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Does the Prague Treaty (aka New START) limit missile defenses? Certainly the text mentions defenses, but does it limit them?

“Limit” is a very particular word — The definitions in OED suggest usage most often involves those things that we can measure: time, acreage, troops, eggs, and whatnot.

That usage holds true, too, in the context of arms control treaties, where we use “limit” to mean a numerical constraint such as so-many ICBMs or so-many warheads. So, for example, the practice in START documents of referring to treaty’s “central limit” of 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as various “limits” and “sub-limits” of delivery vehicles and warheads. In all cases, a “limit” refers to something numerical. Try search strings like start nuclear limit site:.gov or start nuclear limit site:.mil and the pattern is clear.

In that narrow sense, START does not limit US missile defenses. Nevertheless, the treaty touches upon missile defenses in three ways, which I gather will be the subject of discussion during the ratification process:

1. The preambular language recognizes that there is an interrelationship between strategic offenses and strategic defenses.
2. Article 3 (7A) excludes missile-defense interceptors from the definition of a ballistic missile, irrespective of other characteristics like trajectory or range.
3. Article V (3) prohibits further conversion of ICBM and SLBM launchers to hold missile defense interceptors, and vice versa. (Previously converted launchers are grand-fathered.)

Preambular Language

The preamble to the Prague Treaty contains a passage that comments on the relationship between strategic offenses and defenses:

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.

You could utter any or all these things at a Defense Policy Board meeting and no one would spit coffee through his nose. This is pretty bland stuff.

What will complicate the preambular language is Russia’s unilateral statement that “the extraordinary conditions” that might lead to Moscow’s withdrawal would include the development of US defenses that “would result in a threat to the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.”

Such statements are not new — as Kingston Reif and Travis Sharp have both noted, Moscow made a similar statement after signing the original START. (I hasten to add that the vote on START was 93-6 with yes votes including Chuck Grassley, Orrin Hatch, Richard Lugar, John McCain, and Mitch McConnell.) The Administration, too, seems aware of this history.

Yet, it seems some are set to make an issue of this language and the Russian statement. I really don’t understand the issue. It is a fact of life that Russia takes current and anticipated US missile defense capabilities into account when making decisions about its nuclear forces. It is also the fact that the treaty has a withdrawal clause. The New START Treaty would not last long if the United States developed extraordinarily capable defenses that would allow the United States to negate the Russian deterrent.

That is precisely why even the Bush Administration sought to make clear that missile defense did not threaten Russia. On that score, I think missile defense advocates should welcome the preamble, which commits Russia to the statement that “current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties.” That’s going to be useful at some point.

Missile Defense Exclusion

The treaty defines intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and, for good measure, enumerates them by type. Although missile defense interceptors are not listed as treaty-limited equipment, the treaty contains a further provision to make clear that interceptors — without regard to their range or other properties — are simply not ballistic missiles to be covered by the treaty:

A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of the treaty apply.

No Silo Conversion

Finally, Article IV of the Treaty contains a number of provisions that confine the location of treaty limited equipment. So, for example, there are restrictions on joint basing of nuclear-equipped and non-nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. The principle is a straightforward one: Requiring parties to declare the locations of equipment substantially eases the task of verification.

Article V, which deals with the development of new offensive arms, contains a provision that prohibits the parties from using ICBM and SLBM launchers to house missile defense interceptors and vice versa:

Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

The advantages of this are obvious: otherwise, you would have Russian inspectors crawling all over US missile defense interceptors to ensure they weren’t stocked with contraband treaty-limited equipment.

Keith Payne and others have erroneously claimed the Prague Treaty counts the five Minuteman III silos at Vandenberg that were converted for missile defense missions and that “the launchers themselves probably will be eliminated.”

That is incorrect. The passage from the treaty clearly notes that the provision does not apply to launchers previously converted. (Nor, obviously, would it apply to new missile-defense launchers in Alaska or Poland.)

Moreover, the Seventh Agreed Statement of the Protocol contains procedures to conduct an exhibition to demonstrate that the silos at Vandenberg really were converted to hold missile defense interceptors. It is evident that nothing need be eliminated. All one had to do was read the treaty.

Ah, there is the rub! I confronted a colleague making this accusation the other day. He responded that we won’t know until the treaty text is released. The text had been released a couple of days before (and I had slogged through it before doing interviews). Not having read the treaty didn’t stop my colleague from being very confident about his assertion in a public setting, which is a life lesson, I suppose.

