I’ve very much enjoyed these past few posts and the debate in which Devil’s Advocate (DA) and I have had the opportunity to engage. We clearly have different views of the strategic posture that the United States ought to take in the twenty-first century, as well as the international problems that merit the focus of its attention. Thus, in my ‘closing arguments,’ I’d like to come back to some of the principle themes we have explored, and try

to outline what I feel are the main analytical and philosophical differences between our views, as well as point out some areas where our ideas aren’t so far apart.

The first major bone of contention between DA and I concerns the relationship between markets, the environment, development and politics. Contrary to how it may have appeared to some readers, I share Devil’s Advocate’s strong appreciation of the power of free markets to efficiently allocate resources, punish needless waste, and create a prosperous national and global economy. Devil’s Advocate, though, too often falls into the trap of what David Goldstein calls “economic fundamentalism,” which treats the theories of classical economics as immutable laws, rather than as powerful but imperfect descriptors of economic behavior. I respect the precision of markets, but where they fail – for instance, in adequately incentivizing energy conservation, or in capturing the costs associated with global warming – it is up to governments, sigularly and collectively, to provide regulations that guide market behavior toward national and international goals. I think it is exceedingly important that regimes of global governance be constructed to encourage sustainable management of primary resources, impose costs on carbon emissions, and begin to move the global economy away from fossil fuels. I don’t say this because I’m worried about the fate of polar bears – though, as a peripheral issue, I am – but because I feel that the political and economic stability of this planet depends on it.

Devil’s Advocate emphasizes the role that authoritarian regimes play in destabilizing the international system. I don’t disagree with him. The promotion of democracy worldwide (though not at the point of a gun) remains a long-term imperative of U.S. foreign policy. But to deny that resource competition and environmental issues breed global instability is to deny reality. Does anyone think that Russia (or, for that matter, the United States) would evince the level of interest in Georgia that it does absent the energy pipelines that pass through that country? Does anyone think the government of Sudan would so single-mindedly pursue the extermination and subjugation of the populations in its south and west absent competition over oil and water? Even the Rwandan Genocide of the 1990s was strongly influenced by a Malthusian nightmare of overpopulation and famine in that country. As global energy supplies tighten, and as global warming continues to destabilize crop yields worldwide – particularly in the equatorial regions where, I hasten to add, most of the Muslim World is located – to imagine that global political systems will not be similiarly shaken is simply irresponsible. Please don’t misunderstand me. I’m not trying to boil down global political problems to purely material concerns. Identity and governance matter a great deal; but, adapting industrial civilization to the environmental problems of the twenty first century is the challenge of our time. We ignore it, or oversimplify it, at our peril.

This brings me to the other major area of division between Devil’s Advocate and myself, namely, the appropriate size and use of the United States military. DA argues that our military must always remain beyond challenge. I suppose the extent to which we agree with each other depends on how one interprets that imperative. If Devil’s Advocate means to say that the United States military must always be capable of defending our basic security, and some of our truly vital global interests, from foreign attack, then he (she?) and I are in complete agreement. But, if DA means to suggest that our military must always occupy the position that it does now, of unquestioned superiority anywhere on the globe, then we part ways. I simply do not see how we will be able to maintain a military of that kind of strength, in geographically far-flung locations, in the face of several foreign powers that grow inexorably stronger. Most economists predict that, by mid-century, China will have surpassed the United States as the world’s largest economy, with India close on its heels. Assuming European integration continues at its halting-but-steady pace, another serious power center will likely exist in the constellation of London-Paris-Berlin-Brussels. The United States simply won’t occupy the economic position necessary to maintain a military with the relative power it has today. I’m not saying our geostrategic place is on the verge of collapse. I’m saying that, over the next few decades, American leaders are going to have to come to grips with a less omnipotent global position, and adjust to a world in which the U.S. military can’t provide the security foundation anywhere at any time. Our leadership will have to adjust its goals, and its tactics, to that new state of affairs, and they’re better off moving in that direction now than twenty years from now.

In closing, I come back to some of the key questions I asked when I began. What are the key threats to American security, freedom and prosperity in the twenty-first century? Is an omnipotent military really the best way of handling those threats, or do they lend themselves to more complex solutions? Where do we go from here? For all the focus that American leaders and the American media have given to international affairs in recent years, these remain unanswered and poorly-discussed questions. We as a society need to remedy that problem.