to Let Markets Drive Yuan Higher Bloomberg. The article curiously fails to mention that the yuan has actually FALLEN on a trade-weighted basis its widely ballyhooed announcement that is was going to have a more market-based currency policy….maybe…someday.

Antidote du jour:

Picture 18

 
BERJAYA