Does The Treaty Limit Missile Defenses?

I think it is very hard to conclude that the treaty “limits” missile defenses. The treaty may have some implications for missile defense programs, but on the whole it is written in such a way as to create space for current and planned missile defense programs, including language that exempts interceptors from the definition of an ICBM and the provision to “grandfather” the converted silos at Vandenberg.

Still, I suspect we will continue hear from some quarters that the treaty “limits” missile defense. This is a form of special pleading. The common-sense test is that no one would claim that the treaty “limits” conventional bombers, despite some provisions to separate conventional bombers from their nuclear-equipped brethren. By any consistent standard, the treaty limits neither.

The Russians — big surprise — have released the Russian text of the New START/Prague Treaty and the Protocol. Last I heard, the Obama Administration was planning to wait until the entire packet was submitted to the Senate.

Of course, the documents are all in Russian. So, those of us who would like to be helpful are, again, reduced to working from a machine translation. Thanks almighty for Pavel Podvig.

The same thing happened this summer, when the Administration tried to sit on on the Joint Understanding, the Russians burned them, and the official copy leaked — all without action by the White House. Actually, the Russians have done this throughout the negotiation.

Every time, the White House gets caught flat-footed. What exactly is the major malfunction here?

Open note to the White House: The Russians don’t give a f*ck about your carefully managed roll-out, ok?

Upate | 11:13 am I take it all back. State has posted the Text and Protocol online. I can only assume this was the plan all along.

Photo credit: John McDowell. (Worth checking out his entire portfolio, by the way).

Peter Baker, in the New York Times, has a long piece on the bomber counting rules in the New START (or Prague Treaty).

The bottom line — as both Pavel Podvig and Hans Kristensen argue — is that the bomber rules are an accounting gimmick and, by extension, that the treaty would not meaningfully cut US strategic nuclear forces.

Despite my respect for both Pavel and Hans, I think their criticism is a little unfair. Although attacking the treaty from the left may help ratification — cue a senior official saying “This was a negotiation with the Russians, not the Arms Control Association.” The cuts in the Prague Treaty are real, if modest. (And let’s be clear: modest cuts were always the goal.)

Recall that the treaty imposes three limits, including two on delivery vehicles:

• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.

• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Complaining about one of the limits in isolation is a mistake. A primary purpose of US-Russian arms control treaties, I would argue, is to drive the two parties to more stable force structures. To do so requires integrated limits on both warheads and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV, i.e. the missiles and bombers that would deliver those warheads). Similarly, an assessment of the treaty needs to understand how the provisions work together.

Yes, the bomber rules are silly. Bomber rules always are. But as a whole, the limits are serious and meaningful.

First of all, chillax about the bombers

The argument about the bomber counting rules is a proxy for the larger argument about the treaty, focusing on the total number of warheads as the measure of merit.

I happen to agree that the White House is wrong to compare the warhead reductions under this treaty to those in either START or the Moscow Treaty, since none of the three use the same counting rules. What you have are apples, oranges and maybe a ham sandwich.

The only thing the three treaties have in common with each other is that none of them counted actual bomber loadings.

START had completely artificial counting rules for bombers known as discount rules. You will thank me for not summarizing them, but for more than you ever wanted to know, see Kartchner, pp.195-215. To understand how artificial the START rules were, Colin Powell explained to Congress that the United States was moving to “6,500 accountable warheads which will result in 9,500 actual warheads.” That’s a 3,000 warhead slush fund, thank you very much.

The Moscow Treaty, by comparison, had no formal counting rules. As a result, the US counted warheads “stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases” while Russia, as Amyfw noted, did not. That’s hardly an improvement.

The Prague Treaty is not so different in this sense. Overall, the Prague Treaty actually moves the United States and Russia much closer to an actual accounting of warheads, rather than the attribution rules under START — at least for ICBMs and SLBMs. That, however, is the subject of a later post, on verification.

Bombers remain difficult to count, since their warheads are in storage and the aircraft are usually training for, or deploying on, conventional missions. Bomber rules are always weird. Kingston Reif makes all the right arguments about why we shouldn’t be too worked up about that fact.

Fundamentally, I think of bomber loadings as a secondary concern. The main goal is to get stabilizing limits on ICBMs and SLBMs, then use the bomber force to make the math work. It’s not pretty, but if you watched health care reform unfold, you don’t care about the niceties.

Second, focus on the SNDV

The best argument Kingston makes about bombers is probably the best defense of the treaty as a whole: The treaty constrains the number of bombers, if not their warhead loadings.

While the number is warheads is important, the real key to the Prague Treaty is the numerical limit on deployed delivery vehicles — 700. Seven hundred is the number of Minuteman III missiles, Trident missiles and B1, B2 and B52 bombers.

The United States wanted a much lower warhead number than did the Russians, who were only willing to budge on warhead numbers of the US came down on delivery vehicles. So, the two numbers are tightly integrated.

Delivery Vehicles
Comparing the 1991 START and 2010 Prague Treaties

START data is from the MOU. All other are author estimates.

The bulk of the reduction in delivery vehicles will come from changes in counting rules. As the table above illustrates, using the 1991 START counting rules, the United States has today about 1189 delivery systems. Many of these are so-called “phantom” delivery systems, including:

• 100 unexploded silos (100 delivery vehicles). The 1991 START treaty provided for two procedures to eliminate missile silos: explosive destruction of the top 6-8 meters of “headwork” or excavation. Explosive destruction is significantly cheaper than excavation, but local opposition to explosive demolition in the United States left 100 unusable silos.

• 4 converted ballistic missile submarines (96 delivery vehicles). The United States converted four ballistic missile submarines to guided missile submarines (SSGNs).

• 47 converted B1 bombers (47 delivery vehicles). Similarly, the United States converted its B1 bombers to conventional roles.

• 65 B52 bombers sitting in The Boneyard (65 delivery vehicles). The 1991 START treaty rather famously contained extensive procedures for the verifiable elimination of heavy bombers.

The Prague Treaty appears to remove these “phantom” systems in a number of ways. Perhaps most importantly, Russia accepted the principle of conversion of strategic systems to conventional roles.

As a result, with the signing of the Prague Treaty, the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles will, with the stroke of a pen, drop to 881. (Well, maybe not quite with the stroke of a pen — in some cases, the treaty may simply provide for simpler elimination procedures, such as in the case of those empty silos.) As far as I can tell, of the 881 delivery vehicles, about 798 would be considered “deployed” – excluding two submarines in overhaul at any time (48 tubes) and 35 B2 and B52 aircraft that are not “combat coded.” (See Marc Schanz’s magisterial post, BUFF Blogging for Arms Control, for an arms-control oriented explanation of the bomber force.)

Even with the new counting rules, by my estimate, the United States would still need to convert or eliminate about 100 delivery systems to reach 700. If I am right about these counting rules, the number of non-deployed warheads (limited to 800) is largely a function of the deployed force, representing heavy bombers that are not combat-coded (for example, training assets) and ballistic missile submarines in overhaul.

Despite worries in some quarters, I don’t expect these cuts to come from the hide of the bomber force. Because ICBMs and SLBMs sum to more than 700 delivery vehicles, the United States will have to either eliminate additional squadrons of Minuteman III missiles or convert additional ballistic missile submarines. The bomber force is, in David Mosher’s turn of phrase, small potatoes.

It is my understanding that the White House has not yet decided how to achieve any reductions under the Prague Treaty, other than stating that the Holy Triad shall not be desecrated. But Options A-C (in the table above) show three notional force structures that are either compliant or very close with the limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles:

• Option A eliminates two squadrons of Minuteman III missiles (100 delivery vehicles)

• Option B eliminates one squadron of Minuteman III missiles and converts two additional ballistic missile submarines (98 delivery vehicles)

• Option C converts four additional ballistic missile submarines (96 delivery vehicles)

I don’t know which is best — Option C inflicts the least political pain; Option A preserves the biggest “hedge.” Option B is middling, which is a kind of virtue.

But all three are real reductions.

***

You can see, looking at the current and notional forces, why the warhead loadings make little sense when isolated from the number of delivery vehicles. The United States could have downloaded the current force structure to meet the 1550 warhead limit. The expected reduction in delivery vehicles – and the change in counting rules – will bring the number of US warheads to between 1500-1700 warheads without any additional downloading. The United States appears headed toward 1550 warheads or below, with or without a new treaty. That momentum largely explains the US desire to see a significantly lower warhead limit, in some cases reported to be as low as 1,300 warheads.

I accept that the White House fact sheet oversells the reductions in the treaty, which are in fact modest. But a modest reduction is not the same as no reduction. And, when coupled with achievements in verification — which are very good — modest reductions are no mean feat.

Update | 7:24 am 7 April I have been reliably informed that the Defense Department plans to convert some B-52s to conventional roles. So, the number of accountable bombers could drop to between 12-36.

Here is the White House Fact Sheet on the terms of the New START Treaty (which we will be calling the Prague Treaty). I’ve got a bunch of meetings all day, but will try to put something up over the weekend:

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 25, 2010
Key Facts about the New START Treaty

Treaty Structure: The New START Treaty is organized in three tiers of increasing level of detail. The first tier is the Treaty text itself. The second tier consists of a Protocol to the Treaty, which contains additional rights and obligations associated with Treaty provisions. The basic rights and obligations are contained in these two documents. The third tier consists of Technical Annexes to the Protocol. All three tiers will be legally binding. The Protocol and Annexes will be integral parts of the Treaty and thus submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

Strategic Offensive Reductions: Under the Treaty, the U.S. and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer strategic arms within seven years from the date the Treaty enters into force. Each Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate limits of the Treaty. These limits are based on a rigorous analysis conducted by Department of Defense planners in support of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review.

Aggregate limits:

• 1,550 warheads. Warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead toward this limit.

• This limit is 74% lower than the limit of the 1991 START Treaty and 30% lower than the deployed strategic warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

• A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

• This limit is less than half the corresponding strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit of the START Treaty.

Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a verification regime that combines the appropriate elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new elements tailored to the limitations of the Treaty. Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspections and exhibitions, data exchanges and notifications related to strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the use of national technical means for treaty monitoring. To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty also provides for the exchange of telemetry.

Treaty Terms: The Treaty’s duration will be ten years, unless superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdrawal clause that is standard in arms control agreements. The 2002 Moscow Treaty terminates upon entry into force of the New START Treaty. The U.S. Senate and the Russian legislature must approve the Treaty before it can enter into force.

No Constraints on Missile Defense and Conventional Strike: The Treaty does not contain any constraints on testing, development or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense programs or current or planned United States long-range conventional strike capabilities.

##

No, the “separate” and “combined” limits do not make intuitive sense to me yet, but I will let you know.

Update | 11:51 You can watch the official briefing at the White House.

I’ve been quiet about the START negotiations, save for the occasional tweet, in large part because it doesn’t make sense to second-guess negotiators, especially before they’ve completed their work. (Buy me a beer, on the other hand …)

But Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) made some remarks at the recent Strategic Weapons in the 21st Century (SW21) conference that have my attention — and I think they should have yours, too.

At this point, it is no secret that the new treaty is more like a SORT Plus, or if you want to be difficult, START Minus. The Russians went in with a goal of gutting the verification regime and, since that is also accomplished with the expiration of START, the Administration didn’t have too much leverage to stop them.

We know the START mobile missile monitoring regime has been, er, streamlined with the elimination of Portal-Perimeter Continuous Monitoring (PPCM) at Votkinsk. (If you are interested in how the START regime monitored mobile missiles — which comprised an integrated system of obligations — I recommend either Kerry Kartchner’s Negotiating START or Jill Jermano’s and Susan Springer’s Monitoring Road-Mobile Missiles Under START: Lessons from the Gulf War.)

And it is no secret that the last remaining issue is the encryption of telemetry data from missile tests— START prohibited parties from encrypting telemetry as part of the verification regime for throw-weight limits. The Russians want to resume encrypting telemetry, citing the development of US missile defenses and the lack of a limit on throw-weight to verify. (Or, at least, to get comparable data from the US on missile defenses.) If you want to know more, I recommend recent stories by Josh Rogin, Rocket data dispute still unresolved in U.S.-Russia nuke talks and Elaine Grossman, Talks Hit ‘Sweet Spot’ for Landing New START Agreement, U.S. Official Says, or commentary from John Warden and Kingston Rief.

After the Jones/Mullen visit to Moscow and the Obama-Medvedev phone call, it looks like the parties will split the baby, as it were — probably with a limited exchange of telemetry data, if I had to guess. And I hate to guess.

In light of these two issues — monitoring mobile missiles and telemetry — I draw your attention to Senator Lugar’s remarks at the SW21 conference, in which he described himself as “look[ing] forward to a successor to the START treaty” and outlined his thinking on what the Senate might, and might not, consent to ratify.

This is a shot across the bow. Like most Lugar statements, it is precise, civil and free from partisan hyperbole — but that doesn’t diminish the whiff of grapeshot:

Nowhere has the value of strong verification procedures been more clearly demonstrated than the START I Treaty. Whatever is devised to replace it, must be effectively verifiable. START I, together with the Nunn-Lugar program, have served as the means for a dramatically changed relationship with Russia. In fact, recalling the testimony of Ambassador Lehman before the Foreign Relations Committee in 1992 on the START I Treaty, it was clear that a primary goal of the nearly decade-long negotiations on the START I Treaty was to open Soviet society via the treaty. As time has progressed, some have asked whether START I’s “burdensome” verification provisions are necessary given the changed world in which we live. I believe that weakening verification procedures comes with great risks, not merely because the other side may cut corners, but because our relationship with Russia benefits from the mutual confidence and interaction inherent in such procedures.

I have been a strong advocate for extending START I verification procedures. Unfortunately, a choice was made to informally act in the spirit of the treaty after its expiration on December 5, 2009, rather than to extend it by formal agreement. I am hopeful that a successor for START I will be successfully concluded in the coming months and that it will contain strong verification procedures.

The successor to START likely will be considered in the Senate at the same time that we consider the new Nuclear Posture Review and plans for modernization of our nuclear deterrent. START I was submitted at a time when the United States had an active modernization program with specific elements. Today’s stockpile stewardship program lacks this specificity and encompasses many different aspects of the weapons complex.

In 1992, we did not have the record we have today regarding access to Russian sites that produce missiles. We also did not have the telemetric data on Russian missiles provided under START I. Thus, some observers assess the impact of losing START’s verification measures to be minimal. They claim Russia will not field many new missiles in the next ten years and that we have data on all the missiles they are likely to field. However, the rate at which our knowledge erodes is directly related to the rate at which Russia fields new missiles for which we lack data or it modifies existing missiles. Verification of missile capabilities, particularly mobile missiles, depends on both how good our inspection regime is and the extent to which other data provided under the treaty informs the inspection process. Even if inspections are perfect, they will only tell us where a missile is at any given time and the number of warheads it is carrying, not what its capabilities might be.

It may be the case that for the next ten years our existing knowledge, based on what we have learned through the START regime and the Nunn-Lugar program, will provide us with sufficient confidence in making assessments of Russian missile capability. But that confidence will diminish with time. As a matter of national priority, we must maintain an ability to judge with high confidence the capabilities Russia pursues. If we cannot do so, then any attempt to negotiate additional treaties with Russia could founder, to say nothing of efforts for a world free of nuclear weapons.

Verification issues will play an important role in Senate consideration of a new treaty to replace START I. Then CIA Director Bob Gates stated before the Foreign Relations Committee in hearings on START in 1992, “the verifiability of this treaty has always been seen, by supporters and opponents alike, as the key to the Senate consent process.” Such comments equally apply to the treaty that will replace START I.

I suspect Lugar’s statement is a signal of possible trouble for the START Follow-on in the Senate — the President is asking Republicans to hand him a foreign policy victory.

The Administration is going to have to do better than arguing that the verification regime is better than nothing, that the gaps in verification don’t matter or that they’ll fix it in the next treaty. That’s going to mean committing to spend more money on US verification capabilities — note that in another portion of his speech, Lugar proposed “a new verification initiative that devotes substantially more resources to the problem” — and explaining that the Administration set, and stuck to, red-lines that result in an effectively verifiable treaty.

When the real life disappoints, as it is wont to do, human beings often take comfort in fiction, imagining an alternate reality where our problems aren’t so daunting and where we aren’t so fallible. We dream, in short, of a better world. Sometimes, those dreams can rekindle our sense of hope or inspire us as to how we might make the real world a little more ideal.

With the demise of the START Treaty, and prospects for a START Follow-On beginning to dim, it is a comfort that the parallel world of simulations is rather rosier. A few days ago, I mentioned that CNS makes very effective use of simulations to educate students.

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies recently completed a student simulation that resulted in the so-called Strategic Mutual Arms Reduction Treaty (SMART).

You can read a summary of the exercise, as well as the SMART Treaty Text, Memorandum of Understandings, and Joint Statements and additional MOUs.

Not only did the students manage the come up with a decent name for the Treaty — who can complain about mutual? — but the virtual Rose Gottemoeller had a rather easier time working out a deal with her Russian counterpart, who accepted continuation of monitoring at Votkinsk and a prohibition on encrypting telemetry after a developmental period for each missile.

I wrote to her, “Your Russian participants must have been teddy bears. How’d you get them to agree to that?” She replied:

Vodka and arm wrestling.

Someone give that kid a job.

Ok, this is just downright weird.

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen rounds up the usual crowd to co-sponsor an utterly meaningless “Sense of the House” on the START Treaty. (Utterly meaningless since the Senate ratifies treaties. I don’t even want to hear about implementing legislation.)

The resolution is largely about China, and how that might impact the START Treaty, which is a very odd thing to say given the disparity between US and Chinese nuclear forces. Josh Rogin sort of snickers at the resolution:

The GOP’s own resolution actually states that China has about 40 nuclear-tipped missiles that could reach the continental United States today, and could only amass about 100 over the next 15 years.

That’s well below the levels being discussed between the U.S. and Russia — between 500 and 1,100 delivery vehicles each and between 1,500 and 1,675 deployed warheads. That has prompted some to wonder whether U.S. nuclear calculations should really be set with China in mind, considering that country’s relatively small nuclear arsenal.

“It’s silly really and undercuts their arguments for us to beef up our arsenal or do whatever it is they want to do with respect to nuclear weapons,” said one source working on the issue.

Max Bergman was more succint: “North Dakota could deter China.”

He means, of course, that China still has a long way to catch up to the 91st Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base, one of three Minuteman wings in the United States. (Each wing now has 150 Minuteman III missiles. So Long, Deuce)

It is worth, however, considering the resolution on its merits, such as they are. The resolution boils down to two “asks” that are pretty standard GOP talking points (1) The Obama Administration should not sign a follow-on to START until the Nuclear Posture Review is completed and (2) The Obama Administration should not sign any agreement limiting missile defense.

Finish The Nuclear Posture Review

The resolution “urges the President to refrain from negotiating or entering into any follow-on agreement to START I until the Nuclear Posture Review is completed.”

DoD actually checked this box, as one of the awkwardly dated August 6 fact sheets on the NPR explains in some detail:

- The NPR made it an early priority to accomplish the analysis necessary to support the START Follow-on treaty negotiations, which President Obama and President Medvedev directed should be completed by December 2009, when START expires.

- The interagency NPR team, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Energy, and the US Strategic Command and other combatant commands analyzed and provided detailed consideration of a range of solutions to maintain strategic stability with operationally deployed strategic nuclear force levels that would represent significant reductions in nuclear weapons, presuming Russia will be similarly constrained.

- After rigorous analysis, the NPR team determined that maintaining a nuclear triad with a significantly reduced number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons (ODSNW) and accountable strategic delivery vehicles (SDV) would enhance our national security objectives and provide extended deterrence to allies and friends.

- These findings were reviewed by military and civilian leadership and vetted through the interagency. START Follow-on treaty negotiating positions were then subsequently identified and approved at the Cabinet level. Although the specific guidance to our negotiating team remains classified, the results to date of the bilateral negotiations are reflected in the Joint Understanding resulting from the Presidential Summit.

The “cabinet level” decision regarding START Follow-on numbers, which was detailed by Elaine Grossman, occurred during the second week of June at a Principals Committee meeting.

As I understand it, the analytic method was this: Using existing nuclear weapons planning guidance in NSPD-14, how low could we go? One commenter called it NSPD-14 friendly, which I think is about right.

This is a harmless bit of grandstanding — the sort of grandstanding that both parties use to delay an unwelcome decision. Hell, this is why Nuclear Posture Reviews exist — to delay. A Republican Congress created the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review to delay implementing START II cuts until after Clinton left office. A Democratic Congress created the 2009 Nuclear Posture Review to delay a decision on the Reliable Replacement Warhead until after George W. Bush left office.

We certainly don’t do Nuclear Posture Reviews because they are useful exercises. (They always suck, no matter how capable and hard-working everyone involved might be.) A quick read of Janne Nolan’s An Elusive Consensus would tell you that.

Do Not Agree to Any Limitations On Missile Defense

Let’s see, this is a great idea except for two small things.

One, the START Follow-on won’t contain any limitations on missile defenses. And, two, the missile defense system even under the Bush Administration was sized so as “not be a threat to China.”

Other than that, this is a totally germane and sensible thing to include in a Sense of Congress.

Other totally germane and sensible ideas in this spirit include: A Sense of the House that a START follow-on shouldn’t provide for taxpayer-funded abortions. And that no illegal immigrants may be permitted to handle nuclear weapons. Are there any other tired chestnuts I’ve forgotten? Ah yes, inspectors may not bring a domestic partner to Votkinsk.

Still, it is nice to be reminded that Republicans support missile defense. Sometimes I forget.

Nicholas Kralev has an interesting story on the impending closure of the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility.

The key grafs confirm that rumor that the Bush Administration made the concession to Russian on ending monitoring at Votkinsk in November 2008:

Congressional officials said they were told by the Obama administration that it “got stuck” with a deal made by the Bush administration to close the monitoring facility at Votkinsk. They also said the Bush administration did not want to extend START at all.

Paula A. DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification, compliance and implementation in the Bush administration, said she sent the Russians a post-START proposal in November 2008, but it was not a negotiated agreement.

She confirmed that it did not include continuing the Votkinsk mission, but attributed that to the Bush team’s decision “not to limit delivery vehicles,” so it did not need to count every missile Russia produced. “We didn’t need the entire verification regime from START,” she said.

DeSutter suggests the Administration could have just “added” monitoring back in if it wanted, which just floors me.

I had somehow missed that the Bush Administration tabled a proposal to the Russians in November 2008. They had to know, as everyone else did, that Obama was going to win. But they went ahead anyway. David Gollust from VOA reported it on November 6, 2008;

The two powers have been holding general discussions for some time on how to replace their 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which expires at the end of 2009.

Rood said the previously-undisclosed U.S. proposal, conveyed to Moscow late last month, represents a shift in U.S. thinking by focusing on limiting nuclear warheads, rather than missile launchers, as in the START treaty.

“We now have put forward a legally-binding treaty. We think that the focus on nuclear warheads is appropriate in this treaty and that is what is reflected,” Rood said. “The START treaty itself did not set limits on nuclear warheads, it set limits on delivery systems, and then a formula was used to attribute a certain number of nuclear warheads to delivery systems. But the treaty we have put forward has, at the center of its focus, limitation on strategic nuclear warheads.”

Some of the verification hypocrites (ie we only need verification for treaties signed by Democratic Presidents) have been arguing that verification is only necessary now that the Obama Administration is considering significant reductions in the number of nuclear warheads. It would be nice to know the Rood warhead levels just to see how low DeSutter et al were prepared to go on trust alone.

***

On a related note, a Japanese reporter with a Japanese television station is trying to write a story on Votkinsk. If you are interested in being interviewed, please drop me at line at:

armscontrolwonk [at] gmail.com

Posted without comment.

Credit: Otto Stokes

Within the community, we have been going back and forth on whether the United States is still present at Russia’s Votkinsk Machine Building Plant.

As far as I can tell, the US still staffs the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility, which basically allows the United States to count mobile missiles leaving the Votkinsk facility. (The purpose of monitoring production is to provide some confidence that the other side isn’t attempting to break out of the treaty by building missiles that are, by design, very hard to find.)

The most recent news reference I can find is in 2006, when the Yekaterinaburg Counsel-General made a visit. (Wow, talk about a hardship post.) Votkinsk was included under both INF and START treaties. It seems likely we stopped perimeter monitoring when INF inspection regime ended in 2001. Please, dear readers, feel free to fill in the details.

None of this should obscure the really important point: There is a Facebook Group for the Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility.

Oh. Hell. Yes.

God help us if we ever manage to stand up JDEC. All humor aside, the site has great images. And, best all, there is an image of the portal gates:

Credit: Otto Stokes

The caption reads: Portal Gates, I didn’t take this one, but was told it was from a long time ago and was approved, note whats missing (photoshop from their side I assume).

I am not sure what the Russians may have ps’d out — which reminds me how much I loved The Commissar Vanishes. You can, however, see the several structures behind the portal gates in Google Earth. I am pretty sure this is the site; it is amazing how clearly you can see the three structures that hold the two gates in the satellite photograph.

Update | 12:26 November 13, 2008 We have a lot of discussion of about whether perimeter monitoring is still going on in the comments.